Originally published in 1987, The Logic of Nuclear Terror presented a much-needed critical review of the premises, concepts, and policy prescriptions of deterrence theories and doctrines at the time. In particular, authors address: the historical validity, theoretical vitality, and policy-relevance of nuclear deterrence theories and doctrines; the ways in which technological and political change have affected the original concepts of nuclear war and deterrence strategies, and the ways in which such changes have affected policy and doctrine; and realistic alternative ways of thinking about strategy in the changing context of new military technologies and international politics.
The outstanding group of international contributors to this volume include both proponents and critics of current doctrine. The result is an unusually well-balanced and unique contribution to our understanding of nuclear deterrence theory and practice. As such, it will be of interest to students, policymakers, and teachers of international relations, defense and foreign policy, US-Soviet relations, and arms control and disarmament.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments. Contributors. Introduction Part 1: Historical and Theoretical Problems 1. Intellectuals and the Nuclear Deterrence System Roman Kolkowicz 2. Strategic Theory: What’s New and What’s True Robert Jervis 3. Cultural Barriers to an Acceptance of Deterrence George H. Quester 4. On the Tiger’s Back: The Development of the Concept of Escalation Lawrence Freedman Part 2: Soviet and American Perspectives 5. Nuclear Deterrence and Technological Change: Retrospect and Prospect Colin S. Gray 6. Strategy as Politics, Politics as Strategy: Domestic Debates, Statecraft, and Star Wars Arthur A. Stein 7. Has Soviet Nuclear Strategy Changed? Benjamin S. Lambeth Part 3: The Future of Deterrence 8. The Long-Term Future of Nuclear Deterrence Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 9. Nuclear Deterrence and ‘World War III’: How Will History Judge? Ken Booth. Index.