This book situates the origins of U.S. policy in Lebanon in post-World War II and U.S. policy in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East. It identifies the earliest expression of U.S. economic interests in Beirut in terms of postwar U.S. policies on oil and aviation.
Table of Contents
Part I: The Setting of U.S. Policy 1. The Dynamic of Collaborative Intervention 2. U.S. Postwar Policy and the Middle East 3. Learning Lebanon: A Primer Part II: Formative Years in the Evolution of U.S. Policy: 1944–1952 4. Alternating Currents of Criticism and Conformity 5. The Foundations of U.S. Policy, PACLIFT: Petroleum, Aviation, Commerce, Labor, Intelligence, and the Friendship Treaty 6. Altered Circumstances and the Design of U.S. Political Strategy Part III: The Eisenhower Administration and the Sham'un Regime: A Policy of Information and Consent 7. Pressure Points and Priorities 8. Lebanon: The "Bridgehead in the Orient" 9. Realities of Power in the "Rear Area" 10. Our Man in Beirut Part IV: Intervening Before Intervention 11. Civil War, May 1958 12. Doubt, Deliberation, and Preparation Part V: The Minefield Explodes: U.S. Military Intervention 13. 11,000 Sorties in Search of a Target 14. By Mutual Consent: July–October 1958