

ROUTLEDGE ▪ TAYLOR & FRANCIS

Intersectional Feminisms

A Chapter Sampler

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

www.routledge.com

Contents











5 Modes of being vs. categories

Queering the tools of intersectionality

Gabriele Dietze, Elahe Haschemi Yekani, and Beatrice Michaelis

Editor's introduction

Leonie Schmidt

Imagine an old woman in a wheelchair. Imagine a lesbian of Hispanic American descent. Imagine a Muslim woman so poor that she is not able to pay her rent regularly. What do these women have in common? They belong not only to one socially marginalized group but to several at once. They experience discrimination not only on the basis of one identity but on the basis of several features. *Intersectionality* has provided the theoretical tools with which to dissect how culturally dominant exclusions surrounding categories such as race, gender, class, sexuality, and age interrelate in the marginalization of social subjects. Coined by lawyer Kimberlé Crenshaw in the late 1980s in a discussion of how the categories of race and gender cancel one another out in legal terms, the concept serves to point toward how marginalized identities may only be understood in an overlapping web of social dimensions that work interactively in the exclusion of marginal identities.

The value of this comprehensive approach to researching social oppression is that it allows for a decidedly non-essentializing analysis of the identity of the oppressed subject. Yet intersectional analysis also suffers from problems that come with any method which relies strongly on forms of categorization. The categories to describe a subject's identity never seem sufficiently comprehensive. Gender, race, and class have become established 'standard' categories, but what about all those aspects of identity that are frequently excluded from this set of categories, such as able-bodiedness, youth, sexuality, or religious belief? Moreover, the ongoing differentiation of marginalized individuals into ever more precise categories also curtails the possibilities of joint political activism among them by segregating oppressed subjects whose very strength may lie in uniting against dominant forces.

Has intersectionality, then, come to an endpoint or reached a conceptual deadlock? This chapter answers this question by first taking stock of what is controversial about intersectionality and then proposing a solution to the approach's theoretical and practical limitations. Gabriele Dietze, Elahe Haschemi Yekani, and Beatrice Michaelis demonstrate that the constraints of identity categories do

not necessarily need to mark the confines of political activism and agency. Rather it is queer theory that may come to the rescue of intersectionality.

Authors' introduction

Gabriele Dietze, Elahe Haschemi Yekani, and Beatrice Michaelis

Over the past decades feminism has continuously struggled with the deconstruction of its presumed precondition for political action, namely the supposedly coherent subject position of 'woman.' Discussing 'modes of being' as an alternative to categories in intersectional framings of identity, this chapter probes the potentials of 'queering' common approaches to political agency and situatedness.

The first section discusses the position from which demands for justice have been and still are being made. Here, we investigate categories of the self – such as subject/subjectivity, identity, and difference – and introduce students to the pros and cons of employing them in political discourse. The second section revisits the paradigm of intersectionality, which initially promised to be a critical tool with which to tackle power and privileged positions as well as the misguided idea that oppression could be safely targeted via *one* category of marginalization only. But following the implementation of intersectionality as the main methodological tool for acknowledging and combining different regimes of marginalization in gender studies, the approach has been increasingly criticized for re-creating binaries and – via subtle differentiation – ever more forms of exclusion. In the third and final section, we thus map a terrain in which situatedness, identities, differences, and positionalities are not considered to be the only possible bases for political agency. Drawing upon the work of queer theorist José Muñoz, these 'modes of being' describe forms of being together that are based less on an identitarian logic and more on notions of political commonality. In this way, we hope to address political potentialities as well as convivialities that may be latent rather than manifest. In the coda to this chapter, we focus specifically on a vision of solidarity in the 2014 British film *Pride* (dir. Matthew Warchus) as an inroad into modes of being that link queer temporalities and affects with what we wish to call ethical desire.

Introduction

> [Q]ueerness does not yet exist […] [It] is an ideality or a figuration of a mode of being in the world that is not yet here. But […]: If queerness does not exist, how can we have queer politics? […] I begin by reconsidering the role of politics and its relation to the lived experience of social inequality and economic asymmetry that people who understand their sexuality as marked by sexual alterity often share.
>
> (Muñoz 2013a: 103)

Over the past decades feminism has continuously struggled with the deconstruction of its presumed precondition for political action, namely the supposedly

coherent subject position of 'woman.' In the related context of queer theory, the epigraph by José Esteban Muñoz reminds us pertinently of the dilemma: "If queerness does not exist, how can we have queer politics?" In this vein we wish to probe the potentials of 'queering' common approaches to political agency and situatedness. By *queering* we mean strategies that work to deconstruct binary identity formations. The first section discusses the position from which demands for justice have been and still are being made. Here, we investigate categories of the self – such as subject/subjectivity, identity, and difference – and discuss the pros and cons of employing them in political discourse. The second section revisits the paradigm of intersectionality, which promised initially to be a critical tool with which to tackle power and privileged positions as well as the misguided idea that oppression could be safely targeted via *one* category of marginalization only. But following the implementation of intersectionality as the main methodological tool for acknowledging and combining different regimes of marginalization in gender studies, the approach has been increasingly criticized for re-creating binaries and – via subtle differentiation – ever more forms of exclusion. In the third and final section, we map a terrain in which situatedness, identities, differences, and positionalities are not considered to be the only possible bases for political agency. In accordance with Muñoz's terminology, these "modes of being" describe forms of being together that are based less on an identitarian logic and more on notions of political commonality.[1] In this way, we hope to address political potentialities as well as convivialities that may be latent rather than manifest. This also involves an acknowledgment of the agency of the nonhuman, of affect, and of artistic imagination. In the coda to this chapter, we wish to focus specifically on a vision of solidarity in the film *Pride* (2014); this form of imagining togetherness provides us with our closing example of an inroad into modes of being that link queer temporalities and affects with what we wish to call ethical desire.

Modes of being are also about the place of the political in (queer) feminism. Let us clarify that the notion of modes of being is not meant to be understood as a new paradigm, but rather as a kind of alternative toolbox. Through the addition of an analysis of modes of being, established tools may be sharpened, and other tools, designed for different uses, will be tested. This chapter, then, is not so much about newness or originality, but rather about the constant process of revisiting and revising the tools of critical thinking. Nevertheless, the rearrangement of theories and practices cannot be an end in itself. Rather, it should be considered a necessary tool-making machine, a historically and locally distinct instrument of critique. Feminism is our starting point in this endeavor. We understand feminism as a political activity, a demand for justice, and an ethical desire to live in solidarity;[2] that is, in constant (productive) tension with academic gender studies.

Gender studies have become or are on their way to becoming a discipline that is unable to avoid canonizing knowledge and, in the process, to proclaim discourses of truth in more and more places in the (Western) academy (see Wiegman 2012). Our investigation intervenes in two spheres of this kind of

knowledge production: first, the question of possible subjects of knowledge (subjects, identities, and positions of difference); and second, the question of methodology, especially intersectionality. In the following, we draw upon recent debates on queer theory that make use of and have incorporated feminist theory. This chapter then heads in the opposite direction by aiming to infuse feminist thinking with queer theory and, in doing so, to enrich the project of queer feminism.

Identity trouble

After the opening salvo of the feminist cultural revolution of the early 1970s in the Western hemisphere had died down, it became obvious that the subject of 'woman' could not be an all-inclusive lever for change. African American, socialist, queer, postcolonial/indigenous, and transnational feminists brought various fields of oppression and power into focus, such as race, class, sexuality, geopolitics, and the nation. The key position of patriarchy as the main target of critical and activist energies was challenged by an awareness of other forms of oppression, power regimes, and norms, including racism, classism, heteronormativity, colonialism, and the restrictions of citizenship. Initially, the paradigm of intersectionality seemed to be the best way not only to recognize (in the German sense of "*anerkennen*")[3] differences, but also to acknowledge that the marginalization of certain identities cannot be attributed to the binary of man–woman.

The wording used here already points to the zone of conflict: one can only talk about recognition if one is acting on the assumption that there is someone who occupies a hegemonic position and who does the recognizing. In doing so, one promotes ideas of center and margin, and places oneself at the center while de-centering the Other. By using the term *Other*, one assumes a norm from which the supposedly monolithic Other differs. This norm, however, is neither seen nor mentioned. Critical feminist Whiteness studies represented an attempt to make the silent norm of Whiteness visible and to criticize its entanglement in relations of power. However, as Isabell Lorey aptly points out, the study of (and the fight against) White privilege can only exist in a "parasitical relation of inequality" (Lorey 2010: 105).[4] Paradoxically, then, instances of hegemonic (self-)criticism, as Gabriele Dietze calls them (2008), reproduce the idea of a sovereign (Western) subject. This seemingly critical form of self-awareness works then as occidentalist self-affirmation (Dietze 2010), and mistakes awareness of dominance by parts of the hegemony as a kind of self-reflexivity. In the tradition of the occidental enlightenment, this subject wrongfully believes that it can identify its own privileges and thereby betray its own (white) 'race' (Ignatiev and Garvey 1996).

Conversely, referring to marginalized identities in order to win them political recognition, visibility, and justice is a strategy that is not exempt from excluding others. The wish to describe distinct identities as precisely as possible may even lead to an "identity Olympics" ("*Identitätsolympiade*"), as the critical migration studies scholars Jule Karakayali, Vassilis Tsianos, Serhat Karakayali, and Aida

Ibrahim have pointed out in their essay "Decolorise it!" (Karakayali *et al*. 2012: n.p.).[5] Thereby ever more – and ever more subtly differentiated – identities are being claimed and are demanding inclusion and participation.[6] Rey Chow argues that this longing for uniqueness has, over time, become a universalizing project that has never detached itself from the egocentrism of the center (Chow 2006). Such forms of identity politics also have disadvantages because they render minoritarian subjects identifiable to and for the capitalist machinery of exclusion and inclusion.[7]

Accordingly, in queer feminist theory doubts have emerged as to whether the insistence on marginality as a stage of identity is the only legitimate position from which to initiate political action (Puar 2012: 55). Such reservations have been buttressed by other feminists inspired by Deleuzian philosophy (see Grosz 1993: 170; Currier 2003: 333). For instance, Rosi Braidotti has criticized twentieth-century critical theory and psychoanalysis for having tied themselves too closely to an ethics of lack and loss. In this way, politics is always geared toward a better future that is conceived as having emerged out of a negative past and present. Emphasizing the Deleuzian idea of "radical immanence" (Braidotti 2008: 8), Braidotti suggests developing a "postsecular ethics" that "takes on the future affirmatively" (2008: 18).

In the wake of this postsecular ethics à la Braidotti, an idea arises which could be called post-identitarian desire. Yet before we too hastily leave behind all kinds of demands for identity, we wish to revisit certain aspects of the claim to a political self that cannot be dismissed so easily. Strictly speaking, we are dealing with three terms that carry problematic but also critical potential: *subject/ivity*, *identity*, and *difference*. Let us first reconsider the term *subject.* Influential critics who have dealt with subjectification, ranging from Althusser to Foucault and Butler, have all emphasized that becoming a subject is both a form of subordination to a legal and power structure as well as a process of individualization. One is interpellated as an individual subject by the law and thereby subordinated. The interpellated subject encounters the law, then, as a modern 'I' that is no longer subject to the despotism of an absolute monarch but that rather submits to power via forms of self-surveillance and self-control. For the European enlightenment, this ability to speak/think for oneself, ideally through a democratically developed system of rules, is expressed by Kant's famous phrase: "Enlightenment is man's emergence from his self-imposed immaturity" (2010 [1784]: 1).[8] This idea of the subject is at the core of the Euro American occidental fantasy of superiority. It involves voluntarily following a self-appointed system of rules tied to an imaginary belief in natural law, in which humanity is seen as the apex of civilization and emancipatory efforts.

But subjectivity also carries with it a critical potential. It unfolds through the recognition that it is an andro- and ethnocentric construction: women, the enslaved, and the majority of people of color have been excluded from its proclamation of free political subjects. This deficit enables practices of re-signification to take place; this figure of thought has become productive especially in deconstructive feminism and queer theory (see Butler 1997). Re-signification means a willful

misunderstanding of dehumanizing interpellations such as being called *queer* or *cripple* and transforming such terms of abuse into positions that are resistant to processes of subjectification. Moreover, postcolonial and decolonial theorists have criticized the ethnocentric dimension of subject theories. These scholars expose the contemporaneity of European enlightenment ideas with the development of modern slavery and high colonialism and propose a model of reciprocal conditionality between the occidental subject and colonialism, slavery, and racism. Alluding to this theoretical context, decolonial critic Walter Mignolo entitled his latest book *The Darker Side of Western Modernity* (2011).[9]

The second term, *identity*, is located on a different level to that of *subject.* Identity names the attempt to achieve a 'true self' and the political process of making manifest a formerly denied self. In early feminism, one sought to replace marginalized identities (for instance, subordinated women or closeted homosexuals) with 'authentic' and 'whole' identities through consciousness-raising or coming-out performances. In doing so, false identities could be portrayed as questionable, and their marginalization was enforced through hegemonic regimes such as patriarchy and heteronormativity; conversely, newly claimed dissident identities, linked to Black Power, women's, and gay liberation, could be celebrated as subversive. Drawing upon the work of French philosopher Michel Pêcheux, Muñoz argues that the pressure to embody normative identities produces such counter-identities. At the turn of the millennium, this could be seen in mainstream gay self-fashioning, in which the performance of muscular masculinity was meant to undermine the image of the 'effeminate' gay man and/or to counter the stigma of the frail HIV-positive body. Counter-identities, however, are still linked to the norm and require its existence in order to be performed successfully.

Traditionally, then, marginalized subjects were uncomfortably situated between two options: assimilating to a dominant culture or militantly refusing these norms as a "counteridentification with the dominant culture" (Muñoz 1999: 97–98). Muñoz suggests disidentification as a third, intersectional model that works as a norm-breaking tool:

> Disidentification is a performative mode of tactical recognition that various minoritarian subjects employ in an effort to resist the oppressive and normalizing discourse of dominant ideology. Disidentification resists the interpellating call of ideology that fixes a subject within the state power apparatus.
>
> (Muñoz 1999: 97)

Muñoz, for instance, reads the radical drag of performance artist Vaginal Davis, which includes parodies of Whiteness and minstrelsy, as one form of disidentification that evokes discrimination in an exaggerated manner, thereby making the underlying norm visible and denaturalizing it at the same time (Muñoz 1999: 11).

Finally, the third term, *difference*, seems at first glance to be more open and horizontally organized than both *subject* – a mode of belonging to a (supposedly beneficent) set of rules – and *identity*, as a defined form of existence. In the wake

of widespread discussions of Foucault's theory of governmentality, a critique of neoliberal societies' "optimization of systems of difference" (Foucault 2008: 259) has occurred. Rather than dealing with the decentering of the center and understanding difference as a potentially pluralizing effort, this mode of marketing difference turns formerly discriminated subjects into potential consumers (see n. 7). Without neglecting the reasons for and the value of this critique, we want to point out the specific potential of the term *difference* that has played such an important role in the political history of feminism, i.e., in the expression 'difference within.'[10] This composite provides the possibility of thinking, living, and politicizing the commonalities of different women without essentializing 'woman' as a coherent category/identity, such that aspects of a common cause can be fought for through coalition-building under the rubric of feminism. The 'difference within' has also been further developed on the micro level, since difference is not only thought of as a difference between groups but also as one within the individual. Jean-Luc Nancy calls this "being singular plural":

> As for singular differences, they are not only "individual," but infraindividual. It is never the case that I have met Pierre or Marie per se, but I have met him or her in such and such a "form," in such and such a "state," in such and such a "mood," and so on.
>
> (Nancy 2000: 8)[11]

On the basis of this tripartite critique there are clear reasons, first, for leaving behind the "oppressive logic of identity" (Currier 2003: 322) and identitarian interpellations (see Haschemi Yekani and Gunkel 2015). Second, from a queer feminist point of view, we need to continue to criticize the focus on power and the andro- and ethnocentrism endemic to the term 'subject' as well as the hierarchical character of the logic of recognition. Third and finally, difference, at least in its uncritical celebratory use, should be ceded to the vocabulary of the optimization of the neoliberal economy. Nevertheless, to do away with these three terms is not to diminish the need for a constitution of the self as an 'I.' We merely wish to suggest that the critical refusal to be addressed in certain ways also involves an opening; it is an event in which power relations are temporarily suspended or at least shifted. This emphasis on non-consistent modes of being may give rise to an ethical rethinking and, ideally, to new political strategies. One possibility may be to multiply the I(s) and to render them pliable in order to enable a connectivity and conviviality that is not dominated by the concepts of center and margin.[12] Or, as Muñoz argues, what would be desirable is a "collectivity of others co-appearing in irreducible plurality" (Muñoz 2013a: 107).

These various and by no means banal 'identity troubles' have haunted the work of queer feminist scholars and activists and have led to the development of a number of newer methodologies, chief among them the concept of intersectionality.[13] It is the specific assumption that intersectionality is the most appropriate approach to addressing differences that we will critically interrogate in the following section.

Intersectionality hype

While queer theory's evasiveness concerning power and its enchantment with concepts of fluidity have produced self-reflexive critiques, most prominently in the fields of queer or color critique (see Ferguson 2004) and queer diaspora critique (see Gopinath 2005; Manalansan 2006), gender studies, which generally seems more reliant on a categorical approach, has turned the paradigm of intersectionality into a form of methodological panacea. Having discussed the uneasy relationship between intersectionality and queer studies as a form of corrective methodology predicated on modes of failure in more general terms elsewhere,[14] we wish to retrace what by now may be described here as intersectionality hype. This is not, however, to imply that there is no way of putting intersectional theory to productive use.

Nonetheless, in Germany, particularly – but by no means solely – in the social sciences, the term "intersectionality" has come to be used almost synonymously with any research agenda that addresses difference and/or diversity as co-constructed by more than one axis of social stratification. "Intersectionality" is widely employed in gender studies research via imports from US American critical race studies[15] (see Knapp 2005; Klinger, Knapp, and Sauer 2007; Lutz *et al*. 2010, 2011; Winker and Degele 2009).[16]

Several lines of critique have been developed regarding this particular use of the concept of intersectionality. First, the invocation of newness has had a depoliticizing effect, as it often functions to marginalize earlier works by German and non-German feminists of color; this has coincided with struggles over the predominance of certain disciplinary approaches in women's and gender studies. At the same time, critics assert that the discourse of intersectionality paradoxically impedes a focus on racism (see, e.g., Bilge 2013; Carstensen-Egwuom 2014; Erel *et al*. 2008; Gutiérrez Rodríguez 2011; Haschemi Yekani *et al*. 2008). Sirma Bilge describes this phenomenon as "ornamental intersectionality" that leads to an "active disarticulation, of radical politics of social justice" (Bilge 2013: 408). Here, the question of whether intersectionality should be seen as a genuine innovation from within women's and gender studies or rather as a form of critique that stands in opposition to these institutionalized forms of feminism is also contested (Bilge 2013).

Second, there is another inherent danger to the approach. Given its genealogical roots in radical justice activism in Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw's pioneering work, intersectionality has often become shorthand for describing processes of Othering rather than being understood as a way of critiquing all identity formations, including hegemonic ones. Jasbir Puar captures this shortcoming pointedly when she states that "intersectionality always produces an Other, and that Other is always a Woman of Color" (Puar 2012: 52). She elaborates further:

> Difference continues to be "difference from," that is, the difference from "white woman." Distinct from a frame that privileges "difference within,"

> "difference from" produces difference as a contradiction rather than as recognizing it as a perpetual and continuous process of splitting.
>
> (2012: 53)

Once more, difference is seen not as a pluralization but as a marker of lack. With regard to intersectionality research, the fact that privileged positions are hardly ever at the center of attention seems to underscore this critique.[17]

Third, and more fundamentally, critics argue that the all too clear-cut use of categories as a way of understanding identities does not match the multi-layered and conflicting process of subjectification (see Purtschert and Meyer 2010).[18] While in a legal framework it may seem unavoidable that discrimination can only be prosecuted if it can be established as *either* racist *or* sexist discrimination, this neat separation of categories often fails to match the conflicting affective experience of being discriminated against. In this way, intersectionality at its worst becomes "a structural container that simply wishes the messiness of identity into a formulaic grid" (Puar 2007: 212).[19] In the same vein, many critical voices have argued that despite the boom in research in intersectionality, what is needed is a stronger focus on the conditions of inequality and power relations rather than on categories.[20] In her rereading of Butler's "post-foundational" critique of the category of woman, Lorey bemoans the lack of willingness to embrace contingency as a necessary element of political struggle. She reads the clinging to categories in intersectional research as "an (epistemological) technique of securitization" ("*eine (epistemische) Sicherungstechnik*") (Lorey 2011: 103), i.e., as a way to avoid rather than address modes of inequality *within* the feminist project. The affirmative return to identity as the foundation of politics overlooks the fact that the social demand for unambiguousness is that which produced precarity in the first place (Lorey 2011: 110). This concerns, for instance, those subjects who cannot or do not want to meet the identitarian demands of the gender binary.

Finally, transnational, postcolonial, and decolonial approaches discuss modes of oppression that may well not follow the model of identity-based politics that seems to be particularly prevalent in the United States; this model is not easily transferable to other global modes of injustice.[21] Martin F. Manalansan, for instance, examines the discourse on Filipino/a care workers and rejects the assumption that there is a modernization of sexual codes as the result of migration to the North. He shows how syncretic forms between so-called 'traditional' and Western requirements emerge (Manalansan 2006: 230), being especially critical of research on the 'chain of care' in gender studies that at times perpetuates heteronormative assumptions (2006: 237). Other examples of this type of criticism include Nikita Dhawan's edited collection *Decolonizing Enlightenment: Transnational Justice, Human Rights and Democracy in a Postcolonial World* (2014). This volume provides postcolonial reassessments of enlightenment thought and asks whether emancipatory transnational forms of justice can be derived through such a critique. Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez, in turn, advocates a "creolization" of human rights discourses in order to promote a form

of transversal conviviality (2011). All of these approaches take more interest in transnational/global ethical responses to modes of injustice than to categorical framings of difference.

Modes of being

Following these lines of critique, we now wish to outline the following preliminary conclusions: identities are not simply free-floating signifiers, and it is certainly apposite to be wary of a self-indulgent, queer anti-identitarian agenda. Taking global and transnational modes of oppression into consideration also appears highly pertinent. However, we do not consider the turn to stable categories or any form of intersectional matrix of identity categories particularly helpful. The assumption that we need categories to make sense of the world only highlights the need to revise the analytical tools with which we grasp forms of inequality as modes of being rather than as the results of intersectional grids. An epistemological skepticism regarding the conventional methodologies involved in analyses of modes of oppression and deconstruction has resulted in a number of critical interventions that have moved away from identity-centered critique. These moves have come to be known under the umbrella terms of *temporal*, *spatial*, *affective*, and *material turns* (see Bachmann-Medick 2016; Michaelis, Dietze, and Haschemi Yekani 2012; Pedwell and Whitehead 2012). Accordingly, relations of inequality and processes of discrimination can neither be explained by referencing the marked subject who is discriminated against nor by pinning discrimination on these bodies alone.[22]

The resultant queer feminist critique concentrates on the material conditions and lived experience of racisms and sexisms that are historically and spatially heterogeneous and distinct. It does so by, for example, addressing issues of citizenship, healthcare, and economic justice as well as spatial and temporal positionings and fantasies rather than the categories of sex, race, class, gender, and the infamous "etc." (see Butler 1999).[23] Moreover, the emphasis on nonhuman agents, animals, and machines especially in eco-critical approaches challenges an anthropocentric worldview (see, e.g., Giffney and Hird 2008; Cohen 2012); further, decolonial lines of thought accentuate the need to pay closer attention to geopolitics and the possibilities of epistemic disobedience (see Mignolo 2009). Thus, the proposed project of queering the tools of intersectionality may be understood as a form of tool sharpening that aims to bring postcolonial and decolonial approaches into closer dialogue with the predominantly Anglo-American queer critique of identity. This project is not about consolidating one specific methodology; rather, it is geared toward a syncretic mixing and molding of theoretical approaches to correspond to the problems at hand.

As a way of concluding and fleshing out the notion of modes of being, let us focus on the ways in which they converge with queer temporalities, affect, and ethical desire in (fantasies/visions of) political potentialities and convivialities. We begin by looking at how modes of being are entangled with other, nonhegemonic temporalities and by asking what the political ramifications of this

entanglement are. Hegemonic temporality, similar to or in tandem with spatiality, is organized into hierarchies and teleologies. Emphasizing the entanglement of space and time, Anne McClintock, for instance, has described colonialist fantasies that liken going to colonized territories to traveling into early human history as an "anachronistic space":

> According to this trope, colonized people – like women and the working class in the metropolis – do not inhabit history proper but exist in a permanently anterior time within the geographic space of the modern empire as anachronistic humans, atavistic, irrational, bereft of human agency – the living embodiment of the archaic 'primitive.'
>
> (McClintock 1995: 30)

Geographer Doreen Massey has introduced the phrase "space-time," on the one hand, in order to signal the relationality, dominance, and universalizing power of both categories and, on the other hand, in order to help deconstruct them (Massey 1994: 249–69). Queer theory follows this critique by exposing normative notions of time (e.g., in heteronormative concepts of biography that follow a logic geared toward reproduction). Queer temporality studies offers alternative visions of other pasts, presents, and futures that may be driven by a paradoxical desire for a return to the way we never were.[24] Butler has explained that gender itself works, in fact, as a "metalepsis," which means that "the anticipation of a gendered essence produces that which it posits as outside itself" (1999: xiv–xv). Following this reasoning, if there is no original hidden behind gendered scripts, then *other*, non-hegemonic and non-linear modes of relating to time/generativity may come into view. This can occur by, for example, addressing the refusal to get married and have children or the fact of untimely deaths, often in the context of the AIDS epidemic (see Edelman 2004; Halberstam 2005; Muñoz 2009).

Both Lee Edelman's radical affirmation of the now in *No Future* (2004) and Muñoz's notion of queerness on the horizon (2009: 19–32) are prominent instances of the emphasis on time within queer theory. In queer challenges to powerful and normative concepts of time, negativity plays an important role. One main line of argument here follows Edelman's plea for a radical futurelessness of queer modes of being. By refusing to procreate and thereby rejecting a familial selfishness that may be seen in the future-saturated figuration of the CHILD writ large, Edelman challenges queer people to radically own the familiar accusation that they are a danger to the future of society. He thus turns against both "reproductive futurism" and gay and lesbian normativity, which abandons queerness in favor of its collusion with conservatism and the political right in its fight for marriage, adoption, and military service (Edelman 2004: 19). Edelman instead affirms the death drive and the ultimate *jouissance* by demonstrating their impact on a cultural archive that comprises, for instance, novels by Charles Dickens and films by Alfred Hitchcock. Although both the character of this archive and the negation of any future orientation with its concomitant celebration of anti-sociality have garnered criticism, Edelman's powerful

affirmation of the now has been influential. Somewhat in contrast to Edelman, the scope of negativity has been extended to negative affects as counter-intuitive catalysts of political action (see Cvetkovich 2007). Bad feelings, in particular, are increasingly being deployed within queer activism. Such affects[25] do not necessarily limit agency: they may lead to potent refusals by individuals to be integrated into power structures that continually discriminate against the Other. What is needed then are productive forms of saying No. Ann Cvetkovich stipulates that negative affects need to be depathologized "so that they can be seen as a possible resource for political action rather than its antithesis" (Cvetkovich 2007: 460).

Muñoz's considerations in *Cruising Utopia* (2009) may be seen as the strongest voice against Edelman's and others' so-called anti-social thesis, arguing instead for a sense of commonality and an optimism that insists on the permanent futurity of queerness. Work in this vein explores the relationship between affect and ethical practice and takes its cue less from negativity or lack and more from ethical desire and non-teleological utopian imaginations. Muñoz further urges us to consider lived experience as a form of queer politics. What makes this turn to (queer) modes of being a political act is the way in which the "perplexity of living" challenges clear-cut divisions along binaries (Probyn 1996: 19; see also Landström 2007: 19).[26] Muñoz's work on Nancy's dictum of "being singular plural" (Muñoz 2009: 11; Nancy 2000) in the context of queer forms of community is an important source for thinking through the modes of being we have in mind here. The insistence on the "brown commons" as the space-time where the marginalized are always already connected points toward a disrupted or rather a queered temporality (Muñoz 2013b). Utopia is always already here but it is serially ephemeral. One way to grasp this fleetingness is to look at art as a queer utopian space-time. Following the conceptualization of philosopher Ernst Bloch, Muñoz explains the utopian function in art: "The utopian function is enacted by a certain surplus in the work that promises a futurity, something that is not quite here" (Muñoz 2009: 7).

Narrative cinema, for instance, offers a fictional testing ground for actions which reinforce and are inspired by real-life practices that are no longer in being or which have not yet come to be, and these actions always leave their imprint on reality. They are simultaneously more and less real. Like modes of being as a point of view for analyzing forms of inequality, films can challenge easy binaries when imagining the world. As a testing ground for possible social constellations, they can visualize surprising encounters. The 2014 UK film *Pride* (dir. Matthew Warchus) is one such example. It tells the story of unexpected solidarity between gay rights activists and miners on strike that may be understood as an island in time or a queer opening of the binary fabric, which is all the more surprising since the real-life inspiration of this unlikely 1980s alliance-building in another age of austerity seems to resonate so strongly today. The film is a monument to the desire for solidarity; it moves the viewer through a narrative that highlights how coalitions can work across difference and illustrates how solidarity can be established through the response to a negative affect: in this case by being hated

by the same groups (the Thatcherites, the tabloids). This was the reason why the Lesbians and Gays Support the Miners (LGSM) campaigned to collect money for the Welsh miners in London. *Pride* is not about representation or identity but about heart-warming practices, about modes of being, linked to specific spaces such as the London bookshop *Gay's the Word* or the community center in the Welsh village of Onllwyn.

Difference becomes paradoxical here, since social practices do not conform to what notions of concrete identities may insist are defining differences between groups. The miners prove less homophobic than representations of their supposedly male-dominated working-class culture commonly suggest. It is mainly but not only the women in this rural community who find a new form of self-expression in political organization and affective bonding with 'their lesbians'; the 'miner wife' Siân James, for example, later went on to become a Labour MP. Welsh miner Dai Donovan expresses his solidarity with gays and lesbians at the 1984 benefit concert Pits and Perverts, and the miners marched at the 1985 London Pride parade with their traditional banners. Such wonderfully perverse coalitions link the two communities, one threatened by the radical transformation of the English mining industry, the other by the devastating consequences of the early AIDS epidemic.

In this respect, the viewer's suppositions about characters' identities are disappointed. Solidarity functions to devalue allegedly defining differences and leaves only fragments of identity behind:[27] the only true identitarian quarrels in the film arise between the gay men and lesbian women who choose to start their own separatist group. The shared sandwiches, the joint demonstrations, and the gift of the minibus – paid for by the queers, adorned with a pink triangle as an emblem of gay pride, and proudly paraded by the working-class women in the mining community – these moments of exchange *are* the commons/commonality (see Harney and Moten 2013; Bojadžijev 2015b; Gunkel *et al*. 2015). Such moments represent jointly used goods as well as points of surprising similarity. They come into view here because art and life are always already much messier and less well defined than discrete categories might suggest.

Notes

1 In contrast to Andrea Maihofer's influential concept of gender as a "mode of existence" or a "mode of living" ["Geschlecht als Existenzweise"] which describes gender as historically specific sociocultural embodied practices (see Maihofer 1995: 84f.), Muñoz's "modes of being" is not only a methodologically descriptive tool for grasping both the cultural constructedness and real-life materiality of gender (as Maihofer's concept does), but also includes a utopian element of "togetherness"/"interrelationality" that assumes an open futurity in the ways in which we relate to each other as gendered and racialized subjects.

2 See, for instance, Hemmings (2012) and the special issue on "solidarities" in *Feministische Studien* (1/2015).

3 All translations are by the authors. For a critique of the concept of 'recognition' as a hegemonic strategy that allows the Other 'to be like us,' see Braidotti (2008: 18) and Lorey (2010: 102).

4 The original reads: "*parasitären Verhältnis der Ungleichheit.*"
5 Manuela Bojadžijev also takes issue with critical race theory and theories of intersectionality and holds them responsible for the problematic appraisal of difference and the permanent re-production of Otherness: "Ideas of emancipation as a linear integration into participation […] help us understand the tandem of exclusion and incomplete inclusion by fracturing and dividing identities" (2015a: 33).
6 Nonetheless, there is, of course, a difference between the desire to become non-dominant and the identity politics linked to positions of non-privilege that Wendy Brown has fittingly described as "wounded attachments" (Brown 1993: 406).
7 Queer theorist Lisa Duggan (2003) has offered a persuasive critique of the discourses of gay marriage and the new "homonormativity" that this form of state-sanctioned recognition of marginalized sexualities produces. Jasbir Puar (2007) builds on this framework and introduces the concept of "homonationalism" to describe the concomitant Islamophobia that this form of "sexual exceptionalism" has reinforced in the wake of post-9/11 US-American politics. In an unpublished paper called "Homo Inc.," French queer theorist Marie-Hélène Bourcier argues that the neoliberal market economy has adapted itself to valorize difference. The market economy has produced a "multiliberal" regime of inclusion or integration of 'good' difference and the demonization of 'bad' difference (Bourcier 2013). Antke Engel (2009) has also criticized the neoliberal politics of marketing difference.
8 In German, this reads "*Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit*," which has been variously translated into English as "self-imposed immaturity," "self-incurred tutelage," and sometimes as "self-imposed nonage" – all of which have slightly different connotations than the German original. For our purposes the emphasis should be directed to the idea that this is a subject which can free itself.
9 Decolonial theory has also pointed out that the occidental subject/*humanitas* is directly linked to its binary opposite object/*anthropos* (see Sakai 2010).
10 Black feminism realized from early on certain antagonistic differences to white feminists (see Lorde 1984). It took white feminists significantly longer to realize "differences within feminism" (see Spelman 1988; Hirsch and Fox-Keller 1990).
11 See Muñoz (2009: 10) for a queer appropriation of the concept.
12 See Braidotti's claim that

> [c]ontemporary technologies allow for forms of social interaction by desiring subjects, which are nomadic, not unitary; multi-relational, not phallo-centric; connective, not dialectical; simulated, not specular; affirmative, not melancholy and relatively disengaged from a linguistically mediated system of signification.
>
> (Braidotti 2008: 12)

13 See McCall (2005) for a critical overview.
14 The second section of this chapter builds on, but is also a major revision/extension of, Haschemi Yekani, Michaelis, and Dietze (2010). The third section incorporates certain arguments that were first published in German in Michaelis, Dietze, and Haschemi Yekani (2012).
15 In particular, Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw's diagnosis of the intersection of race and gender discrimination in US legal frameworks (Crenshaw 1997) and Patricia Hill Collins' Black feminist standpoint theory (Collins 1999) have proven influential.
16 See Kerner (2012) for an overview of the German debate on intersectionality.
17 The discourse of (white) masculinity in crisis, so predominant in gender and masculinity studies, for instance, is almost never linked to a specific "intersectional" identity but rather to a decentering of the supposedly homogeneous norm (see Haschemi Yekani 2011).
18 In order to critique the notion that categories possess an essential core which somehow remains untouched by their complex relations to other categories, Walgenbach has

suggested using "gender as an interdependent" category (Walgenbach 2012: 58–64). However, as the author concedes, this will privilege certain categories as more prominent than others.

19 Erel *et al*. (2008) voice similar concerns.

20 Floya Anthias (2013), for instance, proposes a "translocational" approach to emphasize location rather than groups; this relates the idea of intersectionality more strongly to social space than to social identity.

21 Kerner (2010) provides a discussion of the similarities and differences in what she perceives to be the more local scale of intersectionality research versus the more global focus of postcolonial analysis.

22 In this respect, these approaches may be said to follow an anti-foundationalist turn that places emphasis on shifting signifiers rather than on narratives of origin. Another way of framing this is through the notion of assemblage. According to Puar, assemblages help us to conceptualize race, gender, and sexuality not as entities or the properties of subjects but as events, practices, and encounters between bodies (Puar 2012: 58).

23

> The theories of feminist identity that elaborate predicates of color, sexuality, ethnicity, class, and able-bodiedness invariably close with an embarrassed 'etc.' at the end of the list. Through this horizontal trajectory of adjectives, these positions strive to encompass a situated subject, but invariably fail to be complete. This failure, however, is instructive: what political impetus is to be derived from the exasperated 'etc.' that so often occurs at the end of such lines? This is a sign of exhaustion as well as of the illimitable process of signification itself. It is the *supplément*, the excess that necessarily accompanies any effort to posit identity once and for all. This illimitable *et cetera*, however, offers itself as a new departure for feminist political theorizing.
>
> (Butler 1999: 182–83)

24 Muñoz captures this sentiment succinctly: "By my clock we were queer before we were lesbian and gay" (Muñoz 2009: 127).

25 Traditionally, emotion has been seen as the cultural expression of affect (which describes bodily reactions), while feeling is sometimes used as an umbrella term that includes both aspects. While affect theorists, and specifically scholars working in the fields of object-oriented ontology and media studies such as Brian Massumi (2002), advocate a clear separation of affect and emotion, others, especially critics indebted to phenomenology such as Sara Ahmed, are much more hesitant. In our seemingly interchangeable use of feeling/emotion and affect, we follow Ahmed who explains how bodily reactions are always tied to cultural meaning:

> Emotions are not 'after-thoughts,' but shape how bodies are moved by the world they inhabit. […] While you can separate an affective response from an emotion that is attributed as such (the bodily sensations [such as shivering] from the feeling of being afraid), this does not mean in practice, or in everyday life, they are separate.
>
> (Ahmed 2010: 32)

26 For Probyn, the "perplexity of living" – a phrase originally coined by Walter Benjamin – points toward the queerness of belonging: "Benjamin's phrase inspires me to study the inbetweenness of belonging, of belonging not in some deep authentic way but belonging in constant movement, modes of belonging as surface shifts" (Probyn 1996: 19).

27 Drawing, for instance, upon Hardt and Negri's *Commonwealth* (2009), Peter D. Thomas suggests regarding solidarity as an "ethico-political principle that aims to allow the multiple-singular of the multitude […] to 'manage their encounters' in an

enabling fashion" (Thomas 2011). And further: "As such, solidarity is a concrete utopia, in the Blochian sense, a hope for a future form of social organization that is simultaneously a promise to work toward its realization in the present" (Thomas 2011).

Works cited

Ahmed, Sara. "Creating Disturbance: Feminism, Happiness and Affective Differences." In *Working with Affect in Feminist Readings: Disturbing Differences*. Ed. Marianne Liljeström and Susanna Paasonen. London: Routledge, 2010, 31–44. Print.

Anthias, Floya. "Social Categories, Embodied Practices, Intersectionality: Towards a Translocational Approach." In *Interdependencies of Social Categorisations*. Ed. Daniela Célleri Endara, Tobias Schwarz, and Bea Wittger. Orlando: IberoAmericana/ Vervuert, 2013, 27–39. Print.

Bachmann-Medick, Doris. *Cultural Turns: New Orientations in the Study of Culture*. Trans. Adam Blauhut. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2016. Print.

Bilge, Sirma. "Intersectionality Undone: Saving Intersectionality from Feminist Intersectionality Studies." *Du Bois Review* 10.2 (2013): 405–24. Print.

Bojadžijev, Manuela. "Housing, Financialisation, and Migration in the Current Global Crisis: An Ethnographically Informed View from Berlin." *South Atlantic Quarterly* 114.1 (2015a): 29–45. Print.

Bojadžijev, Manuela. "Identity: Fortress or Paradox?" In *W(h)ither Identity: Positioning the Self and Transforming the Social*. Ed. Johanna Fernández, Danae Gallo González, and Veronika Zink. Trier: WVT, 2015b, 57–66. Print.

Bourcier, Marie-Hélène. "Homo Inc." Homonationalism and Pinkwashing Conference. The Center for Lesbian and Gay Studies, New York, April 11, 2013. Conference Paper.

Braidotti, Rosi. "In Spite of the Times: The Postsecular Turn in Feminism." *Theory, Culture & Society* 25.6 (2008): 1–24. Print.

Brown, Wendy. "Wounded Attachments." *Political Theory* 21.3 (1993): 390–410. Print.

Butler, Judith. *The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997. Print.

Butler, Judith. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. 10th anniversary edn. New York: Routledge, 1999. Print.

Carstensen-Egwuom, Inken. "Intersektionalität politisieren – Emanzipatorische Bewegungen intersektional denken." *Feministische Geo-RundMail* 60 (2014): 3–5. Print.

Chow, Rey. *The Age of the World Target: Self-referentiality in War, Theory, and Comparative Work*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2006. Print.

Cohen, Jeffrey Jerome, ed. *Animal, Vegetable, Mineral: Ethics and Objects*. Washington, DC: Oliphaunt, 2012. Print.

Collins, Patricia Hill. "Moving beyond Gender: Intersectionality and Scientific Knowledge." In *Revisioning Gender*. Ed. Myra Marx Ferree, Judith Lorber, and Beth B. Hess. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1999, 261–84. Print.

Crenshaw, Kimberlé Williams. "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality and Identity Politics. Learning from Violence against Women of Color." In *Reconstructing Political Theory: Feminist Perspectives*. Ed. Mary Lyndon Shanley and Uma Narayan. London: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997, 178–93. Print.

Currier, Dianne. "Feminist Technological Futures: Deleuze and Body/Technology Assemblages." *Feminist Theory* 4.3 (2003): 321–38. Print.

Cvetkovich, Ann. "Public Feelings." *South Atlantic Quarterly.* Special Issue: "After Sex? On Writing since Queer Theory" 106.3 (2007): 459–68. Print.

Dhawan, Nikita, ed. *Decolonizing Enlightenment: Transnational Justice, Human Rights and Democracy in a Postcolonial World*. Opladen: Budrich, 2014. Print.

Dietze, Gabriele. "Intersektionalität und Hegemonie(selbst)kritik." In *Transkulturalität: Gender- und bildungshistorische Perspektiven*. Ed. Wolfgang Gippert, Petra Götte, and Elke Kleinau. Bielefeld: transcript, 2008, 27–43. Print.

Dietze, Gabriele. " 'Occidentalism,' European Identity and Sexual Politics." In *The Study of Europe*. Ed. Hauke Brunkhorst and Gerd Grözinger. Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlag, 2010, 87–116. Print.

Duggan, Lisa. *The Twilight of Equality? Neoliberalism, Cultural Politics, and the Attack on Democracy*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2003. Print.

Edelman, Lee. *No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2004. Print.

Engel, Antke. *Bilder von Sexualität und Ökonomie: Queere kulturelle Politiken im Neoliberalismus*. Bielefeld: transcript, 2009. Print.

Erel, Umut, Jinthana Haritaworn, Encarnación Gutiérrez Rodríguez, and Christian Klesse. "On the Depoliticisation of Intersectionality Talk: Conceptualising Multiple Oppressions in Critical Sexuality Studies." In *Out of Place: Interrogating Silences in Queerness/Raciality*. Ed. Adi Kuntsman and Esperanza Miyake. York: Raw Nerves Publishers, 2008, 203–30. Print.

Ferguson, Roderick A. *Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of Color Critique*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 2004. Print.

Foucault, Michel. *The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1978–1979*. Trans. Graham Burchell. Ed. Michel Senellart. New York: Picador, 2008. Print.

Giffney, Noreen, and Myra J. Hird, eds. *Queering the Non/Human*. Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008. Print.

Gopinath, Gayatri. *Impossible Desires: Queer Diasporas and South Asian Public Cultures*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005. Print.

Grosz, Elizabeth. "A Thousand Tiny Sexes: Feminism and Rhizomatics." *Topoi* 12.2 (1993): 167–79. Print.

Gunkel, Henriette, Elahe Haschemi Yekani, Beatrice Michaelis, and Anja Michaelsen. "Anrufung und Affekt: Ein Gesprächstext über (Anti-)Rassismus und queere Gefühle." In *I Is for Impasse: Affektive Queerverbindungen in Theorie_Aktivismus_Kunst*. Ed. Käthe von Bose *et al*. Berlin: b_books, 2015, 101–16. Print.

Gutiérrez Rodríguez, Encarnación. "Intersektionalität oder: Wie nicht über Rassismus sprechen?" In *Intersektionalität Revisited: Empirische, theoretische und methodische Erkundungen*. Ed. Sabine Hess, Nikola Langreiter, and Elisabeth Timm. Bielefeld: transcript, 2011, 77–100. Print.

Halberstam, Judith Jack. *In a Queer Time and Place: Transgender Bodies, Subcultural Lives*. New York: New York University Press, 2005. Print.

Harney, Stefano, and Fred Moten. *The Undercommons: Fugitive Planning & Black Study*. Wivenhoe: Minor Compositions, 2013. Print.

Haschemi Yekani, Elahe. *The Privilege of Crisis: Narratives of Masculinities in Colonial and Postcolonial Literature, Photography and Film*. Frankfurt and New York: Campus, 2011. Print.

Haschemi Yekani, Elahe, and Henriette Gunkel. "Tribute to José Esteban Muñoz." In *W(h)ither Identity: Positioning the Self and Transforming the Social*. Ed. Johanna Fernández, Danae Gallo González, and Veronika Zink. Trier: WVT, 2015, 67–70. Print.

Haschemi Yekani, Elahe, Beatrice Michaelis, and Gabriele Dietze. "'Try Again. Fail Again. Fail Better': Queer Interdependencies as Corrective Methodologies." In *Theorizing Intersectionality and Sexuality*. Ed. Yvette Taylor, Sally Hines, and Mark E. Casey. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, 78–98. Print.

Haschemi Yekani, Elahe, Daniela Hrzán, Jana Husmann-Kastein, Carsten Junker, Karolina Krasuska, and Beatrice Michaelis. "Where, When, and How? Contextualizing Intersectionality." In *New Subjectivities: Negotiating Citizenship in the Context of Migration and Diversity*. Ed. Dorota Golańska and Aleksandra M. Różalska. Łódź: Łódź University Press, 2008, 19–47. Print.

Hemmings, Clare. "Affective Solidarity: Feminist Reflexivity and Political Transformation." *Feminist Theory* 13.2 (2012): 147–61. Print.

Hirsch, Marianne, and Evelyn Fox-Keller, eds. *Conflicts in Feminism*. New York: Routledge, 1990. Print.

Ignatiev, Noel, and John Garvey. "Abolish the White Race by Any Means Necessary." In *Race-Traitor*. Ed. Noel Ignatiev and John Garvey. Routledge: New York, 1996, 9–14. Print.

Kant, Immanuel. *An Answer to the Question: "What is Enlightenment?"* New York: Penguin, 2010 [1784]. Print.

Karakayali, Jule, Vassilis S. Tsianos, Serhat Karakayali, and Aida Ibrahim. "Decolorise it!" *ak – analyse & kritik. Zeitung für linke Debatte und Praxis* 575. Aki verlag für analyse, kritik und information, September 21, 2012. Web. June 24, 2014.

Kerner, Ina. "Verhält sich intersektional zu lokal wie postkolonial zu global? Zur Relation von postkolonialen Studien und Intersektionalitätsforschung." In *Postkoloniale Soziologie: Theoretische Anschlüsse – empirische Befunde – politische Interventionen*. Ed. Julia Reuter and Paula-Irene Villa. Bielefeld: transcript, 2010, 251–70. Print.

Kerner, Ina. "Questions of Intersectionality: Reflections on the Current Debate in German Gender Studies." *European Journal of Women's Studies* 19.2 (2012): 203–18. Print.

Klinger, Cornelia, Gudrun-Axeli Knapp, and Birgit Sauer, eds. *Achsen der Ungleichheit: Zum Verhältnis von Klasse, Geschlecht und Ethnizität*. Frankfurt: Campus, 2007. Print.

Knapp, Gudrun-Axeli. "'Intersectionality': ein neues Paradigma feministischer Theorie? Zur transatlantischen Reise von 'Race, Class, Gender.'" *Feministische Studien* 23.1 (2005): 68–81. Print.

Landström, Catharina. "Queering Feminist Technology Studies." *Feminist Theory* 8.1 (2007): 7–26. Print.

Lorde, Audre. *Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches*. Trumansburg: Crossing Press, 1984. Print.

Lorey, Isabell. "Weißsein und die Auffaltung des Immunen: Zur notwendigen Unterscheidung zwischen Norm und Normalisierung." In *Epistemologie und Differenz: Zur Reproduktion des Wissens in den Wissenschaften*. Ed. Bettina Bock von Wülfingen and Ute Frietsch. Bielefeld: transcript, 2010, 99–112. Print.

Lorey, Isabell. "Von den Kämpfen aus: Eine Problematisierung grundlegender Kategorien." In *Intersektionalität Revisited: Empirische, theoretische und methodische Erkundungen*. Ed. Sabine Hess, Nikola Langreiter, and Elisabeth Timm. Bielefeld: transcript, 2011, 101–18. Print.

Lutz, Helma, Maria Teresa Herrera Vivar, and Linda Supik, eds. *Fokus Intersektionalität: Bewegungen und Verortungen eines vielschichtigen Konzeptes*. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2010. Print.

Lutz, Helma, Maria Teresa Herrera Vivar, and Linda Supik, eds. *Framing Intersectionality: Debates on a Multi-faceted Concept in Gender Studies*. Farnham: Ashgate, 2011. Print.

Maihofer, Andrea. *Geschlecht als Existenzweise: Macht, Moral, Recht und Geschlechterdifferenz*. Frankfurt: Helmer, 1995. Print.

Manalansan IV, Martin F. "Queer Intersections: Sexuality and Gender in Migration Studies." *International Migration Review* 40.1 (2006): 224–49. Print.

Massey, Doreen B. *Space, Place, and Gender*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994. Print.

Massumi, Brian. *Parables for the Virtual: Movement, Affect, Sensation*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2002. Print.

McCall, Leslie. "The Complexity of Intersectionality." *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 30.3 (2005): 1771–1802. Print.

McClintock, Anne. *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest*. New York and London: Routledge, 1995. Print.

Michaelis, Beatrice, Gabriele Dietze, and Elahe Haschemi Yekani. "Einleitung: The Queerness of Things Not Queer: Entgrenzungen – Affekte und Materialitäten – Interventionen." *Feministische Studien* 30.2 (2012): 184–97. Print.

Mignolo, Walter D. "Epistemic Disobedience, Independent Thought and De-colonial Freedom." *Theory, Culture & Society* 26.7–8 (2009): 1–23. Print.

Mignolo, Walter D. *The Darker Side of Western Modernity: Global Futures, Decolonial Options*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011. Print.

Muñoz, José Esteban. *Disidentifications: Queers of Color and the Performance of Politics*. Minneapolis and London: University of Minnesota Press, 1999. Print.

Muñoz, José Esteban. *Cruising Utopia: The Then and There of Queer Futurity*. New York: New York University Press, 2009. Print.

Muñoz, José Esteban. "Race, Sex and the Incommensurate: Gary Fisher with Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick." In *Queer Futures: Reconsidering Ethics, Activism, and the Political*. Ed. Elahe Haschemi Yekani, Eveline Kilian, and Beatrice Michaelis. Farnham: Ashgate, 2013a, 103–15. Print.

Muñoz, José Esteban. "The Brown Commons." *Feminist Theory Workshop at Duke University*. YouTube, March 22, 2013b. Web. March 22, 2014.

Nancy, Jean-Luc. *Being Singular Plural*. San Francisco, CA: Stanford University Press, 2000. Print.

Pedwell, Carolyn, and Anne Whitehead. "Affecting Feminism: Questions of Feeling in Feminist Theory." *Feminist Theory*, Special Issue: "Affecting Feminism" 13.2 (2012): 115–29. Print.

Probyn, Elspeth. *Outside Belongings*. New York: Routledge, 1996. Print.

Puar, Jasbir K. *Terrorist Assemblages: Homonationalism in Queer Times*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2007. Print.

Puar, Jasbir K. "'I Would Rather Be a Cyborg than a Goddess': Becoming-Intersectional in Assemblage Theory." *philoSOPHIA: A Journal of Continental Feminism* 2.1 (2012): 49–66. Print.

Purtschert, Patricia, and Katrin Meyer. "Die Macht der Kategorien: Kritische Überlegungen zur Intersektionalität." *Feministische Studien* 28.1 (2010): 130–42. Print.

Sakai, Naoki. "Theory and Asian Humanity: On the Question of Humanitas and Anthropos." *Postcolonial Studies* 13.4 (2010): 441–64. Print.

Spelman, Elizabeth V. *Inessential Woman: Problems of Exclusion in Feminist Thought*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1988. Print.

Thomas, Peter D. "Solidarity and the Commons." *LuXemburg Online*, February 2011. Web. October 23, 2015.

Walgenbach, Katharina. "Gender als interdependente Kategorie." In *Gender als interdependente Kategorie: Neue Perspektiven auf Intersektionalität, Diversität und Heterogenität*. Ed. Katharina Walgenbach, Gabriele Dietze, Lann Hornscheidt, and Kerstin Palm. Opladen: Budrich. 2nd rev. edn. 2012, 23–64. Print.

Wiegman, Robyn. *Object Lessons*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012. Print.

Winker, Gabriele, and Nina Degele. *Intersektionalität: Zur Analyse sozialer Ungleichheiten*. Bielefeld: transcript, 2009. Print.

6 Transgender people negotiating intimate relationships

Damien W. Riggs, Henry von Doussa and Jennifer Power

Introduction

Given the relationship between discrimination and poor mental health, it is perhaps understandable that much of the research to date focusing on transgender people has concentrated on the mental health of this population. Such research has been important for documenting experiences of marginalisation and victimisation, and for identifying the needs of transgender people in terms of mental health service provision (see Riggs, Ansara & Treharne, 2014, for a summary). Yet this focus on discrimination and mental health only speaks of one – albeit significant – aspect of the lives of transgender people. Much overlooked are the experiences that transgender people have of negotiating intimate relationships. To contribute to the growing body of research that has sought to correct this imbalance, this chapter begins by first providing an overview of previous literature on the topic of transgender people and intimate relationships, before reporting on findings from an Australian qualitative study focused on the topic. Importantly, the findings suggest both that understanding transgender people's experiences of intimacy cannot occur absent of an understanding of the effects of discrimination, but that recognising the impact of discrimination does not explain all there is to know about transgender people's experiences of intimacy. Beyond the impact of both discrimination and cisgenderism, for many transgender people experiences of intimacy are fulfilling and meaningful. The chapter concludes with recommendations derived from these findings for clinicians who work with transgender clients.

Introduction to previous research

Transgender people's experiences of intimacy as documented in previous research tend to be divided into four themes. The first theme emphasises the effects of cisgenderism upon transgender people in terms of intimacy. The second theme documents the effects of gender dysphoria upon some transgender people's capacity to negotiate intimate relationships.

The third theme highlights the impact of medical aspects of transitioning upon some transgender people's experiences of intimacy. Finally, the fourth theme emphasises the unique and positive ways that many transgender people negotiate intimate relationships. These four themes are explored in turn.

Impact of cisgenderism upon intimacy

Cisgenderism is defined as the "the ideology that delegitimizes people's own understanding of their genders and bodies" (Riggs, Ansara & Treharne, 2014). Such delegitimisation takes a number of forms, and includes people referring to transgender people as not 'real' men or women, transgender bodies being treated as fetish objects and can include more generalised negative or violent responses towards transgender people.

In terms of transgender people's experiences of intimacy, research by Tobin (2003) suggests that, in some cases, cisgender partners of transgender people contribute to the delegitimisation of their partner's gender identity. This occurs, for example, when a transgender man is treated as female or referred to as such in intimate encounters with a cisgender partner. This often occurs when anatomy typically viewed as female (i.e. a clitoris, vagina or breasts) is referred to as such by cisgender partners, despite many transgender men re-gendering these body parts as masculine (a topic explored in more detail in the fourth theme below).

In terms of the fetishisation of transgender people, research by Riggs, von Doussa and Power suggests that many transgender people find it difficult to negotiate intimate relationships with cisgender partners due to the perception that their bodies are fetishised, which they see as a barrier to meaningful intimate relationships. Tompkins (2014) argues that, on the one hand, the treatment of transgender people as desirable solely on the basis of their transgender status is fetishising. On the other hand, Tompkins suggests that stating that a transgender person's status is irrelevant denies the lived realities of transgender people and ignores the specificity of transgender embodiment and intimacy. In between these two polarised positions, Tompkins suggests, can lie a genuine attraction by some cisgender people to people of a diverse range of embodiments, in which such diversity is respected without being fetishised.

Finally, in terms of the impact of cisgenderism, Gamarel, Reisner, Laurenceau, Nemoto and Operario (2014) suggest that negative societal attitudes towards transgender people impact upon transgender women's relationships with cisgender men. Specifically, they suggest that negative attitudes may be internalised by both transgender women and their partners, and that this can impact upon relationship satisfaction and mental health. As they suggest, a decrease in relationship satisfaction and reduced desire for intimacy can especially impact upon how transgender women view themselves and their bodies in terms of intimacy and self-esteem.

Effects of gender dysphoria upon intimacy

The language of 'dysphoria' in relation to transgender people is widely contested. Primarily, such contestation stems from the fact that the diagnosis of 'gender dysphoria' is seen as pathologising, and the requirement of diagnosis to access services is seen as marginalising. For many transgender people, however, a sense of dysphoria is keenly experienced and impacts upon willingness or capacity to enter into intimate relationships.

For example, Tobin (2003) suggests that some of his transgender participants were unwilling to enter into intimate relationships because of a sense of dissatisfaction or discomfort with their bodies. Importantly, some of his participants negotiated alternate ways of thinking about their bodies that allowed them to experience satisfaction in intimate encounters (a topic explored further in the final theme below). Nonetheless, for many of his participants, a sense of dysphoria reduced their capacity or willingness to even entertain the possibility of intimate encounters with other people.

An additional concern noted in previous research in terms of dysphoria, as documented by Doorduin and van Berlo (2014) in their research with transgender men, is that for many transgender people, feelings of dysphoria can also impact upon how intimacy is experienced. Doorduin and van Berlo suggest that some of their participants who had managed to negotiate intimate encounters with cisgender partners felt that during the experience they were not in control of their body and its responses to intimacy, and that this led to the encounter being akin to a rape. Importantly, as Doorduin and van Berlo note, "they felt not so much raped by their partners as raped by the *situation itself*" (original emphasis, p. 660). These findings demonstrate that for some people, the experience of dysphoria (which is arguably 'the situation' being referred to) has an extremely negative impact upon experiences of intimacy.

Effects of medical aspects of transitioning

For many transgender people, taking hormones and/or gender affirming surgeries are an important aspect of transitioning. Whilst this is not true for all transgender people, research documenting experiences of intimacy amongst transgender people has tended to include participants who have undertaken at least some aspects of medical transition. This research highlights two interrelated consequences of medical transition for expressions and experiences of intimacy: (1) changes to physical arousal and its impact upon sexual desire and sexual practices and (2) psychological and identity changes resulting from medical aspects of transitioning.

In terms of physiological changes, Doorduin and van Berlo (2014) report extensively on the differential effects of hormones upon transgender men and women. The latter, they suggest, often experience a decrease in sensitivity and arousal whilst the former experience greater sensitivity and desire for

intimacy. For some of the transgender women in their sample, the reduced degree of arousal was desirable, as in the past they had found erections to be distressing, whilst other transgender women in their sample found reduced arousal to be distressing. Another point of difference was that orgasms for transgender women who had commenced hormones tended to last longer than they had in the past, whilst for transgender men orgasms were briefer though more intense.

Brown's (2010) research with cisgender female partners of transgender men indicates that some such women struggle to adapt to changes in their partner's arousal as they go through medical aspects of transition. Specifically, some of the women Brown interviewed reported that their partners became more demanding and less emotionally connected to them during sex, which impacted negatively upon their relationship. For some cisgender women, then, medical aspects of transitioning as undertaken by their transgender partners are viewed as a barrier to intimacy.

Finally, in terms of changes wrought by medical aspects of transitioning upon intimacy, Hines (2007) suggests that for many of the older transgender women she interviewed, their relationships with their wives changed following medical transition. Hines suggests that the quality of the relationship changed, though not necessarily for the worse. For many of her participants, whilst there was a reduction or cessation of physical intimacy (and especially sex), there was often an increase in tenderness and the strength of the caring relationship between her transgender participants and their wives.

Unique and positive negotiations of intimacy

Emerging within research on transgender people and intimacy is a clear and consistent narrative that many transgender people find creative ways to negotiate intimacy both prior to and following transition, and that for many transgender people this leads to positive and fulfilling experiences of intimacy.

A strong narrative across research focusing on transgender men is the importance of being perceived of and treated as a man by intimate partners. Research by Tobin (2003) and Schleifer (2006), for example, suggests that for some transgender men, comfort with receptive vaginal intercourse with cisgender men becomes viable if the transgender man feels that they are viewed and treated as a man by their intimate partner.

This relationship between bodily comfort and being correctly perceived leads some transgender men to re-gender particular body parts so as to facilitate perceptions of their bodies that align with their gender identity. So, for example, both Brown (2010) and Edelman and Zimman (2014) report that some transgender men refer to their clitoris as a dick or their breasts as their chest, and thus use language to refer to sex acts that relate to this terminology (so referring to oral sex performed on a transgender man as a

'blowjob'). This re-gendering of particular body parts serves an important role in making intimate encounters viable for transgender people who may not yet have commenced or may not plan to commence medical aspects of transitioning.

Finally, Bolin's (1988) research undertaken with transgender women suggests that for women who have not undertaken gender affirming surgeries, the penis can be re-gendered as a female organ, and thus remain a source of pleasure that is not psychologically distressing. For many of Bolin's participants, whilst vaginoplasty was seen as desirable, it was also seen as potentially unlikely (particularly with regard to the costs associated with it). Finding positive ways to view their penis was thus an important approach to making space for intimacy and sexual fulfilment in their lives.

Research project

The findings reported in the following section are derived from a research project undertaken by the authors, which focused on Australian transgender people's experiences of parenting, relationships with families of origin and intimate relationships. The project involved both an online survey (see Riggs, von Doussa & Power for findings from the survey) and a series of interviews undertaken by the second author. Ethics approval for the project was granted by the second and third authors' institution. With regard to the interviews, participants were primarily sourced via the online survey. Upon completion of the survey participants were asked to indicate if they were willing to be contacted for a follow up interview to explore in greater depth the topics addressed by the research project. In addition to those participants recruited via this method (10), a further two participants were recruited via snowball sampling from one of the initial participants, and an additional participant was recruited via a call for participants disseminated via an email network.

In total, 13 interviews were undertaken. These followed a semi-structured interview protocol. The focus of the analysis below is on responses to a particular series of interview questions related to intimate relationships. Participants were asked to describe their experiences of negotiating and being in intimate relationships, including both positive and negative experiences. The interviews were transcribed verbatim by a paid transcription service. The first author then read responses to these interview questions repeatedly to identify common themes across the interviews, keeping in mind the themes identified above from previous research. Five themes were identified through this process. Of these, two aligned to a certain degree with previous research, namely (1) Negative effects of cisgenderism (with specific regards to the fetishising of transgender bodies) and (2) Negotiations of intimacy across transitioning. Three additional themes were identified: (1) Pragmatic decisions about non-intimacy, (2) Normative expectations in the context of intimacy and (3) Intimacy between

transgender partners. These five themes are now explored in turn, utilising selected representative extracts.

Findings

Negative effects of cisgenderism

Similar to previous research, participants who reported negative experiences of negotiating intimate relationships with cisgender partners emphasised how transgender people are at times treated as fetish objects. In the first extract below, Elizabeth notes that as she desires an accepting and honest relationship, she feels it is important to disclose her status as transgender. Doing so, however, means that she becomes vulnerable to people who would treat her as a fetish object, which means she is no longer seen as a person or a woman in their eyes:

> ELIZABETH: If I put myself on [an online dating site], they have only limited labels so you're identifying as transgender or transsexual or something like that. If I identify as that then you get typically some guy, quite often creepy guys that are interested in that as a fetish, as some sexual turn on thing and then I'm not a person or a woman anymore it's a real fetish thing. So it's a real conundrum because if I want to be open and honest, I want to get the person that I'm ultimately looking for, if I put on there as my real person they won't accept me for who I am, so it's just hard work it really is.

In the second extract below, Tom notes the same binary identified by Tompkins (2014), namely that if he actively names himself as a transgender gay man, then there is the possibility that his cisgender male partners may only be interested in him because he is transgender, rather than as a person (mirroring Elizabeth's concern above). On the other hand, not disclosing his transgender status would potentially deny the specificities of his embodiment as a transgender man:

> TOM: So when I did finally transition I did find it a lot more easier to make casual relationships I would say online, especially, because I found a lot more gay guys are just upfront about having a casual relationship. But I don't think that was so great for my self esteem because the way I was doing it was setting myself up as a novelty, as like a trans guy, so I'm different from other guys. I would have people who were interested in me just because I was trans rather than interested in me as a person. So again that wasn't particularly satisfying and for a long time I was mostly single.

These two extracts highlight the specific challenges that transgender people face when attempting to negotiate intimate relationships. Importantly, these challenges are the product of cisgenderism and the ways in which

transgender bodies are delegitimised or seen in stereotyped ways. These extracts also highlight the double-edged sword of openness: both research and community advocates emphasise the importance of disclosure to potential cisgender partners so as to avoid negative responses (Belawski & Sojka, 2014). Yet the accounts provided by Elizabeth and Tom suggest that disclosure may not always lead to trans-positive acceptance: it may instead lead to fetishisation.

Negotiations of intimacy across transitioning

The extracts included in this theme again echo previous research in terms of highlighting the effects of hormones upon transgender people's experiences of intimacy. In the first extract, Sarah suggests that hormones render 'relationships post transition in technicolour', an evocative description of the power of hormones to change both a person's physicality and also their experience of their physicality:

> SARAH: Before I transitioned most of my emotions were like, suppressed, put behind a dam wall so to speak. I didn't want to deal with them, I couldn't deal with them. And after I transitioned that dam wall started to crack and break and emotions started pouring out. So my relationships became more intense and with the new hormones through my body my body became more sensitive so intimate relations so to speak were heightened a lot. So I would say that my relationships post transition like, in technicolour or high definition whereas before they were standard definition. It was just like, they were much more crisp and real.

Hamish, in the following extract, also emphasises hormones as producing a new form of 'intensity' in regards to embodiment, but also that transitioning meant that he had to adjust not just physically, but also psychologically to different ways of being in the world:

> HAMISH: So, what does transitioning mean for me now? Well it's an interesting journey. I think because I'm still earlier on in the journey, it continues to change and evolve, but I think when I first came out, I wasn't passing at the time and I didn't really get noticed a lot by gay men. That's very different now. So, it is, it's a huge adjustment to be honest. Look, it's an adjustment with the hormones, because the hormones are intense and it's been an adjustment in terms of my physicality and the cultural differences of coming from like a lesbian community to a gay male community is very different. It's highly sexualised; it's much more physical based.

An important recommendation often made to transgender people as they transition is to prepare themselves for the challenges that come with moving social groups. Whilst as critical scholars we might decry claims to essentialist

gender differences, there is nonetheless a truth, as expressed by Hamish, in the *socialisation* of particular groups. In other words, without relying upon an essentialist notion of what it means to be 'male', we can acknowledge, along with Hamish, that the experience of moving from one particular social group ('lesbian community') to another ('gay community') brings with it differing demands in terms of negotiating intimate relationships.

Pragmatic decisions about non-intimacy

To a degree, the present theme echoes the findings of Hines (2007), in that her older female transgender participants reported that physical intimacy often declined or ceased between participants and their wives. Different in the present theme, however, is the arguably pragmatic decision by some of our, again older female, participants to eschew intimate relations, and to instead focus on other aspects of their lives that gave them meaning:

> STACEY: Something that came up in conversation today was the question of "What's your sex life like?" [On a community panel recently] three of us pretty much identified as asexual in that it's not a huge driver in our lives. We've had so many other issues to address that throwing that into the mix is so irrelevant. In terms of looking for another partner I've got no interest in that whatsoever. One of the other panel members has got no interest in that whatsoever. Each of us have had long term relationships that have ended for various reasons. In two of our cases we remain very good friends with our partners. One was same sex, mine was heterosexual and what we've decided anecdotally is that there's far less emphasis on sexual relationships of any description. We're far more interested in living full lives in terms of our professional lives, our friend networks than looking for sex and I think in the public's imagination the only reason we are like we are is because we're looking for some sort of compatible sex partner and I think that's a fallacy. That's a bit of mythology going on there. It's only anecdotal and we've compared notes on various circles of friends that each of us have it's very low on the agenda, incredibly low.

As Stacey notes, amongst her cohort of friends, the perception that transgender women all seek sexual partners is a fallacy. Instead, her emphasis is on other determinants of a 'good life'. Frances too, in the following extract, emphasises the importance of focusing on the good already in her life, though to a degree her shift away from a focus on intimate relationships leaves her nonetheless feeling lonely:

> FRANCES: I'm actually quite lonely. I would have to just perhaps admit you know, I'm quite lonely and I have always been lonely because I have never had, you know, a nice relationship since [I was with my

> child's] mum and we were really loving you know… It's a small demographic you know, it's a narrow demographic you know, of like transwoman interested in lesbian woman or other transwomen. And you know, maybe if I tried harder, I don't try very hard, you know, like, I'm on this social networking site and if I pay money, which I'm too stingy to pay the money… There's a number of women that are saying they would like to meet me, I don't know. I don't know why I don't do it. It might be $70 really well spent, who knows. But look, we're off to [an event] on Thursday, my son and I and although you know, I haven't had an intimate friendship through the people I've met at [the event previously], I have met really nice people my age who I really like. And look, that's okay, that's kind of just about enough for me I think. You know, you can't have everything?… I've got a lot now and it's sort of like, I just - there's something about not expecting everything. That sort of, I think it's the way I think. It's like, you're doing pretty well Frances, you've got a lot of good things happening and good friendships you know. Do I need to get into some strange fucking, you know, needy kind of relationship with a person whose needs sort of overtake my own and those of my - relationship with my son. You know, disrupt this calm, you know, and this established lifestyle? You know, my painting is like my girlfriend. You know, I'm with her all the time, always thinking about her. I'm always mixing colours in my mind, you know. You know, I'm not really - it's not making me very sad really but sometimes I've just got a bit of a hole there.

The account provided by Frances exemplifies our use of the word 'pragmatic'. Whilst some participants like Stacey above provided no clarifiers to the choice of celibacy, other participants like Frances emphasised that whilst technically they had chosen celibacy, they did so in order to avoid heartbreak, or being treated as a fetish object, being rejected by potential partners, or just avoiding the complications and demands that can come with an intimate relationship. This is clear in the emphasis by Frances upon feeling lonely, despite all that she has in her life. To a degree, then, whilst we respect the decisions made by participants such as Stacey and Frances, we also raise the question as to the degree to which some decisions are made in a context of cisgenderism and where older transgender women in particular may struggle to negotiate accepting and affirming intimate relationships (Riggs & Kentlyn, 2014).

Normative expectations in the context of intimacy

The extracts identified as part of this theme all centre upon normative expectations placed upon men's and women's bodies, both by participants and by their intimate partners (or a combination of both). Such expectations became especially problematic for some participants when their desires didn't

necessarily accord with what is normatively expected of their bodies. In other words, normative expectations associated with bodies read as female and bodies read as male conflicted with the desires of some participants to be treated as, or to be able to engage intimately as, men or women. In the first extract below, Janet emphasises that her desire to be a sexually dominant woman seeking intimacy with men means that she encounters particular 'types' of men who don't accord with what she is seeking:

> JANET: I like my sex drive and I like having sex, but I don't like getting fucked up the arse, I'm a bit of a top so I kind of sexually am a little bit limited with guys. I either find two lots of guys: I find guys that just want me to fuck them up the arse and my idea of a man isn't someone taking up the arse, I mean no problem with that, it's kind of fun, but I want my man to be a man if I'm going to be the woman. What else, then I'd either get the guy who wants to fuck me hard and I don't like it up the arse so of course that wasn't going to do it for me either. Then everyone goes well, why don't you go and get [gender affirming surgery] like most of my friends went and did and I'm like I don't think that's kind of working either.

Perhaps particularly important in this extract is the injunction that Janet experiences from her friends, namely to 'solve' the problem she faces in meeting appropriate men by having gender affirming surgery. This type of injunction to surgery reduces Janet's desire to a particular normative form of embodiment required of women who desire men, rather than encouraging alternate ways of thinking about intimate relationships between men and women, and how they may be configured sexually. Hamish too, in the following extract, highlights how normative expectations placed upon him by people who read him as female had previously limited his relationships with men:

> HAMISH: I identified I guess probably as a straight girl up until about 19, at which point I realised that my sexuality wasn't as clear cut as that. And I think probably looking back in retrospect, that's when some of this stuff actually started to come up, but I just didn't have names for it. And what I knew was at the time that I would have relationships with men who sexually were compatible, all that stuff worked, but what didn't work was the energy around it and I'm a driven and ambitious kind of person and I felt very stymied by the role that I was expected to play as a woman in those relationships. It didn't work for me and it didn't work in my relationships with men and so I just think in my early 20s I was quite confused about what that meant and who I was and like I said, I didn't have a language, I didn't know trans men existed for a very long time.

Perhaps different to Janet's account of the expectations of others, the account provided by Hamish emphasises the utility of speaking with other

transgender people, which allowed Hamish to understand his identification as transgender, and from there to be able to explore relationships with other men in which he was recognised and treated as a man (as outlined in the previous extract from Hamish). Different altogether from Janet and Hamish, however, is Zoe's account below, which emphasises her own normative expectations of how she should be treated by a male partner:

> ZOE: Whenever I think about – like at this point in time, where I am – relationships, I guess the thing, for me, would be that – I guess this is probably sexist on my own part. I have this image that came to me one day. I woke up with it so strong in my mind. Is that having my hair quite long in a ponytail, and it's over to one side and standing at the kitchen sink doing dishes, and man coming up and putting his arms just around my waist. That's just what I want. That's just what came to me. That image, that daydream, whatever it was, made me happy. I guess that's what my fantasy would be.

To a certain degree, understanding and validating the accounts of some transgender women runs counter to what we might understand as a feminist account of gender relations. To a degree, we might, in general, argue for a non-normative account of relationships between men and women: one that doesn't reinforce gender stereotypes (and this was certainly the case in regard to Janet's account). At the same time, however, it is vitally important to acknowledge that for some transgender women (and men), a normative experience of gender relations is what is desired, and perhaps indeed needed. The account provided by Zoe thus challenges the normative imposition of non-normative understandings of gender relationships between men and women upon transgender people, and instead encourages a revisiting of the role of gender norms in the lives of some transgender people.

Intimacy between transgender partners

This final theme speaks to the positive and supportive relationships that some transgender people enter into with another transgender person. In the one extract included in this theme, Tom speaks about the positives of being in a relationship with another transgender man, but importantly, he also acknowledges the differences between transgender people.

> TOM: [What is good about my relationship with my partner is that] he is another trans guy. Like we have that understanding and with other people, people can get it really well. Like they can understand being trans but I suppose there is always that sort of barrier where they don't fully appreciate what it means or what you go through and just having someone there for that support and has helped both of us I think. Also I think he's helped me reconcile being trans a lot more because whereas before I was not really meeting any other

> trans people or really having much contact with them at all and it was like living a double life. I would go off to work when no-one knew I was trans and I would come home and I would just be by myself and that sort of thing and it was just sort of like as secret from my life or just something from my past. Whereas now I feel like I can be a lot more open about being trans and I've met a lot more other trans people as well.

As noted above, this extract is important because it highlights both the strengths of intimate relationships between transgender people, but also reminds us that the 'transgender community' is heterogeneous: it is comprised of people of varying experiences, interests and desires, and that two transgender people in a relationship does not mean that there will not be significant differences in terms of experiences. Nonetheless, as Tom's account demonstrates, intimate relationships between transgender people can foster a sense of being understood, of self-acceptance and of feeling connected to a broader community.

Conclusion

The findings presented in this chapter make a significant contribution to the developing focus on intimacy within the field of transgender studies. As suggested at the beginning of this chapter, a focus on intimacy (amongst other topics) is important, so as to provide a rich and holistic account of transgender people's lives, rather than solely focusing on mental health outcomes and their relationship to discrimination. Nonetheless, the findings presented in this chapter indicate that for the large part, transgender people's experiences of intimacy – particularly in relation to partnerships with cisgender people – must be located within the broader context of cisgenderism and the specific forms of discrimination that transgender people encounter. Whilst it is vitally important that the intimacies that transgender people diversely negotiate and experience are celebrated, it is also important to remember that such intimacies, even at their most positive, are often implicitly framed by gender norms and normative expectations of gendered embodiment.

In terms of clinical responses to the findings presented in this chapter – a focus for us as researchers and clinicians in the fields of public and mental health – there are many take home messages. The first has already been stated above, namely that understanding intimacies as experienced by transgender people must involve an awareness of the effects of cisgenderism: how it shapes individual's understandings of their bodies, how it constrains available ways of understanding and how it marginalises transgender people. At the same time, the findings indicate ways that clinicians can work with transgender clients to develop alternate ways of understanding their own bodies. Of course, many transgender people already do this, and discuss with their peers ways of re-gendering particular body parts. But as

some of the interviewees indicated, not all transgender people are connected into transgender communities, and those who are may sometimes receive normative responses (such as the injunction to undertake gender affirming surgery). Knowledgeable and informed clinicians thus have a role to play in sharing information about alternate ways of thinking and talking about bodies.

In terms of the responses that transgender people receive from potential intimate cisgender partners, the findings presented in this chapter suggest that caution is warranted in regard to clinicians automatically assuming that the disclosure of transgender status will be productive. Whilst clinicians may presume that disclosure is a key way to ensure the safety of transgender people negotiating intimate encounters, this may not always be the case. Instead, it would appear important for clinicians to engage with transgender clients to weigh up multiple, potentially competing, factors when deciding whether or not to disclose. These may include potential risks to physical or psychological safety, the mode of meeting (online or in real life), previous discussions undertaken with potential partners (which may indicate attitudes held by them) and risk management plans (such as taking a friend along or meeting in a public place). Importantly, our suggestion here is not that transgender people should necessarily always be on guard when it comes to disclosing their transgender identity. In an ideal world, this should never be necessary. It is to suggest, however, that caution may be warranted in advocating for disclosure in all cases.

Echoing previous research, the findings also emphasise the importance of ensuring that transgender clients who are commencing hormone therapy understand the possible side effects, especially with regard to intimacy. Whilst generalisations must be undertaken with caution, research findings appear to indicate a relatively stable set of changes that occur for transgender men and women in terms of sensitivity in the genital region, desire for intimacy and experiences of intimacy. Without adequate preparation, these types of changes may be alarming and distressing for some transgender people. Discussing fully these possible changes is thus an important part of an informed consent model of transgender health care.

Conversely, it is also important to acknowledge that some transgender people may adopt a celibate or asexual identity upon transitioning. Indeed, of the survey conducted as part of this research project, 6.3% (10/160) of the sample identified as asexual (Riggs, von Doussa & Power). This should not be taken as indicating that transitioning was ill advised. Rather, it indicates that, as with any major life change, priorities will likely be re-evaluated, and the (often pragmatic) decision to focus on other things that give life meaning is valid and should be supported. This does not mean that, over time, some transgender people who for a period are asexual or celibate may not decide upon another path. Rather, it acknowledges that for those people who do adopt celibacy or asexuality, this requires support and understanding rather

than the imposition of normative understandings of what constitutes 'appropriate' expressions of sexuality (Chasin, 2015).

Applying research findings to professional practice

- Those who work with transgender clients (including transgender clinicians themselves) must be mindful of the importance of engaging with transgender people's experiences of intimacy.
- Importantly, clinicians who undertake formal assessments of transgender people to support hormones and/or gender affirming surgery potentially already do this as part of a broader psychosocial assessment. The topic of intimacy in such assessments, however, is potentially developmentally normative and focused on evidence of dysphoria. In a sense, this focus is not inherently positive, and may indeed contribute to a negative perception of intimacy amongst some transgender people.
- Clinicians are behooved to also incorporate a positive focus on intimacy when working with transgender clients, so as to support such clients into the future to live fulfilling and meaningful intimate lives as they determine them to be.

References

Belawski, S.E., & Sojka, C.J. (2014). Intimate relationships. In L. Erickson-Schroth (Ed.), *Trans bodies, trans selves: A resource for the transgender community.* New York, Oxford University Press.

Bolin, A. (1988). *In search of Eve: Transsexual rites of passage*. London, Bergin & Garvey.

Brown, N.R. (2010). The sexual relationships of sexual-minority women partnered with trans men: A qualitative study. *Archives of Sexual Behavior*, *39*(2), 561–572.

Chasin, C.J. (2015). Making sense in and of the asexual community: Navigating relationships and identities in a context of resistance. *Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 25*, 167–180.

Doorduin, T., & van Berlo, W. (2014). Trans people's experience of sexuality in the Netherlands: A pilot study. *Journal of homosexuality*, *61*(5), 654–672.

Edelman, E.A., & Zimman, L. (2014). Boycunts and bonus holes: Trans men's bodies, neoliberalism, and the sexual productivity of genitals. *Journal of homosexuality*, *61*(5), 673–690.

Gamarel, K.E., Reisner, S.L., Laurenceau, J.P., Nemoto, T., & Operario, D. (2014). Gender minority stress, mental health, and relationship quality: A dyadic investigation of transgender women and their cisgender male partners. *Journal of Family Psychology*, *28*(4), 437.

Hines, S. (2007). *Transforming gender: Transgender practices of identity, intimacy and care*. Bristol, Policy Press.

Riggs, D.W., Ansara, Y.G., & Treharne, G.J. (2014). An evidence-based model for understanding transgender mental health in Australia. *Australian Psychologist*, *50*, 32–39

Riggs, D.W., & Kentlyn, S. (2014). Transgender women, parenting, and experiences of ageing. In M. Gibson (Ed.) *Queering maternity and motherhood: Narrative and theoretical perspective.* Toronto, Demeter Press.

Schleifer, D. (2006) Make me feel mighty real: Gay female-to-male transgenderists negotiating sex, gender, and sexuality. *Sexualities*, *9*(1), 57–75.

Tobin, H.J. (2003). Sexuality in transsexual and transgender individuals. Honors Thesis, Oberlin College.

Tompkins, A.B. (2014). "There's no chasing involved": Cis/trans relationships, "Tranny Chasers," and the future of a sex-positive trans politics. *Journal of Homosexuality*, *61*(5), 766–780.

10

INTRODUCING BLACK FEMINIST PHILOSOPHY

Kristie Dotson

Introduction

In her article, "Coalition Politics: Turning the Century," Bernice Johnson Reagon advocates for leaving a legacy of one's liberatory praxis when she writes:

> The thing that must survive you is not just the record of your practice, but the principles that are the basis of your practice. If in the future, somebody is gonna use that song I sang, they're gonna have to strip it or at least shift it. I'm glad the principle is there for others to build upon.
>
> (2000 [1983]: 366)

Reagon articulates not only what people laboring for social change need to leave behind, but also what those who inherit their work should expect to receive. That is to say, those of us who are concerned with social and political change should aim to "throw . . . [ourselves] into the next century," as she suggests, by leaving our practice and our principles (Reagon 2000 [1983]: 365). And those of us who are on the receiving end of messages from previous centuries should, at the very least, work to identify the principles that lay within inherited practices. Accordingly, when exploring Black feminist philosophy this is often what one must do, that is, uncover philosophical positions left for us to discover.

In this chapter, I introduce U.S. Black feminist philosophy by tracing two lessons that can be identified from Black feminist philosophy in that context. They include: (1) oppression as a multistable, social phenomenon; and (2) part of some Black women's experiences of oppression concerns the occupation of negative socio-epistemic space. These two observations gesture to an understanding that liberation agendas require grappling with an ongoing politics of spatiality. These two lessons and their implication can serve as a starting point for the beginner to Black feminist philosophy as they draw on historical and contemporary inquiries in Black feminist thought. Not only do these lessons span over a century of Black women's social theory, including Anna Julia Cooper (1998 [1891–1892]) and Fannie Barrier Williams (2007 [1900]; 1905), but they also remain salient in many Black feminist theoretical positions today. In what follows, I will highlight the above two lessons that can be found in Black feminist philosophy in a US context.

The Multistability of Oppression

There have been and there will continue to be attempts to create metaphors for experiences of oppression where singular analytics fail. Very few feminist and gender scholars are not familiar with critiques from Black feminists on the difficulty of fitting their experience of oppression into categories demarcated by one vector of vulnerability, e.g., gender-based oppression and/or race-based oppression. From Anna Julia Cooper's train station (1998 [1891–1892]), to the Combahee River Collective's idea of interlocking (1995 [1978]), to Frances Beale's double jeopardy (1995 [1969]), to Deborah King's revision of the jeopardy paradigm with her conception of multiple jeopardy (1995 [1988]), to Hortense Spillers' interstices (1984), to Kimberlé Crenshaw's intersection (1989), and beyond, there have been attempts to create metaphors capable of capturing experiences of oppression that seem to twist, turn, twirl, and jump so as to resist being tracked. That Black feminist thought has, and continues to, attempt to track oppression experienced according to multiple aspects of social existence cannot be disputed. However, there seems to be relatively little recognition of what these attempts imply about an overall understanding of oppression as a social phenomenon. That is to say, much of Black feminist philosophy can be said to commit to an underlying assumption that social phenomena, like oppression, are multistable. And the understanding of oppression as multistable puts demands on our theorizing about social phenomena.

The Combahee River Collective's "A Black Feminist Statement," first published in 1978, offers a portrait of the rhetorical landscape within which one can recognize tensions in conceptions of oppression, which one might take as a beginning philosophical problematic about the nature of social phenomenon. The Collective open their famous "Statement" with the call for an:

> *Integrated analysis* and practice based upon the fact that the major *systems* of oppression are interlocking. The *synthesis* of these oppressions creates the conditions of our lives. As Black women we see Black feminism as the logical political movement to combat the manifold and simultaneous oppressions that all women of color face.
>
> (1995 [1978]: 232; emphasis added)

There are two conceptions of oppression conflicting with one another in this passage. There is oppression defined as multiple, interlocking systems and oppression as a holistic, simultaneous experience. These two conceptions of oppression are not wholly compatible. But that the Collective deploy them one after the other indicates a rather sophisticated overall understanding of oppression that has heretofore gone largely unacknowledged. In what follows, I will outline these two clashing conceptions of oppression and the first lesson from US Black women's social theory, i.e. that oppression is a multistable phenomenon.

A System-Based Conception of Oppression

According to the earlier cited passage, oppression can be seen to have several characteristics. It can be seen to be composed of (1) various systems that (2) interlock to create comprehensive wholes. These "wholes" are manifold or varied. This range of descriptors—i.e. systems-based, interlocking, and manifold—can be aligned and realigned in a number

of ways to gesture to different overall understandings of oppression. The most common reading is to trace the descriptors—systems-based, interlocking, and manifold—to an additive approach to understanding oppressions. This interpretation can harken to a remnant of critiques of Francis Beale's "Double Jeopardy" (1995 [1969]), which attempts to promote the recognition of the interrelations of race-based and gender-based oppressions, along with a much-overlooked emphasis on class-based oppressions. The jeopardy paradigm would give rise to the use of "triple jeopardy," to indicate race, class, and gender-based oppression and, as some claim, a fourth jeopardy in sexuality-based oppression. Because the jeopardy model grew by "adding-on" other systemic forms of oppression, the jeopardy paradigm is often considered to be an additive approach. This interpretation largely results from placing emphasis on the descriptor, "systems-based." If oppression is composed of diverse systems of jeopardy that interlock and complicate one another, for example, then oppression, itself, can also be functionalized thus.

Oppression, then, can be seen to function according to diverse systems of jeopardy that interlock and complicate one another. The descriptors—systems-based, interlocking, and manifold—seem to fix oppression as a conglomerate of diverse, discrete systems that represent different and complicated sites of jeopardy according to a functionalization by description. Certainly this kind of reading can be supported by the passage "[we] see as our particular task the development of integrated analysis and practice based upon the fact that the major systems of oppression are interlocking," (The Combahee River Collective 1995 [1978]: 232). First, the use of the plural term, "oppressions," and, second, the call for "integrative analysis and practice" imply, for some, that the underlying conception of oppression is one in which discrete systems, which can be analyzed separately (even if only in theory), are locked together in ways that make sites of jeopardy manifold. Varying remarks throughout the text separating sexual oppression from race oppression, for example, further evidence this understanding of how oppression is conceptualized in the Collective's "Statement." That these "oppressions" are, at times, separated from a holistic account of oppression is notable and can be found in the text. This has made many content with the system-based conception of oppression, which most identify with The Combahee River Collective and the jeopardy paradigm.

Although the systems-based conception of oppression is likely the most familiar reading of the Collective's understanding of "interlocking oppression" and, to a certain extent, of the jeopardy paradigm, this is but half of the story of how the term "oppression" is used in the Collective's "Statement." It is also the least defensible, insofar as it lends itself to a *disintegrative* analysis that is done for the sake of an integrative analysis. That may be precisely what the Combahee River Collective, Frances Beale, and many other Black women social theorists in an US context are attempting to compromise due to problematic oversights that such a functionalized model of oppression promotes, e.g. not just race, not just gender (Smith 1998). It is fortunate, then, for Black feminists who inherit this work, that this is not the only way oppression is conceptualized in "A Black Feminist Statement."

An Experiential Conception of Oppression

The second conception of oppression that is present in the Collective's "Statement" can be seen to follow from, first, the following passage, "The synthesis of these oppressions creates the conditions of our lives" (1995 [1978]: 232) and, second, the fact that for the bulk of the essay oppression is invoked *not* as the plural, "oppressions," but as a singular

term "oppression." This second conception of oppression, I claim, is experience-based, not systems-based. That is to say, emphasis is put on the simultaneity of one's experience of oppression, which is not easily discernable according to a systems approach. As the Collective write, "we often find it difficult to separate race from class from sex oppression because in our lives they are most often experienced simultaneously" (The Combahee River Collective 1995 [1978]: 234). The term "simultaneity" is used to describe the experience of oppression. And the synthesis of oppression, which harkening to experience can promise, involves another dimension of oppression that cannot be captured by understanding oppression as interlocking systems.

It is the understanding of oppression as a holistic phenomenon, as experience-based and not given to discrete systems that can be analyzed separately, that informs the Collective's call for "identity politics." Identifying oppression as experience-based also required harkening to the reality that addressing oppression will need to track *possible ranges of experiences of oppression*. As one member of The Combahee River Collective recalls:

> I think we came up with the term "identity politics." I never really saw it anywhere else . . . But what we meant by identity politics was a politics that grew out of our objective material experiences as Black women . . . So there were basically politics that worked for us . . . It gave us a way to move, a way to make change. It was not the reductive version that theorists now really criticize. It was not being simplistic in saying I am Black and you are not. That is not what we were doing.
>
> (Harris 2009: 28)

Understanding oppression as outlined by one's range of experiences with oppression changes the formulation of oppression from "discrete systems, which can be analyzed separately, and yet are locked together in ways that make sites of jeopardy manifold" to a range of experiences that can condition one's life according to simultaneous jeopardization. *Jeopardy*, a noun, turns into *jeopardize*, a verb. This latter conception is compatible with Beale's usage of *jeopardize*, as her primary deployment of the term "jeopardy" is the verb "jeopardize." Oppression can be understood, then, according to ranges of jeopardization and the range of one's jeopardization can often be tracked according to one's "read-able" social identities in a given geo-political space. What is important to note is that oppressions (plural) transforms into oppression (singular), for the Collective.

One of the differences between the "integrative analysis" of a system-based conception of oppression and the "synthesis" of an experience-based conception of oppression lies in one's reasons to deploy either conception. A systems-based conception of oppression can be used to find bridges across different experiences of oppression, but it contributes precious little to *comprehending* ranges of jeopardization. In fact, it does much to obscure such ranges. An experience-based conception of oppression can aid in identifying ranges of jeopardization, but often obscures sites of coalition. This is not a simple difference. Those invested in an experience-based conception of oppression often think that sites of coalition are merely illusions, whereas those persuaded by a system-based conception of oppression often find the identification of experiential difference distracting, at best, and irrelevant, at worst. These positions are not easy to reconcile. And it is not clear that reconciliation is a necessary goal. Rather, as is evidenced by the Combahee River Collective's text, each conception can be allowed

to exist simultaneously. They can exist side-by-side, clashing horribly at times, but present in a way that calls for a philosophical reading of an operative assumption concerning the nature of oppression, which underwrites the unproblematic deployment of two clashing conceptions of oppression.

The Collective's attempt to examine the "multilayered texture of Black women's lives," takes place among conceptions of oppression that they both utilize and challenge. They complicate the "system or experience" dichotomy that so often plagues reconstructions of Black feminist thought, by refusing to choose one conception over another. They challenge a system-based conception by identifying that their experiences of oppression do not fold nicely into neat analytics, while affirming the necessity of systems-accounts as socialists interested in the articulation of "the real class situation of persons who are not merely raceless, sexless workers, but for whom racial and sexual oppression are significant determinants in their working/economic lives" (The Combahee River Collective 1995 [1978]: 235).

The systems-based theory can work when we are distinctly referring to systems of oppression, and they exist. But such an approach fails miserably to track the range of jeopardization one might face. The Collective affirm an experience-based conception of oppression when they forward that "we know that there is such a thing as racial-sexual oppression that is neither solely racial and solely sexual," even while they proclaim the need to consider system-based analyses (The Combahee River Collective 1995 [1978]: 234, 235). What does this intentional conceptual clashing imply about an overall understanding of oppression? I claim that The Combahee River Collective can be seen to have operated with an understanding that oppression is a multistable social phenomenon.

Lesson 1: Oppression is a Multistable Phenomenon

In its simplest formation, an assumption concerning oppression invoked in The Combahee River Collective's "A Black Feminist Statement" is: oppression is complicated. It admits of no privilegeable conceptions that do not also obscure through the privileging. Multistability, here, refers to "an empirically testable hypothesis about how several stable patterns of the same object can be perceived from the first person perspective" (Whyte 2015: 69). Oppression is a multistable social phenomenon. That means that oppression, as it persists, can give rise to numerous different patterns of persistence that can be empirically verified. Taking oppression as a multistable phenomenon is to say that it admits of an open range of "topographic" possibilities (Ihde 1977: 77). Oppression in a given society, on the ground, will have multiple ways one can understand it, and these multiple ways will have a certain "apodicticity" (Ihde 1977: 71). That is to say, one's certitude that oppression simply "is" a certain way or originates from such and such a place, or can be understood according to such and such an orientation, can be experientially fulfilled time and again. This is not simply to say that we see what we want to see, although this is certainly part of it. Rather, oppression admits of a number of interpretations and a number of manifestations and a number of conceptions. How a multistable phenomenon is interpreted *in space* will depend on a variety of factors, not the least of which will be one's "perspectival perception," one's goals (Ihde 2009: 12), including, but not limited to, cultural inheritances, cognitive commitments, and embodied location. The way oppression is perceived will also depend on its social effect and one's relations to it (Frye 1983).

It is no surprise that a middle-class, able-bodied, heterosexual, Christian, English-speaking, Black man who is a long-time citizen in the United States might identify race as "the" primary form of oppression and privilege a systems-based conception of oppression. Accordingly, it is also hardly surprising that I cannot make sense of what it would mean to be oppressed as Black or as a Woman without having a "conceptual" difficulty akin to the difficulty inherent in resolving the mind/body problem. Where do the "raced" parts end and the "woman" parts begin? And how do they interact? When attempting to comprehend the range of jeopardization I face as a Black woman in the United States, I privilege an experiential-based conception, but not in all cases and not consistently. And it should be noted that there are more ways of conceiving of oppression than either system- or experience-based in Black feminist thought. This reality, that oppression holds stable for empirically testable hypotheses across a range of patterns, gestures to an aspect of oppression that is largely overlooked—although not, I would claim, by the Combahee River Collective. There is simply oppression; and it is multistable admitting of a range of conceptualizations, functionalizations, and manifestations.

I believe that this is what many of the theories of oppression in Black women's writings in the US have been aiming to highlight. Anna Julia Cooper's "Woman vs. the Indian" (1983 [1891–1892]), Fannie Barrier Williams' "The Colored Girl" (1905), Frances Beale's, "Double Jeopardy" (1995 [1969]), Pauli Murray's "The Liberation of Black Women" (1995 [1970]), Audre Lorde's "There is No Hierarchy of Oppression" (2009 [1983]), Deborah King's "Multiple Jeopardy" (1985 [1988]), Kimberlé Crenshaw's "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Gender" (1989), Carole Boyce Davies's *Black Women, Writing and Identity* (1994), Carla Peterson's *"Doers of the Word"* (1995), Patricia Hill Collins' *Fighting Words* (1998), Valerie Smith's *Not Just Race Not Just Gender* (1998) and Kimberly Springer's *Living for the Revolution* (2005)—all of these Black women (and many more) have attempted to articulate some metaphor for oppression that can signify the complex ways oppression jeopardizes the lives of Black women, and yet leave room for the realization that oppression is a multistable social phenomenon. Unfortunately, the clashing conceptions of oppression in these texts are often read as a lack of theoretical sophistication, instead of resting on an important insight into the nature of oppression itself. Namely, that oppression holds within its structure the ability to manifest *stably* differently at different times to different people.

Identifying an orientation that oppression is multistable within The Combahee River Collective's clashing conceptions of oppression is not mere conjecture on my part. Identity politics is underwritten by a realization of a real danger in *not* owning one's social identity and how it affects one's understanding of oppression. They write concerning identity politics:

> We believe that the most profound and potentially the most radical politics come directly out of our own identity, as opposed to working to end somebody else's oppression. In the case of Black women this is a particularly repugnant, dangerous, threatening, and therefore revolutionary concept because it is obvious from looking at all the political movements that have preceded us that anyone is more worthy of liberation than ourselves . . . to be recognized as human, levelly human, is enough.
>
> (The Combahee River Collective 1995 [1978]: 234)

This passage draws attention to the often-cited and still under-appreciated statement that "all the women are white, all the Blacks are men" (Hull, Scott, and Smith 1982). This is not a statement of fact. It is a statement of the power to determine dominant narratives of gender-based or race-based oppression. And those narratives are experientially confirmable for certain portions of those populations, but they lead to rendering unintelligible ranges of jeopardization faced by Black women, for example. This is not a surprise: analytics of oppression do work to obscure experiences of oppression complicated by complex social existences. So-called ill-meaning Black men or evil white women are not the sole cause of such misreadings, although there may have been some. Rather, the nature of oppression as multistable encourages such overdetermination, but it also demands more open-ended approaches. This is where I situate the clashing conceptions of oppression in "A Black Feminist Statement." It is a performance of open-endedness required to acknowledge the multistable nature of oppression so as to resist practices of misreading encouraged by the multistability of oppression itself. These performances of openness are common in Black feminist thought, although they are often read as theoretical incontinence.

The next lesson from Black feminist philosophy that I will identify can be posited as a way to understand why the clashing conception of oppression in "The Black Feminist Statement" was largely ignored and, through reductive critiques of identity politics, erased.

Possessing Negative Socio-Epistemic Status

In her book, *Invisibility Blues*, Michele Wallace argues that one of the primary values of Black Women's literature is its ability to render "the negative" presence of Black women substantial (1990: 228). Claiming that Black women are the "other of the other," Wallace (1990) will, I think, appropriately identify a "fear" of a kind of theory in some Black feminist intellectual traditions that is a response to the ways that abstract theorizing about oppression has rendered invisible Black women's experiences of oppression. Black women, in Wallace's estimation, exist in varying states of negation fostered by, in part, the ways Black women's experiences have been overwritten with narratives where they no longer recognize themselves. Wallace, here, is picking up on a common topic in many US Black women's social and political writings that dates back, at least, to Maria Stewart (1832).

The epistemic violence that often hinders one's ability to "make sense" of claims made by and about Black women has been heavily remarked upon. From Fannie Barrier Williams' pronouncement that Black women are "unknowable" (1905) to Paule Murray's understanding of Jane Crow dynamics (1995 [1970]), to Deborah King's articulation of Black women's theoretical invisibility (1995 [1988]: 43–45), to Kimberlé Crenshaw's description of how Black women can be "theoretically erased" (1989: 139). To shed light on Wallace's point and this understanding of Black women's "problematic" occupation of socio-epistemic space in an US context, I will articulate Fannie Barrier Williams' claim that Black women are "unknowable." Williams articulates two fronts on which Black women are unknowable and then turns to offer an account of what is at stake in being unknowable.

At the turn of the twentieth century, Williams explains that Black women were unknowable "qua woman" and "qua race." In her article, "The Woman's Part in the Man's Business," she writes:

> The American Negro woman is the most interesting woman in the country . . . She has no history, no traditions, no race ideals, no inherited resources, no established race character. She is the only woman in America who is almost unknown.
>
> (Williams 1907: 544)

To say that Black women, in a US context, were almost "unknown" was not to indicate that there were no stereotypical images of Black women in existence. Williams is well aware of negative portrayals of Black women as she writes numerous articles defending Black women in the face of transient public opinions. However, what provoked Black women's general "unknowability" was a paucity of resources within "fixed public opinion" that one could draw upon when interpreting Black women (Williams 2007 [1900]: 54). I take "fixed public opinion" to be something akin to a "social imaginary." Lorraine Code explains that a social imaginary is a "conceptual analytic resource" that refers to

> [i]mplicit but . . . effective systems of images, meanings, metaphors, and interlocking explanations-expectations within which people, in specific time periods and geographical-cultural climates, enact their knowledge and subjectivities and craft their self understandings.
>
> (Code 2006: 29)

The concept of a social imaginary points to the ways that social perceptions are influenced, and the underlying understandings that fashion them. Black women, according to Williams, could not be known via available prevailing social narratives. And though Williams was aware that Black women were subject to social stereotypes, those stereotypes were only one part of the problems Black women faced. She explained that another very real problem for Black women also followed from a lack of available resources within established social imaginaries useful for understanding the lives and plights of Black women.

According to Williams, Black women were situated in a peculiar place. They were not wholly subject to prevailing narratives around race, nor were they wholly subject to prevailing narratives around womanhood. Williams explained, in her article "The Colored Girl," "Man's instinctive homage at the shrine of womankind draws a line of color, which places . . . [the colored girl] forever outside its mystic circle" (1905: 400). She believed that Black women had no male defenders and no prose or literature written to sing the virtues of Black women. It may seem irrelevant to say that there are no poems and literature written in homage to Black women. But what Williams appears to be drawing attention to is a kind of negative socio-epistemic status that is marked by pervasive absence, and not a masked presence. Where Ralph Ellison will express eloquently through the voice of the nameless narrator of *The Invisible Man*, "I am invisible, you understand, simply because people refuse to see me . . . it is as though I have been surrounded by mirrors of hard, distorting glass" (1995 [1947]: 3), Williams expresses a similar edict by indicating that "she is invisible, you understand, because there is no way for her to be seen" (1905: 400).

It is not clear that Williams sees her position as being surrounded by mirrors of any kind. The mirrors are all positioned to reflect other groups, distorting their images, but leaving her image in darkness. So Williams, when speaking of social uplift, expresses

the need to address the negative socio-epistemic space Black women exist in within US social imaginaries. Let me suggest that the liminal, outsider-within status that many Black feminists have identified around Black women as a social group within the US parallels Williams' conception of the "unknowability" of Black women (see, for example, Collins 1986; Peterson 1993).

Now there is much about this account that is dated. First, there are and were Black male defenders of Black women. There have also been great strides in cultural production by and about Black women in the US. However, fixating on these clearly dated features misses a larger commonality that Williams shares with more contemporary Black feminist scholars such as Wallace. What survives the cultural production phases of self-determination is an ongoing identification of erasure. What a paucity in fixed public imaginaries harkens to is, at base, a struggle for intelligibility that cannot be satisfied with "controlling images" or "stereotypes," if they are also transient. The problem that Williams and Wallace identify in common is being the "other of an other," which is obviously not a reduction to the same. It is a relegation to a null, *transient space of signification*. A dynamic space, where one can construct Black women as the welfare queen or the mammy; the diseased maid or the emasculating matriarch; or with whatever purpose Black women are introduced into a given narrative.

The effect of being unknowable is hardly limited to an inability to be detected within "fixed" social imaginaries. For Williams, there was a more profound effect of (what Wallace calls) Black women's varying states of negation. Williams writes:

> That the term "colored girl" is almost a term of reproach in the social life of America is all too true; she is not known and hence *not believed* in, she belongs to a race that is best designated by the term "problem" and she lives beneath the shadow of that problem which envelops and obscures her.
>
> (1905: 400; emphasis added)

Again, contrast this quote with a question posed by W. E. B. Du Bois, who opens his book, *The Souls of Black Folks*, with the question, "How does it feel to be a problem?" (1995 [1905]: 43). Williams situates herself, and other Black women, by asking the question, "How does it feel to exist beneath the shadow of a problem?" Du Bois, a Black man subject to semi-permanent race ideas and conceptions of race character, can have the state of embodying "a problem." Williams, on the other hand, as a Black woman is denied that possibility. Williams recognized the ability to positively "embody" an identity, held by both white women and Black men, as a marker of status. What status, you might ask? I want to suggest that deep-seeded "distortions" actually offer a positive socio-epistemic status. Positive, here, simply means social presence or broad detectability. Williams is not alone in making this observation. Kimberlé Crenshaw will make much of anti-discrimination cases where Black women are seen as too special a class to be subject to anti-discrimination correctives either due to the fact that they were not discriminated against because they were Black or because they were women, but because they are Black women, for example (Crenshaw 1989). This kind of erasure, which Deborah King calls "being socialized out of existence," is precisely what Williams is attempting to draw attention to in 1905.

Books such as Melissa Harris-Perry's *Sister Citizen* highlight the problem of being "socialized out of existence" or, as Wallace prescribes, existing in varying states of

negation as an ongoing problem for many Black women in the US (Wallace 1990; King 1995 [1988]: 45; Harris-Perry 2011). This is not an accident. There are conditions for the possibility of social presence, i.e. the ability to resist Williams' unknowability, and they concern occupying positive socio-epistemic space. Lesson two, then, is simply that erasures can be affected when one exists in varying states of negation, even if (and, quite possibly, especially if) that negation is theoretically inscribed so as to affect social imaginaries. It is important to note that social imaginaries are by no means uniform and universal. As a result, the occupation of negative socio-epistemic is not itself a uniform or universal state of existence. This is why Wallace identifies it as "varying states of negation." Occupation of negative socio-epistemic space is a dynamic condition that is heightened and lessened depending upon context.

Conclusion: Towards a Politics of Spatiality

If oppression is multistable (given to perspectival perceptions *on the ground*) and if part of Black women's experience of oppression follows from inhabiting a negative socio-epistemic space, then Black women's liberation will need to address far more than material concerns and far more than our own material concerns. One must also address the politics of spatiality that the multistability of oppression and the necessity of positive socio-epistemic space highlight. A politics of spatiality, here, refers to tracking dominant narratives of oppression (and the understandings and pivots on which those dominant forms are tracking or obscuring) and the machinations and composition of negative socio-epistemic space in any given geo-political landscape. Addressing problems that result from the multistability of oppression and the occupation of negative socio-epistemic space would require radical reconceptualizations of how we occupy space as part of a liberation agenda**.**

The call for this kind of reconceptualization can be seen in Anna Julia Cooper's 1891 article, "Woman vs. the Indian." Cooper offers an anecdote aimed at clarifying her position as a Black woman in the US. She talks of frequenting a train rest stop, with a main foyer area and two clearly labeled rooms. One dingy, lonely room was labeled "FOR LADIES." And another equally depressing room was labeled "FOR COLORED PEOPLE." Cooper briefly describes her confusion. To which room did she belong? The Ladies' room? The "Colored" People's room? What room should she occupy and at what costs? Cooper describes her awareness of the puzzle presented her when she simply stands in place and asks the reader, "What a field for a missionary woman?" (1983 [1891–1892]: 95). The irony of her question should not be lost. One of the points of Cooper's story is that there *is no field* for a Black woman, missionary or otherwise. The marked failure to find "space" where one belongs speaks to many of the concerns raised in Black feminist thought. Let me suggest, then, that the almost rabid focus on "homes" and "home life" as a strategy for social uplift within US Black feminist thought (see, e.g., Smith 1983; hooks 1990; Omolade 1994; Peterson 1995; Tate 2003) is not indicative of an internalization of the "cult of womanhood" ideals, nor is it an outgrowth of some imagined "bourgeois" self-deception.

What Black feminist social theorists such as Williams and Cooper identified was that Black women had no clear spatial placement. This observation has been reaffirmed and extended in the twentieth and, now, twenty-first centuries to also include an absence of theoretical placement (Crenshaw 1989: 139). The spatial nature of the descriptions

that Cooper and Williams offer of Black women's situation with respect to oppression should not go unnoticed. For Williams, Black women were "beneath," "beyond," and "outside" of US social imaginaries. For Cooper, Black women simply did not have a "field" or space that lent to interpreting Black women's place in American social landscapes. But, as local as this account has been, this is far from a local problem. Oppression is multistable wherever it occurs. And there are populations all over the world occupying negative socio-epistemic space, which is inherently unstable when one allows this notion to travel. Imagining justice and feminist agendas, then, requires that one harken to the politics of spatiality in a given geo-political context, and this will require open-ended, dynamic theorizing.

Further Reading

Collins, Patricia Hill (2000 [1990]) *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment*, 2nd ed., New York: Routledge.

Guy-Sheftall, Beverly (Ed.) (1995) *Words of Fire: An Anthology of Black Feminist Thought*, New York: New Press.

Hull, Gloria, Scott, Patricia Bell, and Smith, Barbara (Eds.) (1982) *All the Women Are Whites, and All the Blacks Are Men, but Some of Us Are Brave*, New York: Feminist Press.

James, Stanlie, Foster, Frances Smith, and Guy-Sheftall, Beverley (Eds.) (2009) *Still Brave: The Evolution of Black Women's Studies*, New York: The Feminist Press.

Smith, Barbara (Ed.) (1983) *Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology*, New York: Kitchen Table Press.

Related Topics

Feminism and borderlands identities (Chapter 17); epistemic injustice, ignorance, and trans experience (Chapter 22); the genealogy and viability of the concept of intersectionality (Chapter 28); critical race theory, intersectionality, and feminist philosophy (Chapter 29); feminism and power (Chapter 54).

References

Beale, Frances M. (1995 [1969]) "Double Jeopardy: To Be Female and Black," in Beverly Guy-Sheftall (Ed.) *Words of Fire: An Anthology of Black Feminist Thought*, New York: New Press, 146–155.

Code, Lorraine (2006) *Ecological Thinking: The Politics of Epistemic Location*, New York: Oxford University Press.

The Combahee River Collective (1995 [1978]) "A Black Feminist Statement," in Beverly Guy-Sheftall (Ed.) *Words of Fire: An Anthology of Black Feminist Thought*, New York: New Press, 343–355.

Collins, Patricia Hill (1986) "Learning from the Other Within: The Sociological Significance of Black Feminist Thought," *Social Problems* 33(6): 14–32.

—— (1998) *Fighting Words: Black Women and the Search for Justice*, St. Paul, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Cooper, Anna Julia (1983 [1891–1892]) "Woman Versus the Indian," in Charles Lemert and Esme Bhan (Eds.) *The Voice of Anna Julia Cooper: Including a Voice from the South and Other Important Essays, Papers, and Letters*, New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 88–108.

Crenshaw, Kimberlé (1989) "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics," *University of Chicago Legal Forum* 1: 139–167.

Davies, Carole Boyce (1994) *Black Women, Writing and Identity: Migrations of the Subject*, New York: Routledge.

Du Bois, W. E. B. (1995 [1905]) *The Souls of Black Folk*, New York: Signet Classic.

Ellison, Ralph (1995 [1947]) *The Invisible Man*, New York: Random House.

Frye, Marilyn (1983) *The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory*, Freedom: Crossing Press.
Harris, Duchess (2009) *Black Feminist Politics from Kennedy to Clinton*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Harris-Perry, Melissa (2011) *Sister Citizen: Shame, Stereotypes, and Black Women in America*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
hooks, bell (1990) *Yearning: Race, Gender and Cultural Politics*, Boston, MA: South End Press.
Hull, Gloria, Scott, Patricia Bell, and Smith, Barbara (Eds.) (1982) *All the Women Are Whites, and All the Blacks Are Men, but Some of Us Are Brave*, New York: Feminist Press.
Ihde, Don (1977) *Experimental Phenomenology: An Introduction*, New York: Capricorn Books.
——(2009) *Postphenomenology and Technoscience: The Peking University Lectures*, Albany, NY: SUNY Press.
King, Deborah R. (1995 [1988]) "Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context of a Black Feminist Ideology," in Beverly Guy-Sheftall (Ed.) *Words of Fire: An Anthology of Black Feminist Thought*, New York: New Press, 294–317.
Lorde, Audre (2009 [1983]) "There Is No Hierarchy of Oppression," in *I Am Your Sister: Collected and Unpublished Writings of Audre Lorde*, Ed. Rudolph P. Byrd, Johnnetta Betsch Cole, and Beverly Guy-Sheftall, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 219–220.
Murray, Pauli (1995 [1970]) "The Liberation of Black Women," in Beverly Guy-Sheftall (Ed.) *Words of Fire: An Anthology of Black Feminist Thought*, New York: New Press, 186–197.
Omolade, Barbara (1994) *The Rising Song of African American Women*, New York: Routledge.
Peterson, Carla L. (1993) "Doers of the Word: Theorizing African American Women Writers in the Antebellum North," in Joyce Warren (Ed.) *The (Other) American Traditions: Nineteenth-Century Women Writers*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 183–202.
——(1995) *"Doers of the Word": African-American Women Speakers and Writers in the North (1830–1880)*, New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Reagon, Bernice Johnson (2000 [1983]) "Coalition Politics: Turning the Century," in Barbara Smith (Ed.) *Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology*, New York: Kitchen Table Press, 343–355.
Smith, Barbara (Ed.) (1983) *Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology*, New York: Kitchen Table Press.
Smith, Valerie (1998) *Not Just Race, Not Just Gender: Black Feminist Readings*, New York: Routledge.
Spillers, Hortense (1984) "Interstices: A Small Drama of Words," in Carol Vance (Ed.) *Pleasure and Danger: Exploring Sexuality*, Boston, MA: Routledge, 86–88.
Springer, Kimberley (2005) *Living for the Revolution: Black Feminist Organizations, 1968–1980*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Tate, Gayle T. (2003) *Unknown Tongues: Black Women's Political Activism in the Antebellum Era, 1830–1860*, East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University Press.
Wallace, Michele (1990) *Invisibility Blues: From Pop to Theory*, New York: Verso.
Williams, Fannie Barrier (1905) "The Colored Girl," *The Voice of the Negro* 2(6): 400–403.
——(1907) "The Woman's Part in a Man's Business," *The Voice of the Negro* 1(7): 543–547.
——(2007 [1900]) "The Club Movement among Colored Women of America," in Henry Louis Gates Jr. and Gene Andrew Jarrett (Eds.) *The New Negro: Readings on Race, Representation, and African American Culture, 1982–1938*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 54–58.
Whyte, Kyle P. (2015) "What Is Multistability? A Theory of the Keystone Concept of Postphenomenological Research," in Jan Kyrre Berg, O. Friis, and Robert P. Crease (Eds.) *Technoscience and Postphenomenology: The Manhattan Papers*, New York: Lexington Books, 69–82.

WHO's MIND, whose future? Mental health projects as colonial logics

Tanya Titchkosky[a] and Katie Aubrecht[b]

[a]*Department of Social Justice Education, OISE, University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada;*
[b]*Department of Family Studies & Gerontology, Mount Saint Vincent University, Halifax, Canada*

This paper examines the Mental Health Improvements for Nations Development of the World Health Organization (WHO), or what it refers to as its MIND project, as it produces versions of human and human suffering. Arising at approximately the same time as decolonization began to occur, the WHO can be read as reflective of colonial history as well as a colonizing force in postcolonial times. Through an analysis of the WHO's publicly available material, we shall show how the MIND project is not only a product of, but also helps to produce the power of coloniality. In the WHO MIND project, professional disability knowledge is used to identify an emergent mental health crisis in need of Western medical intervention. Guided by Fanon's call to notice how assistance makes a subject 'thoroughly fit into a social environment of the colonial type,' we examine the role of disability knowledge in the production of people 'fit' to survive in environments that reproduce coloniality. We show how the WHO MIND project can be read so as to reveal the restrictive and exclusive versions of the human that have arisen from the colonial past as our way to attempt to disrupt the developmental trajectory of the coloniality of the present.

> Positive mental health is linked to a range of development outcomes . . . [and] is fundamental to coping with adversity. On the other hand, poor mental health impedes an individual's capacity to realize their potential, work productively, and make a contribution to their community. In order to improve population mental health, WHO MIND supports countries to implement programmes to ensure that effective treatment, prevention, and promotion programs are made available to all people who need them. (WHO, 2013b)

> Almost three quarters of the global burden of neuropsychiatric disorders occurs in low- and middle-income countries. We can measure the costs to individuals, families, societies, and economies. And the costs of these disorders, which tend to have an early onset and are chronically disabling, are enormous. Taking action makes good economic sense. These disorders interfere, in substantial ways, with the ability of children to learn and the ability of adults to function in families, at work, and in society at large. (WHO, 2010)

This paper examines publicly available documents produced by the WHO regarding its 'Mental Health Improvements for Nations Development,' otherwise known as the WHO MIND project.[1] As the quotations that open this paper demonstrate, the MIND project asserts a direct link between population health and national development, and promotes

the connection of national development to a particular way of conceptualizing and treating mental health issues. Yet, postcolonial studies have taught us to understand that every description of a problem contains within it an evaluation of and prescription for the problem so described (Bhabha, 1994). Thus, every international attempt to solve social problems contains within it a representation of the world and its people in need of such assistance. Informed by both postcolonial and disability studies, our interpretive sociological analysis of the texts of the WHO MIND project will show how it imagines human problems in terms of how nations and their populations can be made to fit within current dominant political and economic structures. We will show how the MIND project's concept of problem people (re)produces a version of human suffering as a symptom of international disorder (DelVecchio Good et al., 2008, pp. 18–22). We read these descriptions of, and prescriptions for, the world and its people as an enunciation (Bhabha, 1994; Titchkosky, 2007) of the history of colonialism and thus as carrying forward the animating interests of this history. By resisting the notion that the WHO transcends its own history prescribing a decolonized future, we aim to show that the MIND project's textual (re)production of humans and human suffering as global problems reflects the interests of a colonial past while also carrying forward these colonial interests into what might (mistakenly) appear to be decolonized present.[2] According to Michael Fischer (2009, p. 261):

> We live (again) in an age in which the very institutions of humanitarian intervention are suspected of complicity, when the humanitarian industry all too often follows military intervention . . . creating new vortices of power and intrigue, before moving on to the next urgent call, the next crisis, the next firestorm of emotion and outrage.

Still, our analysis of its texts also makes it possible to trace the 'performativity of language in the narratives of the nation' (Bhabha, 1990, p. 3). We will show how the WHO MIND conception of human problems inscribes in global consciousness an image of the nation as the outcome of capitalist labour relations.

The emergence of the WHO

Posing the problem of mental health as a sign of a real and potential crisis in a nation's development, and international order, suggests a mutually constitutive relationship between 'security, commerce and disease' (King, 2002, p. 763). Nicholas King remarks that, 'Although often characterized as an humanitarian activity, modern public health as practiced in the United States and other Western industrialized nations has long been closely associated with the needs of national security and international commerce' (2002, p. 763).

The WHO integrated the Health Division of the former League of Nations, the Office International D'Hygiene Publique in Paris and the Pan-American Sanitary Bureau in 1947–1948 (Routley, 1947, p. 226). The League of Nations heralded a transition in thinking from the international to the global in which a discourse of the 'world' began to pose a challenge to the importance of international as frame of reference (Bashford, 2006, p. 69). In the aftermath of World War I, the League-imposed Mandate System enshrined the idea of international control (Logan, 1928), concealing the expansion of colonial policy and power. The Mandate System was designed to deal with the 'problem' of 'territories that were liberated from German and Ottoman colonial authority but

considered to be not yet capable of self-government' (Matz, 2005, p. 54). Developed out of the New York Charter of 1946 (Routley, 1947, p. 494), the WHO was a direct result of a UN-organized International Health Conference (Broster, 1962, p. 787). The WHO constitution was signed by 61 countries and became an official agency of the UN in 1948 (Broster, 1962, p. 787). Although it claims to be a 'global' organization, only UN member countries are entitled to WHO services and aid, and each member state must pay an annual fee to the UN according to a fixed scale. Furthermore, WHO member countries must also bear the cost of International Health Regulations (IHR, 2005), which 'develop core capacities to detect, assess, report, and respond to any public health event that might have international effects, regardless of type or origin of event' (Katz et al., 2012, p. 1121).

According to Maxwell Charles Hardiman (2012, p. 1041), 'Since entering into force in 2007, the IHR have provided a legally binding global framework to support national and international programs and activities aimed at preventing, protecting against, controlling, and providing a public health response to the international spread of disease.' Disease, here, is understood in relation to disruption to economic productivity.[3] The focus of the WHO MIND project on mental illness is unique given that global health security initiatives have typically targeted infectious diseases (Brown & Bell, 2008). The Mandate System can be understood as a way to deal with the '*dis*-ease' that troubles the WHO MIND, most notably, how to achieve modernization and industrialization with fit bodies while also preventing the 'ill effects' (Sloan, 1996, p. 29) of resistance and revolution.

Despite the fact that most countries subject to the WHO MIND project are historically demarcated as postcolonial, their situation is over-determined by the interests of bureaucratically organized world powers such as multi- and transnational corporations, the UN, World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the WHO. In recognition of the fact of the history of colonialism, it is necessary to examine the WHO MIND project literature through terms that focus on the unjust controlling forces of our times, in this case, the 'coloniality' of power. By coloniality (Mignolo, 2000), we mean governing processes that objectify human life as a problem in need of Western control and also make humans into economic units viable for Western profit (see also Césaire, 2000/1972; Fanon, 1967/1952).

This focus on the coloniality of power allows us to address the political and economic significance of the ways millions of people are described (as in the opening quotations) as an unfortunate and emergent mental health crisis deemed in need of Western medical intervention. Thus, we follow Sylvia Wynter (2003, p. 260) who says that, 'any attempt to unsettle the coloniality of power will call for the unsettling of this overrepresentation . . . (i.e. Western bourgeois) conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself.' Attending to how human problems and their solutions are articulated within the context of global mental health projects can reveal the role that public presentations of professional disability knowledge play in developing conceptions of the 'human.' Health management can be read as a new form of imposed order on postcolonial countries. This is achieved through the implementation of systems of surveillance and control ('treatment') administered by local governments but coordinated by global organizations such as, but not restricted to, the WHO (see Roy, 2010). Systems such as the IHR augment social inequalities. Putting them into practice requires access to rarefied languages, disciplinary knowledge and technologies designed, managed and, in the case of pharmaceuticals, patented, by Western powers. This is why we find it necessary to interrogate the power relations that make it possible for the WHO to define

disability as a problem hindering national development, and whose solution makes disability fit within a singular conception of a healthy economic milieu.

We continue by showing *how* the WHO's commitment to minding the minds of others is one way empire now invades consciousness making for a version of people as fit, productive citizens able to actualize a nation's development trajectory as imagined by Western powers. We read the WHO MIND project as a form of governance and profit venture that gives rise to a restrictive version of the human and we do so as a way to play some small part in disrupting the developmental trajectory of the coloniality of power and its version of the future. We hold that by examining conceptions of disability while acknowledging the colonized history from which these conceptions emerge, and into which they flow back, we can address de-humanizing conceptions of our lives together. This means that one task for a more globally oriented disability studies (Goodley, 2012; Grech, 2012) is to come to know how dominant Western-centric conceptions of disability operate in the public sphere, and how their authority is activated, and often accepted at face value in news releases, executive summaries of public reports, and in fact sheets such as those produced by the WHO. Given that knowledge and economic systems carry with them the history of colonialism, and recent postcolonial interventions that view nationalism 'as a version of colonialism' (Dirlik, 2002, p. 428), we hope that re-thinking helping-relations to the disabled other will, to borrow from Shaun Grech, stop the 'solution' from so easily becoming the 'problem' (2009, p. 777).

Postcolonial theory: re-grounding the facts

Today it is said that:

> Across the globe 450 million people suffer from a mental or behavioral disorder. The estimate is that one in five persons will suffer from a mental illness in a given year. (WHO, 2011b, p. 5)
>
> The World Health Organization (WHO) projects that depression will be the number one global burden of disease by 2030, surpassing heart disease and cancer, and anticipated to be the number two burden by 2020. (The NGO Committee on Mental Health, 2012)
>
> Given the pervasive nature of mental illnesses, inaction results in higher cost and lower productivity. Many corporations have identified mental illness and substance use issues as a major source of the loss of productivity. In many developed countries, 35 percent to 45 percent of absenteeism from work is due to mental health problems (WHO, 2011b, p. 6)

These are some of the basic reigning 'facts' organizing mental health programs aligned with the WHO MIND project. These facts, in ready circulation, describe mental illness as a thing, thus rendering it measurable; such things strike many people and are a growing economic burden; such people represent a cost, a burden, as well as a drain on productivity. The global and local character of work environments (shadowed everywhere by profit extraction) are not objectified in this manner by the WHO. Yet, the '450 million people who suffer from a mental or behavioral disorder' are knowable, measureable, treatable and unquestioningly regarded as a burden to profit and even the root cause of economic loss. This is an ordinary, taken-for-granted contemporary way of knowing problems and the individuals who bear them. Now, how to wonder about what we seem to know too well?

Let us begin from a basic but provocative quandary. Anything we *know* about the world has been made possible by the world; and, moreover, what we know about the contemporary world is steeped in and reflective of the world's colonialist history. By colonialist history we mean all the material ways that the category 'human' has been socially invented, dispossessed and disciplined as productive things, 'thingified' as Césaire (2000/1972, p. 42) would say, in the name of colonial and capitalist expansion. All forms of knowing are thus regarded here as carrying conceptions of humans as well as human problems born of the colonial past, and make possible a future that governs humans as profit units while discounting the aim of collective wellbeing. This notion of knowing as already made possible by the world of which it is a part is articulated by Fanon, among others (such as McKittrick, 2006; Walcott, 2009; Wynter, 2003). In Fanon's 'The Fact of Blackness' (1967/1952), we read that he, the Black man, always arrives 'Too late. Everything is anticipated . . . Too late!' (p. 121), too late into a system of humanism that *qualifies* the Black man as participant on the basis of the colonial project. According to Fanon, 'every ontology is made unattainable in a colonized and civilized society' (p. 109). In understanding the system of humanism, Fanon describes the *where* of arrival (spatiality) – in our terms, the Global South versus the Global North – as no less important than the *when* of arrival. Any sense of decolonized space or time is reliant on something more than the transformation of individual minds, as the WHO would have it.

In his reading of Fanon, Bhabha suggests that this means that any individual's late arrival into the protective enclave of the human and its rights can be examined for 'the temporality of modernity within which the figure of the "human" comes to be *authorized*' (1994, p. 339, italics in original). While the WHO MIND project regards 'inaction' (not implementing its recommended health measures) as leading only to a failure in national development, postcolonial theorists such as Bhabha suggest exploring such programs for what version of 'man' is being authorized and for what kind of system of authority it establishes.

How we know the 'individual,' know what their problems look like, or know appropriate treatments, has much to do with the ruling orders organizing contemporary time and space and thus can be examined, as Wynter suggests (2003, p. 260), for the 'conception of the human, Man, which overrepresents itself as if it were the human itself,' in this case human problems understood as disturbing development, and made beyond question. One way that people arrive into the enclave of the human and also continue to be barred from it, is through the orders of mental health and the capitalist relations they enforce. Thus, the WHO speaks on behalf of the corporation, saying 'Many corporations have identified mental illness and substance use issues as a major source of the loss of productivity' (WHO, 2011b, p. 6).

The global citizen is produced by the colonial enterprise and so the need to explore the ways in which the WHO projects that aim to improve mental health for national development contributes to the reproduction of Western-centric social systems.

We now continue our exploration of the WHO literature in order to further assess the type of human life the WHO has in MIND, the imagined ideal subject as this relates to ideals of national development.

WHO's MIND and its irrational other

Constituted at the edges of the authorized human, mental incapacity, mental illness and other forms of impairment are of concern for international world powers who understand

them/us mostly as a pre-existing quantitative entity, that is, as a 'global burden,' a 'looming epidemic,' a significant problem of, in, and for the developing world. For example, consider the 'In Commemoration of World Mental Health Day Global Mental Health, WHO Action Plan 2013–2020: Integrating Physical and Mental Health' announcement:

> The 2011 UN Summit on Non-Communicable Diseases (NCDs) addressed the rapid increase of chronic illnesses and the need to focus on primary care to develop effective prevention and intervention steps, including the need for behavioral and mental health strategies. The May 2012 World Health Assembly Resolution to develop country wide mental health programs and the drafting of the recent draft WHO Global Mental Health Action Plan to implement strategies are essential to curbing this looming epidemic, as well as from the trauma and emotional disorders arising from violence, war, and conflict that not only threaten global well-being, but the economies of all nations. (The NGO Committee on Mental Health, 2012)

This understanding of the burden, prevalence, growth and impact of mental health disorder has been articulated and treated as a threat to the wellbeing of developing nations for some time now. In 2007, the WHO launched its MIND project aimed at reflecting the basic concern that Mental health Improvements are central to Nations' Development. This program is accompanied by, among other programs, an action plan, as detailed above. Whether mental health and illness do or do not reflect the burden, prevalence, growth and economic impact that the WHO (2011b) evidences is not our concern. Instead, we are concerned with how the WHO represents others as irrational – *they* don't have a modernist approach that understands that disability needs rehabilitation, rights, technology, techniques, and treatment regimens (manufactured and sold by the West). In this regard, the various WHO reports acknowledge many medical doctors, professors and other professionals and also say that they wish 'to acknowledge the generous financial support of the Governments of Australia, Finland, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, and Norway, as well as the Eli Lilly and Company Foundation and the Johnson and Johnson Corporate Social Responsibility, [of] Europe' (WHO, 2003, p. iii). Countries need to do the right thing, that is, make disability an objective medical matter, locate disability more clearly on the borders of the authorized and productive human, and clearly demonstrate both the numbers and expense of disability as a way to work toward reducing the problem. All this is understood as rational action. The WHO supports countries which abide with this understanding, as referenced in the 2011 World Mental Health Day publication, 'The Great Push: Investing in Mental Health': 'The point we [WHO] are trying to make this year: for societal advancement, mental health services are essential. The lack of mental health services is not just negligent; in economic terms, it is irrational' (WHO, 2011b, p. 3). The prescription to get rational relies, of course, on grasping the world as divided between the rational mind of the WHO and its irrational nations.

The 'real' of societal advancement and nations' development is tied to an understanding of persons with disabilities as an economic disorder that calls for bureaucratically ordered medical management. This is the 'reality' delivered by the colonial project and that helps to enable its operations. For example, the modern creation and use of an umbrella term to identify and manage 'the deserving poor,' which now includes 'the disabled,' reflects a version of knowing and governing others demarcated as productive and unproductive populations (Davis, 1995, p. 2; Foucault, 1977). Within the contemporary context of postindustrial capitalist expansion, the economic logic of the 'real' is difficult to resist. The WHO statement above suggests that resistance to Western

medical institutional expertise, practice and policy is both careless and irrational. Investing in mental health does not only 'make sense' (WHO, 2011b, p. 5), 'it is the right thing to do' (p. 5); 'investing in mental health is a "best buy"' (p. 3); and, 'The bottom line: Not investing in mental health is very expensive!' (p. 6). The sensibility of societal advancement is supported with reference to studies for and by corporations conducted in 'developed countries':

> Given the pervasive nature of mental illnesses, inaction results in higher cost and lower productivity. Many corporations have identified mental illness and substance use issues as a major source of the loss of productivity . . . In the UK, one survey showed that people with psychosis took an average of 45 days a year off work. (WHO, 2011b, p. 6)

In our terms, the WHO's representation of mental difference and distress reinforces the authority and necessity of Western knowledge and power. As Dubgen (2012, p. 66) asserts:

> remedies aimed at rectifying injustice in the transnational realm must address not only injustices in the economic and political realm, but particularly in the epistemic sphere of representation. If development aid fails to do so, it does nothing to transform central features of the underlying frameworks that generate injustices in the first place.

What, then, are the defining features of the underlying frameworks of the WHO's MIND? Through various moves that define the reality of disability, split between 'the Enlightened' and 'the ignorant,' there is a dominant way of knowing the 'Other' that continues to justify a kind of colonial control. The control takes shape as governments being encouraged to perceive problems the same way as does the WHO and to implement a 'rational' plan of action, that is, a plan of action developed in the West and mandated by the WHO. For example, the WHO frames corporations and employers as in the know; they know that absenteeism is largely due to mental health issues, which is a problem of and for individuals that needs to be managed by drug treatment programs as developed by the West. *They don't know what they are doing! But we know and so we do and we will direct the doings*. Or, to cite a passage from 'The Great Push': 'We have the know-how and the interventions, and now even have models of mental health and development in practice' (WHO, 2011b, p. 3). Things are done in the name of knowing better than those to whom they are done. This us/them dichotomy between those who know and those who don't may in fact be a feature of disability experience shared around the globe. Let us thus proceed into a more in-depth analysis of how the WHO MIND project knows and represents the problem and the solution to mental health and illness issues around the globe today.

The development of de facto problems

According to the WHO, both productive mental health and poor mental health have an impact on the development of nations, affecting individuals and countries, as well as international relations. Recall the WHO MIND orienting assumptions with which this paper began:

> Positive mental health is linked to a range of development outcomes and is fundamental to coping with adversity . . . WHO MIND supports countries to implement programmes to

> ensure that effective treatment, prevention, and promotion programs are made available to all people who need them. (WHO, 2013b)

Countries, like their people, need support from the WHO in order to reorient and get in line with the rationality of the minority world[4] if these countries are to find and forge their rightful place in its developmental schemas. Along with the necessity of help, there is also the representation of the people in need: 'Almost three quarters of the global burden of neuropsychiatric disorders occurs in low- and middle-income countries. We can measure the costs to individuals, families, societies, and economies' (WHO, 2010). And again:

> Mental and neurological disorders such as depression, schizophrenia, epilepsy and substance abuse, among others, cause immense suffering for those affected, amplify people's vulnerability and can lead individuals into a life of poverty. Despite the worldwide availability of cost-effective treatments the vast majority of people are left without access to the treatment they need. (WHO, 2008, cited in Tighe, 2008)

That such things are simply said, that an assumption of a costly epidemic where a growing number of people are thought to impede the wellbeing of nations, and that such things are then circulated amongst world powers, corporations, and their administrators, seems absurd. The social fact of colonialism, as we outlined in the introduction, is translated into a truncated history where disadvantages are depicted as produced by the disabled body, as though it is the disabled body that keeps some countries from their natural place in the developmental trajectory. These beliefs seem as oversimplified and as overstated as they seem outrageous. And yet, this understanding of the growing epidemic of mental health disorders and belief in readily available and efficacious Western drug and therapy treatments is cited again and again, over many years. Moreover, the WHO MIND project's oft-repeated statement of beliefs and aims is not regarded as absurd, but instead has garnered international support and corporate sponsorship. This public articulation of the problem and its solution can be understood as a normalized article of faith within the WHO literature – it is one of its 'sensible say-ables' in need of examination (Titchkosky, 2008, p. 42).

How does the WHO narrative achieve its rationality, its sensibility? Through an erasure. The complex economic terms and conditions of a country are erased by a simplified history, an individualized history represented through the number of people who count as disabled. Developing countries, along with their higher rates of disability, are understood as those who have failed to fully implement adequate treatment plans. The solution: tell countries to spend a higher percentage of their gross national product (GNP) on the pharmacological and treatment enterprise and support them in doing this (WHO, 2003, 2011a, 2011b). In this way, 'history' appears to begin with people with problems living in countries that spend too little on drug treatment plans to mitigate the problem of their problem people. The displacement of the actual histories of actual colonial interactions is central to the rationality at work in the WHO literature.

But have we developed a sense of the problem that is animating the WHO or have we belittled it? The Western world that the WHO represents as an exemplar of health, wealth, and prosperity, is the selfsame world in which the appearance of power is conditioned by forms of government that rule through processes of 'thingification' which perpetuate eurocentrism, racism, eugenics and hate (Césaire, 2000/1972). 'Thingification' is rampant

in all of the WHO MIND project's public articulations of itself – populations' risk factors are assessed in terms of measureable levels of illness. Any departures from the normalcy of the assumed 'norms' of development are measured against the potential loss of productive power. This is starkly represented in relation to levels of production *for* world powers and entrepreneurs, measured and ranked in terms of Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALYs) where people are measured for their assumed drain on the nation-state; but also measured and thingified in the face-to-face of education and work in terms of utility-driven self-interest or a desire to know the other in terms of 'core deficits' and their inability to be other than the same.

The WHO understands disability unequivocally as a biological problem of bodies, minds and senses 'gone wrong,' and defines mental illness, again unequivocally, as a key form of disability. The world DALY map (Figure 1) represents the social and economic expansion of Western knowledge and power treated as both necessary and desirable. Human diversity and the cultural alterity of disability is adjusted to fit a scale that measures all people in terms of loss of productive years via a numerical indexing of disability conditions where 0 represents perfect health and 1 represents death. Consider, for instance, the WHO's 'key fact' regarding depression: 'Depression is the leading cause of disability worldwide, and is a major contributor to the global burden of disease' (WHO, 2012). Severe depression is ranked as 0.760 on the DALY scale, one of the highest ranks given to any of the conditions listed (WHO, 2004). The map reveals the complex nature of the thingification, not only of people but also of oppression since such measures support and are supported by a sense of the individual human problems troubling the supposed natural development of the human community. Thus, the WHO MIND program asserts the reasonableness of its rationality:

> Reason No. 1: The burden of mental health is huge and the costs of mental illness to society are enormous.
>
> Across the globe 450 million people suffer from a mental or behavioral disorder. The estimate is that one in five persons will suffer from a mental illness in a given year. Over a lifetime, one in two persons will experience mental illness. Four of the six leading causes of years lived with disability are depression, alcohol use disorders, schizophrenia and bipolar disorder. By 2030, depression is projected to be the leading cause of years lived with disability. (WHO, 2011b, p. 5)

The sensibility of the DALY map requires a relation to 'mental or behavioral disorder' as something factual and tangible for which lists can be made and around which lines can be drawn. That is, the WHO openly asserts the inferiority of non-Westernized countries' inability to secure their own development, and then attributes this manufactured inferiority, framed as *disability*, to the country being less-developed (Chisholm, 1946). The inferiority of the subjugated becomes a social fact and the grounds of an appeal for Western medical intervention. Thus:

> WHO is appealing to countries to increase their support for mental health services . . . estimates made by WHO in 2002 showed that 154 million people globally suffer from depression and 25 million people from schizophrenia; 91 million people are affected by alcohol use disorders and 15 million by drug use disorders. (WHO, 2013a, paragraph 2)



Figure 1. DALY rates, 2004 (WHO, 2010).

This ready-made statement of fact transforms millions of people into an unfortunate natural disaster of mental illness. This is now a fact ready-made for public consumption. All people are now to understand that many of the world's people suffer a disorder. Whereas lack of medical treatment signals a threat to human reason, participation in Western medical regimes is heralded as reasonable and thus key to development of a nation's wellbeing. The WHO holds that mental health improvements are central to nations' 'development' in that,

> By treating many of the debilitating mental disorders and by promoting mental health, people will . . . be able to work and rise out of poverty, provide their children with the right social and emotional environment to flourish . . . contribute to the economy of their country. (WHO, 2008, cited in Tighe, 2008)

All this can be achieved, according to the WHO, by putting in place 'human rights oriented mental health policies, strategic plans and laws to ensure that [there are] effective treatment, prevention and promotion programs' for all (WHO, 2008, cited in Tighe, 2008). On the WHO's overall programmatic map for development, mental health articulations are used to make discernable borders between misfortune and injustice; a clear border between emergency and history; and a clearer border still between resilient productivity and failure to function as a productive member of one's society.

Disability is defined as a biologically given asocial problem that is nonetheless understood to cause all sorts of social problems such as lack of work, poverty, and restrictive social and emotional environments. This definition of disability supports Grech's assertion that 'disability not only coexists with and remains embedded in the larger socio-economic, political and cultural context, but also that disability issues cannot be dealt with separately from wider poverty concerns' (2009, p. 779), concerns which are themselves shaped by histories of racism and sexism. Yet, in relation to this historically complex intertwining of poverty, racism and sexism, it is the health versus illness perspective that the WHO uses to document, map and treat nations as though no other perspective is possible in that no other perspective is reasonable.

The ambivalence of a singular narrative

Through acting as a 'minder' of troubled minds, the WHO clears a pathway to future forms of human objectification where recognition of humanity is achieved through knowledge of others as a unit of profit and their fitness for productivity. The WHO is intimately involved not only in mapping individuals with problems but also mapping countries' inappropriate responses to problems (itself documented by the WHO as a significant problem). The WHO is directing the governance of conceptions not only of millions of people but also of many countries in the world. We have demonstrated that the WHO provides a singular, even totalizing, conception of mental health problems and their treatment protocols.

In this paper, we have followed the tacit methodological advice that lies in Fanon's (1967/1952, p. 121) exclamation that the Black man always arrives 'too late', too late into a system of humanism that *qualifies* a person as participant. Millions have arrived too late, and their 'health,' like the health of the nation, remains an unattainable ontology (p. 121). At first, it appears that the only hope is to help people to fit into the productive enclave of Western treatment regimens via a right to treatment (pharmacological,

psychiatric and/or community treatment). But the right to have rights, the goal of recognition and inclusion into Western mental health regimes can, as Gayatri Gopinath (2005) suggests, be understood as a myth and lure that can and should be resisted. After all, this hope is premised upon the myth of people arriving with a 'developed' Western sense of the obviousness of the health/illness divide. Globally, people are urged to accept the myth of a health/illness framework of human vulnerability and arrive 'on the scene' of colonial history so as to forge an ahistoricized connection between health and nation development. And again, too late, always too late since this version of a sciencetized and bureaucratized neo-liberal modernity has already authorized only a particular figuration of the human (Bhabha, 1994, p. 339).

In our analysis of the WHO literature, developing nations and their people are positioned as marking, at best, the borders of health. Fanon (2004/1961, p. 182) puts the matter this way:

> The truth is that colonization, in its very essence, already appeared to be a great purveyor of psychiatric hospitals. Since 1954 we have drawn the attention of French and international psychiatrists in scientific works to the difficulty of 'curing' a colonized subject correctly, in other words making him thoroughly fit into a social environment of the colonial type.

In the pursuit of a singular narrative of health, colonial processes of standardization as represented by the WHO structure, literature and programs supply the drive for *fitness*, attempting to enforce a version of the human suitable for expanding productivity and profit values through the proliferation of Western developmental psychology's legitimation. More treatment, greater access to treatment, treatment ensconced in law and human rights rhetoric, and treatment governed by imperialistic countries and corporations is emphasized over and against any more ambivalent or nuanced depiction of the millions of people said to suffer from mental illness. This shows once again that, unlike the worth of disabled people who are depicted as always a cost and a burden, the value (and efficacy) of treatment is uncontested (Titchkosky & Aubrecht, 2009).

During his time as a psychiatrist at Blida Hospital, Fanon focused his attention on people who displayed anguish and distress (Butts, 1979). This focus encouraged interpretations of relations, thoughts and behaviors deemed disordered or 'mentally ill' as expected reactions to the totalizing violence of everyday life under the exploitative and oppressive conditions of colonialism. However, as Fanon (1967/1952) also makes clear in his critique of Mannoni's attribution of a 'dependency complex' of the lives of colonized people, recognition of oppression on its own is not enough, since such recognition can be used to authorize Western knowledge and power. Such knowledge turns people into things and things into use-values that are then mapped on productivity charts. The programmatic administration of mental health puts us in contact with some of the dominant ways to mind the global human community (but it can also provoke questions about the possible *dis*encounters with disability such contact may provide for).

The WHO plays a role in redrawing the lines between developed and developing, the ruler and the ruled, but this time through a system of medical knowledge and Western treatment protocols[5] that aim to fit people into the environment as a productive type. It also entails making sense of human suffering as a lack of development, a lack of mental health or, as many of the WHO statements indicate, both. Suffering is thus located only in the here and now of individual nation states and individual subjective states. Moreover, and in line with a global security perspective (Lakoff, 2010), the WHO MIND project

advocates containment, not only of illness but also of our collective imaginations and of history – all of which are placed within the immediacy of individualized terms. In this, lies ambivalence.

A globally oriented disability studies informed by postcolonial theory offers the possibility of questioning the language of development and its power to set objective standards for the qualification or authorization of the human (Ghai, 2002; Grech, 2009; Meekosha, 2011; Sherry, 2007). Such a project requires that major world-organizing powers, such as the WHO, be examined for how they represent disability and how, through these representations, they wield the power to identify, depict, and circulate, that is, *order* how human problems appear and dictate what *form* solutions will take. We, in contrast, aim to understand disability as a multi-meaning phenomenon and thus follow the opportunity to understand the inherent ambivalence regarding the meaning of mental health and illness (Aubrecht, 2012). Ambivalence lies in any version of global health caught in the fantasy that colonial power is behind us.

Further ambivalence lies in this: the recognition that creating a 'better' world is not the same as beginning to imagine a different one. This ambivalence is related to seeking ways to know and wonder about what is said to be true and beyond question in new and unexpected ways. What, then, to do with the on-going process of transforming millions of people, whole populations, entire nation states, into those in need of Western medical treatment? What to do when this will not be read as a crime against humanity but instead as a humane, human rights-based ideal which offers sustenance and hope to suffering others? And, what to do when this is taken as the most reasonable way to level the playing field in the game called human vulnerability?

This paper is our attempt to demonstrate one possible way to live in the face of taken-for-granted definitions of global problems and solutions that are delivered through representations of disability. How people are encouraged to identify who is disordered and who is not is directly related to powerful ways in which the world and its people are already known. Reflecting on the essential relation between knowing trouble and being troubled can be understood as a way to actualize a version of a global citizenry. The history of the WHO is part of this knowledge system from which our extrication is highly unlikely. And yet, we must at least suspend belief in the WHO's benevolence if we are to begin to reflect upon how human and human suffering are articulated and thus produced.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for inviting us to attend to our understanding of the colonial. Thanks also to Rod Michalko for discussion and editorial assistance.

Notes

1. This paper builds on Titchkosky and Aubrecht's (2009) analysis of World Health Organization texts in Kempf's (Ed.) *Breaching the colonial contract: Anti-colonialism in the US and Canada*.
2. While some scholars make a clear distinction in moments of history where a country is, or is not, governed or owned by another country, we treat the colonial as systems of power foundational to and enabling both capitalism and contemporary ways of knowing and governing. For this conception of the colonial, we thank Katherine McKittrick (2006), Rinaldo Walcott (2009), Gayatri Gopinath (2005) and others who take seriously Césaire's (2010, p. 127) words that the 'colonial situation', colonialism, the semicolonial, and the paracolonial situation is the 'odd conditioning' of all cultures everywhere. This work shows that everything bears the marks of

enslavement including 'normalcy' (see, e.g., Erevelles, 2011; Meekosha, 2011; Sherry, 2007; Wynter, 2003).

3. The IHR represents the WHO's efforts to enforce compliance with its regime of global health security. Andrew Lakoff (2010) suggests that a global health security perspective rests on the assumption that establishing surveillance and early warning systems in developing countries is necessary to protect global health.
4. See Emma Stone (1999) for a discussion of the distinction between minority and majority world in relation to questions of development.
5. For more on this see the entire issue of Sephis E-magazine, volume 6, issue 3 (Roy, 2010).

References

Aubrecht, K. (2012). Disability studies and the language of mental illness. *The Review of Disability Studies: An International Journal*, *8*(2), 31–44. Retrieved from http://www.rds.hawaii.edu/downloads/issues/pdf/RDSv08iss02.pdf#page=31

Bashford, A. (2006). Global biopolitics and the history of world health. *History of Human Sciences*, *19*(1), 67–88. doi:10.1177/0952695106062148

Bhabha, H. K. (1990). *Nation and narration*. London: Routledge.

Bhabha, H. K. (1994). *The location of culture*. London: Routledge.

Broster, L. R. (1962). Editorials and comments: The World Health Organization. *CMAJ*, *86*, 787–788.

Brown, T., & Bell, M. (2008). Imperial or postcolonial governance? Dissecting the genealogy of a global public health strategy. *Social Science and Medicine*, *67*, 1571–1579. doi:10.1016/j.socscimed.2008.07.027

Butts, H. (1979). Frantz Fanon's contribution to psychiatry: The psychology of racism and colonialism. *Journal of the National Medical Association*, *71*, 1015–1018. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2537519/

Césaire, A. (2010). Culture and colonization. *Social Text*, *28*, 127–144. doi:10.1215/01642472-2009-071

Césaire, A. (2000/1972). *Discourse on colonialism*. New York, NY: Monthly Review Press.

Chisholm, G. B. (1946). *The psychiatry of enduring peace and social progress*. Baltimore, MD: William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation.

Davis, L. (1995). *Enforcing normalcy: Disability, deafness and the body.* New York, NY: Verso.

DelVecchio Good, M.-J., Hyde, S. T., Pinto, S., & Good, B. (2008). *Postcolonial disorders*. Berkeley: University of California Press. doi:10.1525/california/9780520252233.001.0001

Dirlik, A. (2002). Rethinking colonialism: Globalization, postcolonialism, and the nation. *Interventions: International Journal of Postcolonial Studies*, *4*, 428–448. doi:10.1080/1369801022000013833

Dubgen, F. (2012). Africa humiliated? Misrecognition in development aid. *Research Publication*, *18*, 65–77. doi:10.1007/s11158-012-9186-2

Erevelles, N. (2011). *Disability and difference in global contexts: Enabling a transformative body politic*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1057/9781137001184

Fanon, F. (1967/1952). *Black skin, white masks*. (C. L. Markman, Trans.). New York, NY: Grove Press.

Fanon, F. ([1961] 2004). *The wretched of the earth*. (R. Philcox, Trans.). New York, NY: Grove Press.

Fischer, M. (2009). *Anthropological futures*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. doi:10.1215/9780822390794

Foucault, M. (1977). *Discipline and punish: The birth of the prison*. New York, NY: Pantheon Books.

Ghai, A. (2002). Disability in the Indian context: Post-colonial perspectives. In M. Corker & T. Shakespeare (Eds.), *Disability/postmodernity: Embodying disability theory* (pp. 88–100). London and New York, NY: Continuum.

Goodley, D. (2012). Dis/entangling critical disability studies. *Disability & Society*, *27*(7), 1–14. doi:10.1080/09687599.2012.717884

Gopinath, G. (2005). *Impossible desires: Queer diasporas and south Asian public cultures*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. doi:10.1215/9780822386537

Grech, S. (2009). Disability, poverty and development: Critical reflections on the majority world debate. *Disability & Society*, *24*, 771–784. doi:10.1080/09687590903160266

Grech, S. (2012). Disability and the majority world: A Neocolonial Approach. In D. Goodley, B. Hughes, & L. Davis (Eds.), *Disability and social theory: New developments and directions* (pp. 52–69). London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Hardiman, M. C. (2012). World Health Organization perspective on the implementation of international health regulations. *Emerging Infectious Diseases*, *18*, 1041–1046. doi:10.3201/eid1807.120395

IHR. (2005). *International Health Regulations* (2nd ed.). Retrieved from http://www.who.int/ihr/publications/9789241596664/en/

Katz, R., Haté, V., Kornblet, S., & Fischer, J. E. (2012). Costing framework for international health regulations (2005). *Emerging Infectious Diseases*, *18*, 1121–1127. doi:10.3201/eid1807.120191

King, N. (2002). Security, disease, commerce: Ideologies of postcolonial global health. *Social Studies of Science*, *32*, 763–789. doi:10.1177/030631270203200507

Lakoff, A. (2010). Two regimes of global health. *Humanity*, *1*(*1*), 59–79. Retrieved from http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/humanity/v001/1.1.lakoff.html

Logan, R. (1928). The operation of the mandate system in Africa. *The Journal of Negro History*, *13*, 423–477. Retrieved from http://www.jstor.org/stable/2713843

Matz, N. (2005). Civilization and the mandate system under the League of Nations as origin of trusteeship. *Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law*, *9*(1), 47–95. doi:10.1163/138946305775160483

McKittrick, K. (2006). *Demonic grounds: Black women and the cartographies of struggle*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Meekosha, H. (2011). Decolonising disability: Thinking and acting globally. *Disability & Society*, *26*, 667–682. doi:10.1080/09687599.2011.602860

Mignolo, W. (2000). *Local histories/global designs: Coloniality, subaltern knowledges, and border thinking*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Routley, T. C. (1947). Miscellany: The World Health Organization. *CMAJ JAMC*, *57*, 494–496. Retrieved from http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1590623/?page=1

Roy, R. D. (Ed.). (2010). Global South – Sephis E-magazine: Special Issue. *History of Medicine in the Global South*, *6*(3). Retrieved from http://sephisemagazine.org/past/vol-6-no-3-july-2010.html

Sherry, M. (2007). (Post)colonising disability. *Wagadu: A Journal of Transnational and Women's Studies*, Special Issue: Intersecting Gender and Disability Perspectives in Rethinking Postcolonial Identities, *4*, 10–22. Retrieved from http://appweb.cortland.edu/ojs/index.php/Wagadu/article/viewArticle/323/610

Sloan, T. (1996). *Damaged life: The crisis of the modern psyche*. London: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9780203407295

Stone, E. (1999). Disability and development in the majority world. In E. Stone (Ed.), *Disability and development: Learning from action and research on disability in the majority world* (pp. 1–18). Leeds: Disability Press.

The NGO Committee on Mental Health. (2012, October 11). *UN – Global Mental Health, WHO Action Plan*. Retrieved from http://historypsychiatry.com/2012/10/05/un-global-mental-health-who-action-plan-oct-11-2012/

Tighe, A. (2008, January 24). *Mental health improvements for nations development: The WHO MIND project. Mental Health Policy Tools: Tools for Advocacy [blog]*. Retrieved from http://mhptools.blogspot.ca/2008/01/mental-health-improvements-for-nations.html

Titchkosky, T. (2007). *Reading and writing disability differently: The textured life of embodiment*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Titchkosky, T. (2008). 'To pee or not to pee?' Ordinary talk about extraordinary exclusions in a university environment. *Canadian Journal of Sociology*, *33*(1), 37–60. Retrieved from http://wigan-ojs.library.ualberta.ca/index.php/CJS/article/view/1526

Titchkosky, T., & Aubrecht, K. (2009). The anguish of power: Re-mapping mental diversity with an anti-colonial compass. In A. Kempf (Ed.), *Breaching the colonial contract: Anti-colonialism in the US and Canada* (pp. 179–201). New York, NY: Springer Press.

Walcott, R. (2009). *Black like who?* Writing black Canada. Toronto: Insomniac Press.

World Health Organization (WHO). (2003). The mental health context. Mental health policy and service guidance package. Geneva: WHO Press. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/mental_health/policy/services/3_context_WEB_07.pdf

World Health Organization (WHO). (2004). *The global burden of disease 2004 update: Disability weights for diseases and conditions*. Geneva: Author. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/GBD2004_DisabilityWeights.pdf

World Health Organization (WHO). (2010). *Mental health and development: Targeting people with mental health conditions as a vulnerable group*. Geneva: WHO Press. Retrieved from http://whqlibdoc.who.int/publications/2010/9789241563949_eng.pdf

World Health Organization (WHO). (2011a, October 10). *Mental Health Gap Action Programme (mhGAP)*. 3rd Meeting of the mhGAP Forum. Hosted by the WHO in Geneva. Summary report of the meeting. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/mental_health/mhgap/mhgap_forum_oct2011_report.pdf

World Health Organization (WHO). (2011b). *2011 World Mental Health Day*. The great push: Investing in mental health. Retrieved from http://www.wfmh.com/2011DOCS/2011%20WORLD%20MENTAL%20HEALTH%20DAY%20document.pdf

World Health Organization (WHO). (2012). *Depression*. Fact Sheet No. 369. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs369/en/index.html

World Health Organization (WHO). (2013a). *Mental health: WHO urges more investments, services for mental health*. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/mental_health/who_urges_investment/en/index.html

World Health Organization (WHO). (2013b). *WHO MIND – Mental health in development*. Retrieved from http://www.who.int/mental_health/policy/en/

Wynter, S. (2003). Unsettling the coloniality of being/power/truth/freedom: Towards the human, after man, its overrepresentation – An argument. *CR: The New Centennial Review*, *3*, 257–337. doi:10.1353/ncr.2004.0015

Between safety and vulnerability: the exiled other of international relations

Amanda Russell Beattie

Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Aston, Birmingham, UK

ABSTRACT

Inspired by the idea of safe citizenship this article queries the possibilities of safety in an age of securitization. It challenges the cosmopolitan worldview and its iteration of a global cosmopolitan citizen. It champions an account of affective citizenship, narration and attends to the trauma of exile. It offers an account of exile before suggesting an institutional design premised on politicization. This design, it is argued, facilitates moments of storytelling fostering individual empowerment. This unorthodox rendering of agency allows the traumatized exile to negotiate the world as it is, not as it could be, as a potential 'safe' citizen.

Introduction

Writing in *Citizenship Studies* Weber (2008) suggests the possibility of safe citizenship underpinning the task of institutional design. She suggests three different angles to understand citizenship; a Hobbesian, a Foucualdian, and a networked account of citizenship. She is clear that her understanding of citizenship reflects legal membership to a community that outlines the rights, obligations and a sense of belonging between the individual and the community that she or he is a part (Weber 2008, 129). As her discussions of Hobbesian citizenship deepens, she interrogates the possibility of safe citizenship noting that this particular understanding of citizenship fails to engage with the problems of allegiance and belonging. While scholars of both politics and IR have grappled with these particular problems, I suggest that a turn to affect, drawing on the lived experiences of exile, provides an alternative means of attending to such challenges. Affective knowledge, rooted in the lived experiences of exiled persons, provides a personal and emotional quality to discussions of citizenship. It is a form of subjectivity that displays unique forms of criticality. Such criticality, I suggest, can help scholars and activists attend to the trauma of exile, and mobility politics in general.

I draw on Weber's account of Hobbes in order to challenge cosmopolitan iterations of citizenship, envisioning in turn what citizenship, informed by lived experience, might become. I question the bounded nature of citizenship that emerges within a state and its boundaries. Within these boundaries, I discover two inter-related relationships. The first

relationship is that between the government and its people. The second relationship is that between the citizens themselves. Safety, if we accept Weber's suggestions, ought to feature in both of these relationships. Yet, I suggest throughout this paper that while we can begin to understand a modicum of safety between citizens, it is difficult to envision the sought after safety in the relationship between the governed and the government simply because it is premised upon the legitimate use of violence, sovereignty and negative liberty. Values, I suggest, which inform a particular reading of the securitized state. This article focuses on the later relationship in order to attend to the potential for harm and trauma that can emerge in the absence of safety, or, I suggest, vulnerable framings of the citizen.

Aware of the various accounts of citizenship (racial, sexual, denationalized, neoliberal, flexible, neurotic, bionic and accidental) this paper engages with two interpretations of citizenship. It challenges the cosmopolitan agent's ability to attend to the lived experience of the exiled other. It suggests that cosmopolitan citizenship, in its critical iterations fails to understand the lack of a voice, or the silence, experienced by the exile. Moreover, it identifies a particular role that the cosmopolitan agent, cum universal ethicist, plays in furthering this silence. The lived experience of exile is a form of trauma. The fact that the cosmopolitan agent contributes to this experience, rather than attending to it in its various guises is deeply problematic if, as cosmopolitan scholars suggests, there is a universal vulnerability shared amongst a global population that are all equally deserving of the rights and obligations outlined by Weber.

One area where this trauma is most overtly evidenced and simultaneously ignored is within the practices of migration, and in particular, deportation. Deportation, as Nyers (2003) writes, is one of the last domains where states can legitimately display traditional forms of sovereign power. It allows the government to overtly display both its legitimate domination of power and its ability to delivery security to its domestic population. Deportation policies frame a discussion that outlines the good democratic citizen while removing those from within the state that fail to live up to such expectations. Yet, it is this very act that demonstrates just how unsafe citizenship actually is and the precarious power imbalance that exists between the state and its domestic population. I suggest this precariousness exists because of the wider framing of securitization, discussed in the first and final sections of this article. I do not engage in a robust critique of deportation. I touch on it briefly at this point to highlight the vulnerability of the citizen vis-a-vis its government in light of the criminalization of those that challenge the public good and are, in turn, deported in order to enhance the safety of the domestic population.

Overt displays of powers, like deportation, can be traumatic. They can rupture our worldview rendering the experience incommunicable to a wider audience. Individuals become isolated. Such isolation may have a geographical quality, but it can also have a relational quality. Both experiences reflect an inability to communicate with others. This is what it is to experience trauma. As Edkins (2002) writes, trauma occurs when 'it involves an exposure to an event so shocking to our everyday expectations of how the world works are severely disrupted' (245). Trauma involves a loss of trust, a breakdown of everyday patterns, and an inability to make sense of the various worlds we are a part. I argue in this article that exile, the counterpoint to citizenship, is a traumatic experience because it does just this. It silences the individual, denies them access to the political, and renders their vulnerability explicit. Bounded accounts of citizenship, that unfold within in institutional design of the contract, like that found in the works of Hobbes, cannot attend to the trauma of the exile because

they are designed within a bounded notion of securitization that criminalizes threats and situates them outside the status quo. Bounded accounts of citizenship are tied to descriptions of the exile as criminal and thus a threat to the public good. They suggest that in order to manage our vulnerability the state must be securitized. Securitization enhances the silence of trauma. It isolates those deemed criminal and denies the opportunity to tell their stories.

This article seeks out the space within which the exile can tell his or her story. It champions a narrative methodology in order to emphasize the value of lived experience in the construction of an affective account of citizenship. In order to achieve this goal part one interrogates the cosmopolitan citizen. It contends that critical iterations of cosmopolitan citizenship lack the necessary reflexive capacities needed to engage with the knowledge that emerges when stories are told. It moves into affective notions of citizenship to understand the origins of trauma and links this trauma to discussions of security and safety. I turn, in the second section, to a discussion of exile to demonstrate how it is an isolating experience that forecloses discussion and in turn, enhances the experience of trauma. The exilic state cannot sustain the necessary working through of the experience if we understand citizenship as bounded, and emerging from within an institutional design of securitization. In the third section, I turn to different framings of the political. I suggest, drawing on Edkins (2002) that an institutional design premised on politicization offers a glimpse of the type of space that affords storytelling a prominent role in the understanding of affective citizenship. Ultimately, this article concludes by demanding a more personal, emotive, form of citizenship that welcomes the exile, and the stories they tell, into the political.

Part one: citizenship

Cosmopolitanism should be the appropriate framework to acknowledge a lack of safety within IR, and in particular, citizenship. Cosmopolitanism in its ethical, moral and legal iterations makes overt claims of a shared human vulnerability. This vulnerability should motivate agents to achieve a sense of safety for domestic and international populations in their daily lives. Moreover, this vulnerability ought to attend to the problems that emerge when citizens' experiences are marginalized and set outside the political. For example, Lu (2009) writes of a world informed by friendship and perpetual peace that eschews universal claims of personhood. Yet, her writings do not offer any means of achieving a kinder world that welcomes the particularities of everyday experiences in a global world. Other cosmopolitan scholars have sought to explain this problem. For example, Waldron's (2000) iteration of cosmopolitanism suggests intersecting communities where multiple identities emerge and relationships are formed. Yet, this account, while offering an antidote to the problems of time, space and distance that are otherwise absent in Lu's imaginings, still sits firmly within bounded accounts of statehood. Lu's cosmopolitanism, I suggest, demands more than a bounded concept of order. Herein, lies its appeal, a call to a future better world. Yet, the possibility of a future better world is co-opted, as Hutchings (2013) writes, because the cosmopolitan agent, cum universal ethicist, lacks the necessary reflexivity to attend to the suffering of others. Such agents cannot grapple with the personal, emotive knowledge that can, in Lu's words, 'eschew the universal'.

A cursory engagement with critical cosmopolitanism's iterations of citizenship reveals why this is the case. Such scholars suggest that the spread of democratic values will attend to the problems of universal vulnerability. Democratic practices, so the story goes, will enhance

participation amongst a global population inviting those outside such institutional designs into the conversation. Yet, the focus on structural and political change, and the absence of reflexive practices, evidenced in such iterations, negates the possibility of listening to such voices. For example, Linklater (1998) draws on the dialogical potential of the cosmopolitan international citizen to enact structural and political change. He contends that the diaological act in and amongst political agents can compel a much needed democratic overhaul of various global structures thereby compelling global actors to avoid instances of harm (Linklater 2001). Likewise, Benhabib (2004) frames an account of global cosmopolitan citizenship suggesting a democratic iteration which prompts discussion and negotiation among agents in order to entrench equality and justice throughout global political structures. Both Benhabib and Linklater focus their accounts of citizenship on the assumption of an empowered agent who already has a strong and compelling voice to add to the conversation. Where, in this conversation, I wonder, is the space for the vulnerable, or perhaps the exile, to speak? Moreover, who is listening if they do? I suggest that the empowered agent cannot owing to the particular design of the political.

Within the political, the space within which dialogic politics and democratic iterations begin, we can begin to find evidence of the underlying norms and values that deny a voice to certain segments of the population. The political, drawing on Dallmayr (1996, 196), reflects an ethereal space where agents come together and create 'a constitutive, quasi-transcendental setting or matrix of political life'. It is within this space that the ideals and values informing politics emerge. It is to note, as Lang (2002) does, that politics is a highly personal endeavour. I draw on such statements in order to propose that the political can be a dynamic space that, like Benhabib's iterations, can contest, challenge and discuss the underlying norms and values that inform politics. I am all too aware, however, that such spaces, for the most part, reflect an assumed stasis championing universal assumptions of personhood that are supported by technical and rational knowledge claims (Beattie and Schick 2012). These values emerge from within the social contract tradition, and the writings of Thomas Hobbes. It is this framework that sustains the idea of a safe citizen, as discussed by Weber, and within which a particular hierarchical relationship between the government and the governed emerges.

While the cosmopolitan citizen, in its various incarnations, remains wedded to such assumptions, it will remain difficult, if not impossible, to address the particularities of human vulnerability. Yet, it is possible to find evidence of an emerging trend focused on the particularities of being human. In 2002, Roland Bleiker published his now groundbreaking article that suggested an aesthetic approach to international relations. He challenges the mimetic practices of IR suggesting an alternative, more personal approach, was needed. The influence of his work remains and, in the writings of Solomon (2012) we can find evidence of the use of emotional engagements with security discourses of IR as well as the emerging discussions of micro politics. An affective, or emotional turn, has much to offer the discourses of citizenship studies and in the works of Isin (2004) we begin to understand the point of origin for an affective account of citizenship. Isin's notion of the neurotic citizen is framed in a Foucauldian understanding of power. His work attends to a lack of safety on the part of the citizen as he interrogates the desire for those ever present desires of predictability and stability within the political. He begins to discuss the idea of insecurity and neuroses felt by domestic population in a contemporary age. In his discussions of the neurotic citizen Isin reveals some of the insecurities that arise when domestic subjects are imagined as

rational, and unilateral beings, capable of making cost/benefit decisions on a daily basis. He suggests that the neurotic citizen emerges at that point when he or she understands the tensions that surround the rational renderings of citizenship in the face of the emotional, more personable, rendering of the human being.

I am all too aware of this particular challenge. I was ordered deported from the UK because my presence in the country was deemed contrary to the public good as described by the UK Home Office and Border Agency. I was internally exiled within the UK as I fought to stay in the same country as my husband and children, all of whom are British by birth. (I am Canadian). An exile, I soon learned, lacks the traditional recourse to agency and cannot participate in the discussions proposed by Linklater and Benhabib. I had to rely on others to make my voice heard, yet I had lost the words to describe what I was feeling and experiencing. I was living through a traumatic episode that challenged the iterations of ethical, moral and philosophical agency and cosmopolitanism that I had encountered, and even lectured on, as a scholar of IR (Beattie 2014). While I acknowledge that my experience of state deportation was experienced in a supportive and entitled framework, it revealed the distance between my own understandings of self, of who I was and what I offered to the community, and the way the government understood the idea of me. In short, they did not align, and the values of democracy, good citizenship, and participatory government that I identified with gave way to a shattered world view. This dissonance, and the absence of any effective mode of agency, contributed to a daily sense of insecurity and an ongoing trauma.

According to Isin, this dissonance is the origin of neurosis. Such neurosis can, I suggest, tend particular individuals towards traumatic experiences. Unfortunately, such renderings of the citizen, as a rational and technical being are difficult to challenge as they are tightly interwoven into the contract design of the modern state and the relationship of hierarchy and violence that sustain the tradition. This is deeply problematic because an approach to design that fosters securitization not only denies the space within which narration can emerge, it further entrenches the experience of trauma. Edkins (2002) suggests that for those that experience trauma, the turn to securitization heightens the structures that contributed to the unfolding trauma in the first place. What is more, for an account of securitization to seem to be working there must be a scape goat, or an exile, to blame for the security threat. Shildrick (2000) has commented on this phenomenon throughout history noting that in the face of threats, fear and insecurity, that which does not align with the status quo is set outside the boundaries of the political.

Isin's neurotic citizen may begin to locate the source of the neuroses. His writings do not, however, offer his reader an understanding of what affective citizenship might look like. In the writings of Zembylas (2009), an understanding of affective citizenship begins to emerge. Like Isin he suggests a turn to the emotional qualities of being human in order to understand the identities, individual and communal, that sustain human relationships. He suggests that an interrogation of conviviality and hospitality might begin to inform an alternative critical pedagogy of citizenship. What Zembylas makes clear is that living together is not always comfortable, yet this discomfort need not render the political hostile. It need not tend towards exclusion and exile as the account of securitization requires. Rather, he suggests, that the emotional criticality afforded to the affective individual allows citizens to attend to the fear of difference and reimagine the relationships of us/them, or 'other' that inform politics. For Zembylas, hospitality and conviviality offer the reader an enriched affectivity.

Zembylas goes much further the Isin in his description of affective citizenship. Before such interrogations begin, I suggest that an understanding of the exile might afford some insight into the nature of the traumas endured by those who sit outside the peripheries of citizenship. Moreover, I wonder if, rather than drawing on theoretical and philosophical works, a turn towards lived experience might generate a greater understanding of the emotional experiences, and trauma of the vulnerable, or indeed, the exile. I suggest that an awareness of the lived experience of the individual and the dynamic iterations that emerge when individuals engage with one another has a compelling potential to achieve a valuable understanding of affective citizenship, especially when such ends are framed within an understanding of narrative politics. An appreciation of what it is to be an exile, and the ability to listen and reflect on the lived experience of the exile can only begin when they are allowed the space to author, and re-author, their own experiences of citizenship, or a lack thereof. Such narrative practices, I suggest, enhance the reflexive potential of the cosmopolitan agent while simultaneously empowering the exile. They could, potentially, open up the required space within the present to attend to the traumas of a vulnerable population and heed the calls of Schick (2011). As the ensuing sections reveal, narrative politics and the move towards individual empowerment in the face of trauma, present one way of imagining an affective account of citizenship.

Part two: exile

Exile is the counterpoint of citizenship. We can understand it from a wide variety of perspectives: historical, political, legal, anthropological or even philosophical. Writing in 1993 Shklar interrogates the relationship of political obligation, loyalty, and exile. She provides a basic, and helpful, definition. She wonders, 'What is an exile?' arguing that 'An exile is someone who voluntarily leaves the country of which he or she is a citizen' (Shklar 1993, 187). That being said there are already distinctions and differences to this particular definition – in some cases an individual may not leave voluntarily but instead may be forced out. Likewise, it might not be an individual who needs to move. Large communities can also find themselves exiled from their native lands. Shklar is pragmatic. She notes it is almost impossible to generate an exhaustive list of exiled experiences. Consequently, the concept of exile is dynamic and evolving. But, at its most blunt, exile demands an understanding that for whatever reason one, or many, find themselves alienated and outside the formal boundaries of 'the political'.

An exiled being, while denied access to the political, may still live out their daily lives within its confines. Shklar points out that some individuals may be internally exiled, in essence, a non-territorial form of exile.

> Official illegality may also create a non-territorial form of exile, internal exclusion from citizenship, which affects slaves, unwelcome immigrants and ethnic groups, and morally upright people trapped within the borders of tyrannical states. The excluded, or internal exiles as they have sometimes been called, even sometimes appear in constitutional regimes on those occasions when these engage in exceptionally unjust and immoral policies. The morally isolated individual may be reduced to living in accordance with no rule other than his private conscience, and I shall try to say something about the arguments that such people make, as part of my review of the obligations and loyalties to excluded persons. (Shklar 1993, 190)

Shklar's essay is interesting on multiple fronts. She is clear that political theory, in 1993, had not paid much attention to the idea of the exile, or his or her plight. But following on from this claim she wonders if the plight of the exile is any more special then the plight of others who decide whether or not to obey the state and its laws. The different lies in the reaction to unjust laws, deciding ultimately if such laws can be changed or if policies are, in her words, 'manifestly unjust' (Shklar 1993, 193). The different, I believe, is for those who find themselves in exile with no community to support them there is nowhere to go. Shklar notes this point. It is one thing to be an internal exile fighting to achieve institutional change (if you disagree with a political policy). It is another thing to lack empowerment and be unable to leave a country or fight for change, in the absence of representation. Finally, it is another situation altogether when you leave the state that persecutes you and it continues on an overt path of aggression be it at an individual or communal level.

At the end of the day, the exile has nowhere to go. If they must leave their state, they rely on the goodwill of another to allow them entry, and if they cannot leave, they require the help of an empowered agent to achieve institutional change that may not address the original vulnerability that lead to their internal exile. In essence, the structures of the political generate dependency while at the same time foreclosing the possibility of reflection and listening. We simply cannot be, we must do, but what we do is a highly scripted engagement of conformity, acceptance, and denial as it relates to promoting state security at the cost of human representation.

Said (2001) provides an alternative, but no less interesting, departure for discussions of exile. Exile, he writes, 'is a condition legislated to deny dignity-to deny an identity to people' (Said 2001, 139). He speaks of the role of nationalism in the quotidian, constructed as an antidote to the experience of exile. 'Nationalism is an assertion of belonging in and to a place, a people, a heritage', he writes. 'It affirms the home created by a community of language, culture and customs; and, by so doing, it fends off exile, fights to prevent its ravages' (Said 2001, 139). While nationalism is experienced in common exile is assumed to be a solitary experience that occurs outside the community. It draws on the historical antecedent of banishment, the ultimate punishment.

Said stresses the negative side of exile. To be alone and to be outside, he wonders, does it create a sense and need to belong? He wonders if the experience of exile helps in creating a hyper-nationalism to overcome the insecurity and jealousy that can surface in the absence of solidarity. He writes that exile is a jealous state. It is also, he writes, a state of resentment.

> Exiles look at non-exile with resentment. They belong in their surroundings, you feel, whereas an exile is always out of place. What is it role to be born in a place, to say and live there, to know that you are of it, more or less forever? (Said 2001, 139)

Said distinguishes categories of exile drawing a line in the experiences of those he labels refugees and those expatriates who he associates with an intellectual lifestyle born out in choice and not in the absence of agency. While refugees connote a political and historical problem, the need for assistance in the face of innocent rupture and bewilderment, an exile and his or her experience, according to Said is both solitary and spiritual. But within this distinction Said notes that exile is an alternative mode of being political that stands in contradistinction from the state.

> Exile is not, after all, a matter of choice: you are born into it, or it happens to you. But, provided that the exile refuses to sit on the sidelines nursing a wound, there are things to be learned; he or she must cultivate a scrupulous (not indulgent or sulky) subjectivity. (146–147)

In this way we can begin to envision how an exile might inform an affective account of citizenship. The exile enjoys a subjective positioning that allows them to query to status quo, to wonder, in the absence of key political relations, if the institutional design, alluded to by Weber (2008) can provide the necessary safety and security envisioned within a liberal, international, world order. He or she is able to do so aware of the emotional impact of feeling unwanted, of being that other. It highlights the emotional impact of hostility and fear discussed by Zembylas.

Said (2001) turns to Adorno to show this exact point. In Adorno we see exile as the means of interrogating the nature of the world 'as it is'. For Said, Adorno reflects a worldview that acknowledges the contingent nature of the world and the provisional nature of security and its constructs. 'Borders and barriers', he writes, 'which enclose us within the safety of familiar territory, can also become prisons, and are often defended beyond reason or necessity. Exiles cross border, break barriers of thought and experience' (Said 2001, 147). Yet, this very act, of intervention if you will, is silenced for fear of rupturing the fragile act of securitization. The exile, removed from the political, highlights the precarious position of the citizen vis-a-vis the government. In revealing the permeable nature of boundaries and borders, and the impossibility of complete safety the citizen is vulnerable. They are vulnerable because, if they are found wanting, they are criminalized and removed in a bid to acquire a modicum of safety.

Shklar (1993) and Said (2001) both reflect on the silencing of the exile. This silencing, I suggest, is the way in which the state, as legitimate wielder of violence, forecloses any possibility of vulnerability and insecurity. As Shildrick (2000) has demonstrated in her work individuals who do not align with the status quo, or force questions relating to categories of belonging within the political, are silenced. Such silencing is produced through the erection of a cordon sanitaire that hyper-securitizes the status quo label of the in group, while maligning the threat of the outsider. For example, she notes, in ancient history, how the image of the feminine was denied access to the political and forbidden from participating in public life, simply due to the dominance of the masculine. She traces this unfolding separation not only through the treatment of disabled throughout history, but also at the contemporary example of the HIV/AIDS hysteria in the 1980s when to be homosexual was to stand outside the status quo. It speaks to the problematic nature of boundaries, and borders, within any construction of the political and the complicit role they play in security provision premised on infallibility and a lack of vulnerability.

This separation as silencing indicates a problem with boundaries and labels. It suggests a faith in the permanence of human creations and a lack of awareness of their dynamic nature. It is also, I suggest, a silencing that denies the ability of the agent to develop, to be a genuine person. I wonder if this is what Said was attending to when he argued that exile is an undignified experience. In short, silencing denies traditional forms of agency premised on a relational account of the political. It denies the expression of the self within the political, and does not engender the safety of citizenship alluded to by Weber (2008). It is a silencing enacted by the state as it seeks permanent secure structures in a dynamic and changing account of the political. This silencing is a form of exile. It exiles the person from a secure state of being and denies the possibility of development on the part of the person as an autonomous and creative force. It highlights the problematics of a state/individual relationship premised on violence and sovereignty as articulated by Weber (2008). I propose it is indicative of one way that a liberal world view maintains its hierarchical and

universal institutional design. In short, exile is the overt controlling of individuals whose life experiences and subjectivity call the status quo into question.

In her 1996 fieldwork in Rwanda and Burundi, Lissa Malkki provides compelling evidence of this type of silencing in her accounting of the liberal humanitarian development regime. As she was listening to those living in exile it became apparent to her that the stories of who they were, as people, the notion of identity, and personality, did not fit within the defined categories of expected and accepted knowledge. When discussing this phenomenon with the aid workers on site, she was quick to learn that this phenomenon was an accepted reality, one that she struggled to comprehend. In the end, she wrote about this exact phenomenon labelling the experience of denied personhood one of corporeal anonymity. Herein, lies her parallel with Said (2001). In essence, to live in exile is to be unable to engage as a whole person. The structures that guide international politics; namely the human rights regime, a subsidiary of the universal rights project, demands one particular notion of being human; namely, a rights bearing subject. To enhance, or even challenge, this image is to render the larger story problematic and reveal the inherent vulnerability of being human and the ensuing narrative that each and every person can, if allowed, author.

Exile, I suggest is a symptom of the underlying relationship of violence and power described by Weber and discussed in the Introduction of this article. It suggests the effective management of the relationships that guide the daily interactions of human beings and their government. What it does not attend to is the relationship of the powerful over the un-empowered. Here, I am suggesting that in the relationship of citizen and government it is the later that holds the power and is able to dictate the relationship between the two. This power imbalance is not limited to the various framings of citizenship discussed by Weber (2008). It is likewise evident in cosmopolitan framings of moral agency. I suggest that until such a time that this particular relationship is unpacked and there is a space for the exiled to author their story, on their own terms, in a safe political structure, it will remain impossible to truly work through the trauma of exile in a way that renders the individual within, or outwith, the state truly safe.

Trauma and the institutional design of exile

How might we begin to make sense of this need to exile and begin to work through trauma? I turn to the writings of Edkins (2002) who offers an alternative means of being political in order to interrogate this claim. Writing in the aftermath of 9/11 Edkins interrogates the decision by the American Government to enact a series of policies that reified boundaries of us and them, create a series of boundaries that reinforced the promotion of anarchy and survival within the international and failed to attend to the opportunities for alternative institutional design. Edkins is highly critical of this political framework. She notes how such an approach cannot attend to the vulnerabilities of being human. In fact, the turn to securitization, is precisely done to avoid such discussions altogether. Vulnerability is denied by a call to arms, quite literally, the use of military prowess in order to safeguard the well-being of the domestic population in times of uncertainty.

The enactment of exile is, I suggest, a direct response to the uncertainty posed by mobile peoples that challenge boundaries within the political. The institutional design of securitization, at the outset, assumes human stasis. Anyone who challenges this assumption and migrates beyond his or her original state is considered out of the ordinary. Writing on the

problems of human stasis, and complimenting her work on corporeal anonymity, Malkki (1995) probes this very assumption and argues that mobile peoples, either forced or voluntary, are considered pathologically ill. The underlying assumption of order, Malkki contends, is that individuals remain in the same place for their whole life and it is the geographical location, and the relational elements it promotes, that provide a moral education. People who are seen to leave this environment cannot acquire the necessary moral knowledge to be good citizens, either domestic or international. It is necessary to curtail their action, interrogate their entire subjectivity, prior to potentially admitting them into the community.

When the arguments of Malkki (1995, 1996) are situated alongside the critique of securitization offered by Edkins (2002), some interesting ideas emerge. Edkins highlights the inherent insecurity of a securitised regime that fails to overtly tackle the problems of instability cum vulnerability. One way to attain this level of sought after predictability is to establish boundaries that demarcate who is, and who is not, a legitimate citizen. This, I suggest, leads to situations of exile, both internal and external alike. This exilic state not only stands in direct opposition to the underlying assumptions of a cosmopolitan worldview, it is a direct challenge to the agent's, cum global citizen, ability to affect change. In essence, it denies the space where stories can be told, or re-authored. It is focused on a future better world and cannot provide the space for the exile to work towards a particular form of empowerment. How might we begin to envision such a space that goes beyond the named safety of Weber (2008) that does not rely on the universal cosmopolitan ethicist or agent that cannot attend to the particularities of trauma?

Once again the writings of Edkins (2002) are exceptionally helpful. At the opposite end of a securitization approach rests the notion of politicization. She proposes to her readers that the ensuing quiet, both psychical and aesthetic, of 9/11 offers an alternative for institutional design. A design which, I contend could sustain the desires of safe citizenship proposed by Weber, because it allows us, as human beings, to admit, engage, and work through a shared vulnerability within the community. Politicisation demands that agents be attuned to the quiet that emerges in situations of trauma and insecurity. It seeks out the human, the relationships that can prompt action of an altogether different sort. Such acts seek reconciliation, prompt communication that fosters understanding, and imagine the possibility of unity and not separation.

Politicisation offers an alternative to the teleological orientation of a cosmopolitan worldview. It is attuned to the present and does not focus the ends of agency understood as a future sought after, and at times elusive, end goal. Politicisation situates the agent within the daily framework of unfolding events aware of the vulnerabilities associated with a relational ontology. It allows for unpredictability, creativity and a dynamic human nature that engages with otherwise previously unknown outcomes that can be simultaneously positive and negative alike. This, I suggest, is a subjectivity that does not accommodate a cosmopolitan ethic or moral agent, but is one account of being human that fosters politicization. The temporality of policization attends to the dislocation of the exile. Moreover, it suggests a thoughtful working through of trauma like that hinted at within Isin's notion of neuroses. It recognizes the creative potential of a subjective critique of the status quo discussed by Said (2001). Likewise it understands the powerful drive of quiet and the unique opportunity it presents to the exile to recreate themselves, and the worlds in which they are a part.

This creative tendency within politicisation facilitates an alternative form of human agency. It is an account focused on empowerment not social or political change. This is

an absent, but much needed discussion that emerges at the intersection of citizenship discourses and institutional design that engages with the challenges of exile. Traditional forms of agency suggest empowered individuals (MacIntyre 1999; O'Neill 2001) that engage with institutional design (Erskine 2003) or, focus on states as the primary agents of IR (Wendt 1999). The exile, on the other hand, is unable to access the political. Thus while he or she can reason and deliberate, their ability to affect change as articulated by O'Neill or MacIntyre is impossible. Likewise, any institutional change, as suggested by Erskine rendered impossible. The exile lacks that teleological quality assumed within a cosmopolitan ethic. Consequently their lived experience reflects the realities of dislocation, separation and loss. The exile must work within this story and, as Said has proposed, cultivate a scrupulous subjectivity (2001). I suggest that we, as scholars, ought to champion a narrative framework to citizenship and draw on the emerging methods of autobiography and autoethnography, in order to generate the space for the exile subject, or solitary agent, to embark upon such a task.[1] There is a space within storytelling that affords the exile the opportunity to work towards a form of personal empowerment.

I suggest that storytelling is that particular act that brings together the notion of traumatic exile, discussed in the introduction of this article, the possibilities of an institutional design premised on politicisation as proposed by Edkins (2002) and the ability to frankly and openly discuss exile within the political. If exile, as I contend, is a traumatic rendering of the individual subject, and is a product of an abusive and violent relationship between the government and the governed, there is a need for such individuals to tell their stories, in essence, to reclaim back their personhood and their identity in the face of securitization. Storytelling, understood as a form of therapy, may in fact provide such an instance. If we turn to the works of Crossley (2000) we can begin to see how important storytelling, as a form of empowered agency, nay therapy, may prompt alternative understandings of the worlds of which we are a part. It attends to the insecurity that follows on from a traumatic episode and allows individuals to reimagine both their subjectivity and positionality in the world aware of an ever-present ontological vulnerability.

Crossley (2002) situates her account of therapy within the works of Carr (1986), who suggests temporal and spatial parallels in the lived experience of traumatized subjects and the unfolding narratives of fiction. He argues on behalf of a relational account of human action which, I suggest, has implications for how we think through not only individual subjectivity and identity formation, but any form of agency that ensues. The works of Crossley are important because they show, very simply, the mirroring of lived experience and narrative and how that plays out within therapy.

> Literary stories such as fiction and autobiography do not in any sense 'impose' a structure and order on human action and life. Instead, they tend to reinforce and make more explicit the symbolisation that is already at work within a culture at the level of practical human action. The function of narratives such as autobiographies, then, is simply to reveal structures or meanings that previously remained implicit or unrecognised, and thus to transform life and elevate it to another level. (2000, 537)

Storytelling does two things. It allows individuals to negotiate the vulnerability of trauma. Individuals can reconcile the traumatic events that have unfolded while simultaneously reenvisaging their role in the world. Here, the distinction between world and the political is important. Storytelling, and the ensuing empowerment that can occur during this process, need not happen within the relational structure of the political, what it does allow for

is a reimaging of the individual and their abilities, aware of their particular temporal and spatial displacement. Empowerment, the second aspect of storytelling, is achieved simply by reconstructing the human narrative that assigns renewed understanding and acceptance in the face of the labelling imposed on the self, by others. In essence the subject is recreating the relationships that sustain their sense of personhood but doing so in such a way that does not reinsert them into the world as it was, hoping for a better future. Instead, this form of empowerment allows the agent to develop an inner strength that enables them to take on the world as it is. In essence, storytelling as agency reflects the temporality of politicisation and not the cosmopolitan ethic emerging within a securitized institutional design.

As I read through Weber's notion of safe design, I find a synergy within its hopeful future to the teleological assumptions of a cosmopolitan ethic. The notion of a 'safe' institutional design mirrors, in subtle ways, the idea of a better future world. But in focusing on the creation of the future better, we forget about the harmful present, a point well noted and reflected upon by Schick (2009). Imagining the benefits of Adorno's work on ethical international relations Schick reminds scholars and practitioners alike of the attendant harm that comes when the immediate present is overshadowed by future potential design. She poignantly argues on behalf of the concrete other of the universal rights project so central to ethical discourses of IR and suggests that only when harm is negotiated in the present, and the traumatized subject is given recourse to negotiate this harm on their own terms, can ethical encounters within the international begin to realistically grapple with the outcomes of trauma. For we must recall, as was made clear in the introduction of this article that trauma is idiosyncratic and so to must the recourse to trauma be multivariate and personal. Cosmopolitanism, in its universal, technical cum rational approach to the world, cannot accommodate this much-needed personableness.

There is no universal approach to rectifying harm and suffering and so, to fully mediate its unfolding and its impact, securitization as an approach to institutional design must be abandoned. It must be abandoned because it cannot accommodate the inherent vulnerability of being human, a vulnerability that sits at the core of trauma. Yet, this vulnerability has always, in the ethical discourses of IR, been something to avoid rather than embrace. An account of agency that rests upon storytelling, of finding one's place within the world, embraces this vulnerability and thus poses questions for the institutional designs of Linklater and Benhabib. Likewise it pushes us to go beyond the safety desired by Weber, but facilitates a thoughtful understanding of the affective citizen. It asks us to recognize individuals, as they truly are, not subjects, but persons with stories, histories and identities that enrich the various worlds of which they are part. It suggests how scholars can begin to imagine the lived experience of affective citizenship.

Conclusion

This article was inspired by the ideas of Weber (2008) and her desire to frame an account of citizenship that is safe. Normative ethical discourses of International Relations, in particular Cosmopolitanism, envision how this safety might come about, if it is understood as a protection from suffering, and an access to the basic rights of security and subsistence, by all members of a global population. Yet, as this article has stressed, cosmopolitanism, in its various guises, while focused on the vulnerable subject, has been unable to attend to the emerging harms evident within an institutional design that adopts the ideas of securitization.

This article suggests an engagement with the idea of politicization outlined by Edkins. Such a framing of International Relations provides the requisites space within which to understand the possibilities of affective citizenship and what this might mean for empowerment of exiled individuals. As Zembylas (2009) has suggested in his engagement with affective citizenship education emotional relationships sustain both individual and communal identities. This type of knowledge can, and does emerge, when stories are authored and re-authored and the lived experience of the exile is allowed to come through. Yet, such stories will only emerge in an institutional design that challenges the need to securitize the state in the face of otherness.

Until such a time arrives when the ends of politicization are realized, individuals must negotiate the world as it is. It is only very recently that a turn to micro-politics has shifted the focus of IR scholars allowing the aesthetics turn in IR to deepen its understanding of the individual affective experience. It remains a peripheral area of study and thus open to criticism. Indeed, many scholars of IR would suggest a focus on storytelling as empowerment is not needed if, by nature, the focus of the discipline is the state. Indeed, safe accounts of citizenship reify the state as primary actor within bounded accounts of citizenship. Likewise, scholars engaged in the task of institutional design will possibly struggle to align the temporal needs of institutional change with the non-linear renderings of traumatic experiences. As Schick has suggested it is easier to pass over traumatic pasts in order to attend to a possible better future. Consequently, scholars engaged with moral and ethical accounts of agency may struggle with an individual focus on agency that addresses the idiosyncratic nature of trauma rather than a universal scripted engagement with exiled others.

Storytelling is an unorthodox form of agency. It empowers individuals in the face of inequality and injustice. As a method of therapy storytelling can help the individual reinsert him or herself in the world aware of its precarious and unpredictable nature. Storytelling, as autobiography, Inayatullah (2010) suggests, reveals the structures and institutions that frame our everyday experience. He also notes, much like Crossley (2000) that such revelations disclose affinities and dissonance within the stories of others. In this way, storying is part of affective citizenship. As Zembylas has suggests it informs an understanding of how best to live with others in a complicated and unpredictable world. This is part of the narrative process, or storytelling. As Crossely notes, this process allows individuals to reconnect with the relationships that matter, and helps individuals to make sense of the worlds they are a part. In this way, individuals can find a sense of inner security, despite the labels, boundaries and projections that are associated with the exilic state. Consequently, the exiled storyteller can imagine alternative subjectivities that understanding that status quo while simultaneously reimaging the particular form it takes in their daily lives.

Note

1. This methodological approach is only now emerging in International Relations and does remain on the peripheries of the discipline. For a cursory overview of this approach see the writings of: Dauphinee (2010, 2013), Doty (2004, 2010), Neumann (2010), and finally, Inayatullah (2010).

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Joe Turner for the opportunity to produce this article. Equally, I am grateful for the insight offered from my colleagues at Aston University where I presented this paper and received valuable feedback, in particular the insights from my conversations with Graeme Hayes. The paper has benefitted from positive feedback and insight from two anonymous peer reviews which greatly enriched the arguments of this paper.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

References

Beattie, A. R. 2014. "Engaging Autobiography: Mobility Trauma and International Relations." *Russian Sociological* 13 (4): 137–157.

Beattie, A. R., and K. Schick, eds. 2012. *The Vulnerable Subject: Beyond Rationalism in International Relations*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Benhabib, S. 2004. *The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents, and Citizens*. Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Edinburgh.

Carr, D. 1986. *Time, Narrative, and History*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Crossley, M. L. 2000. "Narrative Psychology, Trauma and the Study of Self/Identity." *Theory & Psychology* 10 (4): 527–546.

Dallmayr, Fred. 1996. *Beyond Orientalism: Essays on Cross-cultural Encounter*. Albany: State University of New York Press. 193.

Dauphinee, E. 2013. *The Politics of Exile*. New York: Routledge.

Dauphinee, E. 2010. "The Ethics of Autoethnography." *Review of International Studies* 36 (3): 799–818.

Doty, R. L. 2010. "Autoethnography – Making Human Connections." *Review of International Studies* 36 (04): 1047–1050.

Doty, R. L. 2004. "Maladies of Our Souls: Identity and Voice in the Writing of Academic International Relations." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 17 (2): 377–392.

Edkins, J. 2002. "Forget Trauma? Responses to September 11." *International Relations* 16 (2): 243–256.

Erskine, T. 2003. "Embedded Cosmopolitanism and the Case of War: Restraint, Discrimination and Overlapping Communities." *Global Society* 14 (4): 569–590.

Hutchings, K. 2013. *A Place of Greater Safety? Securing Judgement in International Ethics*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Inayatullah, N. 2010. *Autobiographical International Relations: I, IR*. London: Routledge.

Isin, E. F. 2004. "The Neurotic Citizen." *Citizenship Studies* 8 (3): 217–235.

Lang, Anthony, Jr. 2002. *Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention*. Albany: State University of New York Press. ix.

Linklater, Andrew. 2001. "Citizenship, Humanity, and Cosmopolitan Harm Conventions." *International Political Science Review* 22 (3): 261–277.

Linklater, A. 1998. "Cosmopolitan Citizenship." *Citizenship studies* 2 (1): 23–41.

Lu, C. 2009. "Political Friendship Among Peoples." *Journal of International Political Theory* 5 (1): 41–58.

MacIntyre, A. 1999. "Social Structures and their Threats to Moral Agency." *Philosophy* 74 (3): 311–329.

Malkki, L. H. 1995. "Refugees and Exile: From 'Refugee Studies' to the National Order of Things." *Annual Review of Anthropology* 24: 495–523.

Malkki, L. H. 1996. "Speechless Emissaries: Refugees, Humanitarianism, and Dehistoricization." *Cultural Anthropology* 11 (3): 377–404.

Neumann, I. B. 2010. "Autobiography, Ontology and Autoethnology." *Review of International Studies* 36 (4): 1051–1055.

Nyers, P. 2003. "Abject Cosmopolitanism: The Politics of Protection in the Anti-deportation Movement." *Third World Quarterly* 24 (6): 1069–1093.
O'Neill, O. 2001. "Agents of Justice." *Metaphilosophy* 32 (1–2): 180–195.
Said, E. 2001. *Reflections on Exile: And Other Literary and Cultural Essays*. London: Granta Books.
Shklar, Judith N. 1993. "Obligation, Loyalty." *Exile. Political Theory* 21 (2): 181–197.
Schick, K. 2009. "'To Lend a Voice to Suffering is a Condition for All Truth': Adorno and International Political Thought." *Journal of International Political Theory* 5 (2): 138–160.
Schick, K. 2011. "Acting Out and Working through: Trauma and (in) Security." *Review of International Studies* 37 (4): 1837–1855.
Shildrick, M. 2000. "Becoming Vulnerable: Contagious Encounters and the Ethics of Risk." *Journal of Medical Humanities* 21 (4): 215–227.
Solomon, T. 2012. "'I wasn't Angry, because I Couldn't Believe It Was Happening': Affect and Discourse in Responses to 9/11." *Review of International Studies* 38 (4): 907–928.
Waldron, J. 2000. "What is Cosmopolitan?" *Journal of Political Philosophy* 8: 227–243.
Weber, C. 2008. "Designing Safe Citizens." *Citizenship Studies* 12 (2): 125–142.
Wendt, A. 1999. *Social Theory of International Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Zembylas, M. 2009. "Affect, Citizenship, Politics: Implications for Education." *Pedagogy, Culture & Society* 17 (3): 369–383.

1 Intersectionality as Critical Methodology

Kathy Davis

"INTERSECTIONALITY" AS FEMINIST BUZZWORD

"Intersectionality" has become something of a buzzword in contemporary feminist theory (K. Davis 2008). Originally coined by Kimberlé Crenshaw (1989, 1991), "intersectionality" was intended to address the fact that the experiences and struggles of women of colour fell between the cracks of both feminist and anti-racist discourse. Crenshaw argued that theorists need to take both gender and race on board and show how they interact to shape the multiple dimensions of black women's experiences. "Intersectionality" provided a short-hand term for a more comprehensive and complex perspective on identity—one which would take into account the ways in which individuals are invariably multiply positioned through differences in gender, class, sexual orientation, ethnicity, national belonging and more. Crenshaw may have introduced the term, but she was by no means the first to address the issue of how black women's experiences have been marginalized or distorted within white feminist discourse. Nor was she making a particularly new argument when she claimed that experiences had to be understood as multiply shaped by race and gender. Black feminists on both sides of the Atlantic and Third World feminist scholars had already produced numerous critiques of how the experiences of women of colour had been neglected in white feminist discourse and had already underscored the importance of theorizing multiple identities and sources of oppression.[1] Intersectionality was part of a growing body of feminist scholarship which was looking for more sophisticated and dynamic ways to conceptualize how socially constructed differences and structures of power work at the level of individual experiences, social practices, institutional arrangements, symbolic representations and cultural imaginaries. Intersectionality addressed the concern about what was increasingly perceived as the ethnocentricism of white, First World feminist scholarship, offering the promise of a much-needed corrective.

Intersectionality, while not in and of itself new, brought together two of the most important strands of contemporary feminist thought that have been, in different ways, concerned with the issue of difference. The first strand

has been devoted to understanding the effects of race, class and gender on women's identities, experiences and struggles for empowerment. It has been especially concerned with the marginalization of poor women and women of colour within white, Western feminist theory. Initially, this strand of feminist theory adopted a "triple jeopardy" approach to class, race and gender (King 1988) by exploring how, with the addition of each new category of inequality, the individual becomes more vulnerable, more marginalized and more subordinate. Gradually, however, the focus shifted to how race, class and gender interact in the social and material realities of women's lives to produce and transform relations of power (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1983; Yuval-Davis 1997; Anthias 1998; Collins 2000). Intersectionality seemed ideally suited to the task of exploring how categories of race, class and gender are intertwined and mutually constitutive, giving centrality to questions like how race is "gendered", and gender "racialized", and how both are linked to the continuities and transformations of social class.

While intersectionality is most often associated with US black feminist theory and the political project of theorizing the relationships between gender, class and race, it has also been taken up and elaborated by a second important strand within feminist theory. Feminist theorists inspired by postmodern theoretical perspectives viewed intersectionality as a welcome helpmeet in their project of deconstructing the binary oppositions and universalism inherent in the modernist paradigms of Western philosophy and science (Brah and Phoenix 2004; Phoenix 2006). Critical perspectives inspired by poststructuralist theory—e.g. postcolonial theory (Mani 1989; Mohanty 2003), diaspora studies (Brah 1996) and queer theory (Butler 1989)—were all in search of alternatives to static conceptualizations of identity. Intersectionality fit neatly into the postmodern project of conceptualizing multiple and shifting identities. It coincided with popular Foucauldian-inspired perspectives on power that focused on dynamic processes and the deconstruction of normalizing and homogenizing categories (Staunæs 2003; Knudsen 2006). Intersectionality seemed to embody a commitment to the situatedness of all knowledge (Haraway 1988), promising to enhance the theorist's reflexivity by allowing her to incorporate her own intersectional location in the production of self-critical and accountable feminist theory (Lykke 2010).

Given its ability to address issues which are of central concern within different strands of feminist thinking, it is not surprising that many feminist scholars today are convinced that intersectionality is a useful—and indeed essential—concept for feminist analysis. It has been the subject of conferences and special issues of journals. Courses on intersectionality abound in master's programs in Gender Studies. The term increasingly pops up in a whole range of fields (philosophy, social sciences, humanities, economy, law), theoretical perspectives (phenomenology, structuralist sociology, psychoanalysis, deconstructionism) and political persuasions (feminism, anti-racism, multiculturalism, Queer Studies, Critical Disability

Studies, Transgender Studies). It has been heralded as a perfect helpmeet for investigating anything from individual biographies, to media representations, governmental policies and scientific discourse, to the histories of racism and colonialism in different parts of the world.[2]

BUT HOW DO WE USE IT?

While the appeal of intersectionality shows no signs of abating, it is not always clear what the use of the concept might actually mean for feminist inquiry. In other words, how does one actually go about thinking intersectionally? What does it mean to do an intersectional analysis? As an illustration, let me recount an experience I had during a recent stint in Germany as a visiting professor. I offered a two-day seminar on the subject of intersectionality. My initial intention was to draw in a small group of Women's Studies students and introduce them—briefly—to one of the more exciting developments in contemporary feminist theory. To my surprise, however, the seminar drew interest not only from a few enthusiastic undergraduates (as I had expected) but also from PhD candidates, researchers and professors from cities throughout the region, all prepared to sacrifice their weekend and put aside their language difficulties in order to participate in my seminar. In fact, not only did I have to institute a waiting list, but many of the participants ended up having to sit on the floor. Many who were not able to attend approached me later asking whether I might be prepared to give the seminar again so that they could attend it.

Obviously, this interest was gratifying, both personally and because it seemed to confirm what I myself believe—namely, that intersectionality is where it's at when it comes to contemporary feminist theory. However, it was also puzzling. While most of the participants were convinced that intersectionality was absolutely essential to feminist theory (and they had no intention of missing the boat), at the same time, they did not know how it might actually be used with regard to their own fields of inquiry. They had lots of questions. For example, many wanted to know which categories belonged to an intersectional analysis.[3] As feminist scholars, they assumed that gender would *always* be part of an intersectional analysis, but beyond that they weren't sure how to decide. Were some categories more relevant than others—for example, gender, race and class—or was it simply a matter of adding on new differences, depending on the context or the specific research problem? Many were also worried about being essentialist (a cardinal sin in Women's Studies), so, how, they wondered, could they use categories without getting into even more serious theoretical trouble (from the frying pan into the fire)? But, of course, their main concern was *how* to actually analyze the intersections once they had decided which ones were relevant. And, last but not least, they wondered exactly how their use of intersectionality was sufficient to make their research critical/

cutting-edge/subversive or whether additional theoretical tools were necessary. Taken together, these questions indicated that the participants were struggling with uncertainties concerning the meanings of intersectionality.[4] They wanted to know how to apply it to their own research concerns. In short, they wanted a methodology.

METHODOLOGY

Initially, intersectionality as methodology was encompassed by the (deceptively) easy procedure of "asking the other question", described by Maria Matsuda:

> The way I try to understand the interconnection of all forms of subordination is through a method I call "ask the other question". When I see something that looks racist, I ask, "Where is the patriarchy in this?" When I see something that looks sexist, I ask, "Where is the heterosexism in this?" When I see something that looks homophobic, I ask, "Where are the class interests in this?"
>
> —(1991, 1189)

I say "deceptively" because, as anyone knows who has tried to employ this procedure, it merely marks the beginning of the analysis. Many feminist scholars have faced the problem of what to do *after* asking the other question. The hard work of making sense of the connections between categories of difference and interpreting them in terms of power is precisely what has yet to be done.

In 2005 the US feminist scholar Leslie McCall addressed the issue of developing a methodology for doing intersectional research for the first time. She argued that the concept would be considerably more useful if it was accompanied by more stringent methodological guidelines concerning where, how and to what end it could be used in feminist inquiry. While McCall acknowledged that intersectionality could be used to reveal the complexity of categories (as has been the case within feminist poststructuralism) or to examine the crossing categories of identity among specific groups (as Crenshaw and others have done with regard to women of colour), she also believed that an intercategorical approach to intersectionality would provide possibilities for a more sophisticated methodology. She therefore advocated moving away from the almost exclusively qualitative approaches to intersectionality which had been given priority so far and proposed instead a more rigorous quantitative methodology which would focus on "the complexity of relationships among multiple social groups within and across analytical categories" (McCall 2005, 1786) rather than on single groups, single sites or single categories. The subject of intersectionality would then become multigroup and multicomparative (ibid.).

While this call for a quantitative methodology seemed to provide a solution to many of the uncertainties I have described above, it also introduces a host of new problems. For example, it relegates intersectionality to the realm of the social sciences, thereby discounting much of the interesting work which can be done within the fields of literary criticism or Cultural Studies. Furthermore, it omits the use of single case studies which has been so productive for studying intersectionality in the past from further methodological refinement. But—and this is my main concern—the equation of better methodology with quantitative research seems to put an end to intersectionality as a creative methodology—a methodology which is ideally suited to looking for new and often unorthodox ways of doing feminist analysis.

Methodologies are not written-in-stone guidelines for doing feminist inquiry, a kind of one-size-fits-all recipe for feminist research. Methodologies should—and here I agree with McCall—provide help in doing research. I certainly appreciate her desire to develop the promising concept of intersectionality in ways which will actually help feminist scholars do better research. However, better research is not just about more complexity and more stringent procedures. Methodologies should also stimulate the researcher's curiosity and creativity. They should not produce straightjackets for monitoring research, but rather tantalize scholars to raise new questions, engage reflexively and critically with previously held assumptions and explore uncharted territory. Above all, they should mitigate against premature closure.

To this end, I want to propose a rather different strategy. It is a strategy which takes the procedure of asking the other question and elaborates it in ways which could help us do better—that is, more comprehensive, more complex, more interesting feminist research, as McCall has advocated. It is not intended as a recipe, nor as a solution to the uncertainties which plague us when we begin thinking and writing intersectionally. Instead, it is meant as a series of suggestions that could help would-be intersectional researchers to think of their analysis as a process, a journey towards more creative and critical feminist analysis.

SOME STRATEGIES

To this end, I have chosen several strategies which might help you to get started doing intersectional research. These strategies are not intended as a recipe. Nor is the list by any means exhaustive. In fact, I would hope that they would stimulate you to think of your own strategies. They can be done at any stage of the research process: prior to beginning the research, or at any point after the research has been started, or even after-the-fact in order to think of ways to recycle or rethink the work you have already done. They can also be used as a more general writing strategy to encourage a critical

self-reflexivity, which is part of the process of engaging in feminist scholarship more generally. I have drawn my examples and illustrations—selectively and idiosyncratically—from my readings of other feminist scholars as well as from my own research.[5]

Situating Yourself

One of the ways to start thinking intersectionally is to begin with your own multiple positionings as a researcher in terms of gender, class, ethnic, sexual and other social identities. The idea is that locating yourself at the outset of your inquiries will avoid what Donna Haraway has called the god-trick—"the conquering gaze from nowhere" (1991, 188)—enabling instead the production of feminist knowledge which is accountable, reflexive and admittedly partial. While few feminist scholars today would take issue with situating one's self as an epistemological stance, in practice, it is sometimes implemented by providing a list of the researcher's identities—e.g. "as a white, middle-class, heterosexual woman, I . . .". Judith Butler has called this the "embarrassed etc. clause", that endless list of predicates that "strive to encompass a situated subject, but invariably fail to be complete" (1989, 143). Indeed, the differences are endless. However, aside from highlighting the *fact* of multiple identities, such a list does not do much work and may, ironically, even end up becoming an excuse for *not* doing the necessary analysis of situating one's self.

A more intersectional strategy would not entail a list of identity categories, but rather involve developing a narrative about how your specific location shapes or influences you (your thinking, theoretical preferences, intellectual biography) in specific ways—ways which will be relevant with respect to the research you are doing (see also Brewster, Chapter 4, this volume, for further discussion). Ruth Frankenberg (1993), who is one of the founders of Critical Whiteness Studies, developed an interesting way to do this. She was interested in problematizing whiteness as an unmarked, racialized identity, and to this end she developed a methodology which she called writing one's "social geography of whiteness". She had her US white informants write biographical narratives in which they described the presence or absence of people of colour in the various contexts of their everyday lives. They were asked to pay attention to the kinds of interactions that occurred across racialized boundaries within these contexts. They reflected on situations where they were aware of whiteness and what it meant to them to be white (see also Brewster, Chapter 4, this volume, for a similar exercise). For example, one of the common features of whiteness turns out to be never having to think of one's self as having a race. It also means feeling at home in certain kinds of public spaces and endangered or at risk in others. The notion of writing one's social geography could, of course, easily be applied to any number of identity markers (sexual orientation, class background, able-bodiedness, national belonging).

A second step would be to select some of these geographical narratives and explore how they could be relevant to the research you are doing or planning to do. The assumption is that your social location will inevitably shape the ways you look at the world, the kinds of questions you ask (as well as the questions you haven't thought of asking), the kinds of people and events that evoke sympathy and understanding (as well as those that make you feel uncomfortable or evoke avoidance). In my own work on a US feminist grassroots organization grappling with issues of racism, I described my own discomforts and complicities as a white woman talking to other white women about racism (K. Davis 2007, 2010). I used my positionality as a white feminist to critically engage with ways that both my informants and I as researcher were—as I put it—"avoiding the R-word". I used whiteness to analyze the (unwitting) participation of white feminists in the structures and ideological discourses of racism as well as the ways my own complicities as a white feminist researcher shaped the research process.

Complicating Gender

Intersectionality was, among other things, developed in order to complicate gender as the theoretical mainstay of feminist research. The assumption was that gender can never be treated as a stand-alone category but is always and everywhere related to other differences and mutually constituted by these differences.

One way to test this assumption is to begin with an example which seems to be "about gender". Most of us have no trouble identifying some examples. They can include anything from a newspaper article about women's "double-burden" in the workforce and as caretakers to an ad promoting breast augmentations to a particular nasty case of domestic violence. Examples are everywhere and can take nearly any form: a photograph, a film, a TV program, a scientific text or a personal experience. I know that the example is "about gender" because a kind of internal red light begins flashing, a warning to be on the alert, even before I have figured out what the problem is.

Once you have found an example, the first step is to describe it and explain what makes you think it is "about gender". (This is, parenthetically, the way many of us started feminist research to begin with—something which was initially a sense of unease or a suspicion that something was not quite right went on to become a full-fledged research topic, sometimes even culminating in a dissertation or scholarly book!)

Having done this, the second step is to complicate the example and, along with it, hopefully your analysis. Intersectionally speaking, this entails asking the other (and then another and another) question. This could start with writing down three additional markers of differences. You should make a few notes after each about why you chose it and how you think—at first glance—it might provide some interesting insights into your example. For

example, if you have chosen one of those ubiquitous advertisements which show a group of long-legged young women of different ethnic backgrounds, all wearing sexy underwear, you might decide that age, ethnicity and heteronormativity could be relevant or might offer additional critical insights into the example. Remember: you are not just asking another question because you like to ask questions. You are interested because you hope that by introducing additional complexity, you are going to have a better—i.e. more interesting and more critical—analysis.

The third step is to choose one of these markers of difference and proceed to do a more detailed description of the example, along with an account of why this example seems to be about age, or ethnicity, or heteronormativity. Remember to give this step at least as much attention as the first step, drawing, again, on intuitions, experiences, theoretical knowledge. Do not stop writing until you have completely run out of ideas!

The fourth step is to place the two narratives next to one another (literally) and compare them. Where have your descriptions been different? Where are the resonances and parallels in the way you analyzed the example as about gender or about age, or ethnicity or heteronormativity? In what ways are these analyses different? What were you not able to talk about in the second round that you were able to talk about in the first, and vice versa? How would you explain the resonances and the differences in the narratives?

The fifth step is to go back to your first narrative (this is about gender) and re-read it. Write down what has changed in your thinking about the example. What do these changes tell you about gender, more generally? What insights does this exercise give you into what is missing from the version of feminist theory you first applied and/or how it could be elaborated?

EXERCISE 1: ASK THE OTHER QUESTION

1. *Find an example which seems to be "about gender". Describe it and exemplify why.*
2. *"Ask the other question", thinking of three additional differences (like race, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation) which could be relevant to your example.*
3. *Choose one of these differences and write down how and why the example is "about" this difference.*
4. *Compare the narratives. Where are the resonances, and where are the differences? What can you talk about in one narrative but not in the other? Why?*
5. *Return to your first narrative and explain what insights you now have about gender.*

Blind Spots, Near-Sightedness and Other Myopias

One of the most important contributions that intersectionality has made in feminist scholarship is that it helps identify the inevitable blind spots that every researcher has when doing her or his research. Whether because of our experiences or social locations, our theoretical perspective or our political orientations, we are often unable to see what our material has to offer us. Such blind spots can subvert even our best intentions to do research which is comprehensive and critical.

A good example of such a blind spot can be found in Valerie Smith's analysis of narratives of passing—that is, stories of "characters who are 'legally' black yet light-skinned enough to live as white" (1998, 35). Such stories can be found in racially bifurcated societies like the US and apartheid South Africa. Using intersectionality as a strategy of reading, Smith reconsiders these narratives as stories which—while constructed in racial terms—are often motivated by class considerations, and whose consequences are differentially distributed due to gender (women in passing narratives are invariably punished for passing, while men are not). Her analysis highlights omissions in critical race and feminist theory, which have focused on passing primarily as a product of racism, as well as resisting the equation of passing with the desire to be white.

A simple way to look for possible blind spots is to consider a difference which seems totally irrelevant to the topic at hand and apply the exercise described above. Sometimes you are already aware of your blind spots and will want to put them automatically to the test. This is the case, for example, with whiteness, which has been taken as something requiring constant critical interrogation by many white researchers. However, many blind spots fall in the category of never-thought-about-that-before. In these cases, it can be useful to venture a bit farther afield, to go beyond the usual suspects of intersectional analysis (gender, race/ethnicity, class) and consider differences which, at first glance, seem to have nothing to do with your inquiry. For example, what could the consideration of able-bodiedness and disability possibly tell you about issues of citizenship in the EU? Or what does religion/secularity have to do with experiences of dislocation or sedentariness? The consideration of such differences can, of course, culminate in the realization that this is really not the track you want to be on in your particular inquiry. Or it can open up new vistas for inquiry which you could not have imagined before. However, in any case, it will alert you to the possibility of new directions and make you more flexible in your encounters with your material.

A final word about a specific kind of blind spot—the near-sightedness which is almost endemic in academic research in the so-called First World. Despite the best intentions, many feminist scholars in North America or Western Europe tend to position themselves as being able to speak for women in other parts of the world. This occurs simply by virtue of the fact that they do not contextualize their research in terms of their local context

or make clear the connections between their work and scholarship in other parts of the world. In contrast, scholars in other parts of the world are compelled to contextualize their work—this is often called making their work more internationally accessible.

Intersectionality can be a helpmeet here. For example, research which is centred in the US or which draws exclusively on theories produced in the US might re-examine its assumptions, questions, methods and findings through the lens of nation or national belonging or geopolitical location. (There are other names for this; the idea is to find something which will decentre universalistic assumptions which may be lurking unnoticed within one's research and/or to find ways to make global connections between here and there.)

One of my own favourites is Uma Narayan's (1997) *Dislocating Cultures*, in which she problematizes the ways so-called Third World women are represented in First World feminism. She was particularly concerned about US feminist discourse on widow burning (*sati*) in India. In order to criticize the assumptions behind the "death by culture" feminist discourse around *sati*, she compared it to another example of violence against women—namely, US domestic violence. After pointing out many of the similarities between the two, she shows how domestic violence, which is usually treated as a problem of *gendered* inequalities, might look if read through the lens of culture. For example, domestic violence could be linked to "American culture" with its Christian doctrines, myths and practices. Christian values about women's sinful nature, Eve's role in the Fall or the sanctity of heterosexual marriage could be cited as "typically American", analogous to the way *sati* in India is linked to Hinduism (Narayan 1997, 114). The fact that this reading would jar the sensibilities of many US feminist readers, who would probably argue that it just does not "feel plausible", paves the way both for contextualizing the issue of domestic violence in a broader framework and also for uncovering universalist assumptions underlying First World feminist discourse.

CODA

While I hope that the reader has been encouraged in her path toward finding ways to do intersectional analysis, I want to stress that she or he should be open to possibilities which have not been mentioned here at all. To this end, let me conclude my chapter with an example taken from a summer school in which students who had, for the most part, little understanding of what intersectionality was before they arrived taught me about intersectionality as a methodology. As part of their final exam, the students were divided into small groups and asked to devise a performance which would demonstrate what they had learned from the course. This is what one of the groups came up with:

After brainstorming about a series of everyday situations where women and men are often confronted with differences in identity and inequalities

of power (for example, job interviews or walking along a city street at night or embracing one's partner in a public space or wearing a marker of one's religious affiliation), they assembled a list of relevant categories of difference—that is, differences that made a difference. They then made signs which were attached by cords around the students' necks. One student had a sign which read GENDER; another was CLASS, and still another was RACE. In addition to the usual suspects, there were signs bearing the words SEXUAL ORIENTATION, ETHNICITY, NATIONAL BELONGING, (DIS)ABILITY and RELIGION.

One student was chosen as leader. Her task was to read out descriptions of the everyday situations which had been assembled during the brainstorming exercise, making sure to end on a note where it was clear that some inequities of power were involved. When she was finished, the students who felt that their category was relevant sprang to the front. Those who did not feel spoken to remained behind.

This exercise was interesting because of the visually evocative way it demonstrated how you can begin an intersectional analysis. It gave an immediate sense that in nearly any situation multiple differences would be involved. And yet, at the same time, these differences would not be equally involved, nor would every conceivable difference be relevant for a particular situation. The performance ended there, with all of us clapping with appreciation. However, it caused me to consider how this exercise could be expanded in ways that would develop it into an intersectional methodology. For example, the students who came forward could be asked to engage with one another in conversations, conversations which would make clear how different categories made different aspects of the situation relevant. They could be encouraged to explore common ground or get into arguments about which had more to say about the situation at hand. The students who were hanging out in the back could be asked to explain why they had *not* come forward. They might find reasons to change their decision. Ultimately, the goal would be a group discussion in which everyone—participants and onlookers—would return to the situation and consider what we had all learned, what had changed in our perceptions of what was going on and what we would want to look into as critical feminist researchers. It is this kind of conversation—open-ended, tantalizingly ambiguous and yet irresistibly compelling—which is what makes interesectionality a critical methodology and a creative writing strategy.

NOTES

1. It is impossible to do justice to this writing, but here are some of the most well-known and frequently cited works: A. Davis 1981; hooks 1981; Carby 1982; B. Smith 1983; Moraga and Anzaldúa 1984; Ware 1992; Zinn and Dill 1994; Collins 1990.
2. For a good look at the range of disciplines, topics and perspectives which have employed intersectionality, the reader is referred to a special issue of the

European Journal of Women's Studies, edited by Ann Phoenix and Pamela Pattynama (vol. 13, no. 3, August 2006).

3. Helma Lutz (2002) has provided a list of no less than fourteen lines of difference (gender, sexuality, race or skin colour, ethnicity, national belonging, class, culture, religion, able-bodiedness, age, migration or sedentariness, property ownership, geographical location and status in terms of tradition and development). The list is, however, potentially much longer.
4. In K. Davis 2007, I explain how many of these uncertainties are inherent in the term itself—paradoxically part of its very popularity and success.
5. It goes beyond the scope of this particular chapter to expand on this point. However, the reader is urged here to collect her or his own favourite examples of how other scholars employ intersectionality in their own writings. These examples can be analyzed for the kinds of strategies that are used—strategies which one can "borrow"—or, as Sissel Lie says, "steal" (Chapter 7, this volume)—and elaborate for one's own inquiry.

REFERENCES

Anthias, Floya. 1998. "Rethinking Social Divisions: Some Notes towards a Theoretical Framework." *Sociological Review* 46 (3): 557–80.

Anthias, Floya and Nira Yuval-Davis. 1983. "Contextualizing Feminism: Gender, Ethnic and Class Divisions." *Feminist Review* 15: 62–75.

Brah, Avtar. 1996. *Cartographies of Diaspora: Contesting Identities*. London: Routledge.

Brah, Avtar and Ann Phoenix. 2004. "Ain't I a Woman? Revisiting Intersectionality." *Journal of International Women's Studies* 5 (3): 75–86.

Butler, Judith. 1989. *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*. New York: Routledge.

Carby, Hazel. 1982. "White Woman Listen! Black Feminism and the Boundaries of Sisterhood." In *The Empire Strikes Back: Race and Realism in 70s Britain*, edited by the Centre for Contemporary Studies, 212–35. London: Hutchinson.

Collins, Patricia Hill. 1990. *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Power and the Politics of Empowerment*. Boston: Unwin Hyman.

Collins, Patricia Hill. 2000. "It's All in the Family: Intersections of Gender, Race, and Nation." In *Decentering the Center: Philosophy for a Multicultural, Postcolonial, and Feminist World*, edited by Uma Narayan and Sandra Harding, 156–76. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Crenshaw, Kimberlé. 1989. "Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics." *University of Chicago Legal Forum* 140: 139–67.

Crenshaw, Kimberlé. 1991. "Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence against Women of Color." *Stanford Law Review* 43 (6): 1241–99.

Davis, Angela Y. 1981. *Women, Race, and Class*. New York: Random House.

Davis, Kathy. 2007. *The Making of* Our Bodies, Ourselves: *How Feminism Travels across Borders*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Davis, Kathy. 2008. "Intersectionality as Buzzword: A Sociology of Science Perspective on What Makes a Feminist Theory Successful." *Feminist Theory* 9 (1): 67–86.

Davis, Kathy. 2010. "Avoiding the 'R-Word': Racism in Feminist Collectives." In *Secrecy and Silence in the Research Process: Feminist Reflections*, edited by Róisín Ryan-Flood and Rosalind Gill, 147–60. London: Routledge.

Frankenberg, Ruth. 1993. *White Women, Race Matters: The Social Construction of Whiteness*. New York: Routledge.

Haraway, Donna J. 1988. "Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism as a Site of Discourse on the Privilege of Partial Perspective." *Feminist Studies* 14 (3): 575–99.

Haraway, Donna J. 1991. *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*. London: Free Association Books.

hooks, bell. 1981. *Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism*. Boston: South End Press.

King, Deborah. 1988. "Multiple Jeopardy, Multiple Consciousness: The Context of a Black Feminist Ideology." *Signs* 14 (1): 42–72.

Knudsen, Susanne V. 2006. "Intersectionality: A Theoretical Inspiration in the Analysis of Minority Cultures and Identities in Textbooks." In *Caught in the Web or Lost in the Textbook?,* edited by Èric Bruillard et al., 61–76. Caen: IARTEM, Stef, Iufm.

Lutz, Helma. 2002. "Zonder blikken of blozen: Het standpunt van de (nieuw-) realisten." *Tijdschrift voor Genderstudies* 5 (3): 7–17.

Lykke, Nina. 2010. *Feminist Studies: A Guide to Intersectional Theory, Methodology and Writing*. New York: Routledge.

Mani, Lata. 1989. "Multiple Mediations: Feminist Scholarship in the Age of Multinational Reception." *Inscriptions* 5: 1–24.

Matsuda, Maria J. 1991. "Beside My Sister, Facing the Enemy: Legal Theory out of Coalition." *Stanford Law Review* 43 (6): 1183–92.

McCall, Leslie. 2005. "The Complexity of Intersectionality." *Signs* 30 (3): 1771–1800.

Mohanty, Chandra T. (2003) *Feminism without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity*. Durham: Duke University Press.

Moraga, Cherrie and Gloria Anzaldúa, eds. 1983. *The Bridge Called My Back: Writing by Radical Women of Color*. New York: Kitchen Table Press.

Narayan, Uma. 1997. *Dislocating Cultures: Identities, Traditions, and Third World Feminism*. New York: Routledge.

Phoenix, Ann. 2006. "Editorial Intersectionality." *European Journal of Women's Studies* 13 (3): 187–92.

Smith, Barbara, ed. 1983. *Home Girls: A Black Feminist Anthology*. New York: Kitchen Table/Women of Color Press.

Smith, Valerie. 1998. *Not Just Race, Not Just Gender: Black Feminist Readings*. New York: Routledge.

Staunæs, Dorte. 2003. "Where Have All the Subjects Gone? Bringing Together the Concepts of Intersectionality and Subjectification." *Nora* 11 (2): 101–10.

Ware, Vron. 1992. *Beyond the Pale: White Women, Racism and History*. London: Verso.

Yuval-Davis, Nira. 1997. *Gender and Nation*. London: Sage.

Zinn, M. Backa and B. Thonton Dill, eds. 1994. *Women of Color in US Society*. Philadelphia: Temple University Press.