The author’s argument ties this literature to a field that is often called the logic of inquiry. He criticizes an influential and deliberately analytical approach to the study of international conflict and show what can be gained by bringing more integrative or synthetic approaches to bear on problems in the field. The study started as an effort to work out some problems in international relations theory and it has remained that through eight years of writing and research. Still, the book is more than incidentally about the Middle East, and evidence from the region informs the argument made here. This evidence is of two kinds: traditional historical material from both primary and secondary sources, and data on events that have occurred during the course of both conflictual and cooperative exchanges between the actors there. The treatment focuses on the relationship between Egypt and Israel between 1967 and 1979, a period that saw their relations pass from the most intense antagonism to a reasonable degree of comity if not friendship.
Table of Contents
List of Tables, List of Figures, Preface, INTRODUCTION, Chapter One. Elephants and Islands, PART I: FOUNDATIONS, Chapter Two. The (11)Logic of Arms Race Theory, Churchill and Wilson on Politics and Arms, Contradictions of Arms Race Theory, Integrating Arms Competitions with Other Facets of International Conflict, Chapter Three. Integrating Arenas of Conflict, Reciprocal and Nonreciprocal Exchange, Power and Vulnerability, Mapping Flexible Responses, The Relationship between Spheres of Action, PART II: THE EGYPTIAN-ISRAELI CONFLICT, 1967–1979, Chapter Four. The Foreign Policy Environment in Egypt and Israel, The Actors: Geographical and Military Considerations, Egypt's Objectives, Israel's Objectives, Origins of the Conflict, Policymaking Institutions and Processes, Egyptian Views and Foreign Policy Values, The Outlook of Israel's Leaders, Chapter Five. The June War of 1967, Prelude to War, Hostilities Commence, War Initiation and Relative Strength, Fluctuations in Israel's Power-to-Vulnerability Ratio, Appendix, Chapter Six. Stalemate and Two More Wars, Effects of the June War on Egyptian-Israeli Relations, The War of Attrition and Sadat's Efforts to Regain the Sinai, Reciprocity and Nonreciprocity in Egyptian-Israeli Relations, Explaining Egyptian-Israeli Patterns of Response, Chapter Seven. Mapping Crisis Interactions, Types of Interaction, Categories of Behavior, The 1967 and 1973 Wars, Structures of Interaction, Comparative Analysis, Future Possibilities, Chapter Eight. Negotiating the Camp David Accords, Negotiating Peace, Analysis of the Camp David Process, The Influence of International Norms, Third-Party Stabilization, Psychopolitical and Administrative Stabilizers, PART III: TRANSITIONS FROM WAR TO PEACE AND FROM PEACE TO WAR, Chapter Nine. Stability and Sudden Change , Foreign Policy Stability and Change Reciprocity and Instability, A Synthesis, Relative Power and the Likelihood of War, Chapter Ten. The Struggle for Kuwait, Historical Background, A Critique of U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf, The War Begins, The U.S. Decision to Attack Iraq, Estimates of Power and Vulnerability in the Gulf Conflict, CONCLUSION, Chapter Eleven. The Logic of Bilateral Conflict, Comparative Analysis, War and Peacemaking in Sadat's Foreign Policy, Appendix: Data and Analytical Methods, Notes, Bibliography, Index
Steven Greffenius received his B.A. degree in history from Reed College in 1976. After serving overseas in the U.S. Navy, he studied international relations and political theory at the University of Iowa, receiving his Ph.D. in 1987. Since then he has taught international politics at the University of Wisconsin in Madison and at the Hopkins- Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies in Nanjing, China. Currently he is codirector of the Olin Center for International Study in Boston, Massachusetts, and associate professor of political science at Carthage College in Kenosha, WI.