Any discussion of the security of Korea has implications for U.S.-Japan relations, but the Carter administration's announcement in 1977 of its intention to withdraw U.S. ground-combat forces from Korea by 1982, which brought to the surface deep-rooted Japanese and American frustrations with one another, made it clear that neither side fully understood the other's view of Korea. This book, a collaborative effort by specialists of diverse expertise and viewpoints, clarifies U.S. and Japanese perceptions of the Korean problem and explores alternative approaches to the maintenance of peace and security on the Korean peninsula. Demonstrating that much of the conventional wisdom about Korean security rests on oversimplifications, exaggerated fears, and mistaken assumptions, the authors assert that the prospects for avoiding conflict grow brighter despite existing pitfalls, and offer recommendations for the U.S. and Japanese governments.
Introduction -- Images and Interests: U.S. and Japanese Assumptions About Korea -- The Meaning of Consultation -- The Withdrawal of U.S. Forces and the Deterrence of Conflict -- The Nuclear Dimension -- Arms Control and a Stable Military Balance -- The Search for a Modus Vivendi: Long-Term Perspectives -- Steps Toward Détente -- Conclusions of the Working Group