This book addresses the lively interaction between the disciplines of law and economics. The traditional boundaries of these two disciplines have somehow inhibited a full understanding of the functioning of and the evolution of economic and legal systems. It has often been the case that these boundaries have had to be reshaped, and sometimes abolished, before either one of the two disciplines could successfully clarify the real life problems arising from the complex institutions of contemporary societies.
The contributions to this volume encompass some of the core controversial issues in law and economics arising from interactions between legal orderings and economic institutions. They include:
- the nature of institutional and legislative change and the emergence of strong institutional complementarity in legal positions
- the relationship between private orderings and the role of the State in enforcing contracts and defining property rights
- the nature and dynamics of endogenous enforcement and
- the analysis of governance models and corporate ethics.
Part of the renowned Siena Studies in Political Economy series, this book will be an essential read for postgraduates and researchers in the fields of law and economics, and the economics of institutions.
Table of Contents
Introduction 1. Law, Economics and Institutional Complexity: An Introduction Part 1: Complexity in Law and Economics 2. Economics in the Future of the Law 3. Law and Economics in Historic Perspective 4. Legal Positions and Institutional Complementarities 5. Legislate Today or Wait Until Tomorrow?: An Investment Approach to Lawmaking Part 2: Private Orderings, Efficiency and the Role of the State 6. The Enforcement of Contracts and the Role of the State 7. Minimal Liberty and the ‘Coasean Liberal’: Setting Boundaries and Complementarities between the State and the Market 8. Private Orderings and Intellectual Property: What is it the Best Incentive System? 9. Fairness and Welfare: are they Really Competing Values? Part 3: Contractual Incompleteness and the Nature of Endogenous Enforcement 10. Costly Contingent Contracts: A Failure of the Coase Theorem 11. Game-Theoretic Solutions to Endogenous Contractual Incompleteness 12.Customary Contracts 13.Group Relations and Industrial Districts Part 4: Governance Models and Corporate Ethics 14. What is a Corporation?: The Corporate Personality Controversy and Comparative Corporate Governance 15. Fiduciary Duties, Models of Firms and Organizational Theories in the Context of Relational Interdependencies 16. Incomplete Contracts and Corporate Ethics: A Game Theoretical Model under Fuzzy Information