Ontological materialism, in its various forms, has become the orthodox view in contemporary philosophy of mind. This book provides a variety of defenses of mind-body dualism, and shows (explicitly or implicitly) that a thoroughgoing ontological materialism cannot be sustained. The contributions are intended to show that, at the very least, ontological dualism (as contrasted with a dualism that is merely linguistic or epistemic) constitutes a philosophically respectable alternative to the monistic views that currently dominate thought about the mind-body (or, perhaps more appropriately, person-body) relation.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction Andrea Lavazza and Howard Robinson Part 1: The Limits of Materialism 2. Against Physicalism Uwe Meixner 3. Problems of Physicalism Regarding the Mind Andrea Lavazza 4. Materialism, Dualism, and the Conscious Self David Lund Part 2: Dualism and Empirical Research 5. Neuroscience: Dualism in Disguise Riccardo Manzotti and Paolo Moderato 6. Quantum Theory of Mind Henry P. Stapp 7. A Dualist Account of Phenomenal Concepts Martina Fürst Part 3: Cartesian (Substance) Dualism 8. What makes me me? A Defence of Substance Dualism Richard Swinburne 9. Naturalism and the Unavoidability of the Cartesian Perspective Howard M. Robinson 10. On What We Must Think Ralph C.S. Walker Part 4: Non-Cartesian Dualism 11. The Promise and Sensibility of Integrative Dualism Charles Taliaferro 12. The Dialectic of Soul and Body William Hasker 13. Dualism, Dual-Aspectism, and the Mind David Skrbina 14. Why My Body is Not Me: The Unity Argument for Emergentist Self–Body Dualism E.J. Lowe
Andrea Lavazza is a research fellow at the Centro Universitario Internazionale, Italy.
Howard Robinson is CEU Provost/Academic Pro-Rector of the Central European University, Hungary and Professor of Philosophy and Honorary Research Fellow at the University of Liverpool, UK.
"In the current intellectual climate, where physicalism and naturalism hold sway, it is useful to have a volume that surveys a number of contemporary dualistic positions, and this book is a good start." - Lynne Rudder Baker, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews