This volume presents a nontechnical treatment of issues that arise in procurement contracting, with an emphasis on major weapons systems procurement. Employing the economic theory of agency as their analytical framework, contributors assess the incentives that arise, for both buyers and sellers, in different contractual settings. Procurement contra
Table of Contents
Introduction -- Defense Procurement: Politics, Management, and Incentives -- Inefficiently Low Production Rates in Defense Procurement: An Economic Analysis -- Incentive-Based Procurement Oversight by Protest -- Procurement and Quality Monitoring -- The Provision of Quality in Procurement -- The Choice of What to Procure -- Defense Procurement with Unverifiable Performance -- Licensing and Technology Transfer -- Incentives for Cost Reduction in Defense Procurement -- Defense Procurement and Economic Theory
Jim Leitzel is associate professor of public policy studies at the Sanford Institute of Public Policy at Duke University.
Jean Tirole is scientific director at the Institut d'Economie Industrielle in Toulouse and researcher at CERAS (Ecole des Ponts, Paris).