This monograph aims to provide an in-depth analysis of the legal protection of the private equity (PE) investors in China. In an academic sense, this research mainly focuses on the agency problems in the life cycle of PE investment under the business organization law system in China. Briefly speaking, the agency problems of PE investment derive from the two-level separation of ownership and control, one of which is the principal–agent relationship between the PE investors and the fund manager, and the other is the principal–agent relationship between the PE shareholders and the management of investee companies.
It is the first research to provide an in-depth examination on the investor protection in the PE investment under the business organization law system in China.
Contents
List of figures
List of tables
List of legislations
List of cases
List of abbreviations
Foreword
Acknowledgements
Chapter 1 Introduction
Chapter 2 The Agency Problems in Private Equity Organizations
Chapter 3 The Protection for Limited Partners in Private Equity Limited Partnerships
Chapter 4 The Protection for Beneficiaries in Private Equity Investment Trusts
Chapter 5 The Protection for Private Equity Shareholders in Corporate Governance
Chapter 6 Conclusions
Reference
Index
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