© 2013 – Routledge
The thirteen essays in this volume explore for the first time the possible skeptical implications of disagreement in different areas and from different perspectives, with an emphasis in the current debate about the epistemic significance of disagreement. They represent a new contribution to the study of the connection between disagreement and skepticism in epistemology, metaethics, ancient philosophy, and metaphilosophy.
"With its excellent contributors writing on topical issues of disagreement, this is a very welcome collection. It will attract much interest and should enhance the ongoing debates concerning those issues."
--Ernest Sosa, Rutgers University
“The essays are uniformly lucid, and the argumentative moves that are considered are well handled. Overall, the essays make a solid contribution to the ongoing disagreements about disagreement…”
--Guy Longworth, University of Warwick, UK
1. Editor’s Introduction Diego E. Machuca 2. Disagreeing with the Pyrrhonist? Otávio Bueno 3. The Role of Disagreement in Pyrrhonian and Cartesian Skepticism Markus Lammenranta 4. A Neo-Pyrrhonian Approach to the Epistemology of Disagreement Diego E. Machuca 5. Moral Disagreement: Actual vs. Possible Folke Tersman 6. The Fragility of Moral Disagreement Zed Adams 7. How Skeptical is the Equal Weight View? Brandon Carey and Jonathan Matheson 8. Disagreement, Skepticism, and Track-Record Arguments Duncan Pritchard 9. Disagreement and Defeat Clayton Littlejohn 10. Disagreement: The Skeptical Arguments from Peerhood and Symmetry Nathan L. King 11. Dealing with Disagreement from the First-Person Perspective: A Probabilist Proposal Trent Dougherty 12. The Problem of Historical Variability Nathan Ballantyne 13. Is Philosophical Knowledge Possible? Hilary Kornblith 14. Defending Philosophy in the Face of Systematic Disagreement Sandy Goldberg