Originally published in 1966. An introduction to current studies of kinds of inference in which validity cannot be determined by ordinary deductive models. In particular, inductive inference, predictive inference, statistical inference, and decision making are examined in some detail. The last chapter discusses the relationship of these forms of inference to philosophical notions of rationality.
Special features of the monograph include a discussion of the legitimacy of various criteria for successful predictive inference, the development of an intuitive model which exhibits the difficulties of choosing probability measures over infinite sets, and a comparison of rival views on the foundations of probability in terms of the amount of information which the members of these schools believe suitable for fruitful formalization. The bibliographies include articles by statisticians accessible to students of symbolic logic.
Table of Contents
1. Inductive and Predictive Inference 2. Hypothesis and Predictive Inference 3. Probability and Predictive Inference 4. Statistical Inference 5. Bayesian Statistical Inference 6. Statistical Decision and Utility 7. Theories and Rationality 8. Bibliography