Public choice involves the application of economic theory to the study of politics. In studying and evaluating public policy, public choice theorists apply the voluntary exchange paradigm of economics in which the individual is assumed to maximize his own self-interest. The design of rules to regulate socio-political interaction in a society, and the functioning of those rules is affected by the activities of several political actors, including legislators, voters, civil servants, and interest groups. Since it emerged in 1962 with the publication of The Calculus of Consent: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy by James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, public choice has been applied primarily to the study of political economy in the developed market economies. The Public Choice and Developing Societies series is aimed at providing an opportunity for public choice scholars to help explain collective decision-making in developing societies. This series is founded on three important propositions: (1) that the application of economic theory to the study of public policy can provide important insights into collective decision-making; (2) that the application of public choice theory to the study of developing societies can significantly improve the efficiency of bureaucratic and governmental systems, and thus, promote economic, political and social development; and (3) that public choice can help developing societies design and sustain appropriate laws and institutions for peaceful coexistence and sustainable development.