This book combines virtue reliabilism with knowledge first epistemology to develop novel accounts of knowledge and justified belief. It is virtue reliabilist in that knowledge and justified belief are accounted for in terms of epistemic ability. It is knowledge first epistemological in that, unlike traditional virtue reliabilism, it does not unpack the notion of epistemic ability as an ability to form true beliefs but as an ability to know, thus offering a definition of justified belief in terms of knowledge. In addition, the book aims to show that this version of knowledge first virtue reliabilism serves to provide novel solutions to a number of core epistemological problems and, as a result, compares favourably with alternative versions of virtue reliabilism both in the traditionalist and in the knowledge first camp. This is the first ever book-length development of knowledge first virtue reliabilism, and it will contribute to recent debates in these two growing areas of epistemology.
Preface
Introduction
1. Process Reliabilism
2. Virtue Reliabilism: Justified Belief
3. Virtue Reliabilism: Knowledge
4. Knowledge First Virtue Reliabilism
5. The Competition
Appendix The Safety Dilemma
Appendix Lottery Cases
Biography
Christoph Kelp is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Glasgow, UK. His work in epistemology has been published in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Noûs, Synthese, and the Journal of Philosophy. He is the winner of the 2017 Young Epistemologist Prize.
"Virtue Reliabilism promises to improve on the successes of Process Reliabilism. Knowledge First Epistemology promises to reverse the failures of the traditional program of analysing ‘knowledge’ in terms of putatively more basic concepts like justification and belief. Christoph Kelp shows how to combine the best of these two flourishing movements to achieve a satisfying theory of knowledge. This book will set the agenda for discussions of Knowledge First Virtue Reliabilism." – Kelly Becker, University of New Mexico, USA
