Marcin Kaczmarski
I have been researching Russia's foreign policy with unrelenting interest for over ten years: as an academic, analyst, policy advisor and media commentator. Currently based at the University of Warsaw, I was a research fellow at the Aberystwyth University (2012-2013) and a Taiwan Fellow at the Chengchi University (2016). I worked as an analyst at the Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) in Warsaw between 2006 and 2012, and since 2014, I am Head of the China-EU Programme at the Centre.
Biography
Russia’s foreign policy has been the focus of my research for the last decade. I paid particular attention to two topics: domestic sources of Russia’s international conduct and Russia’s role in international crises. More recently I have focused on the study of Russia-China relations. My book, Russia-China relations in the post-crisis international order (Routledge 2015), presents a case for a peaceful power transition between Russia and China. I run a blog commenting on current developments in relations between Moscow and Beijing: www.RussiaChinaRelations.com. I published in: International Politics, Demokratizatsiya and Problems of Post Communism.I am an Assistant Professor at the Institute of International Relations, University of Warsaw.
I was a Visiting Scholar at the Aberystwyth University in 2013 and a Taiwan Fellow at the Chengchi University in 2016. I have combined his scholarly research with policy analysis for the Warsaw-based think-tank, Centre for Eastern Studies (OSW) where I worked in the Russian Department (2006-2012) and am now the head of the China-EU Programme (since 2014).
Areas of Research / Professional Expertise
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post-Soviet studies; Russia's foreign policy; Russia-China relations
Websites
Books
Articles
The asymmetric partnership? Russia’s turn to China
Published: Apr 23, 2016 by International Politics
Authors: Marcin Kaczmarski
Despite growing asymmetry in material capabilities, Russia has not decided to hedge against China. On the contrary, as has been particularly visible in the aftermath of the 2014 Ukrainian crisis, Russia turned to China not only for political but also economic support. This article argues that Moscow’s adaptation to China’s pre-eminence has its roots in the 2008–2009 global economic crisis and has been accompanied by Beijing’s self-restraint in its dealings with Russia.