This book explores the formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American defence policies in the Middle East, 1950-1959. It determines the aims with which the pact was established; the failings of the pact, and the struggle that was undertaken against it by hostile countries. It examines the events surrounding the formation, development and collapse of the pact, and Anglo-American attempts to contain the Soviet Union in the Middle East. It also deals with British and American policies towards the pact and Middle Eastern defence. It seeks to examine British and American post-war defence policies in the Middle East and their collective defence projects in the region, such as the Middle East Command and Northern Tier, leading to the Baghdad Pact. It does not attempt to offer a comprehensive history of British and American policies in the Middle East, and particularly aims to explore those policies with regard to the problems of Middle East defence. In addition, it explores the policies of the local members of the pact, and examines the pact's internal structure. It poses the questions of how the members of the pact and the United States perceived the question of Middle East defence; what their basic aims were; and what problems they faced while trying to achieve these aims and implementing their chosen solutions.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements Abbreviations Preface Introduction 1. Britain's Defence Projects in the Middle East (1950-53) 2. The Northern Tier Defence Project (1953-54) 3. The Attempts to Extend the Northern Tier Defence Project (1954-55) 4. The Formation of the Baghdad Pact (1954-55) 5. The Extension of the Baghdad Pact (1955-56) 6. The Development of the Baghdad Pact (1955-56) 7. The Decline of the Baghdad Pact (1956-58) 8. The Collapse of the Baghdad Pact (1958-59) Conclusion Appendices Bibliography Index
Dr Behcet Kemal Yesilbursa is associate professor at Abant Izzet Baysal University, Turkey. He received his PhD from the University of Manchester.