Originally published in 1958, this book shows how a systematic consideration of what exactly may be meant by calling anything ‘good’, inevitably leads on to the more general and fundamental problem of the relations between value-judgments and statements of fact. It does on to explain some of the difficult and far-reaching issues which this problem involves. The book is intended as an introduction for students interested in finding out the nature and point of modern methods of philosophic analysis when applied to problems of moral philosophy.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction 2. On Problems of Definition 3. On Statements, Synthetic and Analytic 4. Whether Value Judgments are Statements and Whether Values are Properties 5. The Meaning of ‘Good’ 6. The Meaning of ‘True’ 7. ‘Can I Be Sincerely Mistaken About What Is Right?’ 8. ‘ Ought’ and ‘Is’ (i) – A Matter of Logic? 9. ‘ Ought’ and ‘Is’ (ii) – ‘A Recognisable Distinction’ 10. ‘Liking’ and ‘Approval’ 11. The Meaning of ‘Moral’, of ‘Value Judgment’ and of ‘Neutral Statement’ 12. Reasons, Causes and Free Will 13. Retrospect
Alan Montefiore is an Emeritus Fellow of Balliol College, Oxford.
‘This book… gives the reader a good idea both of the content and of the language and manner of ethical discussions in the university world.’ Philosophical Studies