New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism: 1st Edition (e-Book) book cover

New Issues in Epistemological Disjunctivism

1st Edition

Edited by Casey Doyle, Joseph Milburn, Duncan Pritchard

Routledge

396 pages

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pub: 2019-05-07
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Description

This is the first volume dedicated solely to the topic of epistemological disjunctivism. The original essays in this volume, written by leading and up-and-coming scholars on the topic, are divided into three thematic sections. The first set of chapters addresses the historical background of epistemological disjunctivism. It features essays on ancient epistemology, Immanuel Kant, J.L. Austin, Edmund Husserl, and Ludwig Wittgenstein. The second section tackles a number contemporary issues related to epistemological disjunctivism, including its relationship with perceptual disjunctivism, radical skepticism, and reasons for belief. Finally, the third group of essays extends the framework of epistemological disjunctivism to other forms of knowledge, such as testimonial knowledge, knowledge of other minds, and self-knowledge. Epistemological Disjunctivism is a timely collection that engages with an increasingly important topic in philosophy. It will appeal to researches and graduate students working in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of perception.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction

Casey Doyle, Joseph Milburn, and Duncan Pritchard

Part I: Situating Disjunctivism

2. Perceptual Experience and Empirical Rationality

John McDowell

3. Epistemological Disjunctivism and Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology

Duncan Pritchard

Part II: Historical Antecedents

4. Ancient Philosophy and Disjunctivism: The Case of the Stoics

Iakovos Vasiliou

5. The Kantian Roots of Epistemological Disjunctivism

Thomas Lockhart

6. Was Wittgenstein a Disjunctivist avant la lettre?

Genia Schönbaumsfield

7. Settling a Question: Austin and Disjunctivism

Guy Longworth

Part III: Epistemological Disjunctivism: Prospects and Problems

8. Disjunctivism and Realism — not Naïve but Conceptual

Sonia Sedivy

9. Epistemological Disjunctivism and its Representational Commitments

Craig French

10. Either Epistemological or Metaphysical Disjunctivism

Veli Mitova

11. Neither/Nor

Clayton Littlejohn

12. Disjunctivism and Credence

Ram Neta

13. Disjunctivism, Skepticism, and the First Person

Adrian Haddock

 

 

 

Part IV: Disjunctivism in Other Domains

14. Two Forms of Memory Knowledge and Epistemological Disjunctivism

Joseph Milburn and Andrew Moon

15. Testimonial Disjunctivism

Stephen Wright

16. Epistemological Disjunctivism: Perception, Expression, and Self-Knowledge

Dorit Bar-On and Dustin Johnson

17. Ringers for Belief

Casey Doyle

18. Disjunctivism and Other Minds

Anita Avramides

About the Editors

Casey Doyle is Junior Research Fellow in Philosophy at St. Hilda’s College, University of Oxford, UK.

Joseph Milburn is a research fellow at the Center for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame, USA.

Duncan Pritchard is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Edinburgh, and Director of the Eidyn research centre. His monographs include Epistemic Luck (2005), The Nature and Value of Knowledge (co-authored, 2010), Epistemological Disjunctivism (2012), and Epistemic Angst (2015).

About the Series

Routledge Studies in Epistemology

The Routledge Studies in Epistemology series features monographs and edited collections on cutting-edge research topics in contemporary epistemology. It includes both new arguments on hot topics and new angles and innovative takes on established epistemological subjects. The series spans all areas of epistemology, including emerging issues in applied and social epistemology. It is a leading resource for scholars and graduate students looking for the newest and most important developments in epistemology.

Learn more…

Subject Categories

BISAC Subject Codes/Headings:
PHI000000
PHILOSOPHY / General