1st Edition
Democracy, Bureaucracy and Public Choice Economic Approaches in Political Science
By Patrick Dunleavy
Copyright 1991
300 Pages
by
Routledge
300 Pages
by
Routledge
300 Pages
by
Routledge
Also available as eBook on:
First published in 1991. This book initially offers a critique of some key rational public choice models, to show that they were internally inconsistent and ideologically slanted. Then due to the authors’ research the ideas are restructured around a particular kind of institutional public choice method, recognizing the value of instrumental models as a mode of thinking clearly about the manifold complexities of political life.
- Introduction: Institutional Public Choice Theory and Political Analysis
DEMOCRACY - Interest Groups and Collective Action
- Reconstructing the Theory of Groups
- Economic Explanations of Voting Behaviour
- Party Competition - The Preference-Shaping Model
BUREAUCRACY - Existing Public Choice Models of Bureaucracy
- The Bureau-Shaping Model
- Comparing Budget - Maximizing and Bureau-Shaping Models
- Conclusion - Economic Explanations in Political Science
Biography
Professor Patrick Dunleavy (Department of Government, London School of Economics and Political Science.)