What is the nature of temporal passage—the movement of events or moments of time from the future through the present into the past? Is the future and the past as real as the present, or is the present—or perhaps the present and the past—all that exists? What role, if any, does language play in giving us an insight into temporal reality? Is it possible to travel through time into distant regions of the future or the past? What accounts for the direction of time, the sense we have that we are moving toward the future and not back into the past? What is the relation between the physics of time and the philosophy of time?
These are the kind of dizzying questions that have been addressed by metaphysicians since antiquity, and time has remained a critical concept for many thinkers and philosophers since then (for instance, in his Confessions, St Augustine, restating an observation by Plotinus, wrote: ‘So what is time? If no one asks me, I know; if I seek to explain it, I do not’). Interest in the subject has also been enduring—and has blossomed anew in the past century.
The Philosophy of Time is a new title in the Routledge series, Critical Concepts in Philosophy. It meets the need for an authoritative reference work to make sense of the subject’s vast literature and the continuing explosion in research output. Edited by L. Nathan Oaklander, a leading scholar in the philosophy of time, this new Major Work from Routledge brings together in four volumes the canonical and the very best cutting-edge scholarship in the field to provide a synoptic view of all the key issues and current debates.
With a comprehensive introduction to the collection, newly written by the editor, which places the collected material in its historical and intellectual context, The Philosophy of Time is an essential work of reference and is destined to be valued by philosophers of time—as well as those working in related areas of philosophy of science, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of religion—as a vital research resource.
Volume I: The Reality and Language of Time
Part 1: McTaggart’s Paradox
1. J. M. E. McTaggart, ‘The Unreality of Time’, Mind, 17, 1908, 457–74.
2. C. D. Broad, ‘Ostensible Temporality’, An Examination of McTaggart’s Philosophy, vol. 2, (Cambridge University Press, 1938), pp. 264–81, 288–317.
3. A. N. Prior, ‘Changes in Events and Changes in Things’ (Lindley Lecture) (University of Kansas Press, 1962).
4. D. H. Mellor, ‘McTaggart’s Proof’, Real Time II (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 70–83.
5. Steven Savitt, ‘A Limited Defense of Passage’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 38, 3, July 2001, 261–70.
6. L. Nathan Oaklander, ‘McTaggart’s Paradox Defended’, Metaphysica: International Journal of Ontology and Metaphysics, 3, 1, 2002, 11–25.
7. Josh Parsons, ‘A-Theory for B-Theorists’, Philosophical Quarterly, 52, 206, 2003, 1–20.
Part 2: Old B-Theories of Time
8. C. D. Broad, ‘Time’, in James Hastings et al. (eds.), Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, vol. 12 (Scribners, 1921), pp. 334–9, 345.
9. Bertrand Russell, ‘On the Experience of Time’, Monist, 25, 1915, 212–33.
10. J. J. C. Smart, The Space-Time World, Philosophy and Scientific Realism (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963), pp. 131–42.
11. Nelson Goodman, ‘Of Time and Eternity’, The Structure of Appearance (Harvard University Press, 1951), pp. 287–301.
12. Richard Gale, ‘Tensed Statements’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 12, 1962, 53–9.
Part 3: New B-Theories of Time
A. Token-Reflexive and Date-Analysis of Tensed Sentences
13. J. J. C. Smart, ‘Time and Becoming, in Peter van Inwagen (ed.), Time and Cause, (Kluwer, 1981), pp. 3–15.
14. Quentin Smith, ‘Problems with the New Tenseless Theory of Time’, Philosophical Studies, 52, Nov. 1987, 371–92.
15. L. Nathan Oaklander, ‘The A Defense of the New Tenseless Theory of Time’, The Philosophical Quarterly, 41, 162, 1991, 26–38.
16. Joshua Mozersky, ‘Tense and Temporal Semantics’, Synthese, 124, 2, 2000, 257–79.
17. Heather Dyke, ‘Token, Dates and Tenseless Truth Conditions’, Synthese, 131, 3, 2002, 329–351.
18. Laurie A. Paul, ‘Truth Conditions of Tensed Sentence Types’, Synthese, 111, 1, 1997, 53–71.
19. Quentin Smith, ‘The "Sentence-Type" Version of the Tenseless Theory of Time’, Synthese, 119, 3, 1999, 233–51.
20. Joshua Mozersky, ‘Smith on Times and Tokens’, Synthese, 129, 3, Dec. 2001, 405–11.
B. Alternative Analyses of Tensed Sentences
21. Graham Priest, ‘Tense and Truth Conditions’, Analysis, 46, 1986, 162–6.
22. D. H. Mellor, ‘Tense’s Tenseless Truth Conditions’, Analysis, 46, 1986, 167–72.
23. Graham Priest, ‘Tense, Tense, and TENSE’, Analysis, 47, 1987, 184–7.
24. Michelle Beer, ‘A Defense of the Co-Reporting Thesis of Tensed and Tenseless Sentences’, Philo, 10.1 (Spring/Summer 2007).
25. Quentin Smith, ‘Can the New Tenseless Theory of Time Be Saved By Individual Essences?’, Philo, 10.1 (Spring/Summer 2007).
26. Michelle Beer, ‘On the Individual Essences of Moments of Time’, Philo, 10.1 (Spring/Summer 2007).
27. D. H. Mellor, Thinking in Time, Real Time II (London: Routledge, 1998), pp. 58–69.
28. L. Nathan Oaklander, ‘Two Versions of the New B-Theory of Language’, in Quentin Smith and Alexandar Jokic (eds.), Time, Tense and Reference (MIT Press, 2003), pp. 271–303.
29. Heather Dyke, ‘A New Metaphysical Strategy: Lessons Learned from the Philosophy of Time’, Metaphysics and the Representational Fallacy (Routledge, 2007), pp. 37–62.
Volume II: Time and Metaphysics
Part 4: The Full Future Theory
30. George Schlesinger, ‘Temporal Becoming’, Aspects of Time (Hackett Publishing Co., 1980), pp. 23–6, 30–3, 140–1.
31. J. Bigelow, ‘Worlds Enough for Time’, Nous, 1991, 1–20.
32. L. Nathan Oaklander, ‘Bigelow, Possible Worlds and the Passage of Time’, Analysis, 54, 4, Oct. 1994, 244–8.
33. Quentin Smith, ‘The Logical Structure of the Debate about McTaggart’s Paradox’, Philosophical Research Archives, 24, 1988–9, 371–9.
34. L. Nathan Oaklander, ‘McTaggart Paradox and Smith’s Tensed Theory of Time’, Synthese, 107, 1996, 205–21.
Part 5: The Open Future Theory
35. C. D. Broad, ‘The General Problem of Time and Change’, Scientific Thought (Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1923), pp. 53–84.
36. M. Dummett, ‘Truth and the Past—Lecture 3: The Metaphysics of Time’, The Journal of Philosophy, C, 1, Jan. 2003, 38–53.
37. Michael Tooley, Time, Tense and Causation (Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 13–20, 33–42, 152–4, 303–5.
38. L. Nathan Oaklander, ‘Tooley on Time and Tense’, in L. N. Oaklander (ed.), The Importance of Time (Kluwer, 2001), pp. 3–12.
39. Storrs McCall, ‘A Dynamic Model of Temporal Becoming’, Analysis, 44, 1984, 172–6.
40. Graham Nerlich, ‘Falling Branches and the Flow of Time’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76, 2, June 1998, 309–16.
41. Storrs McCall, ‘Time Flow Does Not Require a Second Time Dimension’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 76, 2, June 1988, 317–22.
42. Craig Bourne, ‘When am I? A Tense Time for Some Tense Theorists’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80, 3, Sept. 2002, 359–71.
Part 6: Presentism
43. Robin Le Poidevin, ‘Temporal Solipsism’, Time, Change and Contradiction: A Defense of a Tenseless Theory of Time (St Martin’s Press, 1991), pp. 36–57.
44. William Lane Craig, ‘McTaggart’s Paradox and Temporal Solipsism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79, 1, 2001, 32–44.
45. William Lane Craig, Tense and Temporal Relations, American Philosophical Quarterly, 38, 1, 85–97.
46. L. Nathan Oaklander, ‘Presentism: A Critique’, in Hallvard Lillehammer and G. Rodriguez Pereyra (eds.), Real Metaphysics: Essays in Honour of D. H. Mellor, With His Replies (Routledge, 2002), pp. 196–211.
47. Quentin Smith, ‘Time and Degrees of Existence: A Theory of "Degree Presentism"’, in Craig Callender (ed.), Time, Reality and Experience (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 119–36.
48. L. Nathan Oaklander, ‘Time and Existence: A Critique of Degree Presentism’, in Maria Elisabeth Reicher (ed.), States of Affairs (Ontos Verlag, 2008).
49. Ned Markosian, ‘A Defense of Presentism’, in Dean Zimmermann (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. I (Clarendon Press, 2004), pp. 47–82.
50. Simon Keller, ‘Presentism and Truthmaking’, in Dean Zimmermann (ed.), Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. I (Clarendon Press, 2004), pp. 83–104.
51. Craig Bourne, ‘A Theory of Presentism’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 36, 1, 2006, 1–23.
52. M. Joshua Mozersky, ‘Bourne-Again Presentism’ (new for this collection).
53. Michael Rea, ‘Four-Dimensionalism’, in Michael Loux and Dean Zimmerman (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Metaphysics (Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 246–80.
54. M. Oreste Fiocco, ‘A Defense of Transient Presentism’, American Philosophical Quarterly, Oct. 2007.
Volume III: Time, Experience and Freedom
Part 7: Thank Goodness That’s Over!
55. A. N. Prior, ‘Thank Goodness That’s Over’, Philosophy, 34, 1959, 12–17.
56. Murray MacBeath, ‘Mellor’s Emeritus Headache’, Ratio, 25, 1983, 81–8.
57. D. H. Mellor, ‘The Presence of Experience’, Real Time II (Routledge, 1998), pp. 39–46.
58. Michelle Beer, ‘Prior’s "Thank Goodness That’s Over" Objection to the B-Theory’, Chronos: Proceedings of the Philosophy of Time Society VII, 2004–2005, 32–7.
59. Heather Dyke and James Maclaurin, ‘"Thank Goodness That’s Over": The Evolutionary Story’, Ratio, XV, 2002, 276–92.
60. Maxwell Goss, ‘Temporal Belief and Temporal Experience’ (new for this collection).
Part 8: The Presence of Experience
61. William Lane Craig, ‘The B-Theorist "Tu Quoque" Argument’, Synthese, 107, 2 1996, 249–69.
62. Joshua Mozersky, ‘A Tenseless Account of the Presence of Experience’, Philosophical Studies, 129, 3, 2006, 441–76.
63. Yuri Balashov, ‘Time of Our Lives: Negotiating the Presence of Experience’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 42, 4, 2005, 295–309.
64. William Lane Craig, ‘Wishing it Were Now Some Other Time’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62, 1 2001, 159–66.
65. L. Nathan Oaklander, ‘Be Careful What You Wish For: A Reply to Craig’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 76, 1, 2008, 156–63.
66. Simon Prosser, ‘Could We Experience the Passage of Time?’, Ratio, 20,1, 2007, 75–90.
Part 9: Time and Consciousness
67. Gustav Bergmann, ‘Duration and the Specious Present’, Philosophy of Science, 27, 1, Jan. 1960, 39–47.
68. Ronald C. Hoy, ‘A Note on Gustav Bergmann’s Treatment of Temporal Consciousness’, Philosophy of Science, 42, 1, Dec. 1976, 610–17.
69. Barry Dainton, ‘Time and Consciousness, Time and Space (Acumen Publishing, 2001), pp. 93–109.
70. Robin Le Poidevin, ‘Memory and the A-series’, Time and History (Ontos Verlag, 2006), pp. 31–42.
Part 10: Freedom
71. Jan Lukasiewicz, ‘On Determinism’, in Storrs McCall (ed.), Polish Logic: 1920–1939 (Clarendon Press, 1967), pp. 19–39.
72. L. Nathan Oaklander, ‘Freedom and the New Theory of Time’, in Robin Le Poidevin (ed.), Questions of Time and Tense (Clarendon Press, 1998), pp. 185–205.
73. Joseph Diekemper, ‘B-Theory, Fixity, and Fatalism’, Noûs, 41, 3, 429–52.
74. Michael Rea, ‘Presentism and Fatalism’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 84, 4, Dec. 2006, 511–24.
Volume IV: Time and Physics
Part 11: The A-theory and Special Relativity
75. Kurt Gödel ‘A Remark About the Relationship Between Relativity Theory and Idealistic Philosophy’, in Paul Arthur Schilpp (ed.), Albert Einstein: Philosopher Scientist (Open Court Publishing Company, 1949), pp. 557–62.
76. Hilary Putnam, ‘Time and Physical Geometry’, Journal of Philosophy, 64, 1967, 240–7.
77. Howard Stein, ‘On Relativity Theory and Openness of the Future’, Philosophy of Science, 58, 1991, 147–67.
78. Lawrence Sklar, ‘Time, Reality and Relativity’, in Richard Healey (ed.), Reduction, Time and Reality (Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 129–42.
79. Quentin Smith, ‘The Incompatibility of STR and the Tensed Theory of Time’, in L. Nathan Oaklander (ed.), The Importance of Time (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001), pp. 153–6.
80. Simon Saunders, ‘How Relativity Contradicts Presentism’, in Craig Callender (ed.), Time, Reality and Experience (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 277–92.
81. William Lane Craig, ‘The Metaphysics of Special Relativity: Three Views’, in William Lane Craig and Quentin Smith (eds.), Einstein, Relativity and Absolute Simultaneity (Routledge, 2007).
82. Yuri Balashov and Michel Janssen, ‘Critical Notice: Presentism and Relativity’, British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 54, 2003, 327–46.
83. C. Bourne, The Present Dialectic in Special Relativity, A Future for Presentism (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 160–86.
84. James B. Hartle, ‘The Physics of Now’, American Journal of Physics, 73, 2, 2005, 101–9.
Part 12: The Direction of Time
85. T. Gold, ‘The Arrow of Time’, in S. T. Butler and H. Messel (eds.), Time (Pergamon Press, 1965), pp. 143–65
86. Adolf Grünbaum, ‘The Anisotropy of Time’, in T. Gold and D.L. Schumacher (eds.), The Nature of Time (Cornell University Press, 1967), pp. 149–77, 245–7.
87. Lawrence Sklar, ‘Up and Down, Left and Right, Past and Future’, Noûs, 15, 1981, 111–29.
88. Erwin Tegtmeier, ‘Direction of Time, A Problem of Ontology, not of Physics’, in J. Faye et al. (eds.), Perspectives on Time (Kluwer, 1997), pp. 183–91.
89. Mauro Dorato, ‘Absolute Becoming, Relational Becoming and the Arrow of Time: Some Non-Conventional Remarks on the Relationship Between Physics and Metaphysics’, Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 37, 3, 2006, 559–76.
Part 13: Time Travel
90. David Lewis, ‘The Paradoxes of Time Travel’, American Philosophical Quarterly, 13, 1 1976, 145–52.
91. Paul Horwich, ‘Time Travel’, Asymmetries in Time (MIT Press, 1967), pp. 111–28.
92. Nicholas J. J. Smith, ‘Bananas Enough for Time Travel’, British Journal of the Philosophy of Science, 48, 1997, 363–89.
93. D. H. Mellor, ‘Time Travel’, in Katinka Ridderbos (ed.), Time (Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 46–64.
94. Simon Keller and Michael Nelson, ‘Presentists Should Believe in Time Travel’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 79, 2001, 333–45.
95. Ted Sider, ‘Traveling in A- and B- Time’, Monist, 88, 3, 2005, 329–35.
96. Kristie Miller, ‘Time Travel and the Open Future’, Disputatio, 19, 1, 2005, pp. 223–32.
Epilogue
97. D. H. Mellor, ‘Time’, in Frank Jackson and Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy (Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 615–35.
Biography
L. Nathan Oaklander is (with Quentin Smith) the author of our Time, Change, and Freedom (1995). He has written and edited numerous books on the philosophy of time and other aspects of metaphysics. He is a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Michigan-Flint, President of the Philosophy of Time Society, and Lifetime Member of Clare Hall of the University of Cambridge.
