Mateusz Hohol

Published: Jul 15, 2020 by Scientific Reports, 2020, 10(11531).
Authors: Mateusz Hohol, Klaus Willmes, Edward Nęcka, Bartosz Brożek, Hans-Christoph Nuerk, Krzysztof Cipora
Subjects: Cognitive Psychology

We compared mathematicians and others using the magnitude classification task. The groups did not differ with respect to numerical distance and size effects, suggesting that extremely high mathematical skills neither rely on nor have special consequences for analog processing of numerical magnitudes. We also looked at effects’ individual prevalence using the bootstrapping: surprisingly, while a reliable NDE was present in almost all participants, the prevalence of NSE was much lower.

Published: Jul 15, 2020 by Synthese, 2020
Authors: Marcin Miłkowski, Mateusz Hohol,
Subjects: Cognitive Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy

The debate between the defenders of explanatory unification and explanatory pluralism has been ongoing from the beginning of cognitive science and is one of the central themes of its philosophy. Does cognitive science need a grand unifying theory? Should explanatory pluralism be embraced instead? Or maybe local integrative efforts are needed? What are the advantages of explanatory unification as compared to the benefits of explanatory pluralism?

Published: Dec 05, 2019 by Foundations of Science, 2019, 24(4), 657–680.
Authors: Mateusz Hohol, Marcin Miłkowski
Subjects: Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy

We focus on the development of geometric cognition. We argue that to understand how geometry has been constituted, one must appreciate not only individual cognitive factors, such core systems, but also the social history of the spread and use of cognitive artifacts. The case of Greek geometry clearly shows that explanations of geometric reasoning have to go beyond the confines of methodological individualism to account for how the distributed practice of artifact use has stabilized over time.

Published: Dec 01, 2019 by Theory & Psychology, 2019, 29(5), 567–578.
Authors: Marcin Miłkowski, Mateusz Hohol, Przemysław Nowakowski
Subjects: Cognitive Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy

We focus on explanatory mechanisms in psychology, especially on problems of particular prominence for psychological science such as theoretical integration and unification. Proponents of mechanistic explanation claim that satisfactory explanations in psychology are causal. We hope for cross-pollination between theoretical accounts of explanation and experimental psychology, that could offer methodological guidance, in particular where mechanism discovery and theoretical integration are at issue.

Published: Dec 01, 2018 by PeerJ, 2018, 6(e5878).
Authors: Mateusz Hohol, Kinga Wołoszyn, Hans-Christoph Nuerk, Krzysztof Cipora
Subjects: Cognitive Psychology

A strong link between bodily activity and number processing has been established in recent years. Here we show the practical relevance of finger counting in adulthood, the relative stability of preferences over time along with flexible adaptation to a current situation, as well as an association of FC routines with handedness. Taken together our results suggest that FC is the phenomenon, which is moderated or mediated by multiple embodied factors.

Published: Oct 29, 2018 by Journal of Computational Neuroscience, 2018, 45(3), 163–172.
Authors: Marcin Miłkowski, Witold M. Hensel, Mateusz Hohol
Subjects: Cognitive Neuroscience, Research Methods & Statistics

In this paper, we draw on methodological studies into the replicability of psychological experiments to analyze the functions of model replications and model reproductions in computational neuroscience. We contend that model replicability, or independent researchers' ability to obtain the same output using original code and data, and model reproducibility, or independent researchers' ability to recreate a model without original code, serve different functions and fail for different reasons.

Published: Jun 12, 2018 by Frontiers in Psychology, 2018, 9(2393).
Authors: Marcin Miłkowski, Robert Clowes, Zuzanna Rucińska,..., Mateusz Hohol
Subjects: Cognitive Psychology, Philosophy

In this paper, we argue that several recent ‘wide’ perspectives on cognition (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, and distributed) are only partially relevant to the study of cognition. We argue that the current practice in cognitive (neuro)science has undergone, in effect, a silent mechanistic revolution, and has turned from initial binary oppositions and abstract proposals toward the integration of wide perspectives with the rest of the cognitive (neuro)sciences.

Published: Aug 08, 2017 by Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience, 2017, 11(154).
Authors: Mateusz Hohol, Bartosz Baran, Michał Krzyżowski, Jacek Francikowski
Subjects: Cognitive Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology

In our view, implementation of the insects' models of navigation in the explanation of the vertebrates' spatial behavior omits some important aspects, i.e., multimodal integration. We want to ask again the initial question posed by Wystrach and Graham (2012) pointing out that significant progress in insects' research, which suggests that we might have had underestimated insects' cognitive abilities, e.g., capacity to obtain abstract information from multimodal input during complex tasks.