This book, first published in 1986, examines the American economic aid that was a vital factor in enabling Britain’s success in the Second World War. Whilst Lend-Lease did keep the British war effort alive, the agreement was always a source of great friction between the two countries. This book argues that although Lend-Lease solved Britain’s wartime supply problems, the price was the acceptance of a series of burdens that seriously aggravated the country’s long-term economic decline.
Table of Contents
1. The Supply Problem and its Solution 2. Trade Talks and Lend-Lease Consideration 3. The Atlantic Charter and Lend Lease 4. The Wheat Talks and the Mutual Aid Agreement 5. Reserves Exports and Reciprocal Aid 6. Lend-Lease Take-Outs and Export Restrictions 7. Stage II Lend-Lease and the Quebec Conference 8. Conclusion
Alan P. Dobson