Julian Reiss is Professor of Philosophy at Durham University. He has a degree in economics and finance from the University of St Gallen and a PhD in philosophy from the London School of Economics. His main research interests are methodologies of the sciences, philosophy of economics, and science and values. This spring, Routledge will release the First Edition of his exciting introduction to a newly energized field in philosophy, Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction, to be published in the “Routledge Contemporary Introductions to Philosophy” series.

Philosophers since Aristotle have asked questions and offered opinions about economics, broadly defined. But during the 20th century economics developed into a field which was, as Julian points out in the beginning of his forthcoming work, “hostile to philosophical reflection.” Economics became a science: economists began to see in “the economy” a space made up of empirically observable facts interpretable by the assumptions, methods, and models familiar to students enrolled in Econ 101 classes. In recent years, though, certain economic realities—the financial crisis, e.g.—have challenged those assumptions, methods, and models. A writer for the Economist described the consequence of recent challenges to the science of economics: “OF ALL the economic bubbles that have been pricked [since 2008], few have burst more spectacularly than the reputation of economics itself.”

Julian’s book introduces readers to the field in which many of those challenges are now being articulated. Questions of ethics, of the nature of human rationality when faced with economic decision-making, of the verifiability of economic models—these questions and more are all now being asked anew about economic practices and decisions. This interview hopes to open those questions to all curious readers. Those seeking more comprehensive—but still widely accessible explanations—can of course turn to Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction.

– John Downes-Angus, Editorial Assistant, Routledge Philosophy 

1. Could you give a brief description of the field of philosophy of economics so that it makes sense to non-philosophers, and identify some of the core issues the field takes on?

The philosophy of economics concerns all the questions every economist ought to think about but normally doesn’t because they are regarded as unimportant or unfashionable by the profession. They are about the – moral, methodological, metaphysical – foundations of economic science. Here is an example. Economics is, as is well known, based on a theory of rational choice. This theory assumes that people have stable and transitive preferences over all available alternatives. An economist qua scientist will take the theory as given and explore its consequences. An economist qua philosopher – a philosopher of economics – will challenge its fundamental assumptions. Does rationality really require the existence of stable, transitive and complete preferences? Do people as a matter of fact have such preferences, and how can we know? If not, might the assumption nevertheless be innocuous and useful for explaining economic behaviour and predicting future events?

In the book I divide the philosophical issues raised by economic science into three broad kinds. The first is concerned with the foundations of economic theory. Issues here concern the nature of rationality, whether people do and ought to act rationally as portrayed by the theory, whether there are any economic laws, what’s the nature of causal relations, of mechanisms and so on. The second is concerned with methodology. Methodologists, unsurprisingly, study the methods employed by scientists in order to address their questions. They ask how these methods work, about their presuppositions and the range of questions they can address. Important methods economists use are the measurement of economic indicators (such as inflation, unemployment and GDP), regression methods, economic experiments and randomised field experiments. The third is concerned with the ethical aspects of economics. Whether economic science can and should address ethical issues is particularly contentious among economists. Philosophers are less reserved and ask, for instance, about the nature of well-being, whether or not a given distribution of economic resources is just, whether there are any moral limits to the market and whether or not the government should make decisions for its citizens if doing so improves their well-being.

2. How did philosophy of economics develop? Are there any key figures or contributions that all readers should be aware of?

There are two ways to answer this question because the philosophy of economics is at the same time an ancient and a very recent discipline. It is ancient in that the world’s greatest economists beginning with Aristotle were also or mainly philosophers, and many of their contributions should be classified as contributions to the philosophy of economics rather than the science of economics. Understood in this broad way, Aristotle, Adam Smith, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, William Stanley Jevons, John Maynard Keynes, Amartya Sen and many others are all among the key philosophers of economics.

On the other hand, with the increasing specialisation and professionalisation of academic disciplines that occurred in the nineteenth century, economics was separated from philosophy and developed, especially after the Second World War, a mainstream paradigm that was hostile to philosophical reflection. At the same time, philosophers of science were mainly interested in natural science and thus tended to ignore economics and other social sciences. It is only in the last 30 or so years that we can once more experience a mutual interest and exchange, and witness the development of academic institutions that focus on the intersection of economics and philosophy. In that sense, then, the discipline is a novel one. There are now a number of professional philosophers of economics in this narrower sense. I was personally greatly influenced by the work of Nancy Cartwright, Mary Morgan and Daniel Hausman, but there are of course others.

3. Has the recent economic crisis harkened in an important, perhaps transformative, moment for philosophy of economics?

It has indeed. Not so much in challenging fundamental beliefs philosophers of economics hold but in bringing methodological issues to the attention of economists and thereby opening entirely new ways of doing philosophy of economics. We now hear Paul Krugman publicly complain that many economists ‘mistake beauty for truth’, Joseph Stiglitz accuse his colleagues of ‘murdering the American economy’ by using bad idealisations in their models and Daron Acemoglu proclaim that ‘The financial crisis is an embarrassment for economic theory’. Many of the issues they are raising, for instance about the unrealisticness of assumptions in economic models, have been discussed by philosophers of economics for many years. But they have tended to do so for the most part in isolation from economic practice (which has no doubt been partly due to the resistance of economists to engage in philosophical debate). With some luck future work in philosophy of economics will be done in closer collaboration with economists, motivated by practical concerns, and relevant to economists’ day-to-day work.

4. Do you think that the changes you mention in (3) will have a lasting impact on the direction of philosophy of economics?

Yes – if the criticisms of Krugman, Stiglitz, Acemoglu and others are taken seriously by economists, and philosophers of economics stop asking abstract-philosophical questions and turn towards economic practice.

5. In what ways does philosophy of economics puncture holes in common economic assumptions?

One has to distinguish between valid criticism of economic assumptions and their uptake by economists. The arguments philosophers of economics have given to the effect that economists cannot ignore engagement with ethics, that the revealed-preference theory is untenable, that new causal relations cannot be established without making strong causal background assumptions and many others are compelling. And yet, they continue to be ignored by many, if not most, professional economists. Philosophers find this situation lamentable, and understandably so. To some extent we have to blame ourselves. Not only do philosophers tend to address issues at too high a level of abstraction, they also often use specialist jargon that is difficult to understand outside the profession. We have to learn to communicate better, to focus on issues that are practically relevant, and, if possible, to work on these issues jointly with economists. Unless that happens, there might be numerous philosophical holes in theory, but they might not affect the way economics is practiced.

6. What can philosophy learn from economics?

A number of things. Let me focus on two areas here, one where economics has already had a great influence on the way philosophy is practised, and another where there is still room for improvement. The use of models, especially mathematical models, has proven extremely fruitful in economics. Models create parallel worlds within which claims can be established rigorously. Having to build a model and to derive claims within its confines demands of the modeller to be exact in certain ways, to make implicit background assumptions explicit, to use the same concepts from the beginning to the end of a derivation and so on. While certainly not unexceptionable, these are virtues in many contexts. Formal tools such as mathematical modelling, the proof of representation theorems etc. have become more popular in recent philosophy, and economics has often been an especially important source of inspiration. John Broome’s books can be regarded as paradigmatic of this kind of work. I do not think that this is the only good way to do philosophy, but it unquestionably has a lot to speak for it.

The other area concerns aims. Economics is, no doubt, in part a policy science. That is, economists confidently use their tools to make policy recommendations on a broad range of subjects. And, for better or worse, their voices are heard. Philosophers of science generally, and philosophers of economics are no exception, tend to take a more Aristotelian, contemplative stance towards science and society. But they shouldn’t. Philosophical issues of economics are of great practical importance. This is most salient in the area of ethical aspects of economics but true throughout. Methodological issues are often interwoven with ethical ones. As philosophers of economics we shouldn’t leave the political field to economists (and philosophers specialising in other areas such as ethicists) but ourselves take a stance and think harder about the applied areas of economics.

7. Does economics require prior formal education in philosophy? If so, how does this affect the discipline’s position in the academy? Along these lines, perhaps, does the philosopher of economics have a double-pedagogical role: to explain adequately the philosophical issue and explain the economic issue under discussion?

I don’t think economics necessarily requires prior education in philosophy, but some philosophy (along with other humanities such as history) should be part of the economics curriculum. There’s a deplorable tendency of economics departments to shut down courses in the history and methodology of economics, and with them departmental research groups. This would be a bad idea even if economics was a body of incontrovertible truths. But it isn’t. Foundational assumptions in economics can and ought to be challenged constantly. As social practices evolve, as societal goals and values change, and they constantly do, traditional assumptions become outdated and need to be revised. Philosophy and history are necessary to understand these developments, and they can help economists to become more reflective and better grounded scientists.

8. Does philosophy of economics address problems that would warrant interest from students and scholars outside of philosophy?

At least some of the problems philosophy of economics are of very broad interest. Think of the moral limits of the market. Should there be markets in kidneys or blood? Do tuition fees affect the way university education is conceived by students? Is paying money to skip the queue morally problematic? These are issues that affect almost anyone. Or consider paternalism. Should the government intervene so people eat more healthily? Is eating healthily really good for us? What if it is good for some but not for others? (As an aside, the book talks about foie gras in various places.) Philosophy of economics isn’t a purely academic discipline.

9. How do economists and philosophers view the field of economics differently? Has there been much recent dialogue between philosophers and economists? If so, what was the goal or the result?

When I teach philosophy to economics students I often notice an unease they have with the way philosophers regard almost any ‘truth’ as tentative, subject to future revision, local, and relative to a context at hand. I’d go on and on, say, about how great a philosopher David Hume was and how important his insights about causation, only to show, at the end of the lecture, how he got it (almost) all wrong. They find that frustrating. This way of thinking should not, however, be altogether unfamiliar to economics students because models, which as I noted above are all over the place in economics, are tentative, erroneous, local, purpose-driven constructs. This is not, however, how models seem to be taught in economics departments.

This, then, is one important difference, and there are many more. These differences often make communication across the disciplines and therefore dialogue difficult. I was recently made fun of at an economics conference for using the word ‘ontology’ and for making a point about causality by quoting Mill. The economist in question said that he didn’t understand ‘ontology’ and Mill was better on liberty than on causality. This was perhaps an extreme case, but it shows that economists and philosophers of economics have some way to go to establish fruitful dialogue.

On the other hand, there are many reasons to be optimistic. More and more philosophers of economics have dual backgrounds these days, PhD theses are jointly supervised and we see some collaboration on research projects. It is just a matter of time that economics and philosophy of economics draw more closely together.

10. How does philosophy of economics affect assumptions and research in other fields like moral philosophy and moral psychology?

I wouldn’t say that philosophy of economics affects these other fields but rather that parts of moral philosophy and moral psychology constitute branches of philosophy of economics or at least that the boundaries between the fields are very fluid. Take well-being as an example. Well-being is clearly a core concern of moral philosophy. But it is also important to welfare economics. So shall we say research on well-being is moral philosophy when done by a moral philosopher (such as James Griffin or Roger Crisp), economics when done by an economist (such as Partha Dasgupta or Angus Deaton) and philosophy of economics when done by a philosopher of economics (such as Dan Hausman or Michael McPherson)? That doesn’t make sense. A researcher interested in well-being will build on results in all three fields, and his or her work will be relevant to all three.

11. You write in the Introduction to Philosophy of Economics: A Contemporary Introduction that “Philosophers of economics are philosophers whose work focuses on the theoretical, methodological and ethical foundations of economics.” Does philosophy of economics itself operate according to a standardized theoretical/methodological/ethical foundation or does that depend on the particular philosopher? Are there philosophical approaches to economics-related issues (i.e., John Searle’s work on social ontology) which are not considered philosophy of economics proper because they do not adhere to such a standardized foundation, if it does in fact exist?

Philosophy of economics in the narrow sense is a young discipline, so little if anything is standardised. Philosophers of science often distinguish the epistemic and metaphysical aspects of science, i.e., the ‘How can we know?’ and the ‘What is there?’. This division leaves out ethics, which is important to all science and to economic science in particular. Moreover, economics is based on a theory of rational action, so one has to include rationality as well. In the book I aim to be comprehensive but nevertheless to provide an overall structure and narrative. The division theory-methodology-ethics is the result. What I call foundations of economic theory includes issues concerning rational action but also traditional metaphysical issues such as laws and causality. Social ontology à la Searle could have been included here, but it is largely irrelevant to practising economists, so I left it out. What I call the methodological foundations includes the traditional epistemic issues of philosophy of science but I address them at the more concrete level of particular methods economists actually use. The same goes for the ethical foundations. Many of them have their counterparts in traditional moral philosophy, but in the book they are addressed in the concrete context of welfare economics.

12. How are the more “pop cultural” philosophy of economics texts—the work of Malcolm Gladwell, for example—received by philosophers of economics?

There is clearly an interest in this kind of literature among philosophers of economics. I remember very early in my career I attended a conference, organised by philosopher-economist Kevin Hoover, where Sylvia Nasar, author of A Beautiful Mind (a popular book about the life of John Nash) gave a keynote. My former colleague at the Erasmus Institute of Philosophy of Economics, Jack Vromen, organised a great conference on the ‘economics made fun’ genre (work such as Freakonomics, The Armchair Economist or More Sex is Safer Sex) a few years back. My own book ends with a chapter on Nudge. Nudge is, of course, also a serious policy proposal, but the book is certainly very popular and some of its ideas (or expressions – think of the image of a parent elephant ‘nudging’ its baby elephant) have become part of pop culture.

13. What do you consider to be the future of philosophy of economics? What are the most pressing questions facing the discipline today?

If we continue to do good philosophical work but in a manner that is relevant to economics, is taken up by economists because it helps to address their concerns, and that can contribute to sound economic policy making, we’ll face a bright future.

14. In your opinion, what philosopher of economics has had the greatest impact on the discipline in the last 100 years?

Without a doubt Amartya Sen.

15. And finally, a more lighthearted question: given their concern with the behavior of individuals in certain economic situations, do philosophers of economics gamble? Why or why not?

There must be some ways to exploit humans’ decision-making follies, but philosophers tend to be too well behaved to actually do it, or even consider doing it for that matter. Seems like a good idea to me though, so off I go.
 

Every year in the January issue, Choice publishes a list of Outstanding Academic Titles that were reviewed during the previous calendar year. This prestigious list reflects the best in scholarly titles reviewed by Choice and brings with it the extraordinary recognition of the academic library community. Routledge would like to extend our congratulations to both Shaun Gallagher and Dan Zahavi, authors of The Phenomenological Mind, 2nd Edition and to Holmes Rolston III, author of A New Environmental Ethics: The Next Millennium for Life on Earth.

For more information on Choice's Outstanding Academic Titles, please click here.  

The Phenomenological Mind, 2nd Edition:

"…Accessible to nonspecialists but does not shy away from technical matters of scholarly concern. Skillfully integrating textual analysis, empirical data, and phenomenological narrative, the authors offer compelling arguments that rupture disciplinary boundaries while inviting future dialogue. Borrowing from Robert Nozick's comment about John Rawls, in light of Gallagher and Zahavi's excellent book, philosophers of mind and cognitive scientists ought to seriously engage phenomenology or explain why not. Summing Up: Highly recommended. Lower-level undergraduates through researchers/faculty.' – Choice

A New Environmental Ethics: The Next Millennium for Life on Earth:

"The book's clear writing and relatively brief length should make it an easy read for students... Probably its greatest value is that it is Rolston speaking to anyone who might be wise enough to listen. He covers all the important issues, including the various views of important – sometimes obscure – environmental philosophers; he also discusses US legislation and the state of life on Earth. Summing Up: Highly recommended." – Choice   

Here's what people have been saying about the series:

"Routledge's New Problems of Philosophy series has a most impressive line-up of topical volumes aimed at upper-level undergraduate and graduate students in philosophy and at others with interests in cutting edge philosophical work. The authors are influential figures in their respective fields and notably adept at synthesizing and explaining intricate topics fairly and comprehensively." – John Heil, Monash University (Australia) and Washington University, St Louis, USA

"This is an outstanding collection of volumes.  The topics are well chosen and the authors are outstanding.  They will be fine texts in a wide range of courses." – Stephen Stich, Rutgers University, USA

"[Fiction and Fictionalism is]. . .an impressive book. In a clear, concise and engaging style, Sainsbury manages to explain fairly difficult issues in an accessible way." – Matti Eklund, Cornell University, USA

Read a sample chapter of Fiction and Fictionalism by R. M. Sainsbury.

"[Analyticity] is a great book, and certainly the best introduction to the history of analytic/synthetic distinction out there." – Gillian Russell, Washington University, St Louis, USA

Read a sample chapter of Analyticity by Cory Juhl and Eric Loomis.

Physicalism by Daniel Stoljar is:

"An elegant and insightful introduction to one of the most puzzling dogmas of contemporary metaphysics – much needed and highly recommended." – Huw Price, University of Sydney, Australia

Noncognitivism in Ethics by Mark Schroeder has been called:

"...the best introduction to noncognitivism and to the complex philosophical issues it generates that I have seen… written with teaching in mind."– Mark van Roojen, University of Nebraska, USA

Wherever your interests lie, the New Problems of Philosophy series has a book for you; take a look and see for yourself!
 

The latest Philosophy titles from Routledge Research include volumes in these series and more:

• Routledge Studies in Contemporary Philosophy
  
• Routledge Annals of Bioethics
  
• Routledge Studies in the Philosophy of Science
  
• Routledge Studies in Nineteenth-Century Philosophy
  
• Routledge Studies in Metaphysics
  
• Studies in Philosophy
  
• Routledge Studies in Ethics and Moral Theory
  

We all look forward to the CHOICE Outstanding Academic Resources awards each year. The guys at CHOICE have done a great job over the years. They are pretty much the premier source for reviews of academic books, electronic media, and Internet resources of interest to those in higher education. I attended the ALA Midwinter Conference this year in Dallas, Texas, and swung by the CHOICE stand to pick up some of their shiny gold stickers, which are now plastered all over my suitcase. We are, therefore, very chuffed to learn that our Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online (REP Online) has been named as one of 2011's outstanding resources.

Just a bit of background. In 1998, REP was published as a multi-volume print set. It was the first multi-volume Encyclopedia to be published in the discipline in over thirty years. Not content with resting on their laurels, however, the REP editorial team, led by Professor Edward Craig, then began work on a fully searchable and extensively cross-referenced dynamic Web version, REP Online. Currently, the online version of REP offers nearly 3,000 articles, covering the latest developments in philosophical enquiry as well as giving students and researchers a rich grounding in the fundamental issues and a thorough history of the subject.

At the beginning of last year, we were delighted to launch the new 2.0 version of the resource, which featured substantial revisions to many core articles. The CHOICE review at the time was very complimentary. The reviewer, C.J. Kohen, a librarian at Daytona State College in the US, remarked that 'the comprehensive article content and links to similar subjects make this database a highly useful source for any student interested in expanding upon themes or exploring related topics.'

Interested? Well, you can visit the REP Online homepage here and enjoy some free articles and a bit more background on the resource.

If you think that your institution would benefit from the Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy Online, you might be interested in taking advantage of our 30 day free trial. To register for this free trial, please just fill in this brief online form and we will set you up ASAP. Or if you have any pricing enquiries or other questions, please just drop us a line. All the contact details can be found here. And even if you are not affiliated with an institution, do not panic! We have individual subscriptions too. Give us a call or send an email using the same contact details as above.

First published in Great Britain in 1968, the editor, Robert Denoon Cumming, has organised the work around certain concepts which are central to Sartrian thought, notably Consciousness in its relation to Being, to ‘the Other’, to Art, Literature, History and Society.

The reader can see for himself how Sartre’s aesthetic and highly individual existentialism of La Nausée is systematically transformed into the neo-Marxist sociological theory of his Critique de la Raison dialectique. By a skilful process of editing, Professor Cumming has provided an authoritative introduction to the life of one of the greatest intellectual figures of modern times.

The Philosophy of Jean-Paul Sartre publishes on the 29th January and is available to order online now.

Keen philosophers will be pleased to hear we have a philosophy collection on offer at the moment. Until the end of April you can purchase this 20 volume set at a 15% discount.
 

Q&A with Karen Stohr, author of On Manners

Does Judith Martin really have a Hobbesian view of human nature? Does Emily Post share David Hume’s ideas about good taste? And why—as George Costanza once asked—are wine and chocolate babka more acceptable dinner party gifts than Pepsi and Ding Dongs? Philosopher Karen Stohr, Associate Professor at Georgetown University, sat down with the Routledge Editorial team members, Emilie Littlehales and Andrew Beck, to answer some questions about the relationship between etiquette, manners, and philosophy. For those interested in more on this subject, Routledge will publish her On Manners this November in the Thinking in Action series.

Routledge: Manners or etiquette isn’t a subject that concerns many philosophers. How did you become interested in it?

K.S.: I’ve been reading etiquette columns and books since I was a teenager. (I think I’ve always secretly entertained hopes of becoming the next Miss Manners.) I’m also a huge Jane Austen fan, and of course Austen’s novels focus quite a bit on manners. Even so, it took me a while to find the connection between the central problems of etiquette and the central problems of ethics as philosophers think about them. It really became apparent to me after I taught an undergraduate course on morality and manners a few years ago. Now I see the links between morality and manners everywhere I look!

Routledge: Some researchers have pointed out some more troubling aspects of manners—as a disguise for moral hypocrisy or as a means for maintaining unjust social hierarchies. Do you have a quick, dinner-party response to anyone with these beliefs or suspicions about manners?

K.S.: Only this: anyone who employs the rules of etiquette in an effort to humiliate, mock, or manipulate someone is in fact acting rudely. Immoral behavior is never polite.

Routledge: OK, fair enough. But what about “polite” behavior that is ingrained in the norms of society, rather than perpetuated by an individual? For example, many Americans today—perhaps most—believe it is impolite to talk about politics or religion in a group where there may be differences of opinion. And yet politely holding your tongue in these situations can be an endorsement of an unjust or even cruel status quo.

K.S.: Well, there are more and less polite ways of bringing up controversial subjects. To paraphrase Aristotle, the key is to bring them up in the right way, at the right time, in the right place, and so forth. I don’t think anything from etiquette demands that we let major moral transgressions slide or ignore injustice. Social conflict is sometimes necessary; etiquette only requires that it be conducted civilly and respectfully. It is possible to register disapproval or disagreement without being rude. But it requires considerable self-restraint, and of course, people aren’t always willing or able to exercise that. As we all know, it’s hard work to have a civil discussion about a topic when emotions are running high and the participants have a lot at stake. Etiquette doesn’t tell us never to have such conversations, but it recognizes that they do sometimes devolve into shouting matches or worse. And that’s why it’s not normally a good idea to start in on the idiocy of a particular political platform in the middle of a wedding reception.

Routledge: Could you give a brief description of the relationship between moral philosophy and the topic of manners? How are the two connected in your view? How might an understanding of moral philosophy enhance one’s understanding of how manners and etiquette function in everyday interactions?

K.S.: My view, for which I argue in the book, is that one’s manners are an extension of one’s moral character. The rules of etiquette are vehicles for communicating and acting on our moral commitments in ordinary, daily interactions. Take, for instance, the act of standing in line, which is an important etiquette convention in the United States and much of rest of the world. Cutting to the front of the line is of course rude, but with the help of moral philosophy, we can say something more about the connection between that act and the line-cutter’s moral attitudes and beliefs. Here’s how it works. Immanuel Kant’s moral theory has, as a central component, the requirement that we always treat ourselves and other people as ends with dignity and equal moral standing. The person who cuts to the front of the line without any sort of justification does not abide by this requirement. He acts on the idea that his needs, plans, and projects should take priority over those of others simply because they are his own. But this is an irrational and immoral way of thinking, according to Kant. Morality requires me to recognize the equal moral standing of all rational agents, and standing in line is a way of publicly acknowledging my commitment to that kind of equality. In this way, line-cutting turns out to be not just an etiquette violation, but a moral problem.

Routledge: Many potential readers will wonder with all the problems in the world—global injustice, severe environmental problems, war (just to name some of the biggees)—why anyone should be concerned about manners and etiquette?

K.S.: I certainly wouldn’t deny that war, injustice, and environmental degradation are more serious ethical issues than failing to write timely thank you notes and cutting in line. But it doesn’t follow that it’s morally unimportant whether we express gratitude or acknowledge the equal moral standing of other people in the grocery store. In both cases, the aim is to cultivate moral sensitivity to other people and their needs. I see problems of justice and problems of manners as part of the same general moral question about how we treat other people. So I don’t think etiquette is a distraction from those more important issues. Anyway, to employ a point made by the Earl of Chesterfield, good manners are an effective tool in convincing people to take up your point of view or join your cause. Rude behavior isn’t going to get anyone to reduce her carbon emissions or donate more to Oxfam.

Routledge: Can you talk a little bit about the difference between manners and etiquette? Do they differ philosophically in any way?

K.S.: In the book I follow Judith Martin (a.k.a. Miss Manners) in distinguishing between the principles of manners and the rules of etiquette. The rules of etiquette tell us how to behave in a specific setting or context and hence, are subject to considerable variation across time and place. The principles of manners are the underlying moral principles that justify those rules of etiquette. So for example, good manners tell us to show respect to our host and then the rules of etiquette give us direction about how to convey respect in a particular social setting in a way that will be understood by others. If we think of the rules of etiquette primarily as tools for communicating and acting on important moral goals and aims, then etiquette turns out to be far less static and tradition-bound than many people think. Certainly there have been etiquette rules “in the books” that primarily serve to reinforce unjust social hierarchies and prejudices. On my account, such rules can and should be jettisoned in favor of new rules that fit better with our modern ideas about equality and justice. Careful readers of Judith Martin will recognize that she is constantly adapting and adjusting existing etiquette rules in accordance with evolving social norms.

Routledge: Who are some important philosophers who have taken manners seriously as a topic worthy of close philosophical scrutiny?

K.S.: Here are just a few familiar names from the history of philosophy: Aristotle, David Hume, Immanuel Kant, Arthur Schopenhauer.

Routledge: Schopenhauer? Really? What did Schopenhauer say about manners?

K.S.: Schopenhauer was keenly aware of the important role that manners play in human social life. His view can be summed up nicely by a fable he tells about porcupines. He describes the plight of porcupines trying to huddle together for warmth but getting pricked by each other’s quills when they get too close. For humans, the trick lies in finding the right distance from other people that enables us to benefit from a communal social life without driving each other crazy with our quirks and annoying habits. The conventions of manners help make this possible. Schopenhauer takes a more pessimistic approach to manners than I would, but I think he makes some important points.

Routledge: How can the study of manners in the context of moral philosophy enrich our lives?

K.S.: I think that for many people, questions of manners intuitively present themselves in philosophically problematic ways. Television shows like Seinfeld, Curb Your Enthusiasm, and The Office really bring this out. I begin the book with a discussion of a Seinfeld episode in which the characters are on a Herculean quest for wine and chocolate babka to bring to a dinner party. Elaine is absolutely convinced that this is the only acceptable hostess gift, despite the fact that acquiring it proves to be an enormous hassle. George is skeptical of the point of all if it, and spends the evening raising objections that Elaine can’t answer. (Why, he wonders, can’t they come empty-handed or else just bring Pepsi and Ring Dings?) Seinfeld is philosophically interesting television because it demonstrates how much our daily lives are structured by these seemingly minor conventions and then calls those conventions into question. Once we’ve gotten to that point, we’re in the land of philosophy. One of the tasks of my book is to show how thinking philosophically can help us work out the answers to practical problems about unwanted gifts, friends with bad taste in clothing, crowded elevators, weird neighbors, and so forth.

Routledge: What is the status of the subject of manners in contemporary philosophy? What do you think accounts for this status?

K.S.: Anecdotally, I know of quite a few philosophers interested in manners. It’s not hard to find fans of Judith Martin and Jane Austen in philosophy circles. There have even been a few scholarly articles published on the subject in recent years. That being said, I don’t think that most philosophers really think of it as a subject for philosophical inquiry. I’m hoping to help change that with this book. In general, practical ethics has been gaining ground in the profession over the past several decades, and I think the philosophical study of etiquette is a species of that. In my view, thinking about manners amounts to thinking about how to apply moral philosophy in everyday life.

Routledge: Is the topic of manners treated differently in philosophy than it is in everyday society? Does Hume treat manners differently from Judith Martin, for example?

K.S.: Hume and Martin are, of course, engaged in different enterprises. Hume is trying to work out a broad theory of ethics based on his understanding of human moral psychology. Martin, by contrast, specifically says that she is not doing moral philosophy. (I think she is wrong about that, but never mind!) And yet, they are interested in many of the same topics, although they take them in different directions. Martin seems to have a darker, more Hobbesian view of human nature than does Hume. She is less focused on the aesthetic and moral appeal of good manners than on their importance in preventing us from coming to blows over who was next in line at Starbucks. There is more overlap between Hume and Emily Post, who shares many of Hume’s ideas about the value of social conventions and the basis for our judgments of good taste.

Routledge: Historically, it seems that moral philosophy has been a field dominated by men, while manners and etiquette are often considered the domain of women (and are also often thought of as pertaining to hospitality and other domestic matters). Does connecting women and etiquette risk reinforcing the idea that “a woman’s place is in the home”, or undermine feminist beliefs in any way?

K.S.: Well, my immediate response is to say, “No, of course not!” but that would be an overly quick answer. Although I know plenty of men who read etiquette columns, I think there’s little doubt that the subject tends to be considered rather feminine. What especially bothers me is the implicit background assumption that if a topic is mostly discussed by women, then it must not be intellectually serious or philosophically substantive. Even a quick read of the history of domestic advice and etiquette is enough to disprove this. Women like Catharine Beecher, Emily Post, and Lillian Eichler were brilliant thinkers with interesting and important ideas about the best way for human beings—men and women—to live out their lives. Domestic advice givers like Beecher aimed at making the lives of women in the home less difficult and risky by educating them about more efficient and safer ways to manage a household. Dismissing them as writing about “just etiquette” or “just homekeeping” is a mistake, both in terms of feminism and in terms of moral philosophy. Alas, that has pretty much been the way matters have gone. Emily Post in particular is underappreciated by moral philosophers. She was really a remarkable woman, and people who think she is just reporting on the practices of an elite social set are missing out on a very interesting thinker and an important figure in the history of American culture.

Routledge: At times, acting in a way that demonstrates good manners may entail telling a lie or acting in a way that may be inauthentic. Do moral philosophers see this as problematic in any way?

K.S.: That depends on the moral philosopher! Some moral philosophers worry more about deception and hypocrisy than others. But even Immanuel Kant, who is among the most vociferous opponents of lying in the history of philosophy, recognized that we simply cannot go around saying every true thing that comes into our heads. He values honest communication as much as anyone, but he also recognizes that this kind of honesty comes with a price. As he puts it, “No man in his senses is completely candid.” He takes the view later argued for by Emily Post, which is that we need to cultivate tact—that ability to say true things that focus on the positive and avoid causing pain. As for concerns about inauthenticity, I think that it is just true that good manners sometimes demands that we present ourselves in a way that doesn’t reflect what we are actually like. But I would deny that this is a form of hypocrisy, at least when that polite front, to use sociologist Erving Goffman’s term, represents an ideal to which we aspire. If I act grateful for a present that I actually think is hideous, am I misrepresenting myself? Not if I think that I should feel grateful. In that case, my forced gratitude is an expression of what we might call my better self, or the self that I wish I could be at the moment. And I don’t think there’s anything hypocritical about putting forward the morally best version of ourselves, so long as we are doing it for the right reasons. If I am putting on an act so as to deceive or manipulate people, like Pride and Prejudice’s George Wickham or Persuasion’s William Eliot, then there’s a moral problem. But that’s not usually what’s happening when we act grateful for an ill-chosen present. We’re not grateful, but we think we should be grateful. So in expressing gratitude that we don’t feel, we are not being hypocritical in the usual sense.

Routledge: Has our increased dependence on electronic communication, and our decreased tendency to engage in face-to-face interactions changed the way we view manners in our society? Have they had any impact on morality? For instance, in a sense we are now more available and accessible than we’ve ever been before, even though our interactions may take place online rather than in person. Does our increased access to others have potential to increase our moral respect for them?

K.S.: I am fascinated by the ways in which electronic communication has reshaped how we present ourselves to the world and how we interact with others. Facebook status updates, tweets, and text messages are entirely new conversational forms with their own emerging etiquette rules. Most of those rules are unstated, and there can be significant disagreements among users about, say, how long one has to answer a text message or when a status update on Facebook has crossed the line into providing too much information. Moreover, as most of us recognize, electronic communication deprives us of crucial information that we depend on to make face-to-face interactions go smoothly. I can’t tell if someone has been insulted by my offhand remark if I can’t see her expression. So we have to resort to subtle and not-so-subtle ways of conveying the necessary emotions. But then again, old-fashioned letters have always posed the same problem. I think a very interesting ethical issue that arises from technologies like social networking sites and Twitter is whether they amount to a new form of narcissism. Does the world really benefit from a constant stream of 140-character banalities from 175 million registered Twitter users? (I grant that some people have elevated tweeting to an art form, but such people are few and far between.)

Routledge: In a certain sense, etiquette and manners seem like vestiges of a bygone era (or at least a bygone standard of behavior). As our lives become increasingly different from the way they were in the days of Jane Austen or Emily Post, will manners and etiquette evolve, or will they become less and less important? How would the way in which manners develop or disappear from society effect morality?

K.S.: None of us live like Jane Austen’s characters, but that doesn’t seem to have lessened her appeal in the present day. No doubt Austen’s enduring popularity rests in part on a kind of nostalgia for a different, perhaps more gentle and noble kind of world. But that’s not the whole of it. For one thing, Austen’s characters are not slaves to the conventions of their times. Elizabeth Bennet violates plenty of etiquette rules in the service of more important aims. We look to etiquette writers to guide us through a changing and complex world, and good etiquette writers are up to the task. Emily Post wrote her books and columns during a time of tremendous political and social upheaval in American society. She was well aware of the need for etiquette rules to change with the times, and had no problem jettisoning rules that had become outdated or useless. Even so, we should be wary of the temptation to think that etiquette no longer matters because few of us throw multi-course dinners or attend the opera in formal dress. Maybe rules about glove lengths aren’t relevant anymore, but people certainly get fired up about, say, whether it is rude to answer a text message during a conversation with live people. The specific nature of the etiquette problems change, but our need for reflection and guidance on the subject has not. If I am right that manners are the expression of our moral characters, then manners are important whenever and wherever morality is important. In a nutshell, so long as we live with other people, etiquette will never be out of style.

The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Religion is an indispensable guide and reference source to the major themes, movements, debates and topics in philosophy of religion. A team of renowned international contributors provide sixty-five accessible entries organized into nine clear parts:

• philosophical issues in world religions
• key figures in philosophy of religion
• religious diversity
• the theistic conception of God
• arguments for the existence of God
• arguments against the existence of God
• philosophical theology
• christian theism
• recent topics in philosophy of religion.

Covering key world religions including Hinduism, Buddhism, and Islam, and key figures such as Augustine, Aquinas and Kierkegaard, the book explores the central topics in theism such as the ontological, cosmological and teleological arguments for God's existence. Three final parts consider Catholicism, Protestantism, Eastern orthodoxy and current debates including phenomenology, reformed epistemology, religious experience, and religion and science. This is essential reading for anyone interested in philosophy, religion and related disciplines.

The second edition is due to publish in 2012.

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With several of the most significant and widely celebrated religious holidays of the year fast approaching, our thoughts turn to religion itself. Does God exist? What about evil and suffering? How does faith relate to science? Is there life after death? These questions fascinate everyone and lie at the heart of Philosophy of Religion.

We have put together a list of our publications on Philosophy of Religion, which we hope you will find useful. To find out more about a particular book, click on it below to be taken directly to that book’s web page.

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Happy World Philosophy Day!

Routledge author Alex Rosenberg recently appeared on Philosophy TV in an interview with Owen Flanagan on the significance of Naturalism. Watch the full interview here.

Alex published the 3rd Edition of his popular textbook Philosophy of Science: A Contemporary Introduction with Routledge earlier this year.

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Routledge Author Brie Gertler also recently appeared on Philosophy TV in an interview with Alex Byrne on self-knowledge of beliefs. Watch the full interview here.

Brie’s book Self-Knowledge is available from Routledge.

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Routledge are very excited to publish a new translation by Donald Landes of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s Phenomenology of Perception at the end of November. It's already getting outstanding reviews...

‘This is an extraordinary accomplishment that will doubtless produce new readers for the remarkable philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. This excellent translation opens up a new set of understandings of what Merleau-Ponty meant in his descriptions of the body, psychology, and the field of perception, and in this way promises to alter the horizon of Merleau-Ponty studies in the English language. The extensive index, the thoughtful annotation, and the guidance given about key problems of translation not only show us the richness of Merleau-Ponty's language, but track the emergence of a new philosophical vocabulary. This translation gives us the text anew and will doubtless spur thoughtful new readings in English.’ - Judith Butler, University of California - Berkeley, USA

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Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908 – 1961) is hailed as one of the key philosophers of the twentieth century. Phenomenology of Perception is his most famous and influential work, and an essential text for anyone seeking to understand phenomenology. In this GuideBook, Komarine Romdenh-Romluc introduces and assesses:

• Merleau-Ponty’s life and the background to his philosophy
• the key themes and arguments of Phenomenology of Perception
• the continuing importance of Merleau-Ponty’s work to philosophy.

Merleau-Ponty and Phenomenology of Perception is an ideal starting point for anyone coming to his great work for the first time. It is essential reading for students of Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology and related subjects in the Humanities and Social Sciences.

'An excellent book. Written in an inviting, jargon-free style, it offers sophisticated argumentation and illuminating commentary on the central philosophical issues at stake in Phenomenology of Perception, without descending into technicalities of interest only to specialists.' – Taylor Carman, Barnard College, USA

This book is part of the Routledge Philosophy GuideBooks series.

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It is November already! Crazy. The year has really flown by and before long we will be into 2012. We are sure everyone is looking forward to a nice end-of-year rest and a chance to let your hair down. Before it is quite time to break out the New Year's champagne, however, we would like to bring you the brand new 2012 Reference Catalog, hot off the press and available for download today. Look out for all our social media links, divided by subject area, dotted throughout the Catalog. If you use Facebook or Twitter, there could be something for you!

2011 has been a busy year for Routledge Reference. The Routledge Revivals series, which reissues a wide range of out-of-print titles, has grown to include over 350 titles, all of which are available in hardback and as eBooks. And you can now purchase Revivals as subject-specific bundles within Sociology, Philosophy, Literature, Economics and Politics. Is there a bundle that could benefit your library?

We are expecting the next few months to be equally busy. In December we publish our long-awaited Education set, which boasts contributions from some of the greatest educationalists, teaching professionals and policy makers of the twentieth century. You can get the full low down on the 244-volume Education collection by taking a peek at its new dedicated Online Catalog.

And December will also see the publication of the last of our 2012 Europa Regional Surveys of the World. Eastern Europe, Russia and Central Asia 2012 and The USA and Canada 2012 will be published on the 8th and 15th December respectively. Again, to make life easier, we have put together a snazzy Online Catalog for this collection. In fact, Online Catalogs have been one of our big projects this year, to avoid sending you too many printed pieces (and saving trees in the process!). In the relevant sections of the Reference Catalog you will find screenshots explaining how you can access all our new Online Catalog. Enjoy!

To download the 2012 Reference Catalog in full, just follow this link. Alternatively, if you would like to receive a print copy of the Catalog, please email us at reference@routledge.com with your name and address and we will happily send you one!

First published in 1945, Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s monumental Phénoménologie de la perception signaled the arrival of a major new philosophical and intellectual voice in post-war Europe. Breaking with the prevailing picture of existentialism and phenomenology at the time, it has become one of the landmark works of twentieth-century thought. This new translation by Donald A. Landes, the first for over fifty years, makes this classic work of philosophy available to a new generation of readers.

This edition includes many helpful features such as the reintroduction of Merleau-Ponty’s discursive table of contents as subtitles into the body of the text, a comprehensive translator’s introduction to its main themes, essential notes explaining key terms of translation, an extensive index, an important updating of Merleau-Ponty’s references to now available English translations, a new foreword by Taylor Carman, and an introduction to Merleau-Ponty by Claude Lefort.

'This is an extraordinary accomplishment that will doubtless produce new readers for the remarkable philosophy of Merleau-Ponty. This excellent translation opens up a new set of understandings of what Merleau-Ponty meant in his descriptions of the body, psychology, and the field of perception, and in this way promises to alter the horizon of Merleau-Ponty studies in the English language. The extensive index, the thoughtful annotation, and the guidance given about key problems of translation not only show us the richness of Merleau-Ponty's language, but track the emergence of a new philosophical vocabulary. This translation gives us the text anew and will doubtless spur thoughtful new readings in English.' - Judith Butler, University of California - Berkeley, USA

Find out more about the new translation here.

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