Antitrust is fast becoming a ’trending topic’, with over 120 countries having already adopted some form of competition legislation. This volume brings together carefully selected articles which reflect the evolution and progression of the regulation of joint conduct under competition law on both sides of the Atlantic, and which discuss principles of fundamental importance for antitrust law. The articles focus on various kinds of joint conduct between companies which might bear negative effects on competition, in particular on horizontal cartels and collusion between competitors. Attention is also paid to the debate surrounding the most adequate approach for vertical agreements, which take place between firms operating at different levels of production. Their effects on competition have traditionally been one of the most disputed issues in modern antitrust, and tend to divide the principal schools of thought that have influenced the evolution of competition policy around the world. The articles look primarily at two of the most established antitrust jurisdictions, namely the United States and the European Union. They discuss the general theoretical framework that has influenced the evolution of the law and policy; cover the most relevant practical developments; provide contrasting doctrinal views and pay particular attention to the main schools of thought that have influenced antitrust in the US and the EU; and are representative of the leading discussions in the course of antitrust history.
Table of Contents
Contents: Introduction; Part I Elements of the Prohibition in the US and the EU: Goals of Antitrust: The antitrust consumer welfare paradox, Barak Y. Orbach; The Limits of the Prohibition: From mobile phones to cattle: how the Court of Justice is reframing the approach to Article 101 (formerly 81 EC Treaty) of the EU Treaty, Arianna Andreangeli; The journey toward an effects-based approach under 101 TFEU - the case of hardcore restraints, Alison Jones; Should the European Union embrace or exorcise Leegin's 'rule of reason'?, Craig Callery; The relevant market: an acceptable limit to competition analysis?, Chris Townley. Part II Horizontal Agreements: Cartels: The firm as cartel manager, Herbert Hovenkamp and Christopher R. Leslie; The consequences of the European cartel-busting revolution, Alan Riley; Oligopoly: A proposed solution to the problem of parallel pricing in oligopolistic markets, Alan Devlin. Part III Vertical Agreements: Distribution and Competition: The competitive dynamics of distribution restraints: the efficiency hypothesis versus the rent seeking, strategic alternatives, Peter C. Carstensen; The reform of European distribution law, Romano Subiotto and Camille Dautricourt; The new EU vertical restraints regulation: navigating the vast seas beyond safe harbours and hardcore restrictions, Gianni De Stefano; Resale Price Maintenance: The future of resale price maintenance now that Doctor Miles is dead, Thomas B. Leary and Erica S. Mintzer; Resale price maintenance and Article 101: developing a more sensible analytical approach, Andreas P. Reindl. Part IV Procedural Framework for Fighting Cartels: Procedural Guarantees: A challenge for Europe's judges: the review of fines in competition cases, Ian S. Forrester; Criminal Enforcement: Antitrust violations, Bob Nichols and Eric Schmitt; Name index.