Since 1948, the United Nations has sponsored virtually every third party peacekeeping mission on Arab· Israeli fronts. Three recent events, however, have been responsible for significantly altering the pattern of peacekeeping in the region: the Camp David accords, which, because they were opposed in the U.N. by the Soviet Union and most Arab nations, prevented U.N. sponsorship of a Sinai peacekeeping force; the June 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, during which the U.N. Interim Force was made to look ineffectual; and the Sabra-Shatila massacres in South Beirut three months later, which prompted the deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force. Dr.Pelcovits analyzes these events to answer the questions they raise about peacekeeping in the Middle East: What advantages are afforded by U.N. peacekeepers compared with non-U.N. missions? What net benefits are derived from American participation in a non-U.N. multinational operation? And how do they compare to the classic U.N. peacekeeping rationale of insulating disputed areas from super power confrontation? Finally, what determines the success of such operations-geopolitical circumstance or institutional affiliation?
Abbreviations--Preface--Chapter 1. 1982: Turning Point for Middle East Peacekeeping--The American Commitment:--The Creation of the MFO--Peacekeeping and Geopolitics--Chapter 2. The Travails of UNIFIL:--Mandate and Expectations--"An Impossible Operational Position"--Facts and Expectations:--Disputes over UNIFIL's Role--Chapter 3. Impartiality and Effectiveness:--Measuring Peacekeeping Success --High-threat Fronts: A Peacekeeping Paradox--An American Presence in South Lebanon?--Chapter 4. The MNF in Search of a Mandate--Gemayel Campaigns for an Expanded MNF--Israel-Lebanon Agreement on Troop Withdrawal--Two Stubborn Problems--Rebuilding the Lebanese Army--Syrian Resistance--Chapter 5. Peacekeeping in Lebanon: The Three Sectors --The South: UNIFIL Redux--Prospects for a Multinational Force--in Greater Beirut: Four Options--Option 1: An Activist MNF--Option 2: Phasing Out the American Contingent--Option 3: Replacing the MNF with U.N. Peacekeepers--Option 4: A Corps of Neutral Observers--Disengagement on the Eastern Front--Chapter 6. The Multinational Force & Observers:--Unique or Paradigm?--Success and Vulnerabilities--Freedom of Navigation--Dealing with Charges of Treaty Violations--The MFO: How Long Will It Stay?--Chapter 7. The MFO and the U.N. as Peacekeepers:--Costs and Benefits--Political Consensus and Institutional--Adaptation--Directing the Peacekeepers--Meeting the Costs--Chapter 8. Third-Party Peacekeepers for the Golan--and the West Bank?--The Golan Front--The West Bank--Notes--Appendixes--A. Documents Relating to the Sinai--Multinational Force & Observers (MFO)--B. Documents Relating to Peacekeeping--in Lebanon--C. Document Relating to the United Nations--Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)--D. Security Council Resolutions on the United Nations--Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)--Index.