Illegal online file sharing costs companies tens of billions of dollars of lost revenues around the world annually and results in lost productivity, various psychological issues, and significant reduction of incentives to create and innovate. Legislative, technical, and enforcement efforts have failed. This book presents psychological theories about why people illegally share files online; analyzes and characterizes optimal sanctions for illegal online file sharing; introduces new models for pricing of network-access and digital-content to help reduce illegal online file sharing; introduces new content control and P2P systems; and explains why game theory does not work in pricing of network access.
Introduction. Economic Psychology Issues Inherent in Illegal Online Filesharing by Individuals and Institutions. Corporate Governance and the Economics of Digital Content: Some Legal Issues. Complexity and Optimal Sanctions for Illegal Online Filesharing under Un-Constrained Transferable Utility and Unknown Demand. Economics of Digital Content: New Digital Content-Control and Anti-P2P Systems/Methods. A Survey of Critical Issues in Digital Piracy and Content Pricing. Pricing Digital Content: The Marginal Cost and Open Access Controversies. Human Decisions, Conflict-Resolution and the Pricing of Differentiated Digital Goods in Legal P2P and Client-Server Networks under Un-Constrained Transferable Utility and Unknown Demand; and the Firm’s Distribution Choices. Shapley Value and Network Access Pricing. Stackelberg Analysis and Network Access Pricing. Illegal Filesharing and Network Access Pricing. Conclusion. Appendices.