The first two years of the Reagan administration saw a close correlation between improved unofficial relations between Washington and Taipei and a deterioration of strategic cooperation between Washington and Beijing. These developments led many U.S. officials and scholars to conclude that U.S. security interests may require periodic concessions over Taiwan to ensure China ‘s cooperation in countering the Soviet threat. Rejecting this view, Mr. Lasater argues that Washington’s and Beijing’s bilateral relations with Moscow and not the Taiwan issue are the key international determinants of Sino-American strategic cooperation. Examining the parameters of that cooperation and the role of Taiwan in Sino-American relations, Mr. Lasater suggests that Beijing is deliberately using U.S. security concerns to seek concessions on Taiwan and other issues. He advises a policy that stands firm in negotiations with the Chinese and that resists the temptation to make politically expedient concessions--a more balanced course of action whereby improved relations with Beijing are sought concurrently with the maintenance of friendly, unofficial ties with Taipei.
Table of Contents
Westview Replica Editions -- Sino-American Strategic Relations -- Introduction -- The National Power of the PRC -- Sino-Soviet Relations -- China’s Independent Foreign Policy -- Parameters of Sino-American Strategic Cooperation -- The Role of Taiwan -- Taiwan Today: An Overview -- The Security of Taiwan -- The Taiwan Issue -- Period of Contention: 1981–1982 -- The August 17, 1982 Joint Communique -- Epilogue -- Conclusion -- Summary and Policy Recommendations -- Appendixes
Martin L. Lasater is president of Martin L. Lasater and Associates, a consulting firm specializing in foreign policy and security affairs.