1st Edition
Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis
Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior, first published in 1982, examines the question: for what purposes and under what conditions were Soviet leaders prepared to take risks in international relations? The first part of the book sets out to define the concept of risk and to examine its analytical relevance for foreign policy, its measurement and its relation to the dynamics of crisis. The second part consists of in-depth analysis of Soviet behavior in the Berlin crises of 1948 and 1961. The third and last part compares Soviet policy in the two crises, and the actions of the two different leaderships, as well as relating it to Soviet behavior in other geographical areas.
Part 1. Theory 1. Risk and Risk-Taking 2. A Chess Game Named Disaster 3. Pandora’s Marble Pot 4. Crisis and Risk in International Relations 5. Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior: Wisdoms and Conventional Wisdoms Part 2. Case Studies 2.1. The Berlin Crisis of 1948 6. Interpretations, Ambiguities and Questions 7. Evolution of the Crisis: Events, Perceptions, Risks and Stages of Development 8. Factors of Risk-Taking 9. 1948: Process Analysis 10. 1948: Consequences, Conclusions and Lessons 2.2. The Berlin Crisis of 1961 11. Interpretations, Ambiguities and Questions 12. Evolution of the Crisis: Events, Perceptions, Risks and Stages of Development 13. Factors of Risk-Taking 14. Process Analysis 15. Consequences, Conclusions and Lessons Part 3. Comparisons and Conclusions 16. Operational Principles of Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior 17. Factors of Soviet Risk-Taking and Crisis Behavior
Biography
Hannes Adomeit
Reviews from the 1982 publication:
‘Probably the best and most authoritative and certainly the most meticulously researched account of the Berlin crises of 1948 and 1961.’ The Economist
‘This book of Hannes Adomeit’s is a special event for students of Soviet foreign policy. It is indispensable reading for anyone interested in a rigorous analysis of Soviet crisis behavior.’ Seweryn Bialer, Columbia University
‘Adomeit’s book is a fine synthesis of history, political analysis, and theories of decision making in as neatly reasoned and well-written a volume as one could wish for.’ Thane Gustafson, Georgetown University
