This title examines the political role of courts in new democracies in Latin America and Africa, focusing on their ability to hold political power-holders accountable when they act outside their constitutionally defined powers. The book also issues a warning: there are problems inherent in the current global move towards strong constitutional government, where increasingly strong powers are placed in the hands of judges who themselves are not made accountable.
Table of Contents
1. Introduction: The accountability function of courts in new democracies 2. Judicial Review in Developed Democracies 3. How Some Reflections on the United States Experience May Inform African Efforts to Build Court Systems and the Rule of Law 4. The Constitutional Court and Control of Presidential Extraordinary Powers in Colombia 5. The Politics of Judicial Review in Chile in the Era of Democratic Transition, 1990-2002 6. Legitimating Transformation: Political resource allocation in the South African constitutional court 7. The Accountability Function of the Courts in Tanzania and Zambia 8. Renegotiating "Law and Order": Judicial reform and citizen responses in post-war Guatemala 9. Economic Reform and Judicial Governance in Brazil: Balancing independence with accountability 10. In Search of a Democratic Justice: What courts should not do - Argentina, 1983-2002 11. Lessons Learned and the Way Forward