This book explores the paradox of the ‘security dilemma’ in International Relations, as applied to the post-9/11 context of homeland security.
The book's central argument can be summed up by the following counterintuitive thesis: the more security you have, the more security you will need. It argues that enhancing security does not make terrorism more likely, but rather it raises public expectations and amplifies public outrage after subsequent failures. The book contests that this dilemma will continue to shape American, Canadian and British domestic and international security priorities for decades. In exploring the key policy implications resulting from this, the book highlights the difficulty in finding a solution to this paradox, as the most rational and logical policy options are part of the problem.
This book will be of interest to students of Homeland Security, Security Studies, US politics, and IR in general.
Introduction: The Origins of Homeland Security Dilemma 1. Rising Public Expectations and Higher Standards for Measuring Performance 2. The Power and Triumph of Failure 3. Public Imagination and Probability Neglect 4. Political Imagination and Motivation 5. Declining Support for Sacrificing Civil Liberties 6. Multilateral Failures and the HSD 7. Homeland Security Dilemma and Political Motivations 8. Revisiting the Overblown Thesis: Logical, Empirical and Theoretical Problems 9. Non-Falsifiability of Overblown Theory 10. Weak Theories Lead to Simple (mistaken) Solutions 11. Conclusion: The Homeland Security Dilemma and the Future