The period covered by this book witnessed a significant change in Allied strategy for the Middle East. Its focus switched from Egypt to the states of the so-called northern tier of the Middle East: Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan. This book reveals the extent to which the UK clung on to great-power pretensions and used bluff, even deception, in order to give the impression that it disposed of greater military resources than was in fact the case. It describes not only Anglo-American tensions in the Middle East, but also the Americans' reluctance to take over Britain's former hegemony in the region. Finally, it reveals the extent to which the Allies' relationship with Israel was a constant restraint upon their freedom of action in the area, and their ability to forge military alliances with Arab states.
Table of Contents
1. Allied Global Strategy 2. Allied Interests in the Middle East 3. The British Strategic Concept 4. The Arab-Israeli Problem 5. The Northern Tier Takes Shape 6. The Formation of the Baghdad Pact 7. Anglo-American-Turkish Staff Planning, 1955 8. Baghdad Pact Planning, 1955-56 9. Allied Intervention in a Middle East War, 1955-56 10. The Consequences of Suez 11. Allied Strategy in the Middle East after Suez 12. From the Baghdad Pact to CENTO
Michael J. Cohen holds the Lazarus Philips Chair in History at the University of Bar-Ilan. In 1998 he was a member of the Institute for Advanced Studies, Princeton, and has been Visiting Professor at the Universities of Stanford, Duke, Chapel Hill and Maryland, in the USA and at the LSE in London. He has published eight books on Israel and the Middle East.