The architects of the Camp David process expected their efforts to become a broad and inclusive framework for peace in the Middle East. Dr. Friedlander's book demonstrates how domestic factors affecting policy decisions made in both Cairo and Jerusalem prevented Sadat and Begin from embracing a structure that would yield a more comprehensive arrangement. Sadat, for example, confronted an antipeace movement in Egypt, strengthened by then-Vice President Mubarak's ties to the military-security establishment and his alliance with members of the Arab nation's diplomatic corps. Begin was opposed by Israeli conservatives who saw the Camp David formulas as leading to a peace that would jeopardize Israel's security. Both leaders, Dr. Friedlander concludes, were able ultimately to guide their nations toward approval of the peace initiative primarily because of their mastery of techniques of domestic intra-elite bargaining.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1. The Struggle for a Geneva Conference -- 2. The Soviet-American Communique -- 3. Sadat's Visit to Jerusalem -- 4. The Triangular Relationship -- 5. The Triangular Relationship Deepens -- 6. Meeting at Carp David -- 7. "Peace is at Hand" - Almost -- 8. The Peacemakers -- Selected Bibliography -- Index.
Melvin A. Friedlander is professor of Middle East and African studies at the Defense Intelligence School. He also serves as adjunct professor of foreign affairs at the National War College and adjunct professor at Georgetown University.