Although the current world order is still dominated by the US, there is increasing international concern over the possibility of regional security dilemmas arising from smaller powers’ attempts to develop Weapons of Mass Destruction. A study of US-North Korean interaction using the security dilemma as a conceptual frame of analysis is thus not only hugely topical, but also particularly relevant for the 21st century on theoretical as well as empirical grounds. Is there the prospect of a security dilemma contagion if North Korea acquire nuclear weapons capability leading to an Asia Pacific wide nuclear arms race? This book examines this contentious issue in-depth and explores the difficult choices policymakers face as a result of the uncertainty in international politics.
"Tan’s analysis and use of these theories to examine US–North Korea relations and the nuclear weapons problem is interesting and well argued. This is a valuable study and a helpful addition to the literature. Tan’s book is highly recommended for those who study North Korea and seek a solid application of theory to these issues."
TERENCE ROEHRIG, US Naval War College, Asian Studies Review
Introduction 1. The Security Dilemma 2. Theories of Mitigation 3. Background to US-North Korean Interaction 4. The 1993-94 Nuclear Crisis 5. From the Agreed Framework to the Joint Communiqué of 2000 6. Confrontation and the HEU Program 7. Bush Chooses Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea 8. Conclusion