Analyzing Global Environmental Issues
Theoretical and Experimental Applications and their Policy Implications
Edited by Ariel Dinar, Amnon Rapoport
Unknown – 2013 – 262 pages
The existence of environmental dilemmas and political conflicts leads us to appreciate the need for individuals and groups to behave strategically in order to achieve their goals and maintain their wellbeing. Global issues such as climate change, resource depletion, and pollution, as well as revolts and protests against corporations, regimes, and other central authorities, are the result of increased levels of externalities among individuals and nations. These all require policy intervention at international and global levels.
This book includes chapters by experts proposing game theoretical solutions and applying experimental design to a variety of social issues related to global and international conflicts over natural resources and the environment. The focus of the book is on applications that have policy implications, relevance and, consequently, could lead to the establishment of policy dialogue. The chapters in the book address issues that are global in nature, such as international environmental agreements over climate change, international water management, common pool resources, public goods, international fisheries, international trade, and collective action, protest, and revolt.
The book’s main objective is to illustrate the usefulness of game theory and experimental economics in policy making at multiple levels and for various aspects related to global and international issues. The subject area of this book is already widely taught and researched, but it continues to gain popularity, given growing recognition that the environment and natural resources have become more strategic in human behavior.
1. Global and Environmental Issues: Theoretical applications and policy implications Ariel Dinar and Amnon Rapoport 2. Coordinating to Protect the Global Climate: Inequality and communication in the experimental lab Alessandro Tavoni and Astrid Dannenberg 3. The Role of Information in the Tragedy of the Commons Felix Muñoz-Garcia and Ana Espinola-Arredondo 4. Environmental Negotiations under Uncertainty: Can they improve welfare? Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Muñoz-Garcia 5. Enforced Geographic Separation as a Factor in Avoiding the Tragedy of the Commons Dmytro Zhosan and Roy Gardner 6. Experimental Studies of Games with a Dynamic Public Bad Svetlana Pevnitskaya and Dmitry Ryvkin 7. Regional Fisheries Management Organizations and the New Member Problem: From theory to policy Gordon R. Munro 8. Haggling on the Verge of Disaster Jérémy Laurent-Lucchetti, Justin Leroux and Bernard Sinclair-Desgagné 9. The Dynamics of Collective Actions that Protect the Environment against the Worst Effects of Globalization Paloma Zapata-Lillo 10. Informal Agreements in Transboundary Water Resources Antonio Lloret 11. Efficient Use of the Mekong River Basin: A joint management approach Xueqin Zhu, Harold Houba and Kim Hang Pham-Do 12. Models of Repression and Revolt in Autocracies: A specific point of view on the Arab Spring Mario Gilli 13. Optimal Tariffs on Exhaustible Resources: The case of quantity-setting Kenji Fujiwara and Ngo Van Long 14. A Market-Based Design for International Environmental Agreements Andries Nentjes, Bouwe R. Dijkstra and Frans P. De Vries
Ariel Dinar is Professor of Environmental Economics and Policy, and Director of the Water Science and Policy Center at the University of California, Riverside, USA. His teaching and research focus on environmental and resource economics and strategic behavior, and the environment at local and international levels. He publishes on issues related to the economics and politics of natural resources and the environment, with emphasis on water.
Amnon Rapoport is Distinguished Professor of Management at the University of California, Riverside, USA. His research interests are in individual and interactive decision making. He has published several books and more than 200 book chapters and articles on sequential choice behavior, coalition behavior, dynamic pricing, route choice in networks, and bargaining.