Acknowledgements, Series Preface, Introduction, PART I. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: THEORY, 1. ‘The Problem of Global Environmental Protection’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 6, pp. 68-79, 2. ‘Global Environmental Problems: The Effects of Unilateral Actions Taken by One Country’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 20, pp. 55-70, 3. ‘Creating a Good Atmosphere: Minimum Participation for Tackling the “Greenhouse Effect” ’, Economica, 60, pp. 281-93, 4. ‘Strategies for the International Protection of the Environment’, Journal o f Public Economics, 52, pp. 309-28, 5. ‘Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements’, Oxford Economic Papers, 46, pp. 878-94, 6. ‘Environmental Consciousness and Moral Hazard in International Agreements to Protect the Environment’, Journal of Public Economics, 60, pp. 95-110, 7. ‘Negotiating an Agreement on Global Warming: A Theoretical Analysis’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 32, pp. 170-88, 8. ‘The Effects of Collusion and Limited Liability on the Design of International Environmental Agreements for Developing Countries’, Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Limited, pp. 1-25, PART II. INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS: APPLICATIONS, 9. ‘Political Institutions and Pollution Control’, Review of Economics and Statistics, 74, pp. 412-21, 10. ‘Efficiency and Distribution in Greenhouse Negotiations’, Kyklos, 46, pp. 363-97, 11. ‘A Finnish-Soviet Acid Rain Game: Noncooperative Equilibria, Cost Efficiency, and Sulfur Agreements’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 24, pp. 87-99, 12. ‘Voluntary Provision of a Public Good: Results from a Real World Experiment’, Kyklos, 47, pp. 505-18, 13. ‘The Voluntary Provision of a Pure Public Good: The Case of Reduced CFC Emissions and the Montreal Protocol’, Journal of Public Economics, 63, pp. 331-49, 14.‘A Tale of Two Collectives: Sulphur versus Nitrogen Oxides Emission Reduction in Europe’, Economica, 64, pp. 281-301, Name Index
