The thesis of this book, first published in 1972, is that Kant’s notions of ‘absolute worth’, the ‘unconditioned’ and ‘unconditioned worth’ are rationalistic and confused, and that they spoil his ontology of personal value and tend to subvert his splendid idea of the person as an End in himself.
1. Kant, Harris and the Absolute Value 2. Kant, Harris and the Absolute or Sovereign Good 3. The Argument in Kant: I 4. The Argument in Kant: II 5. The Strange New Doctrine 6. The Ends of Reason, of Life and of Duty 7. Virtue and Rewards 8. Interest or Disinterestedness at the Root of Moral Conduct? 9. Kant’s Ontology of Personal Value: A False Absolute 10. Rationality as Value: Towards a Humanistic Ontology