It took only fifteen years for an army once known for its agility and operational brilliance to turn into a clumsy bureaucratic labyrinth, according to Colonel Emanuel Wald's report to Israeli Chief of Staff Moshe Levi. Not surprisingly, Wald's conclusions greatly embarrassed Israeli political and military leaders as news of the report circulated t
Table of Contents
Introduction -- The Peace for Galilee War: Anatomy of a Military Failure -- Overview of the Peace for Galilee War -- An Analysis of Major Combat Operations -- The Operational Picture in Northern Command -- Anatomy of a Military Failure -- The Military Outcome of Previous Wars: Why Were the Lessons not Learned? -- The Six Day War -- The Yom Kippur War -- Lessons of the Wars -- Why Were the Lessons not Learned? -- The Twilight of Military Power: IDF Force Construction Between the Wars (1973–1982) -- The Flood Tide of Inputs -- Development of the Ground Forces -- The Demilitarization of the Officer Corps Pyramid -- The Debilitation of the General Staff -- The Moloch of “Absolute Security” Catch: Why the Security Establishment and the IDF Are “Drowning Themselves in the Sea” -- A Military Boxing Match -- Mistaken Assessments -- An Exclusive Club: The Over-the-Hill Gang -- Worshipping the Moloch of “Absolute Security”
Colonel Emanuel Wald served as the head of the Department of Long-term Planning within the General Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces. He received his Ph.D. from the Maxwell Graduate School, Syracuse University, in 1972, and currently is consulting for public and private organizations, lecturing in major Israeli universities, and completing a new book dealing with the Israeli national defense Gordian knot.