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



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Introduction

Middle Eastern Politics is a diverse and deeply interesting field of study, which features daily in the global media. This FreeBook is a collection of chapters from key titles from our Middle Eastern Politics range, all written by experts in their fields on a variety of topics ranging from the Arab Spring to the Israeli-Arab conflict.

The chapters here are as varied as the field they cover, and address a range of political issues within the Middle East. To get the whole picture, make sure to check out the full text of the titles excerpted here, available online at Routledge.com/middleeaststudies.

Chapter 1 - Mubarak's Brave New World taken from 'Egypt's Long Revolution: Protest Movements and Uprisings'

This chapter, taken from Egypt's Long Revolution: Protest Movements and Uprisings, introduces the series of events that are believed to have led to the 25th January 2011 uprising. The book argues that the increasing societal pressures from different quarters such as labour groups, pro-democracy movements and ordinary citizens during this period culminated in an intensifying culture of protest and activism that was vital in the lead up to the dramatic overthrow of Mubarak. Maha Abdelrahman is a lecturer at the Centre of Development Studies and the Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge.

Chapter 2 - 1967–1968 Failure from 'Israeli Peacemaking Since 1967'

This chapter, taken from Israeli Peacekeeping since 1967, analyses the factors that led to the failure of peace talks between Syria and Israel. From the beginning of the process, few believed that peace could be achieved without full withdrawal from the Golan Heights. While a fundamental challenge for any Israeli leader, this demand was only one of many reasons for the breakdown of the talks, including the mutual mistrust and skepticism felt on both the Syrian and Israeli sides. Galia Golan is a leading Israeli political scientist, formerly head of the Political Science Department at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, currently Head of the M.A. and Conflict Resolution Programs at the Interdisciplinary Center, Herzliya (IDC).

Chapter 3 - Between Cairo and Washington: Sectarianism and Counter-revolution in Post-Mubarak Egypt Reem Abou-El-Fadl taken from 'Revolutionary Egypt'

This chapter, taken from Revolutionary Egypt, examines the wider responsibility for the sectarian violence and upheavals in post-Mubarak Egypt, focusing on the period of Muhammad Mursi's presidency. It investigates the contemporary sectarianization process by linking its domestic, regional, and international drivers and argues that both the SCAF and Islamist actors in post-Mubarak Egypt worked to highlight and foster sectarian divisions in Egypt, and enjoyed regional and US backing throughout. Reem Abou-El-Fadl is a lecturer in the Comparative Politics of the Middle East at the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London.

Chapter 4 - The European diaspora of Muslim migrants and the idea of Europe taken from ‘Political Islam, World Politics and Europe’


This chapter, taken from Political Islam, World Politics and Europe, analyses the relationship between Europe and Islam and addresses questions concerning citizenship and integration, issues that are becoming increasingly relevant as growing numbers of Muslim migrants settle in Europe. It explores how and why Muslim migrants should embrace the idea of Europe, in order to successfully negotiate both Muslim and European identities. Bassam Tibi is Professor Emeritus of International Relations. Between 1973 and 2009 he taught at the University of Goettingen, and he was A.D. White Professor at Large at Cornell University until 2010. Between 1982 and 2000 Professor Tibi was parallel to Goettingen at Harvard University in a variety of affiliations, the latest of which is the Bosch Fellow of Harvard.

Chapter 5 - Iraq from ‘Oil States in the New Middle East’

This chapter, taken from Oil States in the New Middle East, looks at the political effects of oil in Iraq, examining how Iraq fared throughout the Arab popular upheaval. It argues that Iraq is trapped in the time warp of authoritarian rentierism, leaving the country at risk of fragmentation and unable to face the challenge posed by jihadi Islamism. While providing insufficient glue to hold the polity and society together, oil has become one of the main threats to the nation state’s integrity. Kjetil Selvik is Senior Researcher at the Chr. Michelsen Institute and Adjunct Associate Professor at the Department of Comparative Politics, University of Bergen. Bjørn Olav Utvik is Professor in Middle East History and Director of the Centre for Islamic and Middle East Studies at the University of Oslo.

Mubarak's Brave New World

1: Mubarak's Brave New World



The following is excerpted from *Egypt's Long Revolution: Protest Movements and Uprisings* by Maha Abdelrahman. © 2015 Taylor & Francis Group. All rights reserved.

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From the mid-2000s, Mubarak's Egypt was a poster child for a new neoliberal order in the region. For several years, it had been hailed by the World Bank for its 'reforms' as one of the world's top-ten most improved economies. In 2010, the year before the 25 January uprising, Egypt topped the list (World Bank, 2010). Successive Mubarak governments had indeed made many strides to earn such a celebrated position. From the 1990s, they had accelerated privatization of public assets, introduced drastic cuts in social expenditure, launched legal reform to guarantee 'flexible' employment, privatized agriculture, removed trade barriers and generally put the interests of capital above all else.

The impressive success of Mubarak's regime in dismantling the remaining heritage of the old order of public investment and import substitution strategies, which had been introduced in the 1950s and 1960s, would not have been possible without the restructuring of important institutions and the introduction of new ones. At the heart of this institutional restructuring was the rebranding of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP) and the governments it put in place. Gamal Mubarak, widely tipped to succeed his father as president, was invested with the task of reorganizing the NDP as the stronghold from which to launch a new local version of the neoliberal order. Under the banner of 'New Thinking', the young Mubarak quickly rose through the ranks of the party to head its newly created policy committee in 2002. He surrounded himself with a group of 'reformers' who shared his fervour for scrapping the remaining elements of the developmentalist state. While this state built by Nasser had already started to show cracks under its own weight as early as the 1960s, the task of reducing it commenced in earnest in the 1970s under Sadat as part of his open door economic policies. Unlike Sadat and the early Mubarak governments, the new NDP reformers embarked on their task with a singular commitment and an unwavering disregard for any possible social cost of their project. Steeped in private capital and hailing from top positions within international financial institutions (IFIs) such as the World Bank and the IMF, the pedigree of the new reformers was indisputable. The infamous Ahmed Ezz, for example, was a business tycoon who made his way up the NDP hierarchy and the government, culminating in his heading of the powerful Economic Committee of the Parliament in 2005. Mohamed Mohieldin, a World Bank economist, Taher Helmy, president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt and Hossam Badawi were among the most loyal supporters of the new project.¹ In 2003, the NDP launched a document prepared by the policy committee that outlined a blueprint for its project of transformation: a greater role for the private sector, the removal of trade barriers, a bigger role for IFIs in overseeing domestic market dynamics, attracting foreign investment, reducing tax on capital and creating a public opinion supportive of these policies.²

The advances that Egypt had already made in privatization, reduction of subsidies and trade liberalization in the late 1990s were deemed acceptable by its neoliberal taskmasters but with the observation that there was still considerable room for improvement. According to a USAID evaluation report in 2004, Egypt was not doing enough to attract investment. Among the many 'controllable' impediments to investment in the country were 'issues of contract enforcement, excessive bureaucracy, foreign investors' unsatisfactory

past experience, and excessively discretionary customs and taxation practices' (USAID, 2004: 17). More work needed to be done. Only too eager to deliver, the NDP reformers pushed for the appointment of a new government with the commitment necessary to carry out the remaining steps.

The appointment in 2004 of the Nazif government, dubbed the 'businessmen cabinet', was a watershed in sealing a new order in Egypt. Nazif's government included a large number of business tycoons who controlled some vital portfolios. For example, Rachid Mohamed Rachid, appointed as minister of foreign trade and industry, was a senior executive of the Unilever group and the owner of Egypt's main food company (Fine Foods). Ahmed El-Maghraby, owner of Mansour and Maghrabi investment and real estate companies, was chosen as minister of housing. They were joined by Mohamed Mansour, owner of the Mansour Group conglomerate, which is the distributor of General Motors and Chevrolet, as minister of transportation. The minister of finance, Youssef Boutrus Ghali, was chosen for his experience as a former senior economist in the IMF. With Ahmed Ezz at the apex of the economic decision-making structure in the country and his fellow business tycoons dominating the government, policies and laws to promote the interests of domestic and global capital were now guaranteed. Under the new Nazif government, a new ministry of investment was created, bringing together the public enterprise ministry, the general authority for investment and free zones, and the capital market authority. The principal task of the new ministry was to facilitate the privatization process. The new minister, Gamal Mubarak's close ally, Mohamed Mohieldin, and the government which appointed him, embarked on this mission with gusto. Compared to a mere nine public companies with a total value of \$17.5 million sold in 2003, the new government privatized an impressive 59 companies worth \$2.6 billion in 2005–6 alone. The privatization project was a clear ideological commitment to a new order. While neoliberal logic justifies the need to privatize public firms on the grounds of inefficient management and the supposed inability of state-run businesses to make a profit, among the companies listed for privatization in the same year were some of the most profitable public sector companies in the country, including Sidi Krir Petrochemicals and the Alexandria Mineral Oils Company (Rutherford, 2008: 222).

While a new political project requires a new and committed political class, it also needs new ideologues to advocate and justify its founding principles. Harvey (2003) reminds us how neoliberalism, as a new political economic doctrine in the 1940s, developed into a coherent project through founding exclusive think tanks which produced a steady stream of analysis and polemics in its favour. The Egyptian Centre for Economic Studies (ECES), a think tank established in the 1990s with the support of USAID and a group of powerful businessmen, provided the space for Egypt's new ideologues. The first director of the Centre was Ahmed Galal, a former World Bank economist, a close friend of Gamal Mubarak and later minister of finance in the military-appointed interim government in 2013. Among its board members were Gamal Mubarak himself, the all-powerful Ahmed Ezz, future cabinet ministers such as Ahmad El Maghraby and Mounir Abdel Nour as well as other business tycoons such as Mohamed Farid Khamis, chairman of Oriental Weavers, one of the largest machine carpet factories in the Middle East, and Ahmad Bahgat, owner of the giant Bahgat Group. The Centre was an invaluable institution that produced prolific research emphasizing the necessity and inevitability of the reform being carried out by the regime. Among the research

produced were recommendations for accelerating privatization and extending it to new economic sectors such as the airline industry (Ragab, 2005). Government subsidies were the subject of a great deal of research that offered a critique of the subsidy system as costly, burdening the treasury and causing price distortions and commodity arbitrage (Helmy, 2005). Forecasts were provided for phasing out subsidies on strategic commodities such as petroleum energy products (Abouleinein, El-Laithy and Kheir-El-Din, 2009). To promote the liberalization of trade and a commitment to international free trade agreements, research was published on the inevitability of trade liberalization and on the success of the highly controversial Qualifying Industrial Zone (QIZ) protocol on the textile and garment industry (Refaat, 2003; 2006).³ Very quickly, as Rutherford (2008: 211) commented, 'The ECES became the primary institution for translating the broad principles of neoliberal reform into specific policy proposals ... Through ... [its] efforts, the private sector's aspirations for change were converted into a coherent policy agenda'.

Heavily invested in the building of a neoliberal order, Egypt's new political class was set on a seemingly unstoppable course. Having successfully dominated political institutions, the leviathan of domestic capital was by now enjoying parliamentary immunity, preferential access to public resources and contracts, unlimited credit and, above all, the ability to fashion legal tools necessary for the smooth functioning of its project. Exploiting public office in the service of private interests is not unique to the late Mubarak era. Already in the 1970s Osman Ahmad Osman, a close friend of Sadat and the father-in-law of one of his daughters, was a minister of construction as well as the long-serving chairman of the Arab Contractors Group, a sprawling network of private and public-sector companies. Osman, who secured multi-billion dollar government contracts during Sadat's rule, was known to subcontract many of these contracts to his own private companies. While Osman was certainly the most obvious example, he was by no means the only one. Over the next two decades, a 'network of privilege', a term coined by Sfakianakis (2004), was steadily being woven between capital – or the ranks of the 32 – state bureaucracy and a new political class.⁴

The 2000s saw the rise of a new political class that dominated the policy process allowing the building of new forms of oligopoly unique to this era. Monopolies and oligopolies are central features of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005) and should not, therefore, be explained in over-simplistic terms of corruption or crony capitalism. In Egypt, as elsewhere, monopolies were both an outcome and a servant of new strategies of dispossession. Whether it was steel, cement, telecommunications, food and beverages or agribusiness, almost all sectors of the economy became dominated by monopolistic and oligopolistic practices. In the strategic market of iron and steel, for example, by the end of the Mubarak era all production was in the hands of 22 companies. A mere three of these companies controlled over 90 per cent of total production with over 50 per cent of this share taken by Ahmed Ezz's Ezz Al-Dehkeila.⁵ Similarly, by the end of 2010, almost 90 per cent of total cement production was dominated by only four multinational companies: Lafarge, Italcementi, Cemex and Seymour. This was the culmination of a long process that commenced in the late 1990s when the Arab Swiss Engineering Company, chaired by Mohamed Abdel Wahab, a former minister of industry in the early 1990s, facilitated the majority share sale (51 per cent) of the highly profitable, state-owned meiryah Cement Company to Lafarge in 1997. In 1999, the state

sold large majority shares in its profitable top cement companies: Alexandria (74 per cent), Assiout (90 per cent) and Beni Sueif (95 per cent) to multinational groups. The ensuing oligopoly has not only had negative effects on prices but also grave ramifications for national production plants.⁶

Favouring global capital by offering a large share of domestic markets to multinationals was part and parcel of the new neoliberal order. Following its accession to the WTO in 1995, the Egyptian government had to swiftly take measures to comply with the basic principle of the organization: the euphemistically named ‘non-discrimination’ rule.⁷ By 2000, Egypt’s government had removed most of the measures protecting key local industries against competition from imports. The textile industry is a case in point. The sector, which employed over 100,000 workers and generated about \$1.25 billion in export revenue in 2000, enjoyed government protection in the form of high tariffs on low-cost imports from Asia. The original 40 per cent tariffs were gradually reduced to no more than 12.5 per cent in 2005, with a view to eliminate them completely by 2015 (Rutherford, 2008: 200). As a result, domestic producers lost a dramatic share of the market to cheaper imports from China. In a mere four years between 2001 and 2004, domestic production sales halved from \$6 billion to \$3 billion as cheap exports drove local companies out of the market (Al-Haddad, 2013).

Blatant crony capitalism became the trademark of Mubarak’s regime and a foundation stone of the variant of neoliberalism it fostered. Of course, neoliberalism works hand-in-hand with crony capitalism everywhere. However, by the end of his rule, crony capitalism in Egypt had reached a highly developed state. Three-quarters of all subsidies on hydrocarbons and energy, for example, were consumed by industries owned by Egypt’s new political elite (Springborg, 2011). Innumerable examples illustrate how crony capitalism had become a well entrenched system essential for the capital accumulation of the new ruling class. Changes in the global capitalist economy were at the heart of the functioning of this system. The financialization of the economy, starting in the 1990s under directives from IFIs, for example, had led to the increased value of particular assets such as land, which was crucial to the booming real estate market. Cases like the ‘Palm Hills’ and ‘Madenati’ gated communities, which received huge media attention both before and after Mubarak’s downfall, are notorious examples of how the Mubarak family, the NDP, the cabinet and the state–capital nexus in general colluded to exploit public assets for personal profit and enshrine the new rules of the game in the legal system. In the first case, as one researcher puts it: ‘the Mubaraks and their associates and relatives together with two ministers could unlawfully allocate large plots of public land, at low prices, to a company in which they hold shares’.⁸ The details of the complex deal involved flagrant under-pricing of public land, a favourable bidding process and exploitation of the emergency law to put a seal on the operation. The example of the business tycoon Ahmad Zayat’s capturing of the market for alcoholic beverages is another case in point. Through his strong ties with the state bureaucracy and his business partnership with the military complex in its Safi mineral water venture, Zayat was able to manipulate the privatization process of Al-Ahram Beverage Company, another public sector company that was consistently profitable. By means of a long, convoluted process, Zayat bought the company for EGP 231 million after the government had rejected an earlier bid of EGP 400 million from another company on the grounds that it was too low. For a while,

he was able to monopolize the whole market.⁹

The price of ‘success’

While the World Bank and other IFIs were hailing Egypt for its impressive seven per cent growth rate, mostly derived from labour remittances, Suez Canal fees and high energy prices, especially of natural gas, the UNDP pronounced 44 per cent of the population to be living at or below the poverty line (UNDP, 2008). The accuracy of this figure, indeed any attempt to measure poverty in any context, is fraught with methodological and political problems. In any case, poverty and even the fact of increasing poverty, cannot in itself be seen as the major explanatory factor for the 25 January uprising and the preceding decade of protest.¹⁰ The new neoliberal order, more than just impoverishing the majority of Egyptians, was signing the death certificate of an old order which, while long waning, had continued to provide a sense of security and entitlement for many social groups. However, by the 1990s, many Egyptians had begun to realize that the state was no longer keeping its part of the ‘social contract’ in which it had committed itself, decades ago, to providing social security to a wide range of social groups. Moreover, Egyptians were becoming increasingly aware by the 2000s that this gradual but persistent chipping away of entitlements was not a temporary anomaly. Nor was it contingent on the policies of one particular government or a transient phase that would eventually be reversed. There was a growing realization that state–society relations were being permanently restructured to their disadvantage. The evidence was everywhere. The dismantling of the old system was systematic and universal. It left no area untouched; labour rights, rural livelihoods, progressive taxation, social security and pension schemes were all targets.

Labour and employment rights

The modernization project of the 1950s and 1960s gave a huge role to state bureaucracy across post-colonial societies. Devotees of the project in the words of one author saw the state bureaucracy as the ‘midwife for Western development by creating stable and orderly change’ (Dwivedi, 1999). The provision of universal education and health care systems as well as the introduction of land reform and the nationalization of private assets translated on the ground to rapidly increasing public service employment in many developing countries. Egypt was no exception and during the 1960s the growth rate of the bureaucracy substantially exceeded that of population, employment and production, with the number of employees in the public bureaucracy increasing by 70 per cent and salaries by 123 per cent. At the end of this period, the public sector employed at least one-third of Egypt’s non-agricultural labour force, with some estimates putting the figure as high as one half (Ayubi, 1988; Owen, 1992). Furthermore, state employment under the populist regime of Nasser was characterized by the immense sense of entitlement it provided. All graduates of tertiary education institutions were not only guaranteed automatic employment but permanent jobs with concomitant social benefits. As a result, large numbers of the educated middle classes became not only reliant on the state but based their lives on its promises of life-long security.

Similarly, Nasser’s populist regime extended major privileges to workers, guaranteeing them legendary levels of job security that won Nasser the support of the overwhelming majority of trade unionists and workers. One of his earliest decisions was to pass

Decree 165 of 1953, which guaranteed workers' job security by making it financially and bureaucratically almost impossible for an employer to dismiss a worker without a very strong reason. Nasser's 'social compact' with workers, as well as with large sections of the middle classes, not only granted them job security but further instituted a generous regime of subsidies which supplemented the often low nominal wages, thus preventing any significant drop in real wages (Goldberg, 1992; Hansen and Radwan, 1982).

However, these privileges, which would have been impossible to sustain over the long term in any case, were gradually eroded by Nasser's successors. Over the decades, the share of public employment of total employment decreased steadily. In the period 1981–2008, it fell from 40 per cent in 1981–82, to 30 per cent in 1990–91, then to 29 per cent in 2007–8 (El-Wassal, 2013: 4). Privatization of public sector companies and slimming down of the civil service meant the loss of large numbers of jobs. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, while public sector employment remained more or less stable, the burgeoning of the labour force from 17 to 27 million meant a severe reduction in available jobs (Springborg, 2011). Needless to say, the private sector had no capacity to absorb laid-off workers, let alone the millions of new entrants in the labour market. The lucky ones among the hundreds of thousands of redundant workers managed to join the ranks of the informal sector. Like most countries of the global south, the informal sector in Egypt remains a major source of employment. Accounting for almost one third of total GDP in 2004, it provided employment for 8.2 million workers, considerably higher than the 6.8 million hired by the formal private sector (Galal, 2004). The informal sector remains outside the purview of labour laws and its workers are hence excluded from any form of protection, social security, unionization, access to credit or health insurance.

Perhaps even more relevant to the loss of a sense of job security was the dramatic rise in precarious or vulnerable employment. Among major achievements on the road to reform, Egypt was lauded by IFIs for having removed a great deal of labour market 'rigidities'. The private sector was especially lauded for not having minimum wages, while both the private and public sectors were commended for cutting down on non-wage costs and for fostering weak unionized activity (Hassan and Sassanpour, 2008). In 2004, a World Bank recommendation for slimming down the public sector was to rely on 'lowering remuneration for new entrants, adjusting the pay scale to strengthen the link between compensation and productivity, and focusing on non-wage benefits that distort labour decisions, such as generous pension systems and family allowances that add to the allure of employment in the public sector' (World Bank, 2004: 133). The infamous Law 12/2003 was enacted with the aim of providing more freedom for employers to dismiss workers summarily as well as the power to modify contracts at will. Under Mubarak, new employees, both in the private and public sectors, were increasingly hired on short-term contracts in order to avoid providing any social security. More alarming were reports of newly hired employees being required to sign resignation letters at the moment of hiring which their employers could use to dismiss them at any time. Even those with more secure contracts could not rely on any social security benefits as part of their employment. The overwhelming majority of firms across the economy (91 per cent) employ fewer than five workers, which means they are not required by Egyptian labour laws to provide workers with social security (Abdel-Fadil, 2011: 22). On the eve of Mubarak's downfall, even by the World Bank's

conservative definition of vulnerable employment, 21 per cent of all male and 44 per cent of all female workers in Egypt were considered vulnerable (Springborg, 2011).

Rural dispossession

Integral to Sadat's policies of de-Nasserization in the 1970s, were the commercialization of land and agricultural production and the dismantling of state institutions that had been designed to provide support to small farmers. Nasser's land reforms¹¹ were criticized for not going far enough in creating a more equitable distribution or in reducing the old landowners' positions of economic power in rural areas (Richards, 1993; El-Ghonemy, 1998). However, the reforms were, undeniably, the most extensive in the whole of the Middle East (Bush, 2009). As was the case with labour and public sector laws, Nasser's land reforms afforded small farmers a huge sense of security, backed by laws protecting their rights, especially tenancy rights. In order to liberalize the economy and attract FDI, successive Mubarak governments followed in the footsteps of Sadat by whittling away benefits that had accrued to small farmers under Nasser. The tenancy law, in particular, was regarded by neoliberal policy-makers as the last obstacle on the road to 'freeing' Egyptian agriculture from the 'distorting' control of the state. Therefore, Law 96 of 1992, which came into effect in 1997, revoked the previously state-determined rents of small farmers, allowing landowners to charge any rent they saw fit. In some cases, landowners charged market-based rents, permitting some farmers to continue with their tenancy. But in other cases, landowners charged rents that immediately skyrocketed by up to 400 per cent in some areas, allowing them to terminate the contracts of those unable to pay the exorbitant rents and not issue new contracts to poor farmers, especially in the case of female-headed households (*ibid.*: 59). Millions of tenants were put at the complete mercy of landowners without any state protection, resulting in many peasant families, especially female-headed households, being dispossessed of their rights (*ibid.*: 58).¹²

Although agriculture was the slowest growing sector in the period 1990 to 2008, rural poverty had been declining until the introduction of Law 96. However, in the period after the mass eviction of tenants, it increased rapidly from 22.1 per cent in 2000 to 28.9 per cent in 2009, representing an increase of almost a third in only nine years (see Table 1.1). The plight of Egypt's small farmers and landless peasants was further exacerbated by the intensifying pressure of other neoliberal policies. For example, the country's much criticized food subsidy programme had a distinctively urban bias. In 2008–2009 rural areas benefited ten per cent less than urban areas from food and other subsidies (World Bank and Ministry of Economic Development, Arab Republic of Egypt, 2010).

Table 1.1 Poverty headcount ratio using national poverty line, 1990–2009

Region	1990	1995	2000	2005	2009
Urban	20.3	22.5	9.3	10.1	11.0
Rural	28.6	23.3	22.1	26.8	28.9
Total	25.0	22.9	16.9	19.6	21.6

Source: Bargawi and McKinley (2011) (based on CAPMAS and WB)

The poor pay taxes and service the debt

Mubarak instituted a truly regressive tax regime, thereby even further increasing the inequality engendered by the neoliberal order. In 2001, the pro-rich fiscal system drew only 4.4 per cent of all revenue from taxes on industrial and commercial profits.

Nonetheless, only a few months after its appointment in 2004, the Nazif government abolished progressive income taxation and introduced a flat rate of 20 per cent, with an exemption only for those with an annual income less than EGP 5000 (approximately equivalent to US\$700 in early 2014). More importantly, corporate tax was slashed from 42 to 20 per cent. By 2009/2010, salaried workers paid EGP 13 billion in tax while the contribution of multi-billion dollar corporations was only EGP 22.9 billion (Gamal, 2010).

Not only did the burden of filling the coffers fall on the shoulders of the poor and their meagre incomes, they also had to service the country's huge debts. On the eve of the 25 January uprising, Mubarak's Egypt was servicing a domestic debt of EGP 962.2 billion, which had more than doubled from EGP 434.0 billion in 2004. This rapid rise meant that in 2009 domestic debt reached 67.4 per cent of GDP (Soliman, 2011). At the beginning of 2011, the country's external debt was \$34.9 billion. The cost of servicing the total debt equalled 23 times a taxpayer's share of government spending on education and 3000 times that on housing (Abdel Wahab, 2011). Domestically, the major creditor of the government as well as domestic capital was the National Investment Bank, an institution described by Hazem El-Beblawi as suffering from complex problems and financial entanglement connected to the entire financial situation of the country.¹³ In a study of the fiscal crisis under Mubarak, Soliman (2011: 106) shows that the National Investment Bank not only had financial problems but was financing a wealth of private enterprises. Of course, this is in complete disregard of the main purpose for which all national investment banks are created: to finance national infrastructure and other public projects with funds that are drawn heavily from the savings of millions of tax-payers in the form of social security and pension fund contributions.

One of the precepts of global neoliberal orthodoxy, which has been propagated since the late 1970s, is the need to 'roll back' the overly powerful and pervasive state. Ironically, neoliberal restructuring has led to the opposite in the state's more coercive functions: security and policing. With increasing dispossession, marginalization and disentitlement, neoliberal regimes everywhere have had to resort to new systems of governance in order to manage and control popular mobilization against the consequences of their policies. New modes of regulation have included the growing centrality of security and policing and the criminalization of groups which have been hardest hit by neoliberal policies. In Egypt, the restructuring of the security system has been an integral part of institutional support for the new order.

Policing neoliberalism: a state of terror

The ministry will not tolerate any breach of the dignity of an honourable citizen

... [However] I have reservations [about calling] terrorists, thieves, drug dealers and such others as humans with rights¹⁴

In Marxist analysis, the police is not simply a state institution set up to fight crime and guarantee law and order but an agent in the service of capital. It is responsible for the reproduction of power relations and for crushing the expectations of labour in regard to wages and job security (Neocleous 2000; Gordon, 2005). The rise of industrial capitalism necessitated setting up institutions that would not only 'organize' new labour relations, but more importantly, quash new industrial workers' hopes of transferring a system of entitlement based on feudal tradition in the countryside to the industrial workplace. In the new industrial context, these workers' expectations could include appropriating part of the product of their labour (Coleman, 2003). In this reading, state coercion and police power are not seen as a coincidental outcome of authoritarianism but as an integral part of the capitalist state irrespective of the prevailing political system. With the rise of neoliberal capitalism and the consequent increase in large numbers of the working classes that have been dispossessed of their rights and entitlements, the state has invested heavily in enlarging the scope and power of the police to keep them quiescent.

Mubarak's Egypt was an excellent exemplar of this analysis. Immediately after Sadat's assassination in 1981, the country braced itself for yet another long stretch of rule by the infamous emergency law.¹⁵ No other piece of legislation has endowed the police and security forces with more unchecked powers than this law. Under the pretext of fighting Islamist militants, the law gave the police a wide-ranging mandate to ban public gatherings and any form of demonstration, to inspect personal correspondence and search individuals and places without the need to follow the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code, to censor publications, to detain suspects indefinitely without charge and to try civilians under military courts where no judges preside and where there is no prospect of appeal.

The emergency law notwithstanding, the ministry of the interior (MOI) also enjoys a monopoly over a wide range of aspects of the life of individuals. Managing prisons, providing security during elections and supervising the medical care of prisoners are the least controversial of the MOI's mandate. More controversially, the MOI controls the issuing of passports and birth certificates, grants nationality and provides permission to work abroad for millions of Egyptian migrant workers. To ensure the regime's control over the provinces, the MOI is further entrusted with the responsibility of appointing umdas (mayors) of villages too small to have local councils. Repeated calls to appoint civilians to these functions and a politician rather than a member of the police force as minister of the interior have gone unheeded.¹⁶

As the regime became increasingly reliant on the MOI to fight its war against Islamist militants, the police were gradually accorded more resources and liberties. Like the military, the MOI can count on a huge reservoir of free labour: conscripts, particularly those from poor and rural backgrounds, who provide the manpower for the Central Security Force (*amn markazy*).¹⁷ Created in the aftermath of the 1968 student demonstrations, the *amn markazy* has since functioned as the main agency responsible for suppressing any form of protest in the country. The single exception was the 1986

amn markazy uprising when the notoriously inhumane conditions of the conscripts, long maintained by the use of harsh punishment, finally pushed them to breaking point. The young conscripts, who were expected to suppress those protesting and fighting against the regime, were themselves seething with dissatisfaction. They finally took to the streets in their thousands, destroying property and inflicting damage on a system that had long abused them and taken them for granted. The MOI had to call upon the military to intervene and put down riots instigated by its own force.

While the dismal conditions of conscripts have only been nominally improved, the result of the riots was a substantial increase in the budget of the ministry itself. With the increasing dispossession and impoverishment of more and more groups in society due to intensive marketization, the regime became heavily reliant on the police. Requiring the police to evict people from their land and homes, to silence protestors and to terrify those who might consider resistance as an option came at a price. Since the 1990s, therefore, the MOI budget has been consistently increased relative to general expenditure, exceeding those of education and health combined (Seif El-Dawla, 2009). Financial and human resources aside, the Mubarak regime not only turned a blind eye to police excesses in dealing with society but progressively gave it free rein in the use of terror. Since the 1990s, police violence has become endemic. In its May 2004 report, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) documented 292 torture cases in the period from January 1993 to April 2004. Of these cases, 20 reportedly resulted in the death of the suspect or prisoner.¹⁸ Obviously, these figures are only a fraction of the actual total due to the under-reporting of incidents by victims and their relatives and to the obstruction of access of human rights organizations to police stations and detention centres.

The use of torture in Egypt is nothing new. Memories of Nasser's concentration camps, which held his opponents from across the entire political spectrum in the 1950s and 1960s, are still fresh in the minds and not so fresh on the bodies of the lucky ones who have survived to tell the tale. Sadat's jails continued to bear witness to the physical punishment of members of the opposition as did those of Mubarak in the 1980s. Torture was routinely employed as an interrogation method of suspects and their relatives, neighbours and acquaintances. More often its purpose was to secure confessions rather than gather intelligence. Egyptian prisons were, as they are now, crowded with convicted inmates who had signed confessions under the weight of unbearable torture to crimes which they had probably never committed. In an infamous incident in the mid-1980s, the police rounded up almost one thousand suspects after the attempted assassination of two former ministers of the interior, Hasan Abu Basha and Nabawi Ismail. The usual routine of breaking into the suspects' homes, terrorizing their relatives and using excessive torture during interrogation resulted in a swift confession by three detainees. The arrest of the 'criminals' and their confessions were hailed in the media as a victory for the intelligence services. Shortly afterwards, however, the actual culprits were arrested and the three confessors were quietly released (Abdel Aziz, 2011: 50–51). The same pattern continues to date. In fact, the Egyptian police's reputation for using extreme torture to acquire confessions has achieved international notoriety. The use of torture is so excessive that it is even regarded askance by Egypt's global partners in crime. During the regime of the euphemistically termed extraordinary rendition, Egypt enthusiastically cooperated with

the CIA in the torture and interrogation of suspects in the ‘war against terror’. Commenting on the Egyptian security apparatus compared to other countries in the region, a former CIA official, Robert Baer, said ‘if you want a serious interrogation, you send a prisoner to Jordan. If you want them tortured, you send them to Syria. If you want them to disappear – never to see them again – you send them to Egypt’ (Mayer, 2005: 47).

Since the 1990s, however, police torture has no longer been reserved for (suspected) criminals, political activists and members of the opposition. There has been an astounding escalation in torture at the hands of the Egyptian police of mostly ‘ordinary’ citizens. From petty crime suspects to individuals approaching law enforcement officers to mediate in minor disputes to those whose misfortune has simply put them in the path of a police officer, the ‘hand’ of the law was reaching ever wider. Age, region, political persuasion and religion seemed to matter little.¹⁹ Gender, however, is a different matter. Physical and sexual violence against women, especially in the public sphere, discussed in the following chapter, was increasingly becoming a trademark of state-sponsored brutality. However, all victims of torture do have their poverty and lack of access to power in common. The police reserves its most sustained attacks and methods of collective punishment for groups most vulnerable to neoliberal policies.²⁰ Protests against the removal of subsidies, job losses, forcible eviction from land and a host of other grievances against the neoliberal order have gripped the country since the turn of the century. Against these protests, the police have been at their most brutal. Among the numerous sustained and targeted campaigns of punishment, few have become as infamous in the recent history of resistance to Mubarak and his police terror as the case of Sarando and Borolus villages discussed in Chapter 3. Since 2004, labour protests, which have intensified against privatization and deteriorating working conditions, have been targets of the most organized campaigns of violence. The violence against and collective punishment of striking workers at Mahalla in 2008 is a case in point.

Another marked change in policing under Mubarak was the shifting of the location of attack. Increasingly, police violence has moved from the confines of police stations, detention centres and people’s private residences to public spaces. Reports of physical abuse of citizens in their workplaces, on the street, in coffee shops and even in bus stations, became widespread (Abdel Aziz, 2011: 61). This shift in the location of police violence is neither new nor unique to Egypt. With the rise of industrial capitalism, police efforts to control labour went beyond the workplace or the police station. The focus of the police quickly extended to the public sphere, especially to areas where people engaged in activities that were regarded as undermining the formal market (Gordon, 2005: 62). In Egypt, one of the groups routinely targeted with increasing violence was street vendors. Over the years, campaigns to evict vendors, especially in the capital city, resulted in bloody confrontations, injuries and occasional deaths.²¹

Modern technology and new social media were crucial to this shift in location. In the 2000s, police officers, for example, were increasingly recording the torturing of their victims at police stations on mobile phones. The recordings were circulated to the victims’ families and acquaintances to send a clear message of deterrence. The objective of police violence was no longer simply to extract a quick confession, to disband a protest or to punish individuals and their close relatives. The aim had

increasingly became to terrorize the ‘Egyptian street’. The arbitrariness of the violence, the absence of a clear rationale for the attacks and the brutality were able to create the state of terror that the police and the regime intended.

To support the needs of an ever-expanding regime of terror, the MOI started to ‘outsource’ its most ‘dirty’ business. With increasing impunity, criminal investigation officers began to promote a new ‘police force’ of *baltagya* (thugs). *Baltagya* are criminals, usually with a record of violence and known to the police, who are paid to carry out duties of ‘disciplining’ members of the public in return for the police turning a blind eye to their criminal activities including drug trafficking.²² The *baltagya*’s job description has expanded to include voter intimidation, beating up criminal suspects and political activists, rape and sexual abuse, breaking up demonstrations, forcibly removing farmers from their land and much more. The advantage of *baltagya* is that they can infiltrate any group without being easily traced to the police.

Egypt’s regime of terror was intended to protect Mubarak’s neoliberal order against the dispossessed. Ironically, it helped to provide the exploited and downtrodden masses with a focus to mobilize against the regime which culminated in an uprising that presented the most serious challenge to Mubarak’s elite. From 2005, protestors across the country were already expressing grievances against the MOI and often demanded the resignation of Habib El-Adly, minister of the interior. The date of 25 January itself, with a touch of bitter irony, was chosen by activists to protest against police violence as it is the officially designated Police Day.

The octopus of the Nile

The Egyptian military was never a direct target of people’s grievances prior to the 25 January uprising. If anything, days into the uprising, the armed forces quickly emerged as heroes who had presumably decided to side with the protestors against Mubarak’s regime, leading to the incongruous slogan ‘The military and the people are one hand’. However, the reality is very different. The military was deeply implicated in the reproduction of the Mubarak regime and a willing partner in the economic order it created. While the generals might not have been the greatest winners in the brand of crony, oligopolistic capitalism promoted by Mubarak, his son, and his son’s cronies, the military establishment was profoundly involved in instituting such a system. The army’s sprawling economic empire, while perhaps not as dominant as some exaggerated estimates would lead us to believe, has benefited from the same system of privileges enjoyed by Egypt’s new capitalist class. As its tentacles spread to every niche of the polity, economy and society, the military resembles the octopus, a mollusc with three pulsing hearts. Although the military cannot claim dominance in any of these spheres, its omnipresence has accorded it a unique position in post-1952 Egypt.

The pervasive and privileged position of the military in Egypt has roots growing deeper than those of any other force in the country. These roots go back to the 1952 coup staged by Nasser and the Free Officers. Nasser’s introduction of his special brand of Arab nationalism and the launching of the slogan ‘everything for the battle’ in the 1950s allowed the Egyptian military to establish first claim on some of the nation’s most strategic resources. With its tentacles growing everywhere: state bureaucracy, local government, huge infrastructural development projects, heavy and light industry from weapon production to household goods manufacturing, land reclamation and a

wide range of activities in the services sector, the military has developed into an autonomous middle-class entity with an industrial base. Like many postcolonial states, the military-state complex in Egypt assumed a huge economic role which is unparalleled in the classic bourgeois state. This role was, to some extent, made necessary by the weakness of indigenous private entrepreneurship and the relevant social classes on the eve of independence (Alavi, 1972).

Since then, the power of the military establishment has been reflected in the number of critical top state positions held by current and retired generals. The generals also dominate local government and public sector companies. More importantly, the military has expanded its economic enterprises by exploiting its unique privileges, such as tax exemptions, favourable exchange rates, confiscation rights and preferential treatment in bidding for state contracts. The military further maintains command of considerable resources and opportunities unattainable for the civilian economy, including virtually free labour (conscripts) and huge state-owned land holdings. The army also enjoys control of its own budget without any political oversight, which has deepened its power as an organization with unparalleled independence. This last privilege has been subject to great controversy, particularly in post-uprising political debate. Even private corporations vie for the blessing of the military establishment. Like the cases of Pakistan and Bangladesh, where the military-state oligarchy dominates, big businesses in Egypt have adopted the practice of awarding profitable directorships to retiring generals.

The military enjoyed its heyday in Egyptian politics in the 1950s but over the decades, especially in the aftermath of the 1967 defeat, it has lost some of its power.²³ However, while bearing this in mind, it is crucial to understand that this analysis of the Egyptian military does not set out to prove its complete dominance of politics but to examine the way in which it has been involved in the reproduction of the regime and the establishment of a neoliberal order through its activities in the economy, society and polity.

The military's economy and society

No accurate estimate of the size of the military economy is feasible in a country like Egypt. For one thing, the term 'military economy' is fraught with methodological ambiguities, making it difficult to determine what to include and exclude in such an assessment.²⁴ Apart from official figures on military expenditure, which indicate a very low and not very credible two per cent of total GDP, any information on military financial and economic transactions are shrouded in secrecy and kept behind a facade of national security.²⁵ Furthermore, the diverse nature of the military's economic activities and the caginess which surrounds them has thrown up whimsical estimates of the military's share of the national economy ranging from a massive 40 per cent to a much more modest ten per cent and even five per cent.²⁶ A more accurate figure would be helpful in more carefully analysing the role of the military in the economy. However, for this analysis, the involvement of the military in the reproduction of the Mubarak economic order is the relevant issue.

The immediate post-1952 army concentrated its economic ventures in the field of weapon manufacturing. By 1984, Egypt had attained self-sufficiency in the manufacture of small arms, mortars and similar armaments. The military-owned industries exported

an annual average of \$191 million in the 1980s (Gotowicki, 1997). The majority of these exports were concentrated on arms sales to Iraq during the Iran–Iraq war. From the late 1970s, especially in the aftermath of the Camp David agreement, the military's production expanded into the non-armament, civilian sector. Due to falling military budgets, which was already occurring in the 1980s, there was discussion of the need for Arab militaries to seek funds from activities in the marketplace either through retired individuals or military-owned companies (Picard, 1988). Indeed, the budget of Egypt's military fell in real terms by nearly a half in the last two decades of the twentieth century while the US military aid of \$1.3 billion, not included in the military budget, fell in real terms by 50 per cent (Frisch, 2001). This was an alarming situation that spurred the military to expand its economic portfolio and diversify its activities in order to compensate for its diminishing budget.

The ministry of military production had already had experience in the 1960s of manufacturing basic civilian products, such as boilers, cooking ovens, cars and other household goods. However, in the 1970s, the military embarked on a mission to build a solid base in the production of a wide range of civilian goods and services. Since then, the military has diversified into producing commodities such as pasta, bottled water and cooking oil and into running services such as taxis, cleaning, abattoirs and the construction and management of luxury beach resorts. Army manufacturing expanded under the auspices of the National Service Projects Administration, a subsidiary of the ministry of defence that was created specifically to oversee production in civilian goods and to absorb military officers who no longer had any prospect of active service. By the mid-1990s, this organization ran 16 factories employing 75,000 workers. With almost half of their production geared towards the civilian market, these factories produced numerous commodities ranging from agricultural machines to pharmaceuticals, electric cables and ovens (Frisch, 2001: 8).

The military's economic power also stretches beyond the obvious realm of production and assets. Top military officials command power over economic policy. The example of natural gas exports is a case in point. After Mubarak's ousting, investigation into the case of natural gas exports to Israel revealed that the General Intelligence Service (GIS) subsidiary company *Al-Sharq* managed the export of natural gas to Jordan. Furthermore, some of the former GIS strongmen, such as Hussein Salim, were discovered to have received credit privileges from the government to export natural gas to Israel through their private ventures.²⁷ More importantly, the investigations revealed the role played by Omar Soliman, head of the GIS, rather than the prime minister or the minister of petroleum, in negotiating the price of natural gas exports to Israel (Brayez, 2013).²⁸ Similarly, the military exerted further influence through its representation on state-owned, commercial enterprises. Retired senior officers have always been routinely appointed as board members of public sector companies. While these retired officers are in theory no longer in military service and are expected to serve in their civilian capacity, in reality this is far from the case. Many of these retired officers continue to be employed by the military on the basis of six-month renewable contracts which can go on for ten years or more (Sayigh, 2012).

The military's economic interests have been served well by the neoliberal restructuring under Mubarak. Military officers are routinely appointed as board members and consultants to a vast number of private sector companies. Contrary to the military's

reputation as a ‘pillar of protectionism’, its projects, run by companies in which it is a shareholder, are characterized by collaboration with transnational capital. The military has repeatedly been in partnership with Gulf conglomerates such as the Kuwaiti Kharafi group, as well as Western and Asian multinationals including China’s Sinopec and Italy’s Breda and Eni (Marshall and Stacher, 2012). These joint ventures account for tens of billions of dollars in investment from foreign companies and banks. Even if the military’s share is not huge in most of them, they are testimony to both its ever-growing influence and its enthusiastic accommodation of neoliberal capitalism.

The networks of privilege under Mubarak also included the military complex. Several high-ranking military personnel have not only been involved in large business deals but have also benefited from their political office in the service of these business interests. The case of Sayed Meshaal, a former minister of military production, suffices to illustrate this point. Before his appointment to a ministerial position, Meshaal was the head of the National Service Projects Administration which ran, among its many operations, a bottled water company that he proudly named SAFI after his daughter. At the same time, he was a member of the NDP and an MP for the Helwan district in Cairo between 2000 and 2011. Meshaal secured his parliamentary seat through the votes of the thousands of workers of the military factory 99 based in Helwan. Meshaal allegedly made a huge fortune from his multiple positions (Al-Khalsan, 2011).

The greatest privilege the military enjoys over any other economic actor in the country is the autonomy it holds over its budget and business empire. Revenues from its projects, profits from its exports and shares in companies and assets are off the national budget. They are automatically returned to the military coffers with no government accounting or tax deductions (Springborg, 1989; Gotowicki, 1997). The military’s economic interests, including its monopolistic practices, its revenues and its overall budget are shielded from any form of external scrutiny in the name of national security, a justification which many critics find unacceptable. Hesham Guinena, the head of the Central Auditing Authority, for example, was quoted as saying that it was unreasonable that his agency did not have the power to audit the revenues of military-owned ‘wedding halls’ hired out to civilians, which he argued could not be relevant to national security.²⁹ However, military officers continue to reject any criticism of their complete financial autonomy. In a conference held by the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) on its vision for the future of economic reform in March 2012, General Mahmoud Nasr, assistant defence minister for finance, bluntly said that revenues from the military’s enterprises are not the business of any other body but itself. They constitute what he described as the ‘sweat of the ministry of defence’. In reference to a multi-million dollar mine-clearing operation conducted by the military in Kuwait, he insisted that the state would not be allowed to touch the millions in profits (Gamal, 2012).

However, profits derived from economic enterprises are not the only trophy secured by the military. A highly significant result of the military’s involvement in manufacturing, construction and service activities has undoubtedly been its unique ability to penetrate society. Nasser’s developmentalist state, like its counterparts in the post-colonial world, invested heavily in infrastructure projects. His modernization project rested on land reclamation, the building of roads, bridges and power plants and the construction of hospitals, schools and affordable housing for the country’s growing population. From

the early days of Nasser's republic, the military was given the task of shouldering most of these infrastructure projects. From building housing units to installing electricity grids and telephone networks to even running the national adult literacy programme,³⁰ the military touches the lives of almost all Egyptians, gaining it a unique position not just as the defender of the nation but also as the handmaiden of its modernization and physical development.

At a different level, the military has operated a network of petrol stations, supermarkets, hotels, beach resorts, housing complexes and function halls serving the needs of its own corps as well as those of the general public. Many Egyptians live, shop for their groceries, fuel the tanks of their cars and spend their holidays under the all-pervading banner of the military. A great many young, middle-class couples, for example, have their lives touched by the military when they hold their wedding parties at one of the nation-wide, military-owned and -run function halls. Websites, Facebook pages and newspapers advertise the competitive prices and romantic atmosphere offered by venues such as the House of Ammunition and Artillery and the Electronic Warfare and Presidential Guards Halls.

A militarized polity

Military officers, both retired and in service, occupy a wide range of positions in the state bureaucracy. They are appointed to administrative and managerial positions in academic institutions, state media organizations, hospitals, sports facilities and boards of state-owned industrial companies. In fact, some vital state institutions have been traditionally dominated by military officers. One such example is the Administrative Monitoring Authority (AMA). Established in 1958, it has since been entrusted with the responsibility of combating corruption in all state institutions except, of course, the military itself, which is above the oversight of any civilian body.³¹ No institution is more central to state bureaucracy than the Authority for Organization and Administration, the body responsible for all reform, training, evaluation and restructuring of the civil service since 1964. The military has successfully managed to extend its tentacles into such a vital institution with the appointment of Major-General Safwat Al-Nahhas as its head since 2004 (Sayigh, 2012: 13).

One of the most important sites where the military has been traditionally involved in reproducing and maintaining regime power is local government, for which positions are awarded by appointment rather than election. Municipal positions ranging from the all-powerful provincial governors to village heads have always been dominated by the military and its retired senior officers. Military officers also serve as deputy governors, heads of central communication units, directors of transportation, and heads of water and sanitation companies and information centres.

Military officers control top as well as middle management positions within almost all civilian ministries including housing, transportation, environment, media and information. The military's role in the ministry of housing and its different agencies cannot be emphasized enough. As the military has unlimited access to most public land, it has always been heavily involved in construction and the real estate business. Military officers dominate the Central Construction Apparatus responsible for building housing and urban infrastructure as well as the New Urban Communities Authority. The military's control of agriculture and land reclamation projects has long been justified by

the argument that national security, for which the military is responsible, relies on food security. In this regard, military officers dominate the General Authority for Reclamation Projects and Agricultural Development, an organization at the helm of large irrigation and agricultural projects.³²

In other civilian ministries, the military presence is also acutely felt. A recent report notes an impressive 37 retired generals occupying leading positions in the ministry of environment, including some from the division of chemical warfare.³³ Even the highest state religious institutions such as the ministry of Awqaf and Al-Azhar have not escaped the encroachment of the military. The ministry of Awqaf, in charge of religious endowments and the running of mosques, has for years seen retired generals control the position of director of the central service sector in the ministry. Similarly, Al-Azhar has recently opened its doors to the generals to occupy the position of head of security. In 2010, the prestigious position of the director of the office of the grand sheikh of Al-Azhar was awarded to Major-General Ibrahim Sadeq (Al-Bahnasawi and Zalat, 2012).

Even the MOI, which has grown dramatically not only in budget but also in its centrality to the reproduction of the regime, is still relatively entwined with the military. For example, the Egyptian Armed Forces is said to 'provide a great many of the senior operational and administrative officers in the Interior Ministry and the General Intelligence Directorate' (Sayigh, 2012: 5). The same emergency law which endows the MOI with exceptional powers has also given exceptional powers to the military within similar domains. The emergency law, which stipulates that civilians be subject to military trials in certain circumstances, has meant that military courts have presided over thousands of civilian cases since the 1980s. Article 3 of the same law also empowers the military officer in charge or his deputy to monitor newspapers, booklets and other publications with the authority to confiscate them and take them out of circulation. The military thus competes with other state institutions such as the judiciary and the censorship authority.

Despite this impressive penetration of almost all aspects of society, in the final analysis, the military was not the leading economic or political victor in Mubarak's Egypt. However, the essential issue for the argument in this study is the extent to which the military complex was involved in the reproduction of the regime and the order it had created. As demonstrated above, the military has become an all-important entity for most Egyptians. The army was essential in building an independent, modern Egypt as it had the task of implementing Nasser's developmentalist project. By infiltrating and assuming important positions of power in society, the economy and the polity, the army has become a natural presence in all aspects of the lives of most Egyptians. To many, its omnipresence in the fabric of society is taken for granted. This goes a long way to explaining the high regard with which a majority of Egyptians view the military. Despite its clear complicity in the neoliberal project that was disenfranchising large numbers of poorer citizens, many Egyptians wanted to believe that the army was on their side during the 18 day uprising. Later, when confronted with the imbroglio of Morsi's presidency, an overwhelming majority of Egyptians flocked to the army as the only other meaningful political player that had the ability to liberate them from the stranglehold of the Muslim Brothers. Subsequently, in January 2014, a massive majority voted 'yes' in the referendum on a new constitution which reaffirmed yet again the

army's privileges and impunity. Egyptians' hopes for a more prosperous, stable and democratic future were now entrusted to the army and its unconvincing roadmap. Yet as demonstrated by the army's tentacles penetrating to assume powerful positions in all aspects of society and the polity and its commitment to the neoliberal capitalist project, it is difficult to imagine how the inherently conservative army will do anything but staunchly defend the status quo to protect its interests.

As a political project, neoliberalism relies on a very narrow social base in terms of beneficiaries. With the exception of a privileged elite which gains from its logic of accumulation, the majority of the working classes under neoliberalism are virtually excluded from its wealth concentration. Such an order, inevitably, engenders intense discontent among the dispossessed and leads to social and political mobilization. In Egypt, as the following two chapters will show, the neoliberal order under Mubarak gave rise to intensive waves of mobilization which spanned the decade, culminating in the massive 25 January uprising. However, this order was a tightly knit network of interests bringing the military and the state-capital nexus together in an imposing edifice that was closely protected by the bulwark of a set of institutions whose function was to reproduce and protect the system. Faced with this powerful system, the overthrow of the Mubarak regime was a daunting task.

Notes

1 The American Chamber of Commerce in Egypt represents the interests of the most powerful businesses in Egypt. According to its president, in 2004, member companies accounted for almost 20 per cent of Egyptian GDP (Rutherford, 2008).

2 For a full review of the document, see Al-Ahram (2003).

3 The QIZ protocol, which was signed in 2004, allows the export of Egyptian manufactured products duty-free to the US, provided companies in specially designated zones satisfy the condition that products contain at least 11.7 per cent of Israeli components. See the full QIZ protocol at http://www.qizegypt.gov.eg/About_Text_protocol.aspx (accessed April 10, 2011).

4 Sfakianakis identifies 32 businessmen whom he terms 'whales on the Nile' and who comprised the top of the business elite in the 1990s. Through their cross-cutting networks with the state elite, they built their business empires and supported the new political order.

5 The other two steel companies are Bishay Steel and Al-Garhy. For exact figures on iron and steel production, see Abdel-Fadil (2011).

6 By a tacit agreement, foreign cement plants cut prices by an average of EGP 180 per tonne, forcing domestic plants such as Wadi El Nil, El-Sweid and El Nahda to retract price increases that they had already announced. For more details, see Riyad (2011).

7 WTO members, according to this rule, cannot appeal to pre-existing domestic legislation to avoid adhering to WTO agreements; they have to amend domestic laws to abide by WTO rules or risk retaliation.

8 For detailed discussion of this and several similar cases see Adly, A. (2011a).

9 For details of the process, see Sfakianakis (2004).

10 For a discussion of methodological and ideological concerns in estimating levels of poverty, see Achcar (2013).

11 The first round of the land reform programme was implemented in 1961, restricting ownership to 100 feddans, while the second phase came later, in 1969, further restricting ownership to 50 *feddans* (a *feddan* is 0.42 of one hectare).

12 While article no. 33 of Law 96/1992 proposed compensating the evicted tenants with land in the desert, ridiculous as it might be, in reality no compensation was provided. Moreover, there was no mention of compensating tenants for their houses, buildings and agricultural machines that they had acquired throughout the tenancy period.

13 Hazem El-Beblawi, at the time of this interview with *Egypt Daily* on 16/7/2012, was a former minister of finance. He did not assume the position of prime minister until the ousting of Morsi in July 2013.

14 Zaki Badr, minister of the interior, in an interview with *Ibrahim*, police magazine, in 1989.

15 It is vital to realize that Egypt had been ruled by a state of emergency since 1967 with the exception of an 18-month period before the assassination of Sadat. Following the uprising, it was briefly lifted before being reinstated in another form.

16 See, for example, 'The National Initiative to Rebuild the Police: A Police for the Egyptian People'.

http://eipr.org/sites/default/files/pressreleases/pdf/national_initiative_for_police_reform_en.pdf.

17 The system of military conscription in Egypt is extremely class based. While university and other tertiary education graduates do one year of military service, those with only a high school diploma serve two years. Conscripts without a high school diploma serve a term of three years.

18 EOHR, 'Torture in Egypt ... an unchecked phenomenon' (May 29, 2004), at www.eohr.org/report/2004/re3.htm.

19 Street children and children at risk are often detained and subjected to routine beatings and sexual abuse (HRW, 2004).

20 In the industrialized West since the 1980s, the police has intensified its targeting of particular localities and populations, namely the poor, the unemployed, migrants and blacks (Bonefeld, 1993). The infamous 'stop and search' policy has given increasing discretionary powers to the police to bring into line any group which might entertain ideas about demanding rights or entitlements.

21 See Abdelrahman (2012) for a discussion of state concerns with street vendors and the informal economy.

22 'The National Initiative to Rebuild the Police: A Police for the Egyptian People' http://eipr.org/sites/default/files/pressreleases/pdf/national_initiative_for_police_reform_en.pdf.

23 For a study dedicated to exploring the diminishing role of the military within Egypt's ruling elite, see Kandil (2012).

24 For a discussion of the methodological questions in estimating the size of the 'military economy', see Brayez (2013), who distinguishes between the military's share in GDP, in GNP and the total value of its assets.

25 This figure is corroborated by an estimate derived from World Bank data by Al-Naggar (2013), who uses it to counter what he regards as gross exaggerations of the size of the military economy. However, by simply relying on such a figure for the military budget, he ignores the much greater military holdings in the economy.

26 For various estimates, see Al-Naggar (2013); Al-Khalsan (2011).

27 The director of the Intelligence Service is often drawn from the ranks of the armed forces.

28 The Administrative Court later found the price negotiated to be way below market price, thus inflicting huge losses on the Egyptian economy.

29 A TV interview quoted in *Al-Balad*: 'Head of the Central Auditing Authority Wonders What the Link Is between Armed Forces-run Wedding Halls and National Security?': <http://www.el-balad.com/303191#sthash.4MZQbxLx.dpuf>.

30 The Directorate of Literacy and Adult Education is headed by Brigadier-General Mahmood Abdel-Dayem, see *Al-Shab Al-Gadid* (2012).


31 Despite allegations of corruption against Major-General Mohamed Al-Touhami and his predecessor, Hitler Tantawi, both remained in their position of head of AMA for several terms at the directive of Mubarak.

32 Many of these projects, especially those with the mandate to create agricultural land in the desert, such as the multi-billion dollar Al-Salam canal carrying Nile water to Northern Sinai and the Toshka canal carrying Nile water to the Western desert plateau, have been subject to considerable criticism for wasting water resources.

33 For a detailed account of the infiltration of military officers into the country's ministries, public companies, and service projects see Al-Bahnasawi and Zalat (2012).

1967–1968 Failure

2: 1967–1968 Failure



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The 1967 war could have precipitated a breakthrough, at least from the Israeli point of view. An opportunity for peace had emerged due to, first, changes on the ground – namely, the “bargaining card” now acquired in the form of the occupied territories beyond the 1949 Armistice lines; second, an incentive had been created for the Arab states – namely, the return of their territory; and, third, Israel was now in a strengthened position thanks to its demonstrated military superiority. Moreover, while Israel could and did expect international pressure to withdraw, as had occurred following the 1956 war, particularly from Washington, its international situation was relatively good. As distinct from 1956, the Israeli attack on 5 June 1967 was generally viewed as one forced upon the country by Egyptian moves, and in many circles Israel was perceived as the heroic victim more or less abandoned by the world to face three Arab armies alone. Even if this attitude was not universal, Israel was not generally perceived as an aggressor, thus granting the country somewhat more leeway or bargaining power (e.g., to demand peace agreements in exchange for land) than in 1956. The United States, at least according to President Johnson’s comments to Israel, was not entirely happy that Israel had preempted the war, but it was optimistic that a breakthrough for peace might now be possible.¹ American policy objectives in the region were traditionally focused on stability and the avoidance of polarization so that Washington could pursue its interests with both Israel and the Arab states.² Following Soviet entry into the region in the mid-1950s, primarily through an increasingly positive relationship with Egypt, the US had the added goal of preventing any broadening of the Soviets’ positions there as well as trying to reduce their existing positions. This meant not only seeking to improve relations with Egypt, but also efforts to sustain the pro-western King in Jordan, without harming relations with Israel – to which the US had become increasingly committed in the 1960s. Given this commitment and that of the Soviets to Egypt and, more recently, Syria, the ongoing Arab–Israeli conflict had become more dangerous for the super powers.³ US–Soviet confrontation had been avoided during the June war, and a modicum of cooperation had been achieved regarding a cease-fire, as both super powers refrained from direct involvement. Nonetheless, the dangers inherent in the conflict had become quite clear. Egypt’s defeat in the war provided Moscow with an opportunity to secure long-sought bases and personnel deployment in Egypt (directed against NATO in the Mediterranean) in exchange for a massive rearming of the country. Nonetheless, Moscow, like the US, had an interest in preventing another violent outbreak and was willing to work with the Americans on a plan for possible resolution of the conflict, or at least greater containment. In order to remain a major player in post-war developments, the Soviets not only “represented” Egypt politically, but also pressed for international rather than local, bilateral negotiations favored by Israel and the US. For

Moscow, the task was to secure a return of the territories to the Arab states; for the US it was to promote a settlement of the conflict – the two were not contradictory. Thus, despite the super power competition, the post-war meeting between US and Soviet leaders at Glassboro, New Jersey, on 23–25 June 1967 promised an international environment that might be conducive to a breakthrough. At the domestic level, inside Israel, the public response to the stunning victory in the war was a general euphoria, pride, and delight with the possession of the newly acquired territories. At the same time, there was a general sense that merely returning these territories would now, finally, bring recognition and peace to the country.⁴ The euphoria did, however, also include those for whom the possibility of now achieving the (nationalist or religious) dream of “Greater Israel” (the “Land of Israel,” or *Eretz Israel* in Biblical times) was more important than peace – a segment of the population that was to become more powerful (though not necessarily more numerous) in the future.⁵ On the whole, though, the unexpected six-day, three-front victory seemed to overcome the entrenched sense of victimhood; the victory went a long way toward eliminating the public’s fears of the Arab states and the pre-war apparitions of a second Holocaust.⁶ Indeed, a predominant view was one of contempt for Arab military capabilities (or lack thereof), accompanied by a sense of Israeli military invincibility. Conceivably, this could outweigh the historic insecurities and entrenched sense of victimhood. Moreover, public self-confidence was matched by confidence in the national unity government created on the eve of the war – a government which could, therefore, most likely lead the public in whatever direction it chose.

Changed circumstances; domestic and international conditions appeared auspicious for a breakthrough. Why then the failure?

After the war, on 18 and 19 June 1967 and throughout the following weeks, expecting international pressure but also cognizant of the opportunity to achieve some agreements, the Israeli government set its positions regarding the territories conquered in the war.⁷ With regard to the West Bank, there was, in fact, no decision taken because of significant differences within the government. These were not, however, differences between left and right due to the pre-war addition of the Menachem Begin, leader of the right-wing Gahal Party⁸ (including Herut, today’s Likud) to the coalition. Nor were they even differences over relinquishing all of the territory – none of the 20 members of the government favored relinquishing *all* of the territory, though there were some who saw the danger in holding onto all but a small part of it due to the demographic issue, and most opposed annexation (which would have meant providing citizenship to the 1.2 million Palestinians there). Rather, the differences and discussions were within the left, born of political and even personal rivalries but also based on different visions and possible arrangements.⁹ The main differences focused on the partner with whom to talk, the local Palestinians, or the Jordanians. The basic understanding agreed within

the government was that the Jordan River would constitute Israel's border, meaning Israeli control of the Jordan–Rift Valley, no matter what arrangement would be decided for the rest of the West Bank. Thus, a number of ideas were proposed, from autonomy for the local population but under continued Israeli rule; or independence for major parts of the area, possibly limited in power but, in any case, territorially surrounded by Israel; or some kind of settlement with Jordan along new lines of demarcation.¹⁰ Another understanding within the government from the outset was that Jerusalem would be united under Israeli sovereignty. The Jordanian built wall dividing east from west Jerusalem was physically dismantled; the city was united within days of the military move into East Jerusalem. Retention of East Jerusalem was included in the 19 June government decision and on 25 June there was a government decision to extend Israeli law to East Jerusalem, enacted into law on 27 June along with a major expansion of the city's borders into the West Bank.



Map 2.1 Expansion of Jerusalem
Source: Jan de Jong, Foundation for Middle East Peace

As the political leadership debated options, talks were opened with local influential Palestinians regarding autonomy or limited statehood. Specifically, there was an idea of a Palestinian state in certain areas of the West Bank, as an enclave completely surrounded territorially by Israel. Israel would maintain control of all borders, foreign policy (one version allowed this to be independently Palestinian), security (e.g., a police force but not a local army), and it would settle the areas not included in the “state.”¹¹ There were proposals of autonomy for the whole area within the borders of the West Bank, exclusive of East Jerusalem, but the autonomy plan presented on 27 July 1967 (the first Alon Plan) was actually the same as the idea for a state – namely, areas within the West Bank (surrounded by Israel) to be autonomous and the rest settled by Israelis. Both the ideas of this type of state and of autonomy were discussed, often simultaneously, with local Palestinians throughout 1967; but by the beginning of 1968 autonomy was gaining greater attention (and support by Eshkol). In all of these plans, various proposals were made for moving the refugees to other areas or countries. However, neither the limited state nor the autonomy idea found support amongst the Palestinians consulted. Some were still loyal to Jordan, almost all were unwilling to act independently of the Arab states, there was no willingness to accord Israel control of East Jerusalem, and there was no united Palestinian leadership capable of taking such a decision in any case (although at one point Israel initiated indirect contact with the PLO – though at this time the PLO itself was not a particularly representative or effective organization).¹² On the whole, the limitations proposed by Israel for the state or an autonomous area left any willing Palestinian leader with little to try to interest the Palestinian population. At the same time, the United States was pressing Israel to deal with Jordan, out of Washington’s interest in preserving the King’s rule and preventing any kind of Soviet inroad into this pro-western country.


Defense Minister Moshe Dayan, despite the fact that he favored the Palestinian option, had declared immediately after the war that Israel was waiting for a phone call, meaning (presumably) waiting for an Arab state to discuss peace in exchange for return of its territory. Actually, the phone call did come, from King Hussein. It came first in the form of talks with the Americans, including a private conversation with President Johnson, on 28 June 1967, followed by the opening of a secret meeting with the Israelis on 2 July 1967 in London. These direct and also indirect talks (primarily through the Americans) continued in starts and stops for over a year. Initially Israel would not state its conditions for peace (because it had not decided on a policy yet), and King Hussein would not make a clear commitment on peace without hearing Israel’s terms. According to Hussein’s biographer Nigel Ashton, the King did express his willingness “to enter into formal peace negotiations provided he knew in advance that all of the substantive issues, including the status of the occupied territories, would be open for serious discussion.”¹³

The King did convey his proposal for a settlement to the Americans, declaring that he was willing to make a separate peace agreement. He would demand “return to the 4 June 1967 lines, including Jordanian control of the Old City of Jerusalem...some border rectification, accompanied by over-flight rights and port facilities in Israel.”¹⁴ Israel basically put off an additional meeting until the fall, while trying to decide between the Palestinian and the Jordanian options. There was skepticism in the government regarding the King’s intention to make peace, and the King himself appeared to backtrack at the end of July. He accused the Americans of moving toward a hardline Israeli position (which he believed consisted of an Israeli intention of holding onto territory and also East Jerusalem), saying he would prefer to obtain general Arab backing for a peace deal.¹⁵ The Americans thought he was simply trying to improve his bargaining position; but, in any case, Hussein was willing to resume talks with Israel following the August Arab summit in Khartoum, which, he explained, had adopted a moderate position (and provided him Egyptian agreement for talks for a settlement but not a separate peace agreement with Israel). Once UN Resolution 242 was passed in November, with its call for peace and also assurance of “territorial integrity” (an Arab demand), Hussein was willing to continue for a separate deal.¹⁶ However, return of territory to Jordan was not on the Israeli agenda at this time. According to a telegram to the State Department from the US delegation to the UN, Eban had clarified that “If Hussein said he was [sic] ready to negotiate tomorrow, majority of Israeli people would support such move. However, Jordan cannot get back to June 4 situation. Emphasis in Jordanian settlement, however, would not be on territory [as would be the case with Egypt, see below] but on security. Possibility exists for a free port, economic integration of Jordan. Eban also mentioned possibility of a demilitarization of West Bank with some kind of Israeli military presence.”¹⁷ In the early discussions for a United Nations Security Council resolution, Israeli diplomats suggested to the US (possibly disingenuously given the clear position during the 18–19 June government discussions) that the status of Jerusalem might be “negotiable.”¹⁸ In any case, during discussions around the formulation of a Security Council resolution, Israeli positions appeared to harden, viewed by the Americans (and Jordan) as indicative of Israel’s interest in remaining in the West Bank and East Jerusalem.¹⁹

As Israel’s positions became clearer in the form of the second Alon Plan (presented to Hussein at a September 1968 meeting in London but generally known since early 1968) – namely, holding onto the Jordan Rift Valley and other parts of the West Bank, as well as East Jerusalem – prospects for an agreement were virtually nil (as accurately assessed by Foreign Minister Abba Eban and Dayan even earlier).²⁰

The King was adamant about “territorial integrity” – in other words, return to the pre-June situation of Jordanian sovereignty over the West Bank and especially East Jerusalem. While cognizant that peace with Jordan was possible, the Israeli leadership

was not willing to budge on these two demands, and so peace with Jordan was rejected in favor of holding onto parts of the territory.²¹ Officially (and in conversations with the Americans), Israel attributed the stalemate to Arab unwillingness to deal directly with



Map 2.2 The Alon Plan

Source: Shaul Arieli

Israel, although, in fact, King Hussein had been holding direct talks with Israel since 2 July (and before 1967). While further contacts and secret talks with Jordan were to occur often over the ensuing years, this Jordanian initiative/Israeli refusal marked the failure of the first post-1967 peace effort between the two countries. Examining this failure from the point of view of intractable conflict, one explanation may be that despite the changed military situation on the ground (i.e., Israel's now proven might and the strength of its bargaining position), Israeli leaders' ingrained – and apparently unchanged – security concerns dominated. One might call them "insecurity" concerns, the result of an internalized mistrust of the enemy (or possibly of non-Jews as such), nurtured by the conscious or unconscious impact of the Holocaust and past oppression, but also by the Arabs' past steadfast refusal to accept Israel within the region.²² This touched on a matter of legitimacy, which prompted Israel's demand for direct negotiations with the Arabs as a sign of recognition of the state. Ultimately the matter of legitimacy was connected with national identity – namely, Israelis' collective perception of Israel as unaccepted, a victim to enemy hostility (perceived as

unchanged), and unjust rejection of the Jews' historic, national, and, for some, religious bond to the Land of Israel, part of which had now been recovered. Indeed, in his first talks with King Hussein on 2 July 1967, Israeli negotiator Yaakov Herzog (head of the Prime Minister's Office) delivered a long lecture on this need for the Arabs to recognize Israel's claim and right to be where it was – namely, the Jewish link to the Land of Israel. While the ruling party (the Labor Alignment, later called Labor Party²³) was willing to give up Israel's "justified" possession (i.e., as Biblical Land of Israel) of the newly acquired land for the sake of peace, not all of the land could be relinquished inasmuch as "peace" was not to be trusted.²⁴ In fact, the starting point and unanimous position at the beginning of the post-war talks in June 1967 was that the Arabs would not make peace with Israel, and if they did, they could not be trusted.²⁵ Therefore, any peace agreement must contain the elements of preparation for winning if not preventing the next war. The demand to hold onto the Jordan Rift Valley, which separates the west bank from the east bank of the Jordan River and the rest of Jordan, was viewed by the Israeli leadership as necessary to prevent the entry of an army, particularly a third army (e.g., Iraqi) into the West Bank and from there posing a threat to Israel.²⁶ There had actually been an agreement between Jordan and Israel prior to 1967 barring the entry into the West Bank of heavy armor, and it had, in fact, been violated in the 1967 war. There had also been Fatah terrorist attacks conducted against Israel from Jordanian territory prior to the war. That these had occurred in a situation in which the two countries were in a state of war, not peace, apparently made no difference to the thinking of both the civilian and military members of the Israeli leadership. Actually, together with the fact that Jordan had joined the war despite Israeli assurances on 5 June that it would not be attacked, these violations of the modicum of trust that had built up over the years between Israel and King Hussein may have contributed to the persistence of the internalized view of the enemy, even Jordan, as immutably hostile.²⁷ Ever mistrustful, Israeli leaders sought to prevent a repetition should there be a return of territory to Jordan. This could be done only, presumably, by maintaining control over the eastern border of the West Bank, even if this meant that peace with Jordan would be sacrificed. Such a sacrifice (an "either/or decision") was not the way it was perceived initially; those in the leadership who believed that peace with Jordan was a possibility apparently also believed that Jordan could be persuaded to accept Israel's terms. Some in the government (and the Americans) were less sanguine about this possibility, but to no avail. Neither Israel's proven military strength (and the Arabs' weakness) nor Jordan's explanations that in a time of peace there would be no need for such security concerns²⁸ could overcome Israelis' mistrust, fear, and identity that were linked with a sense of victimhood and isolation. Israel's demand for the Jordan Rift Valley remained one of the two "deal breakers" with Jordan.²⁹

The demand to hold onto all of Jerusalem was of a somewhat different nature. The

issue of Jerusalem was neither framed nor motivated by military security concerns. Rather, it was solely connected to identity and legitimacy related concerns. Jerusalem was the physical as well as symbolic embodiment of Israeli claims to be in the region, based on history and religion. In this way, Jerusalem was different from the rest of the territories taken in the war. It held not insignificant emotional value even for much of the majority, secular public of Israel. Attachment to the city had been strengthened over the years by the simple denial (by Jordan) of entry to East Jerusalem, its old city, the Jewish quarter and Jewish religious sites. It was not only the religious public in Israel who abhorred the presence of a wall across the middle of the city. In fact, whatever the nature of attachment, there were those in the government who were careful to avoid an explicit religious claim for Israeli control. Aware of the importance of Jerusalem to the Muslim (and Christian) world, Moshe Dayan, for example, sought to avoid even the appearance of a religious conflict. Thus, he had ordered the removal of the Israeli flag placed victoriously by Israeli soldiers over the Al Aksa mosque when East Jerusalem was taken in the June war.

There was a security element to the Jerusalem issue. Prior to the war, West Jerusalem had been surrounded by Jordan on three sides, with what was called the Jerusalem corridor jutting like a finger into the West Bank (and completely under siege during the 1948 war). In addition, the Jordanian Legion had been stationed in the heart of Jerusalem, on the walls of the Old City from which it had occasionally fired upon West Jerusalem until 1967. Indeed, in the Israeli government discussion on East Jerusalem at the end of June, there were proposals to expand the city well into the heart of the West Bank as a means of gaining surrounding areas for future protection of the city.³⁰ However, this expansion also had the purpose of ensuring an Israeli hold on as much of the West Bank as possible, in view of the expectation that much of this territory might be returned to Jordan. In general, there had been many within the military as well as the political leadership, among them Moshe Dayan, who had been concerned about Israel's 1949–1967 *de facto* eastern (and northern) borders and welcomed at least some adjustments such as those that might be provided by a greatly expanded Jerusalem.³¹ These considerations, like those regarding the Jordan Rift Valley, were born of a period that had been without a peace agreement; but these same considerations persisted even into ostensible preparations for peace.

One of the considerations in the territorial decision on expanded Jerusalem was the issue, raised also by Moshe Dayan, of the risk in expanding to the point of absorbing too many Palestinians. Some 70,000 were, in fact, added to Israel with the municipal borders finally chosen for Jerusalem (in the government and Knesset decisions of 25–27 June 1967); but this apparently was a compromise designed to limit the Palestinian presence in Jerusalem to no more than roughly one quarter (later set at 28 percent) of the city's population. Beyond that, heavily populated areas of the West Bank

could, apparently, be returned to Jordan, relieving Israel of both the burden and threat of an additional approximately 700,000 Palestinians.³² While the core issue in the Arab–Israeli conflict was, in fact, the clash between Jewish self-determination and the indigenous Palestinian population, Israel’s leaders at the time viewed the Arab states, rather than the Palestinians, as the existential threat to the country, so long as Palestinian numbers inside Israel were kept in check. This is the reason that the Labor Party on the whole preferred what was called the “Jordanian option,” to return (most of) the West Bank to Jordan.³³ Yet, the willingness to relinquish at least part of the West Bank – what became known as the “land for peace” policy – was not only a matter of security consideration but one linked to a basic value or tenet dear to the leadership, and to the Israeli public as well: maintaining the Jewish nature of Israel – namely, a Jewish majority among the citizens of the state. This demographic consideration was to become paramount many years later, even outweighing security concerns.³⁴

Nonetheless, Israel’s adamant refusal to concede King Hussein’s demand for a return of East Jerusalem as a condition for peace went well beyond security consideration or arguments. Indeed, in the negotiations with Jordan, it was the Jerusalem issue that dominated the discussions and provoked the greatest resistance on both sides. Israel was willing to offer the Jordanians certain access or religious rights in the city, but there was to be no challenge to Israeli sovereignty over all of the (now expanded) city. Since the only security concern over the city, that of a Jordanian military presence in East Jerusalem, was one that could have been allayed by an agreement on demilitarization, one can only conclude that some other, presumably emotional, identity-related considerations were the basis for Israel’s preference of Jerusalem without peace rather than peace without Jerusalem. In 1947 the decision had been opposite, in a sense: Ben Gurion and his party, Mapai, accepted the partition resolution despite the plan’s internationalization of Jerusalem; but its later counterpart, Ahdut Avoda, along with Herut (the forerunner of the Likud) opposed the plan because of its exclusion of Jerusalem from the Jewish state. It was also Ahdut Avoda, now part of the Labor Alignment, that had championed Israeli expansion eastward over the intervening years. These political positions were supported in the 1967 government not only by the members of the former Ahdut Avoda, but also, mainly, by the right-wing Gahal Party, which included Herut, under Menachem Begin. This party had been brought into the government for the sake of national unity in the tense days prior to the June war. Gahal clearly had an ideological (nationalist) as well as nationalist-historic interest in holding onto as much of the newly acquired land as possible. For Herut, these were “liberated” territories, possibly even a step toward the eventual achievement of the party’s aspiration for “both banks of the Jordan, East and West,” as expressed in its party anthem. The National Religious Party (Mafdal), also in the government coalition, added a religious element to this aspiration, as many of the party’s adherents believed the

“liberation” of these “God given lands” to be a step toward ultimate redemption for the Jewish people. Such identity-related sentiments, of both Herut and Mafdal, were thus strengthened as a result of the war. While neither party was a critical or even strong component of the Labor Alignment-led coalition (as distinct from their power in later years), they did add their nationalist/religious claims to the post-war deliberations, providing at least a contributing factor for the failure to reach a breakthrough. Yet, it was not these members of the government who held the key to Israel’s intransigence over Jerusalem. It was the secular, even former military, members of Mapai who held fast to this decision. The quotes below provide a sample of the emotional/historic, nationalist, and even religious attachment to Jerusalem, as expressed by two quintessential secularist Israelis, coupled with the symbolic and physical link between the city and Israel’s legitimacy – that is, the right of the Jewish state to be where it was physically:

For some two thousand years the Temple Mount was forbidden to the Jews. Until you came – you, the paratroopers – and returned it to the bosom of the nation Endless words of longing have expressed the deep yearning for Jerusalem that beats within the Jewish heart. You have been given the great privilege of completing the circle, of returning to the nation its capital and its holy center ... Jerusalem is yours forever.³⁵

(Commander Motta Gur to his brigade upon their recapture of Jerusalem’s Old City and holy sites; later chief of staff, later still, a member of Labor governments)

We have returned to all that is holy in our land. We have returned never to be parted from it again.³⁶

(Defense Minister Moshe Dayan upon reaching the Western Wall and, years later, in connection with 1978 Camp David talks on Jerusalem)

In order to arrange that [all of] Jerusalem not be our capital, it was not enough for the UN Security Council and Assembly to pass resolutions to that effect. They would need to rewrite the Bible, and nullify 3,000 years of our faith, our hopes, our yearnings and our prayers.³⁷

These sentiments were clearly echoed within the Israeli public. The war itself had produced an intense patriotism which now turned into often extreme nationalism, rapidly joined in certain circles to religious nationalism and messianic sentiments. One study of generally secular young people indicated a new feeling of connectedness with both the Jewish people as a whole and the land to which the Jews (Israel) had now

returned.³⁸ This is not to say that it was public opinion that determined or even played a role in the debates and decisions of the government regarding the West Bank and Jerusalem. There is no indication that this was a factor. But the political leadership certainly knew that it had general support for the decisions it, in fact, took even if the specifics were not initially part of the public discourse. Beyond the new confidence in the government (as distinct from the lack of confidence in Eshkol and his government prior to the creation of the national unity government before the war), the public in general shared the emotional, historically based attachment to Jerusalem and the West Bank. Indeed, one survey indicated 89 percent in favor of holding onto at least part of them, some 90 percent opposing a return of the Old City of Jerusalem even as part of a peace agreement.³⁹

These historic, religious, or emotional factors were far less – if at all – relevant when it came to the government's decisions on the other two areas occupied in 1967: Syria's Golan Heights and Egypt's Sinai Desert. At least the price to be considered was, apparently, less burdened by such sentiments. This may explain the 19 June 1967 Israeli government decision to agree to withdraw all the way to the international border with Syria, which would mean returning the Golan Heights subject to certain security demands, and with regard to Egypt, to return all of the Sinai to Egypt, but without the Gaza Strip. Out of demographic concerns, it was decided that the Gaza Strip would be occupied rather than annexed until the roughly 400,000 Palestinian refugees there could be relocated (to the West Bank or outside).⁴⁰ However, the Israeli decision to return Sinai (and the Golan Heights) did not refer to all of Sinai, for in addition to Gaza the decision noted security needs, which would later be spelled out. These included access to Sharm el-Sheikh at the southern-most tip of the Sinai peninsula and other security-related issues that would ultimately constitute a deal-breaker with Egypt.⁴¹ The same would prove to be the case regarding Syria.

As in the case of Jordan, so too with regard to Egypt (and Syria), Eshkol said in the 18–19 June 1967 discussions. “Like Begin,” he did not believe that peace was enough since it would not be quiet even with a peace agreement, and “we know who we are dealing with.”⁴² Therefore, the 19 June decision to return Sinai and the Golan Heights spoke of withdrawal to the international borders and “the security needs of Israel,” and included demands for various security measures such as demilitarization as well as other matters – for example, use of the Suez Canal and protection of water sources on the Golan. But it is somewhat surprising that the major area to be kept, ostensibly for security reasons, was the Gaza Strip. Areas of greater security threat (e.g., the Golan Heights) were, at least in principle, to be returned. It is true that in the past (pre-1956) there had been terrorist attacks from Gaza, and Israel had also entertained a more general concern over a potential attack route via the Strip, facilitated by the large concentration of Palestinians there. But regarding the areas Israel was willing to

relinquish, there had been pre-1967 violations of demilitarization understandings, in both the Sinai and in the demilitarized zone with Syria, as well as interference in Israeli shipping by Egypt and attacks from the Golan Heights and terrorist intrusions from Syrian-based Palestinians. Indeed, it was such intrusions that actually had led to the 1967 war. So with regard to Sinai and the Golan, one might have expected similar security considerations or demands as those raised with Jordan regarding the Jordan Rift Valley. While some of these were discussed, and Sharm el-Sheikh was, indeed, demanded, the 19 June 1967 decision to keep Gaza suggests that the major consideration was not always security but rather the ideological view of an historic right to all of Mandate Palestine, or the religious/nationalist view of Gaza as part of the Biblical Land of Israel. The public, unaware of the 19 June decisions (which were, in fact, kept secret), harbored different sentiments on these territories. One study, immediately after the war, found that some 85 percent of Israelis opposed a return of the Golan (in a 1968 study, this was 93 percent) – far more than the 71 percent who did not want a return of any part of the West Bank, and 52 percent opposed a return of Sinai.⁴³ These findings presumably reflected the initial enthusiasm of the public in response to the surprising new acquisitions, though the attachment to the Golan long remained relatively more important in the eyes of the public than the other areas, presumably because of the strategic position overlooking Israeli territory (a security concern) regarding the Golan and perhaps also because of the beauty of the area. In any case, public opinion does not seem to have played a role in the government's decision to return the Golan, and Sinai, to the international borders.

Given these Israeli decisions, one might speculate that breakthroughs might have been possible with Syria and Egypt. It remains unclear if Israel's June decisions were, in fact, ever conveyed to these two countries. There are unconfirmed reports that Dean Rusk passed the proposal to the Egyptians, and in September Abba Eban told the Americans at the UN that Israel had "passed a message" to Egypt but, apparently, Egypt was not willing to make peace and unlikely to give up Gaza or agree to anything less than return of all of Sinai, including Sharm el-Sheikh.⁴⁴ So far as can be determined, however, the decision was not, in fact, passed to the Egyptians.⁴⁵ The Syrians too were unlikely to agree to the international border since by the eve of the June war they had gradually taken territory in the demilitarized zone and a bit west of the 1923 line. (The difference between this 4 June 1967 line and the international border of 1923 would later become a major issue, as we shall see below.) Moreover, the Syrian regime at the time was particularly militant regarding Israel altogether.

Israel's willingness to give up almost all of the Sinai and the Golan in exchange for peace, but not all of the West Bank or East Jerusalem (or Gaza) would attest to the over-riding importance of nationalist, identity-related, historic, and even religious factors. The strength of these factors apparently remained unchanged, or insufficiently

changed, by the results of the war. Even Israel's demonstrated military might, the newfound confidence on the part of the public, a strong national unity government, international favor, and the opportunity of peace with its eastern neighbor did not make the difference for the Israeli leadership when faced with the issues of historic Palestine/Eretz Israel, and especially Jerusalem.

This initial period of potential breakthrough was short lived. Israel's 19 June 1967 positions had already hardened over the summer;⁴⁶ settlement building had even begun on the Golan. The Americans had become aware of this change and expressed concern to the Israelis, even as they publicly supported Israel's positions. Washington was particularly concerned over the Jerusalem question and urged Israel to take up Jordan's offer.⁴⁷ The Americans argued that there was a possibility for a breakthrough and this would be in Israel's interests and those of the US. They added the importance of preventing arms deliveries from the Soviet Union to Jordan, implying US interest in the King's regime and preventing further Soviet inroads in the region. Signs of US concern over Israeli recalcitrance continued throughout the remainder of Johnson's presidency.

The Khartoum Conference at the end of August merely hardened Israeli positions further. At that meeting the Arab League resolved that there would be no recognition, no negotiations, no peace with Israel. What many failed to note was that Syria's leaders had refused even to attend, out of opposition to Egypt's pressure for political rather than military moves against Israel – a position reflected in the resolution's support for international diplomatic efforts for the return of the territories; and the PLO had left the meeting, refusing to sign, presumably because the only territories referred to in the resolution were those taken in the 1967 war (Palestinian rights were mentioned only cursorily, later in the resolution).⁴⁸

For Israel the three no's, as they were referred to upon endless occasions over the next 25 years, brought back the only briefly relieved existential anxieties. This represented a misunderstanding of the Khartoum decision; Hussein was to characterize the Khartoum decision, as, indeed, it was perceived in the Arab world, as an achievement of the moderate camp led by himself and Nasser.⁴⁹ But for Israelis, including apparently most of the leadership, Khartoum was understood as evidence that the war had changed nothing; legitimacy and therefore safety were still denied and once again Israel, it was felt, was a victim of undeserved hatred and rejection. Even Egyptian and Jordanian agreement to United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 in November 1967 did nothing to relieve these concerns. Despite even the most negative interpretation of the Khartoum resolution, by accepting UNSC Resolution 242, Egypt and Jordan agreed to the principle of peace with Israel ("the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security . . . Termination of all claims or states

of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their [sic] right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.”) These were the very principles that had caused Syria and the PLO to refuse to accept Resolution 242.⁵⁰ The price for Israel: “the inadmissibility of acquisition of territory by war” and “Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict.” The latter formulation was compromise wording sought by Israel and achieved with US and British help, for it carried no clear specification of the extent of the Israeli withdrawal (though the implication was clear given the reference to “the recent conflict.”)

In any case, the Khartoum resolution served as justification (though as we have seen, not the reason) for a hardening of Israeli positions. Ignoring what could be seen as the moderate side of the government 19 June decisions, Jerusalem began to speak of withdrawal only within the context of a final peace accord and only to lines in keeping with Israel’s security needs as well as historic rights, in time enunciated as “no return to the 4 June 1967 lines.”⁵¹ This included not only second thoughts regarding Syria, but even that Sinai was no longer to be totally returned, if indeed that had ever been the intention.⁵²

An Egyptian proposal for a non-belligerency pact (with demilitarization of Sinai and Israeli use of the Canal) was rejected, as Eban explained to the Americans at the UN in September 1967 that he was “not sure UAR [the United Arab Republic] understands clearly [the] relationship between end of belligerency and territorial problems Eban gave [the] impression that Israel has tried to and will try again to make it clear to [the] Egyptians that they could get [a] substantial part of territory back in return for what Eban called a ‘juridical definition of relations’ between Israel and Egyptians.” Peace was the issue with UAR, not primarily territorial problems. Israel must have a relationship on a “contractual basis”, which includes recognition of Israeli sovereignty and “total non-belligerency.”⁵³ The building of settlements in the occupied territories began officially in September 1967 (though even leading members of the Labor– Alignment had already joined the movement for “Greater Israel” created during the summer and some settlement activity had begun on the Golan as well). This is not to say that the principle of returning (some) territories for peace was abandoned. Talks with Jordan continued throughout 1968, but by that time, with Israel finally decided on the Jordanian option, the Alon Plan made it official that Israel intended to hold on to the Jordan Rift Valley and East Jerusalem, even at the risk of losing an opportunity for peace.

Factors such as the poor decision-making process due to rivalries and differences of opinion within the Israeli government may have played a role in the impression made

upon the Arab (and US) leaders, but they do not appear to have played a role with regard to the actual failure to reach a breakthrough. The differences of opinion were over issues such as the autonomy or limited statehood for the Palestinians (ideas which, in any case, were rejected by the local Palestinians) or returning part of the West Bank to Jordan. The real debates were not between the left and the right in the government but within the dominant leftist camp. Most importantly, there were no problems within the Israeli government over the two deal breakers for Jordan – namely, continued Israel control of the Jordan Rift Valley and East Jerusalem. The flawed decision-making process was responsible for the delay in engaging Jordan, but from the outset both Jordan and Israel (along with the Americans) knew that a deal with Jordan would stand or fall over the territorial issue and especially Jerusalem, no matter when the talks would actually take place. Similarly, public opinion does not appear to have been a factor – one way or another – in the government's deliberations, for public opinion generally supported holding onto all the territories, including the areas the government was ready to return. Yigal Alon once suggested that the Jordanian option as distinct from the Palestinian option was the result of American pressure, and, indeed, there was an American preference for Jordan.⁵⁴ However, the actual shift to this option appears to have been the result of the internal discussions, as well as the limited nature of the proposal put to the Palestinians. The United States, increasingly preoccupied with Vietnam at the time, did not apply pressure beyond moderate efforts at persuasion and did not play as large a role in the whole matter as it gradually did after 1968 (under Nixon and Kissinger).

The characterization of the 4 June 1967 lines as “Auschwitz lines” by the generally dovish Abba Eban⁵⁵ may sum up the underlying factors in the eyes both of the Israeli public and the left as well as the right wing of politicians at the time. Jewish history, entrenched mistrust of the enemies, deeply embedded fear, were all part of the “security” concern that had become part of Israeli identity and sense of victimhood. However, the immensely frequent and consistent references to Israel’s “rights” to these lands, all of them,⁵⁶ attest to the connected factor of the need for recognition of Israel’s “legitimacy” as well as an increasingly strong ideology of nationalism, patriotism, and outright chauvinism coupled, in some circles, with religious messianism. It is impossible to know if underlying these factors there was also a motivation simply for power in the form of territory. The geographic as well as historic, ideological, and even psychological circumstances would provide ample cover for such aspirations, but they were also weighty elements in themselves, sufficient even to account for the failure. The post-1967 situation – namely, the startling victory in the war with its demonstration of Israeli power (in the eyes of the Israeli public as well as the leadership), a strong government enjoying enormous public support, plus the peace offers of King Hussein and some signs of a possibility with Egypt – created the potential for a breakthrough.

These even occasioned a series of direct and indirect efforts to transform the conflict, but the net result was failure. It was to be a long time before a real breakthrough would occur.

Notes

1 Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1964–1968, XIX, Arab–Israeli Crisis and War 1967, Doc. 488, “Memorandum of Conversation” between President Johnson and Foreign Minister Abba Eban, 24 October 1967.

2 For American policy, see Stephen Spiegel, *The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1985); Kenneth Stein, *Heroic Diplomacy* (New York, NY: Routledge, 1999).

3 For Soviet policy, see Galia Golan, *Soviet Policies in the Middle East: From World War II to Gorbachev* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

4 Poll, in Jacob Shamir and Michal Shamir, *The Anatomy of Public Opinion* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2000): 168–169, citing Gutman poll at the end of June 1967 which has a high of over 80 percent unwilling to return the West Bank.

5 Holding onto the land was never to outweigh Jewish majority or even peace as a preferred value amongst Israelis (see Shamir and Shamir, 2000; Michal Shamir and Asher Arian, “Competing Values and Policy Choices: Israeli Public Opinion on Foreign and Security Affairs,” *British Journal of Political Science*, 24(2), 1994: 249–271).

6 During the waiting period, graves had been prepared for thousands of casualties and the public (though not the Israel Defense Forces) expected house to house fighting. The IDF was far more confident and, of course, better informed about the relative strength and likely outcomes. Interviews in kibbutzim after the war indicated that young soldiers going into battle had had thoughts of the Holocaust. Shapira, Avraham (Ed.), *Siah Lohamim: [Soldiers’ Conversations]* (Kevutzat Haverim Tze’irim Meha-tenu’ah Ha-kibutzit, 1968).

7 Israel State Archives (ISA) (Hebrew), Documents 1–6: a-8164/7; a-8164/8; a-8164/9, and a-7634/5 (Government Publications, Periodic History, Stenographic Minutes of Meetings of the Government, 18 and 19 June 1967 April–June 1967, including Six Day War).

8 Herut and the Liberal Party joined to form Gahal in 1965.

9 For example, particularly, but not only, between Prime Minister Eshkol and

Moshe Dayan (from Ben Gurion's breakaway party, Rafi), who had been appointed to replace Eshkol as defense minister just before the war. Traditionally the prime minister held the defense portfolio as well.

10 Aside from the archival protocols of these discussions, other accounts may be found in Avi Raz, *The Bride and The Dowry* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2012); Reuven Pedatzur, Nitzahon Ha-mevukha: Mediniyat Memshelet Eshkol Ba-shtachim Le-ahar Milhemet Sheshet Ha-yamim [*Embarrassing Victory: The Eshkol Government Policy in the Territories After the Six Day War*] (Tel Aviv: Yad Tabenkin, 1996); and Tom Segev, 1967: *Israel, the War, and the Year that Transformed the Middle East* (New York, NY: Metropolitan Books, 2007). Positions were also conveyed to the Americans, see, for example, ISA, a-7634/5 "Decision of the Government," 19 June 1967, or discussions recorded in FRUS, XIX, Arab-Israeli Conflict and War, 1967 – for example, Doc. 290, "Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State," 15 June 1967 and Doc. 369, "Memorandum of Conversation," 15 July 1967 (Eban in Washington).

11 At one point, Dayan suggested a confederation between Israel and a Palestinian state in the West Bank, but quickly abandoned the idea (Pedatzur, 1996: 80).

12 Segev, 2007: 518 on the PLO; Fatah joined the PLO only in 1968, assuming the leadership in 1969.

13 Nigel Ashton, King Hussein of Jordan (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008): 124. The King told British Foreign Secretary George Brown, immediately after his meeting with the Americans, that he would make a separate peace if a common Arab effort failed (Aston, quoting British document).

14 As conveyed via the US Ambassador to Jordan (FRUS XIX, Doc. 370, Memorandum of a Meeting of the "Inner Circle of the Control Group" – Katzenbach, Eugene Rostow, Battle, Kohler, and Wiggins, plus Walsh and Burns) (Johnson Library, National Security File, Middle East Crisis, Vol. VIII) Washington, 16 July 1967; FRUS, XIX, Doc. 331, "Memorandum of Conversation," 28 June 1967; see also FRUS, XIX, Doc. 360, "Telegram from the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations," 13 July 1967).

15 FRUS, XIX, Doc. 393, "Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State," 28 July 1967. See also, Samir Mutawi, *Jordan in the 1967 War* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1987): 175; Segev, 2007: 511. Mutawi, Segev and Avi Shlaim, *Lion of Jordan* (London: Allen Lane, 2007) all have details of the 2 July 1967 discussions between King Hussein and Yaakov Herzog, as well as later meetings.

16 Segev, 2007: 567 (e.g., Eshkol's comments to his party's Political Committee, 3 June 1968). "Territorial integrity" was the most the Arabs could get in the resolution instead of an explicit demand for Israeli withdrawal from *all the* territories occupied in the 1967 war.

17 FRUS, XIX, Doc. 449, "Telegram of the Mission of the United States to the Department of State," 26 September 1967.

18 FRUS, XIX, Doc. 505, "Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel," 5 November 1967, referring to earlier Israeli comments on Jerusalem.

19 *Ibid.*

20 Pedatzur, 1996: 103 (Eban); Amos Shifris, *Yisrael Galili* (Ramat Efal: Yad Tabenkin, 2010) [Hebrew]: 334 (Dayan); also, Nathan Yanai, *Moshe Dayan: Al Tahalich Ha-shalom ve Atida shel Israel*, [*Moshe Dayan: On the Peace Process and the Future of Israel*] (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense, 1988): 104.

21 Eshkol acknowledged this on 3 June 1968 (ISA 7921/A-13), as did Rabin (FRUS, 1964–1968, XX, Arab–Israeli Dispute 1967–1968, Doc. 185, "Memorandum of Conversation" (with US State Department – Under Secretary of State Rostov and others including Dayan), 4 June 1968. Jordanian Foreign Minister Zaid Rifai, who accompanied the King in most of his talks with Israel, said later that Hussein had taken a very daring and risky step and had been "shocked when the Israeli response was that they were willing to sign a peace treaty with Jordan but only if Jordan agreed to cede parts of the West Bank and all of Arab East Jerusalem" (Shlaim, 2007: 282 (interview). Shlaim has detailed accounts of subsequent Jordanian–Israeli talks).

22 See, Yechiel Klar, Noa Schori-Eyal, and Yonat Klar, "The 'Never Again' State of Israel: The Emergence of the Holocaust as a Core Feature of Israeli Identity and its Four Incongruent Voices," *Journal of Social Issues*, 69(1), 2013: 125–143 on experiments inspired by Zygmund Bauman. See also Bauman's interview, "The Golden Compass," in *Haaretz*, 15 February 2013 (that logic guiding Israel is the idea that "Jews are constantly facing a looming Holocaust ... [leading] to insularity and isolationism").

23 In 1965, Mapai, the leading party of the labor movement, joined with Ahdut Avoda to create the Labor Alignment for the 1965 elections. In 1968 the breakoff group Rafi joined them to create the Labor Party for the 1968 elections. In 1969 Mapam joined and the name Labor Alignment was restored.

24 Also illustrative of the lack of trust was Yigal Alon's supporting argument (expressed on 30 July 1967) for holding onto the West Bank that "we must

always take into consideration the chance that the Jordanian regime may be changed": Yigal Alon, *Be-hatira Le-shalom [In Search of Peace]*, Tel Aviv: Hakibbutz Hameuchad, 1989: 28.

25 ISA, a-8164/7, Documents 1 & 2, Protocol – Government Meeting, 18 June 1967; Hagai Tzoref, *Levi Eshkol: Rosh Ha-memshala Ha-shlishi:Mivhar Te'udot Mi-pirkei Ha-yav-1895–1969 [Levi Eshkol: the Third Prime Minister: Selections of Documents from his Life]* (Jerusalem: State Archive, 2002): 580. Only one member of the government mentioned that King Hussein had made some moderate comments a few days before (Minister of Police Eliyahu Sasson, Doc. 2).

26 There were other Israeli territorial demands but these were in the nature of minor adjustments – for example, the Latrun area that King Hussein appears to have been willing to consider (FRUS 1964–1968, XX, Arab–Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968, Doc. 221, "Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State," 20 July 1968).

27 This sentiment was expressed by Yigal Alon (Alon, 1989: 28) though he ultimately was willing to agree to the Jordanian option, February 1968, but only with significant parts of the West Bank in Israeli hands. (Alon, 1989: 27–30) If Israel felt its trust betrayed by Jordan, King Hussein is said to have himself felt betrayed before the war by the Israeli military incursion into Jordan at Samu against Fatah operatives in November 1966 (Ashton, 2008: 190; Shlaim, 2007: 262).

28 FRUS XIX, Doc. 331, "Memorandum of Conversation" (between King Hussein and President Johnson), 28 June 1967.

29 In August 1968, King Hussein told the US that in order to accommodate Israeli concerns he would not place the Jordanian army in the West Bank if there were a peace agreement, needing no more than minimum forces to preserve public order. He was also willing to consider border "rectifications" (probably in the Latrun area), but there was no sign that these would include Israel military control or sovereignty over the Jordan Rift Valley, and he opposed Israeli retention of East Jerusalem (FRUS, XX, Doc. 227, "Telegram from the Embassy in Jordan to the Department of State," 3 August 1968).

30 Dayan argued against a very broad expansion proposed by General Rehavam Zehevi (Gandhi) on the grounds that such a large annexation would include too many Palestinians (Pedatzur, 1996: 117–118).

31 Such "adjustments" had, in fact, been made on the ground, unofficially, many times over the years, most notably by actions of Ariel Sharon's commando 101 unit.

32 Statistics vary on the number of West Bank residents at the time of the war, with some estimates, including students and others temporarily abroad, as high as 800,000, while Israeli figures from September 1967 were a little less than 600,000 (Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), 31, XII, 1967).

33 Although there were some who spoke of the need to placate Palestinian demands by creating a state for the Palestinians in most of the West Bank and Jordan.

34 Shamir and Shamir, 2000; Michal Shamir and Asher Arian, "Competing Values and Policy Choices: Israeli Public Opinion on Foreign and Security Affairs," *British Journal of Political Science*, 24(2), 1994: 249–271.

35 See www.sixdaywar.org/content/ReunificationJerusalem.asp (CAMERA Committee for the Accuracy of Reporting on the Middle East in America).

36 Cited in Jerold Auerbach, *Are We One: Jewish Identity in the US and Israel* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 2001): 97.

37 Moshe Dayan, *Breakthrough* (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 1981): 176.

38 Segev, 2007: 557.

39 Segev, 2007: 551.

40 Segev, 2007: 522–544 regarding the Gaza refugee issue. Land was purchased outside for voluntary relocation; it is not clear if relocation to the West Bank was to be voluntary or forced.

41 ISA, *The Peace Plan of the Government of Israel: Israel Policy Determinations Regarding the Future of the Territories Occupied in the Six-Day War, 18–19 June 1967*, "Decision," (Hebrew), 19 June 2012; www.archive.gov.il/nr/rdon/yres/A8EE926E-9A1B-4281-AOIC-F6C93349AB15/O/haclata31101968.pdf.

42 Tzoref, 2002: 580.

43 Segev, 2007: 551. A January 1968 survey had 91 percent opposed to returning all or some of the West Bank (up from the June 1967 poll), but the next month this fell to 75 percent and over the years gradually declined further; Asher Arian, *Security Threatened* (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1995): 102.

44 Egyptian Foreign Minister Fawzi met with US Secretary of State Dean Rusk on 21 June 1967, but there is no mention of an Israeli offer in the record of the conversation. (FRUS XIX, Doc. 327, "Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State," 27 July 1969). Samir Mutawi (1987: 180) claims the offer was conveyed to the Arab states but they did not respond

because Jordan was not included. Abba Eban's 25 September 1967 remark in FRUS, XIX, Doc. 449, "Telegram of the Mission of the United States to the United Nations to the Department of State," 26 September 1967.

45 Avi Raz, "The Generous Peace Offer that Was Never Offered: The Israeli Cabinet Resolution of June 19, 1967," *Diplomatic History*, 37(1), 2013: 85–108 has a detailed study of the fate of the decision and the myth of its having been rejected if even presented to the Arab states.

46 Pedatzur, 1996: 69–70; FRUS, XIX, Doc. 425, "Telegram from the Embassy in Israel to the Department of State," 21 August 1969 (from US Embassy in Tel Aviv) cited expansionist public comments by Israeli politicians, but also continued Arab reluctance to make peace; "Memorandum from Special Consultant to the President, McGeorge Bundy," on 31 July 1967 also referred to a hardening of the Israeli position, though this is at a time of the Jordanian retreat from its earlier willingness to talk before there was a joint Arab decision (FRUS XIX, Doc. 399).

47 FRUS, XIX, Doc. 411, "Telegram from the Department of State to Embassy in Israel," 9 August 1967 and Doc. 425, 21 August 1967.

48 Avraham Sela, *The Decline of the Arab Israeli Conflict* (Albany, NY: SUNY University Press, 1998).

49 Shlaim, 2007 (citing King Hussein): 366–68; Sela, 1998: 98–109; Pedatzur, 1996: 142.

50 For the PLO, in addition to the recognition of Israel implied in Resolution 242, the resolution referred to the Palestinian issue only as one of a refugee problem rather than one of national rights; Galia Golan, *The Soviet Union and the Palestinian Liberation Movement* (New York, NY: Praeger, 1980).

51 The secretary of the Prime Minister's Office, Adi Yaffe, wrote to the Israeli ambassador in Washington, Avraham Harman, in late 1967: "it doesn't seem like the decisions made by the government in June still hold, as the days pass, the idea of maintaining control over the territories, for security and historical purposes, grew stronger" (cited in Pedatzur, 1996: 70) On 31 October 1968, the government officially revoked the June 1967 decisions (www.archive.gov.il/nr/rdon/yres/A8EE926E-9A1B-4281-AOIC-F6C93349AB15/O/haclata31101968.pdf).

52 Shifris, 2010: 335 (quoting Alon in 27 September 1968 talk with Rifai).

53 FRUS, XIX, Doc. 434, "Telegram from the United States Interest Section of the Spanish Embassy in the UAR to the Department of State," 11 September 1967;

Doc. 449, "Telegram from the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State," 26 September 1967; Doc. 466, "Telegram from the Department of State to the United States Interest Section of the Spanish Embassy in the UAR," 12 October 1967.

54 Eshkol said that the Jordanian option was result of US pressure (Shifris, 2010: 33; see also Pedatzur, 1996: 100).


55 "We have openly said that the map will never again be the same as on June 4, 1967. For us, this is a matter of security and of principles. The June map is for us equivalent to insecurity and danger. I do not exaggerate when I say that it has for us something of a memory of Auschwitz. We shudder when we think of what would have awaited us in the circumstances of June, 1967, if we had been defeated; with Syrians on the mountain and we in the valley, with the Jordanian army in sight of the sea, with the Egyptians who hold our throat in their hands in Gaza. This is a situation which will never be repeated in history" (to Der Spiegel, 5 November 1969); Yitzhak Tabenkin, (kibbutz founder and labor movement leader): "the borders prior to June 5th brought a Holocaust upon us, a Holocaust worse than the Nazi Holocaust. After the Nazi Holocaust, enough Jews were left to re-build the people and establish the State, however, if the State were destroyed now, a future revival of the Jewish People would be doubtful": Arieh Naor, *Greater Israel: Theology and Policy* (Haifa: University of Haifa Press and Zmora-Bitan, 2001): 324.

56 A study of Israeli attitudes to the occupied territories found consistent sentiment within the Labor Party leadership (as well as in parties to its right) that these territories historically and rightfully belong exclusively to the Jewish people, even if, for pragmatic, demographic reasons – namely, the need to maintain a Jewish majority in Israel – parts might be relinquished; Tamir Magal, Neta Oren, Daniel Bar-Tal, and Eran Halperin, "Psychological Legitimization – Views of the Israeli Occupation by Jews in Israel," in D. Bar-Tal and I. Schnell (Eds), *The Impacts of Lasting Occupation: Lessons from Israeli Society* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2013): 122–185.

Between Cairo and Washington: Sectarianism and Counter-revolution in Post-Mubarak Egypt

Reem Abou-El-Fadl¹

3: Between Cairo and Washington



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In the run-up to 30 June 2013, the day of mass protests against President Muhammad Mursi, Egypt had been strained by the escalating tensions between his supporters and his detractors. Just one week before the protests, a new convulsion of violence targeted one of Egypt's most marginal groups. On 23 June, a mob of Sunni Egyptians, incited by the Salafi imam of their local mosque, lynched four Shi'i Egyptians in the Giza village of Zawiyat Abu Musallam. Scores more Shi'i residents fled in terror, and many of their homes were torched. At the time, analyses pointed to the disturbing rise in such sectarian incidents in Egypt, highlighting domestic dynamics to the exclusion of regional and international contexts (Hellyer 2013, Ruthven 2013, *The Economist* 2013).

Yet a different perspective reveals that beyond the eight men later charged with murder, responsible parties included political elites in Washington, Riyadh and Doha, as well as at the Muslim Brotherhood headquarters and in Cairo's presidential palace at the time. Since 2011, these power players' differing interests had converged against the principal demands of the 25 January Revolution in an attempt to preserve the economic and foreign policy orientations of the old regime while ushering in a new administration. As this chapter will discuss, one of the primary means through which they pursued this goal was the fostering or toleration of socio-political processes of 'sectarianization' among the population. This aimed to dissipate the unity that had characterized Egyptians' revolutionary momentum, breaking up coalitions that could mobilize for fundamental change.

Within Egypt, the sectarianization process rested on discourses and practices that excluded non-Islamist voices and that were productive of difference where alternative, pluralist frameworks of community were being imagined. The principal agents were the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) – primary power brokers during the first eighteen months of the post-Mubarak period – alongside the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafi parties, which consolidated their positions with electoral victories in 2011 and 2012. The three deployed a normative discourse built on varying degrees of religiously infused legitimacy to confront revolutionary demands. Where the Islamists were acting on norms embedded in their conservative Islamist worldview, the SCAF generals were motivated primarily by the desire to open up fissures in the revolutionary camp of early 2011 and to create disorder. Their varying motivations notwithstanding, one common outcome was sectarian violence, starting with the attacks on churches from March 2011 (Shenoda 2011) and continuing with the anti-Shi'a violence in 2013.

Understanding this phenomenon also requires attention to the role of US Middle East policy and its historical preference for conservative Islamist and authoritarian rule

among its clients. The United States was a principal political and financial backer of both the SCAF and the Brotherhood between 2011 and 2013, as were Saudi Arabia and Qatar. These states shared an interest in expanding the influence of a constellation of Sunni forces in the region and in containing the so-called Shi'i 'axis' of Iran, Syria and Lebanon's Hizbullah. The difference in sect between the two camps did not drive this conflict: the more relevant fault-line lay in their positions on US regional policy, particularly towards Israel, and within international and regional networks of neoliberal economic interests. If sectarianism was not the prime driver, however, it was certainly a desired outcome.

A comparative historical perspective here is illuminating: the sectarianization processes of 2011 have their roots in the strategies of former president Anwar al-Sadat, who employed a range of mechanisms to empower the Islamist right against the nationalist left, and whose decade in rule saw the first incidences and rise of sectarian violence. The ensuing dynamic of 'outbidding' between tolerated Islamist opposition and ostensibly 'secular' government continued under Hosni Mubarak. Again, these policies need to be understood within a particular regional and international political context: as Sadat's regime sponsored politically conservative religious actors and opened up the Egyptian economy, he earned the financial and diplomatic support of rising Gulf powers and the United States. After he signed the 1978 Camp David Accords with Israel, he was rewarded with two billion dollars of annual US military aid. For each party, the break rather than unity in ranks of potentially or actually disgruntled Egyptian citizens was an advantage.

This chapter investigates the contemporary sectarianization process by linking its domestic, regional and international drivers and setting them in historical context. It argues that both the SCAF and Islamist actors in post-Mubarak Egypt worked to highlight and foster sectarian divisions in Egypt in a bid to contain revolutionary change, and that they enjoyed regional and US backing throughout. It focuses on the period of Muhammad Mursi's presidency (June 2012–June 2013), whose demonstrated compliance with US-sponsored regional arrangements facilitated its growing relations with Washington based on the same interests that had underpinned US–Egyptian ties under Mubarak and Sadat. Meanwhile, Mursi received financial and political support from regional states rich in oil wealth and willing to invest in a new and dependent regime in Egypt, where traditional competition from former National Democratic Party crony networks was vastly weakened.

This chapter's discussion of sectarianization builds on the literature on religious politics and internecine tension in Egypt and the wider Arab world and draws attention to the ways in which the process of producing difference can be propelled from a distance as well as between the immediate subjects of mutual identification. By



training a critical eye on the implicated regional and international actors, the chapter brings existing theoretical work on ‘ethnicization’ and the production of difference into conversation with the literature on geopolitical shifts and political economy in the Middle East during the early twenty-first century.

Sectarianization as process

The question of relations between and among religious groups in Egypt has long been the subject of intensely politicized debate, both inside the country and in the United States and Western Europe. The vast literature on Islamism has often reflected the political campaigns of modernizationists in Western states, aiming to entrench suspicion of Islam as a religion of violence, its followers naturally opposed to democracy and pluralism (Sadowski 1993). Similarly the situation of religious groups in Egypt has been analysed from a standpoint aiming to vindicate this same view (Sedra 2009: 1050). Within Egypt, the concept of religious unity has been subject to contestations by nationalists – of the pan-Arabist as well as the ‘Egypt-first’ mould, by those of Islamist affinities, by liberals and by leftists. Its academic investigation has also been discouraged by the state and by the Coptic Church. Both have been protective of pacts long since sealed between them and sensitive to potential interventions with divisive colonial undertones.

Nevertheless, an important body of scholarship has produced differentiated accounts that problematize simplistic notions of the endemic existence or complete absence of a sectarian problem in Egypt. Instead they have examined the historical and institutional contexts through which politicized religious consciousness has been constructed and the different socio-economic groups engaged in such processes of construction and negotiation (Eickelman and Piscatori 1996, Ismail 2006, Shakman Hurd 2008, Sedra 2009, Farah 2013, Tadros 2013). Others have examined religious violence across different Arab cases in light of horizontal and vertical socio-economic stratifications, the discursive practices of boundary-drawing it entails, and the role of law and states, colonial and postcolonial (Khalaf 2001, Mahmood 2012, Tripp 2013).

This chapter builds on their insights first in its social constructivist approach to the production of religious difference in Egypt. Specifically, it draws on the theories of identity construction and production of difference that situate this process in ‘specific historical and institutional sites, within specific discursive formations and practices, by specific enunciative strategies’ (Hall 1996: 4). Among those analysed here will be political speeches, statements and manifestos, media output, private conversations, violence against non-Sunni citizens, symbols and places of worship, and mobilizations to restrict the freedom of conscience or political protest of non-Sunnis. As Stuart Hall

(1996: 6) further emphasizes, ‘the “unities” which identities proclaim are, in fact, constructed within the play of power and exclusion, and are the result, not of a natural and inevitable or primordial totality but of the naturalized, overdetermined process of “closure”’.

Following this conceptualization, this chapter seeks to focus attention on the agents and structural capabilities that enable this ‘play of power and exclusion’ of certain religious groups in Egypt. It considers first conservative Islamist actors, conceptualized as political agents whose endeavours, alliances and foes change with their social, economic and political contexts. It aims to highlight the ways in which their ideological narratives evolve and are deployed for different political ends as political opportunities change, affecting their position with respect to other power players. This attention to historical contingency and change is crucial to understanding sectarianization as a political process.

Second, this chapter addresses a further set of actors whose role in the construction of religious difference in Egypt – albeit from afar – has been significant. As social constructivist accounts shed light on the plays of power in fixing identity, much of the literature is focused on the dynamic between identified and identifier. Yet this is also extendable to actors who shore up the power of those engaged in this process of differentiation. In the case of many of Egypt’s contemporary Islamists, their backers operate in regional and international networks of business and political alliances, with bases in the Gulf and the United States. While these actors’ roles have been discussed in relation to sectarianism in the Gulf states (Matthiessen 2013) or in the Arab Mashreq (Khalaf 2001, Gendzier 2006), they are rarely considered for their effects within Egypt.

These actor networks are most frequently discussed in the scholarship on neoliberalism in the Arab world, on US empire, hegemony and foreign policy, and on bilateral relations in trade, war and ‘security’. These accounts offer valuable insights into the ways in which US hegemony is built upon its special relationship with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, through the control of market prices, and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member states’ increasing volume of investments in recent years, while the latter rely on the US for security and diplomatic support (Khalidi 2004, Vitalis 2007, Mitchell 2011). This scholarship has also uncovered the ways in which Gulf power is in turn implicated in Egyptian class formation through their control of capital and the sensitivity of business elites in Egypt to Gulf investors’ interests (Hanieh 2013).

It is a short step from these sophisticated analyses of Gulf and US economic and political power to an understanding of these actors’ hostility to revolutionary movements for redistributive justice and their ability to contribute resources to counter-campaigns, even those with dissimilar objectives. Conceptualizing the production of difference as a power play, then, illuminates the contribution of disparate



actors to a locally performed set of exclusive practices.

Egypt's Islamists from sectarian ideology to practice

Among the reasons why Shi'i Muslim and Coptic Christian citizens became targets of intensifying violence after 2011, this section addresses two: in the longer run, ideological commitments among many contemporary Islamists; and more immediately, political competition. In Egypt, contemporary Islamism had its origins in the early twentieth century and the founding of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, as principles emphasized by these groups changed – in a dynamic with the state, with the rise of influential figures, and with regional influences – but all have shared an exclusively Sunni framework and constituency. What has translated this into recent practices of exclusion by some relates to the newfound confidence of the Islamist camp, born of the shifting landscape of political opportunity that favoured its members since 2011. During this time they moved quickly to form associations and coalitions and later political parties.

The ideological roots of the Muslim Brotherhood can be traced to the thinking of Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865–1935), a student of Egypt's Grand Mufti Sheikh Muhammad Abdu and a conservative member of the reformist 'Salafiyya' movement in the early twentieth century. Rida's teachings inspired the Brotherhood's founder, Hassan al-Banna, whose self-declared mission was to purify Islamic practice and society from alien and imported influences. The Brotherhood's vision of citizenship centred on Sunni Muslims, while members of other faiths and confessions were accorded at best 'dhimmi' status. While there was already a militant arm to the Brotherhood in the 1940s, namely the 'Special Apparatus' (Mitchell 1969/93: 54–55, 60, 62), Sayyid Qutb further radicalized the Brotherhood's message in the 1950s and 1960s. He argued that the spiritual and moral decay of contemporary Muslims, not to mention all Christian and Jewish societies, made them legitimate targets of violence (Hassan 2012).

Contemporary Egyptian Salafism traces its roots to Sheikh Hamid al-Fiqqi's establishment of Gam'iyyat Ansar al-Sunna ('The Association of Advocates of the Sunna') in 1926. Its members proclaimed a commitment to revive the Islamic practices established by the prophet Muhammad and the first caliphs ('the righteous forefathers', *al-salaf al-salih*). With time, Egyptian Salafism grew into a heterogeneous social movement with no single organizational centre, but rather followers gathering around particular preachers. Given unprecedented freedom of manoeuvre under Sadat and Mubarak, a loose network of Salafi preachers proliferated (Abdalla 1993). Many of these developed close ties with their Wahhabi counterparts in Saudi Arabia and flourished especially thanks to Saudi financial support after the 1970s oil boom (Abd al-'Al 2009).

Particularly concentrated in Alexandria was the so-called Salafi Call (al-Da' wa

al-Salafiyya), but diverse networks developed nationwide, and their collective position for decades was to forbid rebellion against a ruler, as long as he were Muslim.

Accordingly, many Salafi leaders judged that the optimal course of action was to build strength in relative seclusion from jahili society. Others emphasized the implication that once a ruler ceased to be Muslim, this legitimized the use of violence in opposition. For such preachers, particularly ‘jihadi Salafi’ militant groups such as al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya and al-Jihad, this principle was freely extended to ordinary citizens. It is important to note that the Brotherhood is also connected with Salafi trends, particularly since the 1970s (Maged 2011). Most recently, the Qutbist trend was ascendant in the Brotherhood, represented by the pre-eminence of Khairat al-Shatir, who enjoyed relations of trust with Salafi political elites (Hassan 2012).

These groups' ideas found loud echoes after the 25 January Revolution, as Islamists of multiple stripes moved into the sphere of formal political practice. The most prominent of these were the Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the Salafi Call's Al-Nur Party, registered in May and June 2011 respectively. Salafi leaders had originally forbidden their cadres from joining the protests against Mubarak, toeing a characteristically quietist line (Abd al-Latif 2012: 3–5, 6–7). Members of Al-Nur and Al-Fadila, another Salafi party, justified this reversal by announcing that they were thereby protecting the ‘public interest’ in seeking to secure Islamic values and an Islamic constitution in post-Mubarak Egypt (Al-Anz 2011, Al-Shaqra 2011). The crucial actor expanding their political opportunity was the SCAF, which began the transitional process by abbreviating the ambitions of the revolutionary movement into a few constitutional amendments in March 2011, drafted by a handpicked committee privileging conservative and Islamist political voices. There followed the generals' progressively more violent crackdowns and intimidation of the revolutionary groups and their evident bias towards Islamist politicians in the public sphere and media and, ultimately, in the 2011–12 parliamentary elections (Brownlee 2012: 123–153, Eskandar 2013). Close to a thousand Islamists formerly detained under Egypt's emergency law were variously released, acquitted and their sentences overturned, or they were pardoned directly by Muhammad al-Tantawi, head of the SCAF during the transitional period. Among them were the masterminds of Sadat's assassination, Abbud and Tarik al-Zumur (Bahgat 2013).

In this atmosphere, and after decades of state repression, the sudden opportunity to disseminate ideas and impose strict codes seemed intoxicating for some. For Salafis in particular, this was a moment of remarkable rupture. It entailed the challenges of negotiating the norms and regulations of political life, establishing a hierarchy and a disciplined ‘party line’ on a range of policy issues. Meanwhile the Brotherhood, given its success at the polls, finally had to shoulder the burden of rule, managing confrontations with opposition members as well as internal dissent. Many scholars have written of the

'moderation effect' that political participation and even executive power has on formerly 'radical' groups (Anderson 1997, Wickham 2004, Schwedler 2007). As Wickham (2004: 206) points out,

Less clear is whether or not participation can trigger ideological moderation. Ideological moderation refers to the abandonment, postponement, or revision of radical goals.... It entails a shift toward a substantive commitment to democratic principles, including the peaceful alternation of power, ideological and political pluralism, and citizenship rights.

From 2011, the record of Egypt's most 'radical' Islamist political organizations certainly exhibited a moderation of public discourse. This was best illustrated by the manifesto of the Building and Development Party (BDP), founded in June 2011 by the formerly militant Islamic Group (al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya). Its fifth objective specifies 'building an open political system that secures the rights of all citizens and protects non-Egyptian foreigners' while the party's insistence on Egypt's Islamic identity is emphasized as 'not implying denial of the religious identities of non-Muslims' (BDP 2011).

At the same time, however, prominent figures as well as rank-and- file members of the BDP and Al-Nur incited sectarian prejudice and encouraged intolerance in practice and in private discourse (Seikaly and Iskandar 2013). Most notably, Salafi individuals engaged in mob violence against Copts and minority Muslim sects without party censure in a periodic flexing of muscles throughout 2011, 2012 and 2013. As early as March 2011, a Salafi mob torched the Church of the Martyrs of Mar Girgis and Mar Mina in the village of Sol Atfeeh in Helwan, outside Cairo. By April 2011, the 'Coalition of New Muslims' had formed, as thousands of Salafis protested to demand 'the prosecution of the Coptic Pope and the release of two priests' wives believed to have converted to Islam and rumored to be detained by the church', as well as 'the inspection of churches and monasteries' (Egypt Independent 2011). Weeks later, on 7 May, a group of Salafis and other Muslims attacked the Coptic Church of Saint Mina in Imbaba, on the grounds that a Christian woman who wished to convert to Islam was being detained there. The same group went on to burn three Coptic churches, including the Virgin Mary Church (Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights 2011). Also in May, there was an attack on Saint Mar Mina Church in El-Maqadeer village in Minya (El-Gergawi 2011). Later that year, Salafis were involved in the demolition and burning of Mar Girgis Church and many Christian homes in Al-Marinab village in Aswan, on the pretext that its builders had violated their licence (El-Gergawi 2011). In December 2011, local Salafi groups attacked a group of Egyptian Shi'a who went to Old Cairo's Al-Hussein Mosque to commemorate 'Ashura (El-Gundy 2013).

These were the first of many in a string of such incidents that peaked in summer 2013 after the ousting of Mursi. As Tripp (2012) explains of the Iraqi context, here the use of



violence

is imagined to be a way of realising, or at least of setting in motion, political ends that speak of the ruthlessness, the determination and the realism of those who use it. In this respect, it is often seen as being the most effective way of gaining recognition, of opening a channel of communication with government by speaking a language that those in authority understand only too well.

In Mursi's Egypt, this strategy seemed to work: neither the FJP nor the Salafi leaderships condemned these attacks with particular force. Just as the SCAF and its governments had done before them, they chose instead to send 'reconciliation committees' to 'mend fences' between the aggrieved citizens and their attackers. Harsh threats and punitive measures, of the sort Mursi meted out to peaceful protesters in late 2012 for example (Sallam 2012), were absent.

Among the Salafi groups' other visibly exclusionary practices were the censored party manifestos of Al-Nur, for example, which included covering women's images on electoral posters, while some members and those of all other Salafi parties vociferously condemned the idea of Christians or women attaining positions of power, let alone extending full citizenship rights to Shi'i and Baha'i Egyptians (Fathi 2011b, Hassan 2012). In November 2012, a group of Salafis prevented thirty Shi'i citizens from entering Cairo's Al-Hussain Mosque to commemorate 'Ashura, and were aided in doing so by the police (Shalaby 2012). Members of licensed Salafi political parties such as Al-Nur and its mother organization, the Salafi Call, also furiously condemned the budding rapprochement with Iran in May 2013 during former Iranian president Mahmud Ahmedjinad's visit to Egypt (Dagres 2013, Salah 2013). They further opposed the subsequent re-launching of tourism between the two states by staging sit-ins outside the Iranian Ambassador's residence and the Muslim Brotherhood's headquarters (Al-Masry Al-Youm 2013a). Some Al-Nur members saw fit to put up posters in Aswan in southern Egypt describing the Shi'a as enemies and heretics, while others later printed similar banners far north in Munufiyya (Al-Jazeera English 2013).

Meanwhile, in private gatherings, Salafi leaders were candid as regards their objectives in interpreting Islamic law in ways that compromise the rights of those deemed to be unbelievers. For example, in a closed gathering of Salafis discussing the constitution-drafting process on 22 November 2012, Al-Salafi Call preacher Yasir Burhami affirmed that while some of their goals had had to be postponed, many others had been achieved: 'This constitution imposes complete restrictions that have never before been imposed by any Egyptian constitution ... [it] places restrictions on freedom of thought, expression, and creativity' (*Jadaliyya* Reports 2012).

As for the public discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood and its Freedom and Justice

Party (FJP) spokesmen, this featured the language of pluralism and human rights but revealed important contradictions. The first of these was newly elected president Muhammad Mursi's early references to 'his kith and kin' which seemed to address an exclusive Brotherhood group (*Al-Youm Al-Sabe'* 2012). But it was the president's inaction that was arguably most telling: during his year in power, he permitted practices that ran the gamut from hate speech to incitement to violence among his own party membership (Sedra 2012a). In late 2012, senior Brotherhood and FJP figures repeatedly spoke of Egyptian Christians as a fifth column conspiring to overthrow Mursi and wreak havoc (Sedra 2012b). Also notable here was the president's tolerance for the proliferating private television channels that hosted Salafi tele-preachers whose fatwas and commentaries were flagrantly sectarian and misogynist (Misriyyun Muthaqafun 2011, Al-Hafez TV 2011, Human Rights Watch 2013, Al-Nas Television 2013a).

Indeed, the relationship between the Brotherhood and the main Salafi parties between 2011 and 2013 was itself productive of some of the most exclusionary and violent outcomes of that period. The relationship saw both bitter rivalry and pragmatic cooperation. In view of the recent history of division and mutual recrimination, however, their collaboration was particularly significant (Attar and Haggag 2011). According to a tacit understanding, the Salafis provided the Brotherhood with support to push through their policies, 'resisting external pressure or calls for genuine democratic reforms' (Al-Anani 2013). In return, the Brotherhood leadership recognized the Salafis' aspirations, to found a religious state for example, and gave them a greater say in influencing outcomes. This cooperation was first manifested in the formation of the 'Religious Council for Rights and Reform' in summer 2011, featuring leading Salafi and Brotherhood figures such as Muhammad Hassaan and Khairat al-Shatir respectively, as well as senior figures from Al-Azhar, the foremost Islamic institution in the country. The council aimed explicitly at 'correcting the path' then being followed by the allegedly 'corrupt' institution of Al-Azhar and establishing an Islamist political system instead (Dabash and Sharqawy 2011, Religious Council for Rights and Reform 2011).

In 2012, the Brotherhood–Salafi bargain buoyed Mursi through the massive protests against his unilateral 'constitutional declaration' of November and against the unpopular constitution itself. Similarly, many observers noted the upsurge in violent attacks incited or steered by Salafi preachers and 'allowed' by Brotherhood authorities, seemingly in return for support at times of political crisis – for example, ahead of the 30 June protests. It was in this context, for example, that Salafi preacher and Brotherhood supporter Safwat Hegazi issued his harsh critiques of the Sufi Grand Imam of al-Azhar, Sheikh Ahmad al-Tayyib, and also that jihadist Salafi and al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya leader Assem Abd al-Magid denounced the opposition to Mursi as 'the communists, the atheists and the radical Copts' in June 2013 (Rashwan 2013, Sabry 2013). Abd al-Magid was clear: 'I tell the church not to sacrifice your children. Do they

think that the Islamist public will remain silent if they answer this call and try to overthrow the president? (Sabry 2013).

Even instances of conflict between Brothers and Salafis led to processes of outbidding that intensified rather than tempered the exclusionary nature of the political outcomes. For example, in late 2012, the Salafi members of the constituent committee exerted great pressure on their Brotherhood counterparts – as the committee haemorrhaged more and more non-Islamist members – over Article Two of the draft constitution. Members of the Salafi camp threatened to leave the assembly if the article did not strictly delineate shari'a law as the primary source of Egypt's legislation and also specify the Sunni schools of jurisprudence recognized by the Salafis. The result was that the Brotherhood drafters introduced Article 219, which clarified the 'principles of Islamic shari'a' as including: 'general evidence, foundational rules, rules of jurisprudence, and credible sources accepted in Sunni doctrines and by the larger community' (Youssef 2012). With this article, the constitution demoted and excluded various non-Sunni schools of jurisprudence, despite the fact that Al-Azhar officially recognized these schools in 1959 and continues to teach them today (Dagres 2013). This was compounded by the exclusion of other faiths and secular legal traditions in the 2012 constitution, which was moved into place in January 2013. The analyst Mustafa al-Labbad (2012) even described the constitution as establishing a '*Sunni velayet-i-faqih*'.

Washington's Sunni sectarianism

The same constitution mostly elicited murmurs of approval from the liberal democracies of Europe and the United States: the latter, given its pre-eminence among external powers in the region, is the focus of this section. Officially, US cooperation with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood had only begun in 2012, once Mursi came to office. Yet analysts such as Muhammad Hassanein Heikal have affirmed that Washington had been in dialogue with Egypt's Brothers since the mid-2000s at least, and may have pressured Mubarak to step down in favour of the organization in February 2011 (Elmenshawy 2013). Scholar Saad Eddin Ibrahim (2012) claimed to have been the mediator himself. In fact, the United States has been backing conservative regimes built on religiously-infused legitimacy for decades, providing it was not of the actively anti-Zionist kind. Its direct support for the Gulf oil monarchies – and for their pacts with Islamist political movements – has been vital to US hegemony and is crucial to understanding sectarian violence in Egypt and the Arab world.

As early as 1947, American and British officials met at the Pentagon to put together their strategy for the Middle East, given the emergence of Soviet influence as a threat to their vital interests there (Hare 1993: 20). As Hudson (1996: 330) clarifies: 'While still conceding Britain "primary responsibility" for the Middle East and the Mediterranean,

Secretary of State George C. Marshall already was contemplating an eventual leadership role for the United States in the region'. Yet even before the early Cold War and Washington's decision to engage with the Middle East, the US preference for working with religiously conservative regimes had been clear. Washington's first 'special relationship' in the region was forged with King Abd al-Aziz of Saudi Arabia in the 1940s, as US interests in the Middle East crystallized around regulating oil supplies and security cooperation. The new kingdom provided a reliable ally with an official doctrine of puritanical and quietist Islamism and with no anticolonial grudge, owing to Britain's diplomatic support in Saud's earliest battles with his political rivals.

As decolonization gathered momentum elsewhere, the new generation of secular pan-Arabist leaders threatened these US interests, as well as those of the Saudi monarchy, by emphasizing the Arab people's unity and rights to sovereignty, independence and indeed control of Arab oil. American and British policymakers soon singled out the Egyptian vanguard of this trend, Gamal Abdel Nasser, for 'containment' (Yaqub 2004). They attempted this containment through a combination of intermittent incentives, subversion, and increasing intimidation and coercion throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Their principal strategy was to build up regional rivals in Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan, all conservative monarchies with state ideologies that revere Sunni Islam and that actively opposed Nasser's brand of unifying and secularly oriented pan-Arabism.

Meanwhile, after the establishment of Israel in 1948 and the confirmation of that most special of relationships by the early 1960s, the new state was to play a vital role in securing the regional order that Washington had imagined (Little 1993). US interests extended to include the assurance of Israeli security and military advantage and Israel was given licence to act as regional policeman. This it did with Nasser's Egypt and Baathist Syria in successive wars, with the Palestinians in ongoing conflicts, including in Jordan and Lebanon, and with the Lebanese resistance (Said 2002). The US administration's permissive attitude towards Israel's nuclear programme, already no secret by the 1960s, as well as its unconditional support for Israel in international fora, was accompanied by efforts to compel Arab states to recognize and 'normalize' with the occupier state.

Israel's own logic of sectarian privilege was the model that successive US administrations sought increasingly to reproduce in combating regional opposition movements: they should be kept divided, while the US engaged privileged sects as junior partners. In the following decades, the United States signed defence agreements with the most sectarian of authoritarian leaderships in the Gulf, such as the minority Sunni monarchy of Bahrain in 1971, Oman (which also received US assistance in suppressing the Dhofar revolutionary movement) in 1981, Kuwait in 1991, and Qatar

and the United Arab Emirates in 1992 (Cordesman 1998). Franklin Roosevelt had secured and launched construction of the first of such strategically located regional military bases in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, by 1943. Robert Vitalis (2007) has documented the ways in which racist hierarchies were imported from the United States to discipline the labour force in the Eastern Province in which this base and ARAMCO (the Arabian-American Oil Company) operated.

Washington's relationship with Qatar flourished after the 11 September 2001 attacks, which had led to a breach with Riyadh that new Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa al-Thani rushed to fill (Achcar 2013: 130–133). The Qatari ruler offered Washington a crucial new military base and a venue for exploratory talks with new friends, most notably the Muslim Brotherhood. Through such joint ventures as Qatar and the Brookings Institution's US–Islamic World Forum, Doha now played a mediating role between Washington and the Brotherhood that would last until the uprisings and beyond. A crucial link in this chain was senior Muslim Brother and Doha-based Egyptian cleric Yusuf al-Qaradawi, through whom senior US officials met with a growing network of Muslim Brotherhood members and allies (Achcar 2013: 131–132). By the mid-2000s, Egyptian Brothers were making gestures to signal their receptivity to these US overtures.

Meanwhile the United States consistently refrained from meaningful censure of these allies' sectarian policies, and indeed bolstered their security through increasing arms sales (Jones 2012). With the outbreak of the Arab uprisings, the political interests behind this alliance, and the sectarianism it fostered, were exposed. In 2011, Saudi tanks, sold by the US and grouped into the GCC 'Peninsula Shield', rolled into Bahrain to abort the 14 February uprising and the possibilities it had carried of cross-sect unity in opposition to the al-Khalifa regime. Throughout this time, as the Gulf states' revenues grew, their investments in US as well as European business had grown, further enhancing the strategic value of the US–Saudi special relationship and US–GCC relations. As Hanieh explains in this volume, during the 2000s it was estimated that just over half of all GCC investments went to US markets, 20 per cent to Europe, and 10 to 15 per cent each to Asia and to the Middle East (Economist Intelligence Unit 2008).

Apart from propping up sectarian regimes at the level of states, corporations and political organizations, the United States made successive direct interventions in the Middle East that guaranteed the production of sectarian actors for generations to come. The paradigmatic case was the Ronald Reagan administration's co-sponsorship, along with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, of Wahhabi *mujahideen* in the war against the Soviet Union in 1979 (Rubin 1997: 186–199). Often portrayed as a reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979,

In fact, it began almost six months before the Soviet invasion, and its aim was



not to oppose that invasion but to provoke it. As U.S. national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski later confirmed, the United States hoped to provoke a war that would embroil the Soviet Union in ‘its own Vietnam’.

(Mitchell 2002: 14)

The next defining moment in America’s production of sectarianism came with the neoconservative era of George W. Bush, during which Condoleezza Rice’s principle of ‘creative chaos’ was put into devastating effect through the US-led invasion and occupation of Iraq. The United States oversaw a transition in which de-Baathification orders resulted in mass unemployment among Sunnis, and which privileged minority sect figures in the process, generating resentment conceived in sectarian terms. This was exacerbated by the effort to turn Iraq into a model neoliberal market and the slashing of public subsidies. In this context, some Sunnis ‘joined the insurgency simply in order to make a living’ (Hurst 2009: 188).

Saudi Arabia allowed the use of its Prince Sultan Airbase in the Iraq war, but given the disapproval among Saudi public opinion, the Saudis ‘cooperated with Washington militarily when such cooperation could be kept removed from the glare of publicity’ (Gause 2013). Qatar stepped up willingly to fill this gap, hosting both the US Central Command and US Combat Air Operations Centre from 2003 onwards. In Iraq itself, already under the strain of war and sanctions for well over two decades, the United States’ ‘early policies eliminated the Iraqi state and symbols of common national identity. Sectarian-minded actors stepped into the vacuum while occupation forces passively observed the unraveling of the national fabric’ (Tikriti 2008). Meanwhile, as Achcar (2013: 132) describes, the ‘Iraqi Muslim Brothers sat in the Iraq Governing Council established under the aegis of the Coalition Provisional Authority … then joined a string of collaborationist governments’.

Throughout this time, the Sadat and Mubarak regimes served as ‘bulwarks of stability’ in the region and security collaborators with Israel, earning over a billion dollars of annual US aid in return (Yom 2008). They also successfully repressed the democratic aspirations of the most populous Arab state for four decades between them. This success was partially based on a host of strategies of ‘authoritarian upgrading’, with a policy of controlled sectarianization. Both regimes touted their pious credentials, believing that they could not only foster and use intercommunal tensions but also defuse them to divide or distract the public (Farah 2013: 1–3, 9–13, Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights 2005, 2007, 2010, Fathi 2011a).

Anwar al-Sadat pioneered this by reinventing himself as ‘the believer president’, while gradually supplanting the official tropes of nationhood in Nasser’s Egypt with alternative visions that stressed piety as well as inter-Arab differences (Sadat 1976). He

also fostered, drawing on state budgets, an Islamist presence on campuses and increasingly in the public sphere, developing a pact with the Brotherhood in particular (Baker 1990: 243–249). When, by the late 1970s, tensions had escalated with his former protégés and with other critics of his recent peace treaty with Israel, Sadat did not hesitate to include the Coptic Patriarch among his detainees. Mubarak may not have projected this self-image with the same gusto, but he eventually secured a bargain with the Muslim Brotherhood in which the latter enjoyed privileged opposition status, notwithstanding fluctuations in this pact. Competition over control of the symbols and meanings of piety between each side contributed to a rising conservatism in the socio-cultural landscape of twenty-first-century Egypt (Amin 2011).

In early 2011, faced with the sudden loss of strategic allies such as Mubarak and before him Tunisia's Zine El Abidine Ben Ali, US President Barack Obama sought reassurances on the preservation of the status quo ante in business and security cooperation. The SCAF was clearly open to a raising of its own profile in the US–Egyptian relationship, and senior US security officials' already intimate relationship with their Egyptian military counterparts contributed to shaping the flawed 'transition period' (United States Embassy in Cairo 2012a). In addition, however, the Muslim Brotherhood presented itself as a willing partner. This was first evident in clandestine meetings initiated by its Guidance Bureau with Intelligence Chief Omar Suleiman during the course of the anti-Mubarak protests (Al-Masry Al-Youm 2012). It was later manifest in the conservative stances the Brotherhood leadership consistently took, supporting the mild amendments of the constitution in March 2011 and refusing to participate in the broad-based mass mobilizations that continued to insist on core revolutionary demands throughout that year. Finally, the Brotherhood elite broke its promises not to field a particular threshold of candidates in the November elections. Ultimately, despite some senior officials voicing doubts when the FJP was able to dominate the new parliament in January 2012 (Wittes 2013), the rise of conservative Sunni political Islam did not appear to perturb the United States and its allies (*Egypt Independent* 2012).

Secretary of State Hilary Clinton then blessed the handover of power to civilian president Muhammad Mursi as democratic and historic (United States Embassy in Cairo 2012c). Indeed, US officials appear to have begun consolidating ties with Mursi rapidly, as his economic and foreign policy choices increasingly mirrored those of his ousted predecessor (United States Embassy in Cairo 2012d, 2013b, Haggag 2012, Kassab 2012, Al-Naggar 2012, Abou-El-Fadl 2013). Meanwhile, the Brotherhood leadership's weak reactions to sectarian violence, assaults on freedom of expression, military trials for civilians and SCAF crackdowns on non-governmental organizations did not elicit strong reactions from the United States or Europe (United States Embassy in Cairo 2012b). Once in power, Mursi failed to bring to justice Islamist militias who had tortured and abused peaceful protesters outside the presidential palace in November 2012; he also

failed to ensure the safety of Egypt's Coptic Cathedral from attack by armed gangs (Tadros 2013). Meanwhile Christian schoolteachers were being taken to court for 'defamation of religion' (Amnesty International 2013). Again, none of these transgressions received more than the lightest of rebukes or expressions of concern from the United States Embassy in Cairo (2013a and 2013e). For the Obama administration, it appeared to be business as usual.

Meanwhile, further east, the United States was providing logistical and diplomatic support to groups who understood their role in Syria as soldiers of a Sunni crusade (Ford 2013). As a leaked cable from the United States Embassy in Damascus (2006) shows, Washington's interests in toppling a regime that staunchly supports Hizbullah are not new. The public figures representing the US-backed current of the opposition, which received near exclusive media and political attention in the United States and Western Europe from 2012 to 2013, consistently underlined the 'Alawi nature' of the Assad regime (Shakman Hurd 2013). This current displayed its violent sectarian logic in the targeting of Christian civilians (Black 2013).

The ongoing Syrian crisis is merely the most recent in a series of interventions by Washington, bolstered by a consistent discourse of liberal interventionism, in which it has offered selective support for regional players, empowering those in the Gulf and Egypt who employed sectarian difference as a method of political survival. In this way, US discourse and practices have shaped the regional context for religious politics profoundly since the 1940s.

Sunni sectarianism in the Gulf

Analysis of Washington's sponsorship of regional sectarian actors remains incomplete without a closer examination of the methods by which these actors have engaged in the production of difference in their own realms. This cooperation involved most of Washington's regional partners in its oil, security and sectarian policies: foremost among these has long been Saudi Arabia. The territories of the Saudi kingdom itself had been won through a pact between the al-Saud tribe and the ultra-conservative Ikhwan movement of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, first signed in 1774. Despite their subsequent disputes, the descendants of al-Ikhwan became critical allies of Abd al-Aziz al-Saud as he established the third and final Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Al-Saud then shrewdly sought the protection as well as the expertise and technical assistance of the United States to safeguard his fledgling state, and facilitated this through

a compromise with the religious establishment. The muwahhidun leadership would tolerate the role of the foreign oil company, and in return their programme to convert Arabia to the teachings and discipline of tawhid would

be funded with the proceeds from oil.

(Mitchell 2002: 10)

The United States meanwhile secured a crucial state with an oil surplus allowing it ‘to operate as a “swing” producer, switching its surplus on and off to discipline other producers who tried to exceed their production quotas, thus maintaining the system of scarcity’ whereby oil prices could not rise beyond a certain point (Mitchell 2002: 6). It also secured a lucrative market for its arms industry (Jones 2012).

In the 1950s, as an Arab cold war developed between the region’s conservative monarchies and its anticolonial socialist republics, the former devised strategies to curb the unifying popular trend of pan-Arabism. In Saudi Arabia in particular, members of the religious establishment founded the Muslim World League in 1962 and poured their petrodollars into proselytizing Wahhabism. As Piscatori (1983: 40) points out, ‘From this beginning, the League continuously functioned in effect as a non-governmental Saudi spokesman’. League activities included building mosques and centres for Qur'an learning in various Asian, African, European and American countries, thus building a transnational network of Muslims socialized and schooled in Wahhabi ideas and mores (Piscatori 1983: 46–49, Rubin 1997). Most of its funds came from the Saudi government, and other organizations with similar functions were later founded, such as the King Faysal Foundation and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (Al-Rasheed 2004: 154).

Saudi Arabia also gave refuge to Muslim Brothers fleeing the Egyptian state’s crackdowns, and these, as well as the later generations of migrants who arrived during the oil boom, also developed strong affinities with Wahhabi Islamism. The League was founded during the Egyptian–Saudi–Yemen War, and the common opposition to Nasser of the Saudis and the Muslim Brothers made them allies. Birt (2004: 169) elaborates:

In the 1960s, the kingdom provided shelter to Egyptian Islamists who were supported in order to act as a conservative counterweight to Nasser’s populist Arab socialism. An alliance between the Wahhabi ‘ulama’, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and other reform movements worked to establish a set of global Islamic institutions – the Islamic University of Medina in 1961, the Muslim World League in 1962, the Organization of the Islamic Conference in 1969 and the Islamic Development Bank in 1975 – which the Al Sa'ud assumed would serve to cement their leadership of the Muslim world.

Saudi Arabia also played a critical role in pitting the Afghan Arabs against Soviet forces in Afghanistan in 1979, arguably the single conflict most productive of sectarian Islamist fighters in the twentieth century. While the Americans provided the expertise of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Saudis provided the funding and indeed many of

the men:

The Saudi government saw in Afghanistan the solution to these growing domestic difficulties. It exported as many as twelve thousand young religious activists, increasingly critical of the corruption of the ruling family, to fight the crusade against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.

(Mitchell 2002: 15)

The Saudi sources of funding were diverse: from the official aid of the Saudi General Intelligence Agency, headed by Prince Turki al-Faisal, to the League's funding of schools and madrasas, to the 'Afghan support committee' led by governor of Riyadh Prince Salman ibn Abd al-Aziz, who 'funded the Arab volunteers recruited by the Muslim Brotherhood' (Rubin 1997: 188–189). Finally, in close coordination with Prince Turki was Osama Bin Laden's Islamic Salvation Foundation, while Salafis in Kuwait and Muslim Brothers region-wide also donated.

In 1981, feeling threatened by the Shah's overthrow in Iran and the Iran–Iraq war, six Gulf monarchs 'huddled together' and founded the Gulf Cooperation Council: their interest in political survival was enhanced by 'growing American apprehension about Gulf security and its vital interests in this highly strategic region' (Abdulla 1999: 116, 123). These Gulf monarchs had long worked to pre-empt any unified resistance to their authoritarian rule by practising sectarian discrimination as a state policy. This ranged from systematically excluding Shi'a citizens from full rights to crushing periodic instances of dissent. With the GCC, they were now better able to coordinate their surveillance and repressive operations. Such policies included, for example, the naturalization of Sunni foreigners in Bahrain to engineer a demographic majority (Errazzouki 2012) as well as the use of police violence against Shi'a in both Saudi's Qatif province and across Bahrain (Jones 2007). The crucial corollary of this was the stifling of national, let alone transnational, pan-Arab solidarities.

This was arguably the preferred orientation of Qatar's news channel Al Jazeera, another significant intervention in the realm of Arab identity politics by a sectarian Gulf state. By the early 2000s, Qatar was playing host to several émigré and visiting members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who were enjoying the novelty of a budding utilitarian relationship with the United States. These figures touted their neo-Islamist centrist credentials to a receptive Bush administration, positioning themselves as a moderate alternative to the violence of al-Qaeda. Now the Qatari channel could further establish this narrative, with a Jordanian Muslim Brother at its helm and numerous prominent journalists with Brotherhood sympathies presenting its principal programmes (Al-Qassemi 2012).

This strategy informed the Gulf states' attitude to the Tunisian and particularly the

Egyptian revolution, which threatened to spread and confront them with cross-sect oppositions at home. Several Gulf monarchs' first reactions were to support their ousted counterparts, hosting Ben Ali in Riyadh and insisting that Mubarak be spared the humiliation of a trial (Fawzi 2011). Ultimately unsuccessful in this bid, the various Gulf players then decided to sponsor the most conservative players on the new political scene in Egypt, whose interests corresponded most closely with their own. The Saudis, having seen their historical protégés migrate towards Qatar and fearing being eclipsed as the foremost Sunni Islamic model in the region, opted to back the Salafi groups in Egypt (Al-Rasheed 2013). Qatar, with its established support of the Brotherhood, now used the Arab uprisings as an opportunity to enhance its regional influence at Riyadh's expense and in keeping with US interests.

As Matthiesen (2013: 120) points out, the Syrian uprising gave these same counter-revolutionary regimes the opportunity to 'jump on the bandwagon' as it was now in their political interests to help topple Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, and weaken Iran, all by supporting Islamists in the opposition. Saudi Arabia and Qatar duly became the main financiers of the Free Syrian Army, many of them Sunni jihadists from Gulf states, while Turkey played host to its political representatives in the Syrian National Council and enabled the transport of arms over the border (Stephens 2013, Chulov *et al.* 2013, Ilgit and Davis 2013). Al-Jazeera's channels now broadcast increasingly pro-Brotherhood interpretations of Egyptian and Syrian current affairs (Al-Akhbar English 2012, Sha'ban 2013).

In semi-official media too, there was staunch support from Salafi clerics in the Gulf to the Syrian opposition, conveyed through a starkly sectarian discourse. For example, Salafi Bahrainis on a visit to Syria declared this a jihad against 'the hated Safavids', a derogatory term for the Shi'a, while Syrian exiled cleric Adnan al-'Ar'ur had long enjoyed a platform in Riyad from which he preached anti-Shi'a hatred and now support for the Syrian jihad (Matthiesen 2013: 121). Meanwhile in Qatar, prominent Muslim Brother Yusuf al-Qaradawi worked to bring this logic into mainstream settings and to normalize its implications. Speaking on his popular Al-Jazeera programme in early June 2013, al-Qaradawi urged Sunnis to join the battle in Syria, asking 'How could 100 million Shi'ites [worldwide] defeat 1.7 billion [Sunnis]? ... only because [Sunni] Muslims are weak'. Saudi Arabia's Grand Mufti and president of its Board of Senior Ulema, Abdallah Al-Sheikh, promptly hailed al-Qaradawi's statements and denounced Hizbullah as a 'repulsive sectarian group' (*Saudi Gazette* 2013). By summer 2014, the rise of the Islamic Caliphate State had brought new waves of sectarian brutality to both Syria and Iraq, still with the same backers: 'The foster parents of Isis and the other Sunni jihadi movements in Iraq and Syria are Saudi Arabia, the Gulf monarchies and Turkey' (Cockburn 2014).

Contexts and players in Zawiyat Abu Musallam

Returning to the tragic events of 23 June 2013 in Zawiyat Abu Musallam vividly illustrates the interplay of these contexts and players, and their outcomes in sectarianism. On 9 May, US Secretary of State John Kerry had authored a memorandum overruling concerns at the undemocratic record of the Egyptian regime (Reuters 2013). The text went on to authorize the release of the US\$1.3 billion in annual aid to Egypt. Kerry noted that this aid would serve such US national interests as increasing security in Sinai, preventing attacks from Gaza into Israel, countering terrorism and securing transit through the Suez Canal. He explained: 'A decision to waive restrictions ... is necessary to uphold these interests as we encourage Egypt to continue its transition to democracy' (Reuters 2013). On 13 June, US Ambassador to Egypt Anne Patterson added her vote of confidence to the Mursi administration. Dismissing plans for the 30 June protests, she stated: 'the Government of the United States of America supports Egypt, its people, and its government.... Some say that street action will produce better results than elections. To be honest, my government and I are deeply skeptical' (United States Embassy in Cairo 2013c).

One day later, US president Barack Obama declared his administration's intention to arm rebel forces against Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. The larger Friends of Syria Group – composed of the United States, Britain, France, Italy, Germany, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Egypt and Turkey – then together resolved 'to provide urgently all the necessary materiel and equipment to the opposition on the ground' (Foreign and Commonwealth Office 2013).

Mursi's rapid reaction to these developments indicated continuity with the notorious Mubarak trade-off: cashing in foreign policy credit to stem domestic discontent and bolster authoritarianism. On 15 June, the Egyptian president severed diplomatic ties with Syria and spoke at an Islamist rally in Cairo Stadium organized 'in support of the Syrian revolution'. The rally was a show of strength, in defiance of popular plans for 30 June, and of the Tamarrud ('Rebellion') petition campaign, which had just announced its securing of over twenty-two million signatories withdrawing confidence from Mursi and demanding early presidential elections (Al-Masry Al-Youm 2013b). Mursi and the Brotherhood had clearly hoped that the Syria event would distract from the domestic crisis and would rally Egyptians around the Sunni crusade beyond the border.

The United States failed to comment on the unabashedly sectarian content of the meeting, which soon reverberated violently beyond its Cairo stadium venue. Mursi himself betrayed his sectarian outlook by denouncing the Assad regime as 'a Shi'i oppressor of Sunnis' rather than of all Syrian citizens (Macdonald and Fick 2013). Salafi preachers such as Muhammad Hassaan and Muhammad Abd al-Maqṣud underlined the 'necessity of declaring Jihad in Syria, in which Syrians and any capable Muslims shall

take part' (Ahram Online 2013a). Still more telling was Mursi's lack of reaction or subsequent action when these preachers, after denouncing the protests of 30 June, called on Mursi to bar Shi'i Muslims from Egypt, describing them as 'filth'. Later on, Salafi preacher Safwat Hegazi appeared to taunt Egypt's Coptic Patriarch Tawadrus III, addressing him repeatedly with the words 'Mursi is your president!' before elated revellers. Mursi sat listening impassively throughout. His spokesman Ahmed Arif observed: 'Throughout history, Sunnis have never been involved in starting a sectarian war' (Macdonald and Fick 2013).

This uncensored hate speech and incitement to violence (Human Rights Watch 2013) doubtless contributed to the boldness of the Salafi preachers in Zawiyat Abu Musallam. These men had kept up a longstanding anti-Shi'a campaign, using Friday prayer sermons to incite worshippers against their neighbours (Arab Network for Human Rights Information 2013). As Egyptian human rights investigators observed, there was no supervision by the Ministry of National Endowments of the goings-on in these gatherings (Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights 2013, Arab Network for Human Rights Information 2013). The decision to attack was taken just a few days after Mursi's stadium rally – as several Shi'i families gathered to mark a religious holiday. Acute state negligence peaked with the police's total disengagement from events, despite being stationed close by.

Certainly, there is a particular form of popular piety prevalent in Egypt today, which has meant that a wider mass of Egyptians – not only some self-professed Salafis – can respond to the incitement of sectarian entrepreneurs (Brown 2011). This mode of piety has been encouraged by the state but is not connected to clear institutional direction nor to stable sources. These men's motivations, their blocked social mobility and the disciplining practices to which they have been subject require separate investigation (Ismail 2000).

With the lives lost in sectarian violence in Egypt over the years and the upheavals that Mursi's popular impeachment has brought on Egypt, this chapter's concern has been with the question of wider responsibility. In June 2013, the presidency's lukewarm response to the anti-Shi'a attack was matched only by the tenor and brevity of the United States Embassy press release (Shorouk 2013, United States Embassy 2013). The same Salafi tele-preachers appeared to dance on the graves of the four Egyptians on live television in the aftermath and were not censured (Al-Nas Television 2013b). The investigation launched into the attack was no more effective than its antecedents, continuing to avoid carefully the critical matter of citizenship (Sedra 2013). Mursi's legitimacy, already paper-thin after the flawed transitional process, had withered to reveal a sectarian Islamism that excluded ever-larger swathes of his constituency and fuelled the violent tendencies of an increasingly audacious minority.

By 30 June 2013, that legitimacy was in tatters and Egyptian protesters carried banners that singled out both the Brotherhood and the United States for blame. As this chapter came to a close, the United States and its regional allies were now loudly acknowledged to be standing with counter-revolutionary Egyptian forces, even if from a distance, displaying the multiple levels and networks through which efforts persist to contain Egyptians' struggles to secure their full social, economic and political rights.

Note

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
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The European diaspora of Muslim migrants and the idea of Europe

Could they become Europeans by choice?

4: The European diaspora of Muslim migrants and the idea of Europe



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Euro-Islam, legal citizenship and “citizens of the heart”

In a historical long-term perspective Europe faces two competing options in the future. The first is the Europeanization of Islam in its European diaspora. This also requires that Europeans and Muslims living in Europe share a European identity as a sense of belonging to the same polity. The other option is the Islamization of Europe,¹ i.e. viewing it as a part of *dar al-Islam*, as some Muslims already do. This statement is neither a polemic nor is it a panic – let alone an expression of Islamophobia, as some contend. This is a realistic perspective based on the demographic growth of the Muslim diaspora community combined with self-assertive expansionist attitudes of leaders of the Islamic mosques, occurring simultaneously with a shrinking of European population – due to the low birth rate – and the spread of postmodern and self-denying fashions among European intellectuals. Those Europeans and Muslims engaged in identity politics in favor of immigrants are asked: Are you dealing with a Europe with no identity?² Migration is making Europe a battlefield³ between these competing options. My stand is against “clash” and I claim to be a mediator.

Introduction

The frame of reference employed here relates to the fourteenth-century Muslim philosopher Ibn Khaldun, who – as repeatedly stated – places the selfconsciousness, i.e. the *asabiyya/esprit de corps*, of a civilization as a criterion for its flourishing or decline.⁴ Europe’s image of itself seems, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, not to be a promising one. After having lived as a Muslim immigrant for four and a half decades in Europe, I claim to see a very weak European *asabiyya* replacing the earlier ugly Euro-centrism. This is a shift from one extreme to the other. I translate *asabiyya* as civilizational self-awareness. As a Muslim who is committed to freedom and rationality, and who fled the despotism and authoritarianism that is currently not only prevailing but spreading in the world of Islam, I do not like to see the political culture of Islamism establishing itself in the Islamic diaspora in Europe. This is happening through the espousal of the indiscriminate mindset of multi-culturalism. I see an Islamist neo-absolutism embracing a cultural relativism in order to put it to use. For the Islamic diaspora in Europe, I present Euro-Islam as an alternative to the vision of Islamization. This is based on the assumption that a Europeanization of Islam is a feasible project. To be sure, it can only be accomplished if change and religious reforms are admitted by Muslims.⁵

In Europe, anti-Americanism reinforces the popular perception that the Muslim contestation of the West, as articulated by violent actions inspired by the new Islamist

jihadism,⁶ is a revolt against US unilateralism and the *Pax Americana*. The facts of thriving self-ethnicization and the unfolding of an Islamic enclave within Europe are overlooked, as are the realities on the ground of Europe as a battlefield (see note 3). To put it succinctly and plainly: Europe faces equal challenges, both Islamic and Islamist. One is related to Islamic universalism and its proselytization, the other to political Islam and its jihadism, which is already established within the Islamic diaspora of Europe.⁷ In this context, I argue against polarization and suggest a Euro-Islam as a strategy for peace within Europe, to replace the exclusion which is inflicted by Europeans on Muslims and which contributes to their defensive response of self-ethnicization. The issue is wrongly presented in terms of a conflict between “communitarian multi-culturalism” and its critics, viewed as enemies. It is no such thing: it is a fight over the shape of Europe in the decades to come – Europeanization or Islamization.⁸

The rioting in the French suburbs, labeled *banlieues de l'Islam*,⁹ in October/ November 2005 was a warning which was not well taken either by the European Union, as a reminder of existing problems, or by the Islamic community, which was itself challenged. At issue was not only a revolt against exclusion, but also rebellion with a religionized character. It was a French intifada. After the rioting died down, for the French state and society it was business as usual, as if nothing had happened. Other Europeans remarked, in a self-congratulatory manner, that it was a French affair. However, well-informed experts were of the view that the Islam-based uprising of Paris, spilling over to other cities, showed challenging realities which cannot be managed within a security approach, as the then French minister Nicolas Sarkozy, then later elected into the office of president, repeatedly suggested. A policy based on the consequences of what is taking place on European soil needs to be much more than that.

If we take the idea of Europe at face value, i.e. as being based on a religion and ethnicity-blind secular civilizational identity, then a Europeanization of Islam should by no means be an adjustment to Christian values, as some German politicians repeatedly argue, with consequent damage to the integration of Muslims. Euro-Islam, institutionalized through educational channels and incorporated into a policy for integration endorsed by both civil society and the European Islamic diaspora, is in no way a copy of distorted Christianity in a Europe that fails to distinguish between secularization and profaneness – and this is not to speak of Europeans as “religious illiterates,” as a prominent German Jew, Michael Wolffsohn, has rightly suggested.

To understand those Muslim youngsters of the *banlieues* who torched some 12,000 cars while calling “Allahu Akbar,” thus clearly thinking of themselves as warriors waging jihad, Europeans need more knowledge of real existing Islam. The related allegation

that the uprising was socially determined and has nothing to do with Islam is useless for any strategy attempting to deal with the religionization of politics. Of course, in a short term perspective concrete measures are needed. But in order to make clear that jihad and shari'a are no alternatives to European law, a policy seems to be more promising than a policing – yet there is none in place. A surveillance of 20 million Muslim migrants living in Europe is neither possible nor recommendable. In the long term the message has to be both conciliatory and determined to maintain the identity of Europe. My concept of Euro- Islam as a value orientation for the Muslim diaspora claims to provide the strategic guidelines for integration.

The concept was first presented in Paris, where I coined the term “Euro- Islam.” I propose to specify its content and dissociate my understanding of Euro-Islam from the one propagated by Tariq Ramadan, the proud grandson of Hasan al-Banna. My own understanding has been well covered in the following quote from Time magazine of 24 December 2001. On page 49 of that issue one reads:

Bassam Tibi . . . who coined the term Euro-Islam, insists that the integration of Europe’s Muslims depends on the adoption of a form of Islam that embraces Western political values . . . “The options for Muslims are unequivocal,” says Tibi. “There is no middle way between Euro-Islam and a ghettoization of Muslim minorities.”

The concept goes back to 1992, when the French were about to abandon the illusion that the assimilation of immigrants could be achieved by drawing on a concept of integration restricted to an acceptance of the civic values of the republic. In this context I presented my paper “Les Conditions d’un Euro-Islam”¹⁰ at the Institut du Monde Arabe; it was also published in Paris to provide a framework for integration. In terms of documentation, this is the origin of the concept, which has been elaborated upon in my writings ever since in both German and English.

The idea of Europe, Euro-Islam, legal citizenship and “citizens of the heart”

The starting point is the changing composition of the European population; the demographic growth of Muslim immigrants is skyrocketing throughout Europe in comparison to migrations from other parts of the world. This is also related to the fact that these immigrants are mostly an ethnic underclass. The rioting of the banlieues de Paris in 2005 compels Europeans to see that they are under pressure to deal with this new Islamic element in their societies, as well as with the related social problems. One adds to this the Islamic claims that affect the identity of Europe itself. At issue is the question of whether the idea of Europe can be made compatible with Islam in a



cultural synthesis here called Euro-Islam.

In the present situation one encounters two extremes: the populist, unacceptable Islamophobic view on the one hand, and indiscriminate multi-culturalism, based on the cultural-relativist understanding of “anything goes,” on the other. In big European cities the realities reflect the emergence of parallel societies creating an Islamic enclave within the old continent. The assaults in a series of events stretching from Madrid to Amsterdam in 2004 and from London to Paris in 2005 clearly illustrate the relevance of Islam for the future of Europe. In line with this is also the conflict over the Mohammed cartoons in early 2006, followed by another dispute the same year over a lecture by the Pope calling for a dissociation of religion from violence. The lecture was viewed as offensive.

Throughout this chapter it is argued that a politics of integration that differs from both multi-culturalism and assimilation is the most pertinent strategy. In this pursuit, there is a need to combine civics with economics in order to make integration happen. By this I mean accomplishing a sharing of basic values by Europeans and Muslim immigrants, combined with integration in the workplace. The ongoing migration into the welfare system is not only deadly for Europe, it also precludes Muslim immigrants becoming true European “citizens of the heart,” i.e. sharing the civilizational identity of Europe.

It is most dismaying to see those Islamists and Salafist leaders of the Muslim community claiming “a place for Islam in Western society” (this is an aspect that European multi-culturalists fail to understand) while at the same time rejecting the call to embrace the “idea of Europe.” The mushrooming Islamic enclaves within Europe are challenged by the bid to make Muslims living in Europe true European “citizens of the heart.” Citizenship is much more than a passport: it is membership of a polity based on a culture of democracy and individual human rights.

It has to be candidly stated that the integration needed for Muslim immigrants to become European citizens cannot take place alongside claims that run counter to secular civil and open society. The related absolutist vision of Islamizing Europe, which for tactical reasons is not spelled out by Salafists and Islamists, is a strange bedfellow for a multi-culturalism based on the cultural relativism of “anything goes.” In contrast to this communitarianism, as well as to assimilation, an integration limited to civic values, shared identity and the workplace can be made compatible with a reformist interpretation of Islam through embracing the core principles of cultural modernity.¹¹

The background to the concept of Euro-Islam comes from my observations of customary – i.e. lived – Islam in Western Africa. There, Islam – though an Arab culture by origin – is basically African, just as in Indonesia it is Indonesian, accommodated to *adat*/traditions of local cultures. In non-Arab traditions of Islam, one encounters

varieties of cultural accommodation. There one may ask: Why cannot Islam be European in Europe, along similar lines? If Muslim immigrants are willing to leave their culturally gated enclaves in order to become European “citizens of the heart,” then they must be challenged to open themselves instead of being aliens and *muhajirun* – frankly speaking, migrants in the Islamic meaning of a proselytizing diaspora in the process of extending *dar al-Islam*.

To be sure, Europeans themselves are the other obstacle to the project in question. If they were honestly politically and socially inclusive – of course, beyond hubris and rhetoric: in other words, in practice – then integration could be accomplished. I lived as a Muslim in Europe for four decades, and this lived experience denies Europeans that honesty. The idea of Europe based on values of secular democracy, individual human rights, pluralism, civil society and the enlightenment culture of tolerance could be accommodated in a Euro-Islam consonant with cultural modernity. In the present situation, there can be no half-solutions for the competing options: either a “citizenship of the heart” or citizens by passport; not real members of civil society, but rather nominal Europeans living in enclaves, “in the West, but not of it,”¹² not only because of the lack of a will to integrate, but also because they are denied equality and membership in the polity – even if they cross the threshold related to Islam.

The existing obstacles related to Europeans by Muslims contribute to a thriving of an Islam diaspora existing in Europe, but not of it. The Islamic rioting in France back in fall 2005 could become the model for sidelined Muslim youth throughout Europe. On the occasion of the first anniversary of the assassination of Theo van Gogh by a jihadist Islamist, this threat was addressed by the political Dutch elite in dialogue with some enlightened Muslims under the heading “One Year On: Radicalization and Society’s Response.” There, as a keynote speaker, I again presented my concept of Euro-Islam, in which the starting point has been both normative and factual. The murderer of Theo van Gogh, the well-connected Islamist Mohammed Bouyeri, regarded his crime as the fulfilling of a religious duty against *kufir/unbelief*. After the execution of this jihadist duty, Bouyeri reiterated and reconfirmed this view throughout the trial, assuring the court that he had no remorse and would do the same again if he were to leave prison. To be sure, this is also the mindset of those who were torching cars in France in October/November 2005. The letter Bouyeri pinned to van Gogh’s body included the phrase: “Europe! It is now your turn.”

A deeper problem is related to tensions related to identity politics and based in a religionization of the conflict.¹³ Both Islam and Europe need to acknowledge the challenge, to accommodate and to change. It is wrong to put the blame either on Muslim immigrants or on Europeans; both are responsible for the existing state of affairs. There are Muslims who are willing to participate in the defense of civil society,

but there is a price Europeans must pay for this if they really want Muslim allies. For paving the way for Euro-Islam from a vision to reality, Europeans need to be inclusive, while Muslims in return need to be willing to become Europeans. If integration fails, then the radicalization taking place in the world of Islam will spill over to Europe. In fact, this process is already in place. Regrettably, time is running out for Europe and Europeans to continue to be blind and to turn deaf ears to burning issues. Europe needs a double-track strategy for dealing with Islam and Islamism: in general, on the one hand a dialogue with pro-democracy Muslims who are willing to abandon the jihadization and shari'atization of Islam in order to promote a Euro-Islam; and on the other hand, a security approach for dealing with Islamism and its jihadist branch.

For many reasons Europe attracts people from the world of Islam/*dar al-Islam*, who are currently pouring in. They come as legal and illegal alike, be it as asylum-seekers, refugees or simply guest workers. Among the attractions is prosperity, promising a better life. Others seek refuge for themselves on the continent, a home where they can be assured of human rights and the benefits of democracy, both lacking to varying degrees throughout the world of Islam. The question asked here is: Could these Muslims also be attracted by the idea of Europe and consequently become true Europeans? That is, can they become true "citizens of the heart" (Charles Maier of Harvard, see note 17 to Chapter 5) and not merely holders of European passports or people living at the fringe of society in their enclaves?

Throughout this chapter I criticize Europe but also defend its ideals, as I learned them from one of the major sources of inspiration, my late teacher Max Horkheimer. This great Jewish philosopher and social scientist established the Frankfurt School of thought, but was forced in 1933 to flee Germany in order to save his own life.¹⁴ He found refuge in the USA but in 1950 returned to Europe, remaining grateful to America until his dying day. For Horkheimer both Europe and the US constitute the pillars of Western civilization. The Jewish Horkheimer's plight in Nazi Germany and his legacy are highly pertinent to pro-democracy Muslims, who share with such Jews the suffering of exclusion and a love of the idea of Europe.

Shortly before his death in 1973, Horkheimer wrote, in the preface to his collected essays, what would remain an intellectual legacy of the Frankfurt School: "in terms of time and space Europe remains an island of freedom surrounded by an ocean of despotic rule/*Gewaltherrschaft*".¹⁵ He continued that it is "an obligation on those who subscribe to critical theory" to be committed to Europe as the West, and to defend it against all varieties of totalitarianism (*ibid.*). Indeed, this legacy should become a civilizational creed for all Europeans, if they wish their civilization well and want the idea of Europe to survive the present great challenges posed by Islam and Islamism; however, they need to make sure that those Muslims who accept democracy share it

too. In my view, as a pro-democracy Muslim and a European by choice, the contemporary jihadist Islamism, and its call for a world revolution to remake the world in a “revolt against the West,” incorporates the most recent variety of totalitarianism¹⁶ to be countered by all who are committed to the open society. Here, there can be no tolerance in the name of cultural diversity and multi-culturalism. The vision of a Europeanization of Islam presented in this chapter has been introduced with this reference to Horkheimer, my university teacher, to express my commitment to this *Vermačhtnis*/legacy of a European Jew who suffered the exclusion of Nazi Germany; in the same way, we Muslims living in Europe suffer exclusion from a democratic Europe, but are not quite open to the idea of Europe. In the present civilizational crisis there are Muslims and postmodern challenges to cultural modernity to be taken seriously. To be sure, I stand against civilizational fault-lines¹⁷ as much as I do against a postmodern, indifferent Europe. Self-congratulatory attitudes are not promising while dealing with Muslims and the related challenges. The starting point for the following reasoning is the reality that the combination in Europe of low birth rates, leading to demographic decline, and high migration rates, of people from non-European cultures, is clearly affecting European identity.¹⁸ But who can – and who will – change whom? Will Europe prove able to shape the incoming migration through the strength of its own identity – in Ibn Khaldunian terms, its *asabiyah*, albeit enhanced by inclusiveness – or will it be the migrants who shape Europe by imposing their own identity upon it? To reiterate the option expressed earlier: will we see their Europeanization or an Islamization of Europe?

Between Islamization and Europeanization

Is Islam changing the identity of Europe? A project at Berkeley, University of California, was suggested by the title “Islam and the Changing Identity of Europe.” Is this appropriate for dealing with the issue? Statistically one can state that more than 50 per cent of the non-Europeans currently heading to Europe come from the world of Islam. Between 1950 and 2000, the number of Muslims in Western Europe rose from 800,000 to 15 million. It is now 20 million. German figures acknowledge that 20 per cent of the German population are people with *Migrationshintergrund* – they are not ethnic Germans. Can harmony be established between the immigrants and the Europeans, or will tensions be the outcome, with a religionized fight over the future shape of Europe? This will depend on the potential for an unfolding of a European Islam, or Euro-Islam. Of course, Muslims have the right to freedom of religion, but they have no right to an Islamization of Europe, for Europe – even though it has become home to 20 million Muslims – has its own European identity and is not a subject for remapping in a global *dar al-Islam*. Europeanization of Islam is the antithesis to the Islamization of Europe. Muslims living in Europe and Europeans themselves are exposed to these options.

Lawrence Harrison, who spent decades studying poverty in Latin America, coined the phrase “underdevelopment is a state of mind” to refer to a cultural attitude, and concluded that “culture matters.”¹⁹ In a similar vein I argue that belonging to a particular civilization is also a state of mind. Some civilizations have been able to develop a modernity, like Europe, and therefore Europe is “a beautiful idea”²⁰ even though corresponding realities in European societies are not fully in line with this civilizational project. Others, like the Islamic civilization, continue to have difficulties with modernity. The politicization of Islam is an expression of this predicament.²¹

The term “a beautiful idea” as used to refer to Europe was coined during the Dutch presidency of the European Union in 2004. A related project turned the slogan into a question: “Europe – A Beautiful Idea?” In a meeting that took place in Rotterdam, none of the participating Europeans was publicly ready to profess willingness to sacrifice for Europe. This is the prevailing European mindset. So, how could one expect Muslims living in Europe to agree to Europeanization as consent to the civilizational identity of Europe?

On these grounds one sees a Moroccan Islamist killing an “infidel” in the name of Islamic law/shari'a as an act of jihad and issuing a warning for Europe, while Europeans either talk about a “clash of civilizations” or belittle the issue in a mindset of appeasement. In going beyond this impasse it is possible to contribute to “preventing the clash of civilizations” by establishing a cross-cultural international morality inspired by the pluralist idea of Europe. However, it would be foolish to overlook the existing conflict. It is possible to address the conflict, and not to be silent about it in the name of a political correctness of cultural-relativist multi-culturalism, while equally subscribing to “the sound of Europe.” This is the Mozart theme coined at a subsequent EU presidency, that of Austria in 2006. I was sad to see, at the celebration in Salzburg, that only a few politicians were honestly willing to acknowledge the place of Islam in their project. Is the conclusion that there is no hope for Europe? No hope for the Europeanization of Islam on European soil – that is, its integration within an inter-civilizational dialogue? And of course, an honest dialogue, not like Khatami's camouflaging of global jihad into European civilization. In the present conflict, Europeans are challenged to engage in defending Western civilization by taking a stand.²²

The contemporary predicament of Islam to come to terms with modernity stands in contrast to the rationalism of Islamic heritage. An unfolding of guidelines for a combination of Europe and Islam within a Euro-Islamic identity is a model of Europeanization that could contribute to making the increasing Muslim population of Europe accept the “idea of Europe” in an age of global migration combined with a “cultural turn.” Collective identity politics is leading to entrenching communities as

separate from one another, not only globally but also within Europe. Europeanization does not contradict cultural diversity, which is precious, but it needs to be addressed – as in a famous Amsterdam debate a decade ago – within the framework of “the limits of pluralism.” In the framework of the controversy that developed between relativism and neo-absolutism,²³ Islam, in its radical forms of Salafist orthodoxy and totalitarian Islamism, was addressed as an antipluralist ideology. If those spokesmen for the Islamic diaspora in Europe who control most of the mosques and are either Salafists or radical Islamists embrace this anti-pluralist ideology in the name of cultural diversity, as they do, then one must have the right to say “No!”

The envisioned mapping of Europe into the dar al-Islam is, in other words, the Islamization of Europe. This is not only done through proselytization, but also through the spreading of a worldview among the Muslim diaspora that is in contrast to the idea of Europe. There is clearly a conflict between this worldview of neo-absolutism and the pluralist idea of Europe, often phrased in politically correct language as a cultural misunderstanding. It is most disturbing to see this orthodox Salafist and Islamist challenge facing up to a European worldview of cultural relativism which denies Europe the very civilizational identity it needs to try and stay alive. To argue in a relativist manner that European culture is – on European soil – merely one among others is self-defeating. Yes, the migrants have their own culture, but in this case it is not a valid one for Europe. Collective identity politics becomes an instrument against the civilizational identity of Europe itself. In this context, relativism, when exposed to neo-absolutism, is certain to be the worldview of the loser, because it does not defend itself against challenges and threats. The French scholar Raymond Aron was among the very few who foresaw that the era of “bipolarity” in world affairs concealed the reality of a world consisting of a “heterogeneity of civilizations.”²⁴ He rightly predicted that bipolarity would end and that this true vision would be revealed. Aron did not live long enough to see the materialization of his prediction, which we are currently witnessing.

It is clear that, today, peace means a peace among civilizations, not only in the world at large but also within Europe, with its emerging cultural diversity. How can such a peace be achieved while the idea of Europe is still maintained, and what is the necessary framework? In earlier times, there were obvious civilizational boundaries, e.g. between Europe and Islam, and in those days the Mediterranean²⁵ marked such a boundary. However, global migration is blurring these territorial boundaries.²⁶ As John Kelsay put it, one is “forced to speak not simply of Islam and the West, but of Islam in the West.”²⁷ It matters, therefore, that we make it clear which Islam we are talking about. Is it a European Islam, an indigenous version of Islam such as those that have evolved in Senegal or the many varieties existing in Indonesia, like the one in Java? No. Kelsay tells us that at issue here – as already quoted – are sectarian “enclaves in Western culture, but not of it”²⁸ – in other words, parallel societies.²⁹ To conceptualize the change, in

the Global Village Lecture held in Stockholm 1997, I coined the slogan: “Islam and Europe – Islam in Europe.” This is not playing with words, but rather a way of maintaining that these are two different issues. The interaction between these civilizations is in our case no longer restricted to an activity spanning the Mediterranean; rather, it exists under conditions of Islamic migration within Europe itself. What are the implications for Europe? What policies are needed? Should we conduct a dialogue in the name of multicultural tolerance at the expense of European identity? If we talk about cross-civilizational bridges, what should they look like?

To be sure, any dialogue can only be successful if the needed requirements are fulfilled and it has its limits and constraints. It seems clear that one cannot carry out a dialogue with individuals like Mohammed Bouyeri and similarly minded Islamists, who – as well as their movements – only understand the language of jihad. Their understanding of the politics of the “sacred” is neoabsolutist in nature. They envision the Islamization of Europe.

In contrast, a moderate Islam open to change and also open to Europe could help achieve the dual goal of being inclusive while preserving Europe’s identity. Here, we have to set clear terms and they need to spell out what is European. At stake is a stark choice: either the Europeanization of Islam or the Islamization of Europe (see note 1). The middle road of multi-culturalism, a vision of two different worlds expected to live peacefully side by side in Europe, is a deception. For Islamists and their allies, multi-cultural communitarianism is only one transitory step on the road to Islamization. This is not my view, but rather the way neo-absolutists themselves view the issue. It is a state of mind that relativists fail to understand.

Let us refer to the Netherlands as a case in point. In his “Dutch Diary,” published as a series in *Die Welt*, the Dutch writer Leon de Winter first cites Recep Tayyip Erdogan: “Europe has no other option, than either opening itself freely to Islam, i.e. through accession of Turkey under AKP-rule to EU, or involuntarily through exposure to extremist jihadist violence.”³⁰ Leon de Winter then goes on to state that we need to have the courage

to educate our Muslim fellow citizens in tolerance, individualism and the rights and duties of modern citizenry. But instead of fulfilling this task, we succumb to illusions of multi-culturalism, which paralyzes Europe ... In the Netherlands, as well as throughout Europe, the pressure of intolerance on our tolerance is increasing ... we must ask ourselves what we want to be and what we are willing to sacrifice for this end.

(ibid.)

In fact, Leon de Winter speaks – of course unwittingly – in the language of the great

Muslim fourteenth-century philosopher Ibn Khaldun, the first theorist in the history of humankind to write on civilization/*umran*.³¹ In his science of civilization/*ilm al-umran* Ibn Khaldun argues that the civilizational awareness of the self is expressed in *asabiyya*. This Arabic term can be translated as “esprit de corps,” summarized in a system of values and norms and the related worldview: *asabiyya* is thus the identity of each civilization. Ibn Khaldun argues that civilizations are strong when they are based on a strong *asabiyya* and weaken in general alongside the weakening of their *asabiyya*. In reviving this Ibn Khaldunian understanding, I view the idea of Europe as the *asabiyya* of the European civilization. Can it be extended to and shared by Muslim migrants, or is it so weak that it will succumb to Islamization? On an individual level I can say that many Muslims have succeeded in becoming Europeans by choice. I believe myself to be one of these, while experiencing the fact that European societies do not appreciate this move and continue to lack the ability to be inclusive. In fact, this is in contrast to the idea of Europe and cannot be the basis for a Euro-Islamic *asabiyya*.³² It is not only Muslims but also Europeans who need to change if the conflict is to be solved peacefully to make a shared polity possible.

I conclude this section with a reference to the great philosopher Ernst Bloch’s book on Islamic rationalism based on an enlightenment in Hellenized Islam, *Avicenna und die Aristotelische Linke*. In doing so, I argue that the “idea of Europe” can be incorporated into the concept of Euro-Islam in an effort to bridge two civilizationally different worlds. The identity of Europe – which, despite ugly European attitudes, I see as also my own identity, as a citizen of Europe by choice and a “citizen of the heart” – is based on freedom and democracy and individual human rights. Therefore, the idea of citizenship/*citoyennete*’ is not restricted to a legal status, and as such it must include the demand for commitment. One cannot be Arab or Turk by choice, because this is an ethnic identity. But a Muslim, Turk or Arab could, by embracing the idea of Europe, become a true European citizen. This is an assumption which I state without any sense of naïvité: I know that the idea of Europe is not in line with everyday life in European societies. If Europeans do not change, they risk the Islamization of Europe.

The pending issues

To state it plainly: the basic issue is the fact that Islamic migration is changing the identity of Europe, and not only in a positive way. I contrast two options, a vision of Euro-Islam and a communitarian ghettoization expanding in parallel societies. The assumption that Islamic migration is changing the identity of Europe is based on Islamic claims that are not consonant with the idea of Europe. Islamists and Salafists have another vision for Europe. As a Muslim migrant myself, though a European citizen by value-orientation, I seek a compromise between the competing assertions of a European identity and of an Islamic identity. The idea of a multiple identity determines

the concept of Euro-Islam, inspired both by the idea of Europe and by the historical experience of the Hellenization of Islam in the better days of Islamic civilization. This normative orientation takes as a starting point the reality that Islamic migrants are caught between those Islamists who abuse them in an effort to confront the secular state and those Islamophobic Europeans who do not give Islam a chance to become European. This conflict is also reflected in the French debate following the release of the report on church-state relations with a focus on the Islamic head-scarf issue in France. This report makes clear that accepting *lai‘cite* is the bottom line for the integration of Muslim migrants in France. At issue, therefore, is the idea of a Europe in which *lai‘cite* is part and parcel, and not simply a way of clothing oneself. The controversy highlights – as Elaine Sciolino phrases the issue in the *New York Times* – “the challenges that secular France – like much of Europe – faces in coming to grips with Islam … organized groups are testing the secular French state.”³³

This test is also a test of the idea of Europe and of the strength of the European *asabiyya*. Clearly, a civilization conflict is at issue. As Nilu“ fer Go“ le puts it, “the contemporary veiling of Muslim women underscores the insurmountability of boundaries between Islamic and Western civilization … as a contemporary emblem for the Islamicization … the conflictual encounter between civilizations.”³⁴ But I reiterate my own standpoint that I do not subscribe to a Huntingtonian point of view, and refer to my contribution to *Preventing the Clash of Civilizations*.³⁵ In this chapter I therefore renew my proposition of Euro-Islam presented in Paris a decade and half ago, but do so by incorporating it into the venture of “Europe: A Beautiful Idea?” without overlooking the ugly part of it. In their dealings with Islam and Europe in the age of mass migration, Europeans resent having to acknowledge the basic issue with both civilizations, namely the values-related conflicts, while Muslims stress their basing of “values” in Islamic culture, often viewed as an essentialized civilizational monolithic identity. Again, in my discourse I emphasize the need for opening an inter-civilizational dialogue beyond essentialization as means of conflict resolution. The rhetoric of a clash between Islam and Europe is not helpful for Europeans or for Muslims in dealing with this issue. Islam’s difficulty with cultural modernity, of which pluralism³⁶ is part and parcel, is a basic issue. There is a lack of willingness on the Islamic side to be involved in such a discourse, going beyond the cult of self-victimization. On the European side there is in fact very little beyond the rhetoric of dialogue endorsed as a substitute for the alternative rhetoric of “clash.” Neither sentiment is helpful in the pursuit of a cross-cultural consensus over values of the political culture of democracy. I respect “difference,” but – unlike Seyla Ben-Habib³⁷ – I unequivocally put political democracy above it in my concept of pluralism (see note 36). It is, however, unacceptable to stop short at acknowledging that there are entrenched differences. Clearly, cultural relativists who essentialize “difference” fail to provide any prescriptions for dealing

with the conflict. In this case the conflict arising from this difference is between *laïcité* and shari'a and it can be resolved in a concept of Euro-Islam.³⁸ However, if this cannot be accomplished, the two parties cannot exist side by side in Europe if European identity is to be maintained and Muslims insist on shari'a. In this regard I share the view of Ernest Gellner in his criticism on cultural relativism, which I will return to later. It suffices to note here that cultural relativists conspicuously accept cultural differences without any limitations, and in so doing even admit neo-absolutisms (see note 23). Yet they apply their cultural relativism only to Western values and stop short of proceeding in a similar manner with non-Western cultures. The winners in the game are the absolutists aiming at shari'a. Moreover, any critique of these mostly pre-modern cultures³⁹ is often misconceived and qualified as a "cultural racism." Such an accusation is of course belied by the fact that Muslims are not a race but an *umma*/religious community, multi-racial and, characterized by tremendous diversity.

Interestingly, the rampant drive to employ relativist concepts does not halt even in those cases in which such a critique comes from people belonging to these very cultures – e.g. Islamic reformers and secularists. As a Muslim scholar who – according to the authoritative history of Damascus – descends from a centuries-old Muslim-Damascene notable family (Banu al-Tibi) but who lives as a migrant in Europe, I maintain that the present attitudes of self-victimization and accusation on the Islamic side and selfaccusation and self-denial on the European side are inappropriate ways for dealing with "difference" as related to Islamic migration to Europe. One must ask, then, whether Europe and Islam could come to terms with one another while maintaining a European-inclusive *asabiyya* that can be shared by Muslim migrants. The context of the Muslim– European encounter is the time and space set by Europe itself. It follows that Europe itself is exposed to the effects of globalization, i.e. to the process Europe itself has set in motion through European expansion.⁴⁰ In our age, migration to Europe has unwittingly become a component of this very globalization.

In facing the challenges related to "difference," the idea of "remaking the club" has emerged. The phrase refers to needed changes in the identity of the hitherto exclusive "Club of Europe." Even though I agree with this demand, I strongly feel the need to add that the "remaking" encompasses the need for all members of the club, old and new, i.e. including the migrants, to change their identity. I find this insight missing in some of the pleas for attitudinal change.⁴¹ The call for a de-ethnicization of European identity must equally apply to the identity of the migrants, lest we find ourselves dealing with both a "one-way change" and a "one-way tolerance." I share the view expressed in a French report of December 2003 that France has "no other choice" than prevention when facing "groups seeking to test and undermine core values" (*International Herald Tribune*, 12 December 2003). Likewise, the idea of Europe should be the bottom line in finding a solution for the future of Europe itself. Europe is changing in the light of

migration, so why shouldn't Muslims also accommodate to the civilization giving them home?

In embracing the typology of Manuel Castells concerning identity-building, I would like to single out his ideal type of "project identity," by which he means that identity is not primordial but determinable. This pattern explores the idea that social actors need to "build a new identity that redefines their position in society ... No identity can be an essence."⁴² Among the basic issues is the call upon Europeans to de-ethnicize and de-essentialize their identity to allow the newcomers to become Europeans too. To the same extent, Muslim migrants are requested to redefine their identity in the diaspora by adding a European component to it, in approaching a multiple identity. There is no such thing as an essential identity, be it European or Islamic.

One cannot escape the observation that Islamists and Salafists claim to live in Europe but with the firm belief that they do not want and do not have to change. This attitude is not reconcilable with the idea of Europe if European civilization is to survive in an age of global migration. Moreover, the cited Muslim belief demonizes and deprives Europe of its own identity. To be sure, despite its Muslim population, Europe is not *dar al-Islam*.

In the age of migration, Europe needs to overcome its Euro-arrogance, while Muslim migrants must engage themselves in the unfolding patterns of a Euro-Islamic identity by abandoning their universalist absolutism. In so doing, they could establish a commonality between themselves and European civilization while recognizing the idea of Europe, in order to become citizens of the heart. As a starting point, I view the de-ethnicization of Europe on the European side and religious-cultural reforms on the Muslim side as basic requirements for the feasibility of the Euro-Islam project. The idea of Europe provides an opening for this venture. Are Muslims willing to adjust their cultural identity in a more flexible manner along these lines?

In short, the requirement of change and the challenge to both to redefine identity are the pending issues. As much as one should overcome stereotypes about Islam, one must recognize that it is equally wrong to essentialize Europe as "racist," "genocidal," etc. To essentialize Islam in an Islamophobic manner is as wrong as doing the same to the West. Europe and the world of Islam are two established civilizations with centuries-old records that equally encompass enmity and cordiality.⁴³ In this regard the dichotomies built up on this legacy – such as those of East versus West – are based on "artificial categories," as Nezar Al-Sayyad rightly argues. He adds that "societies are constructed in relation to one another and are ... perceived through the ideologies and narratives of situated discourse."⁴⁴ When it comes to the construction of identities – as based on the production of meaning – academics need to free themselves from their "preoccupation with globalization" in acknowledging that "each individual belongs to

many cultures and people have multiple cultural identities . . . Identity is always under construction and in constant evolution.”⁴⁵ My vision of a Euro-Islamic multiple identity as a new *asabiyya* for Muslim migrants in Europe is developed along lines that question constructed dichotomies – however, without overlooking existing value conflicts related to the entrenched differences and, of course, subsequent limits. It cannot be reiterated enough that if Muslims are really willing to become Europeans by embracing the idea of Europe, they need to disconnect their understanding of Islam from jihad and shari‘a and also abandon the *da‘wa*/proselytization. Moreover, this disconnecting should not only be *stated* unequivocally but also *practiced*, as these concepts are unacceptable in Europe.

Living across cultures produces cross-cultural meanings and affects identity patterns. In the context of Islamic migration to Europe, I envisage an identity affected by the concept of Euro-Islam. This concept was first introduced at the Institut du Monde Arabe in Paris and I have since developed it on various occasions at several European and international institutions from Stockholm to Sydney to Berkeley. Euro-Islam also applies to Euro-Turkish relations, and in this regard the integration of Turkish migrants to Europe⁴⁶ is a case in point. To be sure, I strongly differentiate between integration and assimilation, and thus these concepts constitute the prescriptive part of my analysis of the Islamic presence in Europe as creating a basic challenge to the idea of Europe.

The term “New Islamic Presence”⁴⁷ has been coined to describe the increasing contemporary migration from Muslim countries to Western Europe. By the end of the Second World War there were fewer than one million Muslim people living in Western Europe, with the majority in France and the United Kingdom. By 2000 the figure had risen to 15 million, in 2006 to 20 million, and it is expected to reach 40 million by 2035. Muslim migrants now live in virtually all European societies, from Scandinavia in the north to Italy in the south, and with their increasing numbers and presence they are beginning to make demands that touch on European core values. People like Bernard Lewis predict that Europe will become a part of the Arab-Muslim Maghreb by the end of this century. I contradicted this view,⁴⁸ arguing that the problem is not whether a majority of immigrants pouring to Europe believe in Islam as a religion. Rather, what is important is the question of what kind of Islam they adhere to. If European Islam were to be accepted by Muslims living in Europe, then their presence in Europe would not pose a problem, because a Euro-Islam would be in line with the idea of Europe.

In discussing these issues one should also not forget that there are native European Muslims⁴⁹ who live predominantly in southeast Europe and number around 10 to 12 million. In view of the focus of the present analysis on Western Europe, I shall set aside this native Muslim-European community and concentrate on Muslim immigrants to EU

countries from the Middle East, Asia and Africa. It may sound strange to Americans to see Muslims born in France, the United Kingdom or in Germany addressed in this analysis as immigrants rather than natives. The reason for doing this is the fact that second and even third generations of Muslim migrants to Europe are still not accepted as belonging to the existing polity. In stating this unfortunate reality, I acknowledge and reiterate that Europeans are also responsible for this lack of integration.⁵⁰ The issue is not simply related to Muslim problems with the idea of Europe.

Now we need first to deconstruct the phrase “Muslims in Europe” by looking at the migrant community in a dis-aggregative manner – that is, as a community that is both ethnically multifaceted and also divided along sectarian lines. Only on the surface can one speak of one Muslim diaspora in Europe. Muslims living in France were and still are predominantly migrants from the Maghreb,⁵¹ whereas those living in the United Kingdom remain largely from South Asia (Pakistan, India and Bangladesh). Until the early 1960s, the Muslim presence in these European states was almost exclusively related to French colonial rule in North Africa and to British colonial rule on the Indian subcontinent. In addition, the sectarian divide among these Muslims is decisive: The Muslim Sunni community in the German state of Hessen, for instance, in its application for recognition as an institution refuses to view Shi'ites, Alevi, Ahmadis and others as Muslims, i.e. members of their community of faith. This attitude discloses a rejection of diversity and pluralism even within Islam. So how can one expect such people to recognize other faiths within a broader concept of religious pluralism?

In 1950 fewer than one million Muslims lived in Europe. Since the 1960s, Islamic migration has been growing ever more significantly, due to labor migration linked to the once booming European economies. West European countries are today home to about 20 million Muslims. Due to the low birth rates and the related demographic growth, West European countries other than France and the United Kingdom (e.g. Germany) started to encourage people from the Mediterranean region to come to Western Europe to earn their living. This process received a further boost from the loosening of border controls after the end of the Cold War. Despite its magnitude, this new migration did not change traditional European attitudes. In Germany, for example, the majority of workers – not only the Turks, but also South and South-East Europeans working in German factories – were perceived as *Gastarbeiter*/guest workers, i.e. people coming for a limited stay that would end when the need for their work no longer existed. Germany has been a country of reluctant immigration,⁵² even after the legislation of a new law admitting migration. It has become common for critically minded Germans to state, with equal parts prudence and repentance: “We have imported labor and have overlooked the fact that we were importing human beings.” But by then, sarcastic and cynical jokes were already being tossed around, and accusing fingers pointed at the Germans as stingy people who would invite people as

Gäste/guests but would make them *Gastarbeiter/guest workers*, thereby neglecting accepted manners of hospitality according to which hosts do not require their guests to work, let alone carry out unskilled, physical “*Drecksarbeit/dirty work*.” To be sure, there were and still are academic *Gastarbeiter*, like me. My life in German academia reflects this unpleasant experience of discrimination.⁵³ Indeed, were Germany the sole criterion for the idea of Europe, I would never embrace it. Sadly, this background promotes the growth of political Islam in the German Muslim community of about 4 million (2.5 million of whom are Turks and Kurds). Among its powerful representatives we find largely Islamists and other extremists,⁵⁴ although they play a double game of pretending to be moderate, at least in their rhetoric.

The earlier social-democratic/green German coalition government expressed its open-mindedness in legislating the new citizenship law in 2000. However, in their politics almost all German parties intrinsically continue to confuse the complex understanding of integration with the simple granting of a German passport. Theo van Gogh’s slaying by a Moroccan Islamist with a Dutch passport has served as a wake-up call in the Netherlands, but not in Germany. Citizenship/*citoyenneté* ‘means more than receiving a passport: it must resemble membership of a special club, one with rules. These rules should be based on the idea of Europe and inclusiveness. Accordingly, becoming a European requires above all the willingness to be a “citizen of the heart” and, in return, to be accepted as such by fellow Europeans.

Among the pending issues to be seriously taken into account is the one of the imposed Imams. These either come from within Islamist groups or are appointed by Muslim governments like those of Turkey and Morocco. Even Saudi Arabia is having considerable impact through providing petrodollar funds for appointing Imams in Germany in Saudi-funded mosques, despite the fact that there are no Saudi migrants in the country. In this regard, Germany is the most extreme case. For instance, the Saudi-funded Fahd Academy in Bonn has over the years educated some 500 young Muslims in Wahhabi Islam and thus serves to directly undermine any efforts at integration. Despite powerful press coverage about calls for jihad against the West stemming from this “academy” (*Der Spiegel*, 13 October 2003) there was not enough concern to get this madrasa on European soil closed down. It is clear, though, that if the Imams preaching in European mosques continue to be powerful, the vision of a European Islam will never flourish. An abandonment of the “anything goes” mentality of multi-culturalism is needed as much as an end of Saudi Wahhabi poison in Europe.

Does Europe respond to the Islamist challenge beyond security?

Does it engage in embracing Euro-Islam?

Among the migrants coming as asylum-seekers to Europe we find those militant Muslims who relate migration to the religious obligation of *hijra*, to be discussed below. This is in contrast to most of the first-generation Muslims, who, like the Europeans themselves, did not view the “presence of Muslims in Europe” as a lasting phenomenon related to migration. Ultimately, however, their continuing long stay and the fact that a second and, by now, third generation of Muslims have been born, are changing not only attitudes but also perceptions. What is the identity of these Muslims, born in Europe but not committed to the idea of Europe? Should it be admissible to acquire European citizenship without accepting the identity that comes along with it? I have observed that Turks born in Germany are disliked in Turkey as *allemani* (meaning something negative, like “Germanized”), but are at the same time not considered to be Germans in the country where they were born and where they live permanently. Thus they are torn between Turkey and Germany. This notion applies also to others. The complexities of this type of inner conflict were addressed at an international conference on migration held in Sydney, Australia, in July/August 1998 under the heading, “Adventures of Identity.”⁵⁵ Given the fact that the interrelation of identity and migration has been dealt with elsewhere, the focus of this chapter will be on the competing options for future strategies concerning the risks and the opportunities related to Muslim migration to Western Europe as it increasingly poses a challenge to the idea of Europe.

In honoring the fact that Muslims living in Europe⁵⁶ are there to stay and thus are not temporary residents, my first question concerns the status of the current 20 million Muslim immigrants living in Europe. At the outset it is important to know that there are basically three major and comparable groups among them. The first of these are the Muslim Turks and Kurds, who number around four million, with 2.5 million living in Germany alone. The second group are the Maghrebians, with more than ten million in Europe, about eight million of whom are in France. A study on this second group carries the appropriate title “Algeria in France.” The final group is made up of the South Asians, who are found predominantly in the United Kingdom, where their number is around two million, but a total of a few million can be found in all other European countries. It is most interesting and profitable to engage in comparative studies on this subject.⁵⁷ The figures show that Muslim immigrants to Europe come from all over the world of Islam. In the city of Frankfurt, 30 per cent of the city dwellers are foreigners who carry the passports of 165 different states. Among them, representatives from virtually every Muslim country worldwide can be found.

The Muslim diaspora in Europe is characterized by two traits. On the one hand there is an ethnicized Islam vis-a-vis European societies, claiming unity; on the other hand,

however, ethnic and sectarian divides among Muslim migrants are most clearly reflected in the structures of the mosques. In Germany religious associations (*Moscheevereine*) are not purely Islamic, but rather Sunni or Shi'ite, Turkish, Bosnian, Arab or Pakistani, or perhaps divided between Ahmadi and Sunni, but almost always divided along ethnic and sectarian lines. Apart from the rhetoric of an overall Islam ethnicized in confrontation with Europe, one very rarely finds comprehensive Islamic mosques or associations. Most worrying is the politicization of this divide and the inter-Islamic violence involved. What is the European response? In the Netherlands, after van Gogh's death the Dutch people and a few others have started to look at the *Innenleben der Moscheen*⁵⁸ and have begun to see them as representing something not just in contrast to the idea of Europe but vehemently opposed to it. However, in Scandinavia and in Germany people continue to carry on as usual. Among the few exceptions is the German journalist Udo Ulfkotte, who published a book on the German Islamic diaspora entitled *Der Krieg in unseren Staedten* – "The War in Our Cities"⁵⁹ – in which he describes Islamist activities. He paid a high price for his disclosures. He was taken to court by supposed Islamists (who were mostly living on welfare payments; the German welfare state paid most of the legal expenses) and as a result his life was ruined. Those he exposed in his investigations remain active and thriving. What are the prospects for a Euro-Islam under these unfavorable conditions? Sadly, not promising!

Though I am respectful of Islam's capacity to adjust to a variety of divergent cultures and I remain hopeful, I acknowledge that the identity of culturally different people of Islam who nevertheless share the very same religious faith creates some obstacles. We may talk therefore about the simultaneity of unity and diversity in Islam. However, in considering the fact of existing Afro-Islam for African Muslims and Indo-Islam for Indian Muslims, I ask why we can't talk about the feasibility of a Euro-Islam in the context of the migration of Muslims to Western Europe.

What exactly would such a concept comprise? In Euro-Islam I address the effort of devising a liberal variety of Islam acceptable both to Muslim migrants and to European societies, thus an Islam that can accommodate the ideas of Europe, ideas including secularism and individual citizenship along the lines of a modern secular democracy. Yet I reiterate that Euro-Islam is the very same religion of Islam as exists anywhere. In the case of Europe, however, it is culturally adjusted to the civic culture of modernity.⁶⁰ In European civil societies an "open Islam" could be as much at home as – for instance – Islam in Africa (Afro-Islam), which is adjusted to coexist with domestic African cultures. The major features of the concept of Euro-Islam would include laïcité, cultural modernity, and an understanding of tolerance that goes beyond the Islamic tolerance restricted to Abrahamic believers (*ahl al-kitab*). In addition, Euro-Islam acknowledges cultural and religious pluralism and thus gives up on the claim of Islamic dominance, which is, in any case, out of touch with reality. In sum, Euro-Islam is

compatible with liberal democracy, individual human rights and the requirements of a civil society. Therefore, Euro-Islam departs from *citoyennite* and thus represents a contrast to communitarian politics that result in ghettoization. It is important to note that the politics of unfolding patterns of Euro-Islam should in no way be equated with assimilation. The integration is limited to the adoption of the civic culture of civil society, resulting in a variety of Islam addressed here as Euro-Islam. Thus I am speaking out in favor of an enlightened and open-minded Islamic identity that would be compatible with European civic culture. In line with this thinking, it is pleasing to see that the French are now using the term “integration” and no longer “assimilation”; in other words, they are limiting the understanding of Europeanization to meaning the acceptance of civic rights for becoming European “citizens of the heart.”

As a student of Europe and the potential of Europeanization by choice, I am aware of the fact that the “beautiful idea” of Europe is much more than a civic culture. Art too is a part of *das Schoene*/the beautiful. Acceptance of the European civic culture that determines a person as an individual is the bottom line. This civic culture is not negotiable and not compatible with the Islamic law of shari'a.⁶¹ Here lies the “challenge,” both to Muslims and to Europeans. Mohammed Bouyeri killed Theo van Gogh because he was a *kafir*/unbeliever. Years ago, Salman Rushdie was denied basic human rights in the name of the shari'a and some Europeans asked for tolerance. Euro-Islam is simply a proposition for a response driven by a commitment to individual human rights, to be demanded of Muslims living in Europe as a kind of a Euro-Islamic *asabiyya* shared by Europeans and Islamic immigrants.

In light of the demographically increasing Muslim community in Europe, the option of Euro-Islamic political integration as a response to this challenge should be taken seriously. The proposition here is that Muslims become members of the European body politic they live in, without giving up their Islamic identity or rejecting the identity of Europe. To be sure, the Islamic identity of Muslim migrants needs first to be compatible with a European identity related to the idea of Europe. The reader is reminded of the earlier debate and of the fact that both identities, European and Muslim, are changable and not to be essentialized. Citizenship issues ought to be placed within this framework. Enlightened Islamic education is a means of maintaining an Islamic identity, but not if it serves segregationist ends. Neither imported Salafist and Islamist Imams nor the cultural relativists of multi-culturalism are friends to the idea of Europe. I repeat the reference to Ernest Gellner who puts it this way:

Logically, the religious fundamentalists are of course also in conflict with the relativists ... In practice this confrontation is not so very much in evidence ... The relativists direct their attacks only at those within their own enlightened tradition, but play down ... religious fundamentalism.⁶²



It follows that not only the totalitarian Islamists, but also those European cultural-relativist multi-culturalists are no friends of the open society or the idea of Europe related to it.

Back to Islam and the idea of Europe: commonalities and disagreements in a historical perspective

Euro-Mediterranean relations reveal a centuries-long history of all kinds of civilizational interaction. Migration is now changing this pattern in a way that has led a prominent American student of Islam, John Kelsay, to raise the following question: "The rapidity of Muslim immigration ... suggests that we may soon be forced to speak not simply of Islam and, but of Islam in the West. What difference will this make?"⁶³ It is sad to see that the differences between Muslims and Europeans based on cultural divergences are becoming an inter-European issue of conflict, while earlier commonalities are sidelined. Basically, migration as a basic concern is bringing these differences in worldviews to the fore within the framework of gated communities in Europe. In public speech, these conflicts are often obscured and even denied, often presented as a misunderstanding. It is important that, in going beyond the censorship of dictatorial political correctness to address impending and real issues, we lean towards reconciliation, aiming not to antagonize divergent views but to talk about them clearly and without concealing them. Only in this manner can we put ourselves in a position where we realize how foolish it is to deny the existing cultural differences and the conflicts they engender.

In Europe, Islam's importance for the West lies in its being a close neighbor. In this regard, there is a shift through migration from Islam to the West and also to Europe. In this new situation there is a need to deal with persistent commonalities between both civilizations in a new manner. As John Kelsay puts it:

Perhaps such commonalities serve, in the main, to indicate the nature of disagreement between the West and Islam ... But there should be no doubt that in certain contexts, the common discourse about ethics ... has the potential for creative and cooperative endeavor. Given the increased presence of Muslims in Europe and North America – a presence that makes for a more than intense interaction between the two traditions than ever before – it is important to see this.⁶⁴

Even though conflict is the core issue in this book, I argue for a common discourse about inter-cultural ethics and link this to the migration debate. The outcome could be a civic culture based on the idea of Europe to be shared by all. With this concern in mind, dealing with Islam in Europe leads us to ask what our choices are. To do this rationally we need a common discourse and there is a precedent for this in the history

of Islamic and European civilizations, to which I shall return in more detail.

At this point, I shall focus on two European extremes at work: Euroarrogant exclusiveness on the one hand, and, on the other, European attitudes of self-denial being presented in a distorted manner as a self-opening to other cultures. These two attitudes are mutually exclusive and both have an impulse to dominate, i.e. not to tolerate or even consider other positions. The French response to migration to date has been “*intégration ou insertion communautaire*.” In reviewing the French response I would argue that “integrated Muslims,” i.e. those who accept the beautiful idea of Europe, are a part of the polity, whereas “communitarian ghettos” are a threat both to the civilizational idea of Europe and to the security of European societies, because civic values are not accepted in these ghettos. In this regard, the Ibn Khaldunian notion of *asabiyya* – a kind of *esprit de corps*, or civilization-awareness – is highly pertinent in the process of opening oneself to others without self-denial. Some see in this issue signs of a phenomenon of decline in the West, concealed as open-mindedness. It is a misperception of Europeans that they can earn respect through self-denial. It is exactly the other way around. It is very important that Europeans grasp the idea that a low degree of *asabiyya* is not the alternative to their Euro-arrogance and racism. Similarly, as much as philo-Semitism does not represent an overcoming of anti-Semitism, cultural relativist self-denial is only the other side of the coin of Euro-centric exclusiveness.

For a cooperation between the two strange bedfellows in the context of “Islam in Europe” for the sake of a better European and Muslim future, the two parties involved need to cultivate an ability to dialogue with one another in order to develop common responses to the pending challenges, and thereby solve the conflict on the grounds of a consensus on the idea of Europe. I repeat my contention that there is no such thing as an essentialist Islam – much as there is no such thing as an essentialist Europe – in order to argue against a constant pattern of exclusive Islamic or European identity. Islam will always be an ever-changing cultural system designed by Muslims themselves, and similarly, Europe can be an open society in which there is a place for the “other,” like Muslims, as equal citizens. In short, both need to change.

My reference to the European extremes discussed focused on dominant inclinations among Europeans, i.e. the exclusivist and the self-denying attitudes, and is meant as a reference to great obstacles to an inter-cultural dialogue based on reason. A real inter-civilizational dialogue aimed at establishing multiple identities, a cross-cultural consensus – for instance over individual human rights⁶⁵ – is required.

It would be dishonest to limit the talk about obstacles to European exclusiveness undermining the integration of Muslim immigrants. I am equally concerned about the maintenance of certain orthodox Islamic views among parts of the European Muslim community. It is especially worrying to see those views in the Islamic *hijra* doctrine

according to which migration is related to the *da'wa*, i.e. the call to Islam as a proselytization, spreading in the Islam diaspora. It is alarming to see the neo-absolutists pursuing their uncompromising proselytization in the name of religious freedom. Salafist Muslims in Europe refer to the meaning of *hijra* and view themselves as an outpost for the spread of Islam in Europe.⁶⁶ This belief – and, of course, the voicing of its rhetoric – can only contribute to the growth of anti-Islamic attitudes among Europeans and to the bolstering of existing prejudices. Among the exile groups of Islamists in London was the one led by Sheikh Omar Bakri before he returned to the Middle East. That group, named the Movement of the Muhajirun, supported the terrorist attacks on the US embassies in Africa and celebrated the 9/11 assaults as “heroic acts of Islam.” Bakri clearly links the status of migrants Muhajirun to the doctrine of *hijra* in the pursuit of the *da'wa*/call to Islam. Like his predecessor, the late fundamentalist Kalim Siddiqi, who established the Islamic Counter-Parliament in London, the Syrian preacher Bakri has become most prominent through the British media. In a BBC interview held after the blasts at the US embassies in Africa and the retaliation by the United States on Sudan and Afghanistan, Bakri described Muslims in Europe by saying “We are all Osama Ibn Laden.” Slogans like this are of the greatest disservice not only to Islam but also to all Muslims living in Europe. More peaceful Imams, like Zaki Badawi of London or the Swiss-born Tariq Ramadan, present themselves as moderates, but the fact that they label Europe as a part of *dar al-Islam*/abode of Islam is an offense to the idea of Europe. Cultural-relativist multi-culturalism accepts these offenses as examples of cultural communitarianism and fails to see the religious imperialism that is included within this neo-absolutist universalism. In this context one is inclined not only to recall the judgment made by the late Ernest Gellner, cited above, but also to seriously consider the attempt at an “Islamization of Europe”⁶⁷ a recent variety of “Islamic imperialism.”⁶⁸

In the search for alternatives and commonalities I propose to draw lessons from history. These are culturally enriching European–Muslim encounters which were reason-based. The reference is basically to the traditions of medieval Islamic rationalism and its impact on the Renaissance leading to European Enlightenment.

The current cross-cultural search for an acceptance of a political culture of democracy and human rights may benefit from history. One can draw much from the words of the Prince of Jordan, Hassan Ibn Talal, who attended the crucial Nexus project during the Dutch presidency of the EU in 2004 and an earlier speech held in 1996 argued that “Muslims and Europeans have been at their worst when they sought to dominate each other and at their best when they looked to learn from each other.”⁶⁹

My own research on Muslim–Western relations supports this very profound insight. In my view, the opening of the Islamic mind to Hellenism and the ensuing Hellenization



of Islam in the medieval period led to the heights of Islamic civilization. In return, European adoptions from Islamic rationalism on the eve of the European Renaissance contributed to processes of rationalization in European civilization. As Berkeley scholar Leslie Lipson wrote in his work on civilizations,

Aristotle crept back into Europe by the side door. His return was due to the Arabs, who had become acquainted with Greek thinkers ... Both Avicenna and Averroë's were influenced by him ... Aristotle was introduced from Cordoba. Aristotle was significant not only for what he taught but more for his method and spirit.⁷⁰

Muslim thinkers in medieval Islam had combined this method and spirit with their Islamic minds and identities. In learning from Aristotle they were in a position to give the Greek philosopher the status of "*mu'alim al-awwal*/the first teacher." That was the height of Islamic tolerance. The great Islamic philosopher al-Farabi was only second to Aristotle in the ranking by the Islamic medieval rationalists.⁷¹

This reference to historical records must admit that history cannot repeat itself in our age of migration, but in the shadow of looming Christian–Muslim encounters, perceptions and misperceptions are still at work. Therefore, the reference to positive traditions remains both topical and relevant for Euro-Mediterranean dialogue. As Arab Muslims and Europeans in the past engaged in positive encounters with one another on the grounds of a spirit based on *aql*/reason, it must be equally possible to revive this tradition and its spirit as a framework for the needed dialogue in our own age, rather than engaging in new varieties of jihad and crusades. I

In the pursuit of a revival of the heritage of Islamic rationalism, the Harvard Iraqi-born Muslim philosopher Muhsin Mahdi believes that al-Farabi was the greatest thinker in Islamic political philosophy. In fact, al-Farabi was by origin a Turk, but his cultural language was Arabic and his commitment was to the Islamic civilization, not to his ethnicity. The Farabian Islamic *aql*-based philosophy is a lasting indication of a Euro-Islamic encounter at its very best. In my view this encounter continues to be of great importance and relevance, and could even provide the framework for Western–Muslim common ground in the age of migration. But instead of referring to al-Farabi, many Turkish mosques in Europe are named after Sultan Fatih, who conquered European soil. This is not an indication of cultural pluralism but an abuse of multi-culturalism! To be sure, cultural pluralism is not the relativism of multi-culturalism. The commitment to a European civic culture that is shared by all stands in opposition to a cultural relativism that negates common values. Multiculturalism is based on cultural relativism; European multi-culturalists look at other cultures with a sense of romantic-eccentric mystification, following in the Euro-centric tradition of viewing aliens as *bons sauvages*. There are multi-culturalists who look at Cordoba as an example of multiculturalism,

while in fact lacking profound knowledge about the subject. I want to refer to this mystification to underscore my urgent and important distinction between cultural pluralism and multi-culturalism. In this pursuit I need to come back to the question regarding the choices: Do Muslims living in Europe want to belong to a peripheral minority with respective minority rights, or do they want to be full members of the European polity itself, with the respective rights and duties that this entails? I see no contradiction between being a European and being a Muslim. But in contrast to this position, there are Islamist groups in Europe which are not interested in the role of Muslim migrants as a bridge between the civilizations. They are, rather, interested in using the Muslim diaspora for a political confrontation.

The repeated references in this chapter to the Hellenization of Islam in the past serve to present an Islamic model for European–Islamic commonalities in the present day, in order to underpin an acceptance of Europeanization by Muslim migrants in Europe. If this enlightened Muslim position should now fail in favor of a multi-cultural communitarianism that admits different laws and different treatment for people from different cultural communities, then Islamization will doubtless be the future of Europe. There are blind Europeans who fail to see that such an Islamization would result from their idea of “multi-cultural discourse,” a romantic ideology directed against cultural pluralism that combines cultural diversity with a consensus over core values. The link of “Islamization” to “communitarianism,” as in the vision of some leaders of the Islamic community with the aim that their minority will become the majority in Europe in the future, is the opposite strategy.

Aside from this vision of an Islamic Europe, one should look to Muslim minorities in non-European countries for comparison. In looking to the experiences of others, India,⁷² with its considerable Islamic minority, is a significant case in point. In a study completed for the project of the University of Leiden on the Islamic presence in Western Europe, I have for comparative purposes dealt with the status of Muslims in India. Despite the fact that the constitution of India prescribes one secular personal law for all religious communities, the early Congress government, for political expediency in luring Muslim votes, allowed the practice of a “Muslim Personal Law.” One result has been the rise of Hindu fundamentalism, of which the elections of 1996 and 1998 were just an alarming sign. This rise is related to resentment over privileges being given to minorities. Pointing to these privileges, Hindu fundamentalists call for the de-secularization of India and infringe on even the physical existence of Indian Muslims. Based on my study of the Indian case⁷³ my conclusion for the case of Muslim migrants in Europe is that, given the already existing evidence of a growing hatred toward foreigners and the dreadful right-wing radicalism, we should be very cautious in discussions on collective minority rights and also need to discern the Muslim hatred ignited in some mosques against “Jews and crusaders.” I have misgivings that any

granting of minority privileges and special collective rights to cultural and religious groups would be counter-productive, leading to similar results as in the case of India. Most worryingly, such measures would not only contribute, I fear, to impeding the political integration of these groups, but moreover would encourage the growth of rightwing radicalism on both sides. Some Muslim speakers view themselves in a propagandist manner as the “new Jews” of European anti-Semitism.⁷⁴ The hypocrisy comes to the light when, at the same time, they are completely silent about Islamist anti-Semitism,⁷⁵ if not openly in favor of it.

Conclusions: what lies ahead?

There is an Islamic and Islamist challenge to Europe. One response to both is multi-culturalism, the other is cultural pluralism. We must keep in mind that political integration does not have to mean assimilation. Muslim migrants can become Europeans, accepting both the individual citizenship rights and duties that would smooth the way for their membership of the club, without ceasing to be Muslims. However, it is appropriate to demand from them loyalty to the democratic polity in which they live, i.e. to the “idea of Europe,” a formula which covers the core values of European civil society such as those related to secular European laws and above all the secular constitutions separating religion from politics. This loyalty and the acceptance of corresponding values is in conflict to the loyalty to an imagined *umma* as well as to the Islamic concept of the legitimacy of the Imam. Cultural reforms would enable a Muslim migrant to live under the governance of a non-Muslim *imam/ruler*. On the part of the Europeans, religious reforms are no longer needed, although a change in their cultural attitudes is imperative if society is to become really inclusive, as the idea of Europe suggests. Only such cultural changes could lead to the acceptance of Muslims as citizens. In Europe, the rules of the club and of the game have to be European, inspired by the true idea of Europe. In short, success depends on the willingness of both sides to change and to deliver.

The vision of a Euro-Muslim is based on the assumption that multiple identities are feasible within the framework of cultural pluralism and political integration. In my own life I have lived migration in a context of adventures of identity. In considering this adventure and conceptualizing this multiple identity, it seems appropriate to draw on the idea of “project identity” that has been cited for combining different civilizational patterns.

Again, it will not be possible to promote and defend the idea of Europe within the framework of multi-cultural communitarianism as pursued equally by Muslim segregationists and European cultural relativists. I continue referring to Gellner, who has described these groups as strange bedfellows that, however, end up becoming allies. My criticism of multiculturalism departs not only from my commitment to

sharing a civic culture, but also from my opposition to rampant universalisms. As a Muslim committed to European Enlightenment I oppose all varieties of hegemonic universalisms, be they Western or Islamic. I also believe I find in multi-culturalism just another universalist variety. This is shown by David Gress in his overall study of Western civilization as he states:

Although multi-culturalism might seem to contradict universalism, the two were compatible; indeed, multi-culturalism was simply universalism applied to cultural politics ... Universalism ... never solved its fundamental dilemma of being both a Western idea ... and an anti-Western idea.⁷⁶

This is a rigorous criticism pointing to the fact that cultural relativism is in fact a rampant universalism. The ethical integrity and the relationship of cultural relativists is also questioned by the late Ernest Gellner in the following argument, which I share:

Three principal options are available in our intellectual climate: religious fundamentalism, relativism, and Enlightenment rationalism ... Logically, the religious fundamentalists are of course also in conflict with the relativists ... In practice, this confrontation is not very much in evidence.⁷⁷

The reason for this is that both share an enmity to Western civilization; even though this is for different reasons and motivations, the result is the same.

The commitment to Enlightenment rationalism is based not only on its substance, but also on the fact that it succeeded in building bridges between Islam and Europe over the course of two fundamental encounters. The rationalism of medieval Islamic philosophy constituted the seeds of an Islamic Enlightenment that was ultimately prevented from unfolding by the Islamic *fiqh*-orthodoxy. This rationalism resulted from the Hellenization of Islam, and was the result of the first positive Euro-Islamic encounter. The impact of Islamic rationalism on the European Renaissance was the second. According to Habermas the Renaissance is one of the sources of cultural modernity. In a reversal of that second positive encounter, the Islamic fundamentalism⁷⁸ of our age could succeed in fulfilling the wrongful prophecy, creating a "clash of civilizations" rather than building bridges to prevent this clash. Therefore, the expansion in the European diaspora of Islamism is detrimental, both for Muslim migrants and for the European societies that shelter them. Political Islam hinders these migrants from an embracing of the idea of Europe, and the result is that they are isolated in a dreadful ghetto.

Ethnic identities are exclusive in character. If cultivated in the diaspora they lead to a kind of neo-absolutism and subsequent related social but ethnicized conflicts. An all-inclusive civil identity based on cultural pluralism is the alternative. In contrast, fundamentalism is a modern variety of neo-absolutism. Pluralism in turn refers to the

European concept of people representing different views while at the same time being strongly committed to shared cross-cultural rules and values, above all to mutual tolerance and mutual respect. Tolerance can never mean that only one party has the right to maintain its views at the expense of the other. This would be the opposite of pluralism. For this reason I look at the fairly exclusivist bias of multi-cultural communitarianism as standing in contrast to a polity of citizens based on cultural pluralism and tolerance. One-way tolerance is the tolerance of the loser. Truly, Muslim migrants cannot deny others what they require for themselves. When in the majority they oppress others; however, when a minority they make victims of themselves if their will is questioned.

The granting of multi-cultural minority privileges to Muslim migrants in Europe could prove to be a double-edged sword with far-reaching harmful consequences. On the one hand it could facilitate the unwanted interference of Islamic-Mediterranean, mostly undemocratic governments in the affairs of Muslim migrants in Europe, which happens already. On the other, it could also lead to the minorities in Europe being used as the ghetto, hijacked by the self-proclaimed representatives of political Islam acting in exile and operating as a transnational movement. These Islamists are by no means democrats.⁷⁹ In their hearts they consider democracy as *kufir/unbelief*,⁸⁰ while in public they pay lip-service to it and abuse it in their actions. In contrast, a Euro-Islamic interpretation of Islam is in a position to smooth the way for an Islamic Enlightenment that would contribute to an embracing of the idea of Europe as grounds for Muslim immigrants to become European citizens of heart. The necessary rethinking of Islam would lay the groundwork for introducing “*de mocratie et democratisation*” into Islam.⁸¹

In sum, the Euro-Islamic view that Muslim immigrants could act as a bridge between Islam and Europe leads to opposing the politics of making Europe a refuge for Islamic fundamentalists. These new totalitarianists are not interested in the integration of Muslim migrants because they flatly reject the idea of Europe, so why should the open society shelter those who want to undermine it? The concept of civic culture for all, on grounds of cultural pluralism, stands in contrast to the multi-culturalists and to their cultural relativism. I argue that the bottom line for a pluri-cultural – not a multi-cultural – platform is the unequivocal and binding acceptance of the core European values of secular democracy, individual human rights of men and women, secular tolerance and civil society. In my understanding this is the basis for Euro-Islam, and contrasting options of ghetto-Islam or fundamentalist Islam are anti-European. At the beginning of the century, Muslim migrants in Europe face the challenge of having to choose a destiny for themselves and for their children; will they continue to be alien or will they join a changing club on the grounds of embracing the idea of Europe?

Let it be said without ambiguity: It is not an exaggeration to state that the future of


Europe will be determined by the ability of both Europeans and Muslim immigrants to establish peace between themselves. They need to forge a pattern of Euro-Islamic identity based on the core values of Europe, described as the idea of Europe endorsed by a liberal and reformed Islam. A polity for people of different religions can only be a secular one, and the idea of Europe is secular, not Christian.⁸² The value-conflict between Islamism and the idea of Europe is not a conflict between Islam and Christianity, nor is it a clash of civilization.⁸³

Iraq

Can a fractured rentier state be rebuilt?

Robert Springborg

5: Iraq



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Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki¹ and his Da'wa Party are seeking to reconstruct in Iraq a repressive rentier state of the type once ruled over by Saddam Hussein and the Ba'th Party. Their attempt can thus contribute to the present debate about post, post-colonial states, the essence of which is whether or not they will persist as nation states and, if so, whether they can be rebuilt on the foundations of their authoritarian predecessors or will require new underpinnings, such as those provided by democracy and/or Islamism. Precisely because al Maliki's recipe for rule is so similar to that of Saddam's, whereas the consolidation strategies of successor leaderships in Tunisia, Libya, Egypt and Yemen seem to depart from historical precedents, contemporary Iraq should provide unique insight into authoritarian rentierism and whether indeed it has a future as well as its inglorious past.²

Turning the political clock back to the era of post-colonialism, during which time the term "rentier state" was coined by three sets of Middle East scholars working independently, presents significant challenges.³ Populations are now younger, better educated and, in most cases, more urbanized. They also suffer from higher unemployment rates as citizens face greater difficulties in securing middle-class lifestyles. Divides between rich and poor have widened, opening up opportunities for widespread mobilization by Islamists of the disaffected. Regime-legitimizing myths of nationalism and monarchical supremacy have eroded. Increasing regional tensions, combined with weakening state capacities for legitimization and repression, have fueled sectarian and ethnic conflicts, further complicating those states' tasks of maintaining national coherence. And as if all of this did not pose challenge enough to post-colonial states seeking one way or another to transition to a new order of post, post-colonialism, the vital ratio of rents to population is steadily turning against them. Never in fact has the ratio returned to its highpoint in the wake of the first great oil boom that followed the October 1973 War. While it has bounced up and down over the succeeding three decades or so, the overall rent/population trajectory has been downward as hydrocarbon prices and production have not kept pace with population growth. With less rent per capita to distribute, Arab states face in varying degrees of urgency the transition from allocation to extraction as their primary modus operandi, a progression which simultaneously incentivizes the state to increase production so as to grow the tax base.⁴

Iraq is trapped in the time warp of authoritarian rentierism more than virtually any other Arab state. The critical measures are: hydrocarbon dependence; swollen state and public sector with concomitant public dependency; manifestations of the Dutch Disease including stagnation of the economy's productive sectors; poor governance coupled with extensive corruption; concentrated executive power; and harsh repression.

Evidence relevant to these indicators is as follows:

1 *Hydrocarbon dependence.* The oil sector in 2010 accounted for 53 percent of GDP, the third highest percentage among OPEC states, exceeded only by Angola and Libya.⁵ Oil accounts for 99 percent of Iraq's exports and 90 percent of government revenue, which makes it by both measures the most oil dependent country in the Middle East.⁶ The share of oil rents to GDP, as calculated by Ahmad Galal and Hoda Selim, is higher in Iraq (60 percent) than for any other Arab country, including Kuwait (48.5 percent) and Saudi Arabia (44 percent).⁷

2 *Overgrown state and extensive dependency.* The civil service, which doubled in size in the six years after 2005, accounts for 70 percent of all salaried income and 43 per cent of the total labor force, again the highest ratios in the region.⁸ Of the 171,000 new government employees recruited in 2011, 100,000 were employed in various branches of the security services.⁹ The state continues to own and operate 260 industrial firms, to which it provided \$2 billion in 2011. Only eight of these state-owned enterprises (SOEs) reported profits in that year.¹⁰ The financial sector is more directly controlled by the government than in any other Middle Eastern country. The three state-owned banks hold 85 percent of all bank assets.¹¹ The relative inefficiency of the sector is revealed by the high prime lending rate, which was 7.2 percent in December 2011, compared to an inflation rate over the previous two years of about 4 percent on average and to global prime rates of less than half the Iraqi figure. The primary source of bank earnings is not loans, but transaction fees from electronic transfers and a 2 percent fee for making a deposit.¹² The population is more directly dependent on government for basic foodstuffs than any other in the region. Food rations are distributed to 99.7 percent of all households. The food so distributed provides 85 percent of average daily caloric requirements. The program consumed 8.6 percent of GDP in 2011.¹³ Profound dependence on government accounts in considerable measure for the extremely low labor force participation rate, which is 57 percent for all adults and only 13 percent for women, ratios that place Iraq even below Gulf Cooperation Council states.¹⁴ Less than one in three workers are employed in the private sector.¹⁵ The state budget is consumed almost entirely by salaries, subsidies, security and SOEs, with little remaining for capital investment.¹⁶

3 *Dutch disease symptoms.* Despite economic stagnation in all sectors other than oil, the Iraqi currency has remained reasonably stable for several years and

indeed virtually without change against the US dollar since January 2009 (at about 1,170 Dinars), suggesting typical Dutch Disease overvaluation militating against production of tradable goods.¹⁷ The oil sector itself accounts for only 1 percent of total employment. The industrial sector accounts for a minuscule 2 percent of GDP.¹⁸ Despite its oil wealth, Iraq is a relatively poor country, suggesting that oil has been more curse than blessing. The World Bank estimates that one-quarter of the Iraqi population lives in poverty.¹⁹ The percentage of the population living below the poverty line is higher in Iraq than any other Arab country except Yemen.²⁰ Iraqi GDP per capita of slightly less than \$4,000 annually ranks the country as 160th in the world, about on a level with Gaza and about a third of that of neighboring Iran, whose almost \$12,000 GDP per capita ranks it 99th globally. Iraqi per capita income from petroleum exports was \$1,335 in 2011, compared to \$33,400 in Qatar.²¹

4 Poor governance. Iraq's governance performance as measured by the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators is the worst in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). In 2011 it was in the bottom 5 per cent of all ranked countries on three of the six indicators and on average in the lowest tenth percentile for the other three, on two of which (government effectiveness and control of corruption) it ranks lowest among MENA countries. What is particularly disturbing about its poor governance is that it has shown only marginal improvement since the removal of Saddam Hussein. Indeed, on the indicators of political stability/absence of violence and rule of law, it deteriorated from 2002 to 2011, on the latter measure being far and away the worst in the Arab world, even well below second to the bottom Yemen.²² The only substantially improved performance over that period was on the voice and accountability indicator, on which contemporary Iraq achieved its highest ranking. It is worth noting, however, that the ranking occurred shortly after the 2010 parliamentary elections, at which time Nouri al Maliki's return to power was in doubt. Now that he has indeed returned and further consolidated power, presumably Iraq's standing on this indicator will again deteriorate.

As for doing business in Iraq, it presents profound perils. On the World Bank's "Ease of Doing Business" measures, Iraq ranked 165th out of 185 countries in 2013, a decline of eight ranks since 2009.²³ It had the distinction of being the most difficult country in the world for "resolving insolvency," and ranked 176th on "getting credit," 177th on "starting a business" and 179th on "trading across borders."²⁴ Iraq's score on the "logistics performance index" in 2011 was the lowest in the Arab world.²⁵ The 2011 Enterprise Survey conducted in Iraq by the

World Bank and the International Finance Corporation found that only 1 percent of Iraqi firms were likely to export, the lowest proportion in the MENA countries and among lower middle income countries. The average time to clear customs as well as “losses due to theft and breakage” were far and away the highest. On the “graft index,” which is the proportion of times a firm is asked to pay a bribe when soliciting public services, Iraqi owners and managers reported a frequency of 33 percent, compared to 18 percent in other MENA countries and 15 percent among lower middle income ones. As one would expect from tight concentration of the banking sector and the dominant role of government in it, owners of Iraqi firms report that to obtain credit the collateral provided would need to be almost 160 percent of the loan’s value. Less than 5 percent of firms had been able to obtain bank credit, as compared to almost 30 percent in the MENA overall and somewhat more than that in lower middle income countries.²⁶ In 2012 Iraq ranked 175th out of 178 countries on Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. The Heritage Foundation has not assigned Iraq a rank on its Economic Freedom Score since 2002 “because of the lack of sufficiently reliable data on economic freedom within the country.” In 2002 Iraq’s score was 15.6, compared to a world average of 59.5 and a MENA average of 59.9.²⁷ Iraqi governance is, in sum, the worst in the MENA, which with Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia, is the worst in the world.

5 Executive power. Indicators of the concentration of power within the executive are budget allocations and degree of control over the coercive arms of the state exercised by the chief executive, in this case the prime minister. Regarding the former, the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Interior have officially been allocated about one-fifth of all budgeted expenditures since 2007, a proportion which places Iraq at the very top of the security-obsessed MENA region.²⁸ The prime minister personally controls all branches of the armed forces, all of the security agencies under the ministry of interior, the intelligence services and the national security ministry.²⁹ In short, no governmental coercive capacity exists that is not under the direct control of the prime minister, a greater concentration of power than in any other Middle Eastern state.³⁰ The prime minister also exerts substantial influence over at least one militia, the Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (League of the Righteous), an offshoot of the Mahdi Army which he permits to parade in Baghdad in order to intimidate opponents.³¹

6 Repression. Human Rights Watch introduces its 2012 country summary of Iraq with the observation that “human rights conditions in Iraq remain extremely

poor, especially for journalists, detainees, and opposition activists.” It goes on to describe violence, including killings, perpetrated against “Arab and Kurdish Spring” demonstrators in February, 2011, by members of the respective security forces. In April of that year regulations barring street protests were issued and in May a law was issued that criminalized politically relevant speech, with penalties of up to ten years in prison. Human Rights Watch reported in 2011 the existence of a secret detention facility at a Baghdad military base operated by the 56th Army Brigade and the Counter-Terrorism Service, both of which report directly to the prime minister.³² The State Department’s 2012 annual human rights report on Iraq observed that

continuing violence, corruption, and organizational dysfunction undermined the government’s protection of human rights.... A culture of impunity has largely protected members of the security services, as well as those elsewhere in the government, from investigation and successful prosecution of human rights violations.³³

The classic indicators of authoritarian rentierism thus all reveal post-Saddam Iraq as still being afflicted with this political malady. Iraq, however, is profoundly unstable, as indicated by continuing high levels of political violence, which claimed the lives of almost 3,000 civilians and security personnel in 2010 and again in 2011.³⁴ On the Failed State Index Iraq is ranked as the 9th most imperiled country in the world, bracketed by Yemen (8th) and the Central African Republic (10th).³⁵ Its worst scores on this Index are on the indicators for “factionalized elites” (9.6), “group grievances” (9.7) and “security apparatus” (9.9), the last of which makes Iraq’s security agencies the second most counterproductive to state viability in the world, only Somalia being worse (10).³⁶ Nouri al Maliki and his supporters obviously face an uphill struggle in their effort to subdue the country, which they are seeking to do through a mix of coercion and allocation, the classic authoritarian rentier strategy. This begs questions as to the viability of this strategy in the post, post-colonial Middle East and Iraq specifically, and whether or not alternative strategies might be better suited to the political utility of diminished rents in this new era.

Rent/population ratio

Evidence from the Arab Spring suggests a direct correlation between stability of rentier states and the magnitude of rents per capita at their disposal. The GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) states as a subset of Arab states have since the outbreak of that Spring in December 2010, experienced least political turmoil, and they have the highest

average per capita rents, the mean being \$11,898 compared to \$532 for the Arab republics that export oil (Iraq, Algeria, Syria, Egypt, Sudan and Yemen).³⁷ Although no direct calculation of rent per capita is available for Libya, it is closer to that of the other republics than it is to the GCC monarchies. Among these republics, Syria, Egypt, Libya and Yemen have all experienced extensive violence and/or overthrows of regimes, as did non-rentier Tunisia. Violence in Iraq has been on-going, while Algeria underwent a near civil war in the 1990s that obviously militated against willingness to risk further violence inevitable in an Algerian political spring. By comparison, other than Bahrain, the GCC states appear to have been able to buy off discontent with rents, a strategy they have pursued with alacrity. One measure of those rents is the public sector wage bill per capita, which is calculated by the total government expenses on government employees divided by the population. Among the GCC states, those with the highest degree of unrest, Bahrain and Oman, have the lowest per capita public wage bill. The GCC's public wage bill per capita is 30 times greater than that for the oil exporting republics.³⁸ As for Iraq, its public wage bill per capita is about the same as Algeria's and slightly higher than Yemen's, Sudan's and Syria's, but lower than Egypt's. Rent as distributed through public employment is thus highly correlated with political stability. Handing out jobs is clearly the best political strategy for regimes well-endowed with rents, as Ali and Elbadawi's model predicts.³⁹ The Arab republics, on the other hand, rely more upon repression, as reflected in the huge gap of more than 20 times in scores between them and the GCC states on the Index of Political Repression.⁴⁰ Of the republics, Iraq is the most repressive, with only Sudan coming close to Iraq's abysmal score on that index.

The data thus suggests that unless Iraq is able to generate substantially more rents per capita, its leaders will have to either continue to repress the population, or adopt some other political strategy, such as democratization. Iraqi rents per capita averaged some \$1,775 in 2007. They have risen only slightly since that time as the increase in oil revenue has been offset by rapid population growth.⁴¹ Although this is the highest figure for the republics, it compares unfavorably to the GCC mean of \$11,898. Iraq clearly cannot realistically aspire to being a rentier state of the GCC variety, unless it dramatically increases its oil and gas revenues.

Unfortunately the prospects for that may be sufficiently alluring to cause incumbent elites to continue to adhere to the rentier paradigm, albeit one with a heavier dollop of repression in the ruling mix. Iraq is currently the world's fastest growing crude oil exporter, its output rising significantly from 2010, reaching 3.4 million bpd presently (including production from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)) and expected to average 3.7 million bpd in 2013, just short of Iraq's all time high of 3.8 million bpd.⁴² Iraq is now producing more oil than Iran and has significant amounts of gas that await construction of an LNG (liquefied natural gas) facility for it to be exported. The

International Energy Agency forecasts Iraqi oil production to double by 2020 and by 2030 for it to be the second largest oil exporter after Saudi Arabia.⁴³

Given the risks of adopting other ruling strategies, the appeal to incumbents of digging in and waiting for rent income to rise is understandable. But it is also fraught with peril both because of the uncertainties surrounding future earnings and because in any case rents on a per capita basis are never likely to be sufficient to sustain a stable, reasonably beneficent as opposed to vicious rentier state. As for risks on the revenue side, a rising share of total Iraqi production is coming from the KRG, the continued inclusion of which in Iraq cannot be assumed, especially in light of the temptation to Ankara of supporting Kurdish independence as part of a deal that would see pipelines conveying KRG oil and gas into and then beyond Turkey, as well as the Turkish state oil and gas company assuming control of acreage in Kurdistan.⁴⁴ Iraqi mismanagement of its oil resources is also threatening the speed at which its production increases, as indicated by the willingness of several major multinational oil companies, led by Exxon-Mobil, to abandon their operations in the south of Iraq and take up new acreage in the KRG.⁴⁵ And even if Baghdad manages to deter Kurdish secession while improving its management of the oil sector, it still confronts losing mathematics in the rent/population ratio. In 2003 Iraq's population was 23 million, whereas now it is some 30 million and is forecast to be 56 million in 2050.⁴⁶ As its population expands at almost 3 percent annually, it is far from being guaranteed that increases in oil rents will keep pace.

Production poses one question, but so too do prices. In light of new extraction techniques and alternative energy sources, dramatic rises in US hydrocarbon production, and stagnating Western demand, prices in real terms in the near and medium term are forecast to plateau, or even fall, although oil price forecasting does not have a good track record. Still, the prospects for oil revenues to outpace population growth in Iraq seem slim. In fact revenue growth must dramatically exceed population expansion if Iraq is to be able to provide its citizens with GCC style entitlements. Saudi rent per capita now is some \$8,239, more than four times greater than Iraq's. Even Saudi Arabia is struggling to maintain its rent/population ratio, which has fallen substantially since the late 1970s. Finally, Iraqi oil exports are now bumping up against the country's OPEC quota. That organization, already having to impose supply restrictions on member states, is seeking to cap Iraqi exports.⁴⁷ In sum, trying to ride out political storms with more repression while awaiting a build-up in rents may be tempting, but is a flawed strategy.

State capacities

The “new institutionalists” have argued that the resource curse is not inevitable, or indeed even the primary cause of national economic underperformance. Instead, they

contend, state capacities, largely historically determined, account for variations in performance.⁴⁸ In Iraq's case it is difficult to separate the two explanations. The three provinces of the Ottoman Empire that comprise modern Iraq could not be argued to have been well governed, nor could the successor, British dominated colonial state be said to either.⁴⁹ Since 1958 Iraqi governments have had a less than enviable record of governance even by the low standards of the Arab world. Yet, oil has also been part of the Iraqi national story since its creation. Its borders are due to jockeying over access to suspected oilfields, which were finally then discovered in 1927, with exploitation commencing a decade later. Iraq was one of the world's first rentier states, as evidenced for example by the creation of what was in essence the world's first sovereign wealth fund in 1950 in the form of the Iraqi Development Board. But even prior to oil earnings providing rents, the government in Baghdad, first controlled directly by the British and then mainly by Iraqis subordinate to them, based much of its power heavily on allocations to tribal shaikhs. Oil revenues then provided rents to augment existing allocations, thereby reinforcing rather than transforming an existing, if much poorer rentier state. The various post-colonial regimes, ending with Saddam's, perpetuated the practice, each of them distributing rents more or less in inverse proportion to the relative power of the center over the periphery. So as Saddam's hold on the country weakened after his disastrous war against Iran, so did state allocation shift from capital development projects to payoffs to intermediate elites, of whom the revitalized shaikhs were the most numerous. Since his fall subsequent governments, including that of Nouri al Maliki and his Da'wa Party, have followed suit.

Authoritarian rentierism in Iraq results from historical inheritance, so-called path dependency, and is reinforced if not actually caused by abundant oil rents. It is further propelled by Iraq's ethnic and religious fragmentation, over which a minority Sunni regime ruled from Ottoman times until the U.S. invasion in 2003. The Iraqi "bunker" Arab praetorian republic is thus based on a long tradition of a ruling minority having to subdue or buy off the ruled majority. Not surprisingly it was among the most dug in, as it were, of the bunker states, as the evidence reviewed in Clement Moore Henry and Robert Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*, indicates.⁵⁰ It pulverized civil society rather more than, say, the Syrian or Yemeni bunker equivalents, as manifested by absolute control of the financial sector, of information flow and of any other possible inputs into a robust civil society. Like all other bunker Arab republics, the Iraqi state was nevertheless brittle and malformed, with overdeveloped coercive and allocation capacities and underdeveloped developmental ones. This malformation has persisted, as manifested by mismanagement even of the crucial oil sector. Despite having what is claimed as being possibly the second largest oil reserves in the world and the world's second largest supergiant field (Rumaila) from which a single well produces as much as 50,000 bpd, Iraq has been unable to prevent

the world's leading oil companies from walking away from contracts to develop these resources. It is only BP among the Western multinational oil companies that seems to have made the strategic decision to endure Iraqi governmental mismanagement, despite grumbling among BP managers in Iraq.⁵¹ Unlike the major producers in the GCC, especially Qatar and Saudi Arabia, Iraq has not walled off its vital hydrocarbon sector from intra-elite competition in order to ensure that the goose laying the golden eggs is not debilitated or slain. Clearly the Iraqi government does not even have the capacity to set limits on its internal rent seekers, thereby indicating its weakness in comparison to the GCC monarchies to the south.

The magnitude and nature of corruption provide further evidence of the malignancy that afflicts the Iraqi state. Corruption is not inevitable in rentier states. In the MENA, five of the GCC states rank higher on the World Bank's "control of corruption" indicator than all of the republics, with only Saudi Arabia ranking slightly lower than Tunisia, the least corrupt of the republics. All the MENA monarchies, with the exception of Saudi Arabia, are in the upper half of the index, whereas of the republics only Tunisia is. Iraq is at the very bottom.⁵² In the wealthy rentier states of the GCC, institutionalized rent allocation appears to render corruption a secondary component in the strategy of rule. Additionally, the quality of GCC governance is sufficiently high to prevent endemic corruption, i.e., that not informally sanctioned by central authorities.⁵³ By contrast, both planned and endemic corruption is ubiquitous in Iraq. The former type is orchestrated by the ruling elite in order to secure and broaden power bases. Presumably the less legitimate, institutionalized and coherent that elite, the more corruption is required both to mediate intra-elite tensions and to secure the power bases of members of that elite. In Iraq planned corruption performs both functions, while the poor quality of governance, combined with the fragmentation and unevenness of state authority throughout the country, ensure that endemic corruption is similarly ubiquitous.⁵⁴

Lebanon may be most similar to Iraq in the MENA in this regard, as corruption there is also essential to both elite integration and popular acquiescence. In Lebanon no politician, including the comparatively powerful, now deceased Prime Minister Rafiq al Hariri, has been able since the end of the civil war to concentrate control over corruption in his own hands. This is the clear objective of Nouri al Maliki, as attested to by his endless maneuvering, that includes such recent steps as dismissing the independent director of the central bank and appointing one of his allies in his stead, and removing the minister of communications in an effort to gain direct personal influence over a major telecommunications contract.⁵⁵ But the very fact that the prime minister continues to engage in intra-elite struggles over bribes and kickbacks attests to the fact that, like his Lebanese counterparts, he has not fully consolidated control, and may never do so.

The case of the Ba'ath Party and Saddam Hussein may be instructive in this regard. Iraq had comparatively little corruption in the mid to late 1970s as the Hassan al Bakr/Saddam Hussein led Ba'athist government was fully in control, organizationally reasonably coherent and relying on development to legitimate the regime and expand its hard power regionally. Corruption was not vital for intra-elite cohesion, nor for popular acceptance. This state of affairs continued briefly after Saddam purged President al Bakr in 1979, but began to deteriorate as a result of Saddam's disastrous war with Iran, followed by the catastrophic invasion of Kuwait.⁵⁶ Growing intra-elite fragmentation, reflecting rising discontent among the populace, resulted in Saddam opening the taps of corruption to the benefit of the high ranking, while simultaneously seeking to buy broader loyalty through side payments to peripheral elites. At the time of his demise he was doling out *bakshish* to over 7,000 shaikhs.⁵⁷ Mirroring this growth of planned corruption, endemic corruption also spread.

That the two forms frequently go hand in hand is reflected in today's Iraq, where endemic corruption is ubiquitous, rendering difficult to impossible the implementation of government policy. Organized theft of equipment by managers and workers, for example, is a major contributing factor to the failure of the authorities adequately to expand electricity supply, the shortage of which is the single largest cause of popular disaffection, to say nothing of being a key obstacle to expanding industrial production.⁵⁸ Even in the vital security area the regime is unable to deter endemic corruption. Those responsible for operating high security prisons, for example, have an established scale of "fees" for releasing prisoners, including those loyal to al Qaeda, the sworn enemies of the regime by which the prison wardens are employed.⁵⁹

Corruption, in sum, is both political glue and governance solvent. Planned corruption holds Nouri al Maliki's regime together, but is insufficient to enable him to fully consolidate control over the elite, to say nothing of the country as a whole. Endemic corruption simultaneously undermines his regime's ability to govern and drains resources from the treasury. This then is a malignant rentier state, in which planned and endemic corruption essentially displace legal entitlements, such as subsidies and public employment, as the principal form of allocation. It bespeaks of the relatively greater ethnic, religious and regional fragmentation of the Iraqi nation-state than of the GCC states, for example, and the related problem of intra-elite competition and incoherence. The elite is neither sufficiently united nor farsighted to agree upon a strategy of converting corruption into legal, institutionalized entitlements, thereby reducing the drain on the treasury, while ameliorating intra-elite conflict and popular disaffection, while possibly also contributing to increased production. Iraq is thus a primitive rentier state, so also a politically unstable one. While it is possible that a strong man could consolidate power, much as Saddam did, the very persistence of corruption and Nouri al Maliki's ongoing struggle to capture more of it than his

competitors suggests that this is no easy task. In the meantime, popular resentment against the self-indulgent, corrupt elite continues to grow, in turn necessitating yet more repression. The projected increase in hydrocarbon rents is unlikely to solve the underlying problems. Indeed, new rents may pour more metaphorical oil on smoldering political fires.

Civil society capacities

Bunker states are those controlled by a single social formation, which in Iraq are now the Shi'a. As for their societies, bunker states seek to prevent autonomous socio-political organization, in part by denying material resources to potentially independent actors. The Iraqi financial sector, dominated by the state and essentially inaccessible to independent entrepreneurs, large or small, is a clear case in point. The two most critical measures of a financial sector's potential contribution to civil society are the Contract Intensive Money (CIM) ratio (percentage of the money supply held by banks rather than by individuals, i.e., a measure of trust in the banking sector and government more generally) and outstanding bank credit as a percentage of GDP. On both these measures Iraq ranks far and away the lowest of Arab countries.⁶⁰ Less than half the money supply passes through banks. In Syria, the next lowest scorer on the CIM ratio, banks hold more than two-thirds of the money supply. Bank credit as a percentage of GDP in Iraq is 3.9 percent, compared to an average in excess of two-thirds in the Arab monarchies and to next lowest scorer, Libya, at 7.2 percent.⁶¹ Civil society, starved of material resources and hobbled by lack of trust, cannot grow, even if the prevailing political atmosphere were more hospitable. In bunker rentier states, civil societies are also under threat from being cleaved by the vertical linkages that patronage fosters and which erode the horizontal ones upon which vibrant civil societies depend.

The history of Iraqi civil society bears witness to the collateral damage rentier states, especially those run by bunkered elites, inflict upon their civil societies. Of all the Arab countries, and especially those relatively highly tribalized, Iraq under the monarchy and even in the early years of the republic had one of the most vibrant civil societies. The size and dynamism of its political parties, at the forefront of which were the Communists and the Ba'athists, attest to that. These and other political organizations were founded on horizontal social ties that crossed vertical cleavages of sect, ethnicity and tribe.⁶² Other prominent political loyalties were those based in region, centered most notably on Baghdad, Mosul and Basra. The Iraqi urban middle class was remarkably cosmopolitan and multi-religious, as the prominence within it of Jews and Christians suggests. That there is so little legacy of Iraq's comparatively dynamic civil society reflects the state's steady drift toward authoritarian rentierism. Repression combined with the growing political importance of oil rents essentially destroyed a civil society comprised of the deracinated middle and working classes. Vertical ties

within the respective religious, ethnic and tribal social formations, cemented with patronage, displaced the horizontal ones. Iraqi civil society essentially decamped, moving to London, Beirut, the Gulf and elsewhere. After Saddam was toppled many of its members, to say nothing of its western backers, hoped and even assumed that they would return to their homeland and establish a civil polity.

Alas, they were not the only Iraqis who had departed to sit out despotism abroad. Active opponents of the regime, especially among non-Sunni and non-ethnic Arabs, also fled. Kurds and Shi'a in particular in exile reinforced their sectarian loyalties, especially the Shi'a who served as cat's paws for Iraq's enemies, most notably Iran and Syria. Nouri al Maliki, for example, divided his time in exile between those countries as his Iranian backers placed political bets on various of the Shi'a exile organizations, including his Da'wa Party. These returnees thus staked their political futures on their past experiences, which were sectarian in nature, reinforced by foreign patronage. The two fundamentally different types of exile communities contested for power from 2003 until 2010, with the sectarianized one, unaccountably backed by the American occupiers, gradually gaining the upper hand. Finally, in the moment of truth in the negotiations following the 2010 elections, which were won by Ayad Allawi and his cross-sectarian Iraqiya Party, the U.S. and Iran intervened to ensure that al Maliki's absurdly named State of Law Coalition would form government, so relegating Allawi, Iraqiya and the prospects for revitalization of cross-sectarian civil society to the dustbins of Iraq's inglorious history.⁶³ Civil society in Iraq thus fell victim not only to repression and rents, but to external intervention.

The Iraqi political climate has thus become progressively more inhospitable to civil society, with the brief hope for its return dashed by the calculations of Iran and the miscalculations of the U.S., to say nothing of intensification of repression accompanied with corruption. But the attitudinal underpinnings for a robust civil society are also frail. They may reflect the impact of a rentier state rather more than even an abiding sectarianism, as seems suggested by the data of the World Values Survey (WVS). Since 1981 WVS has conducted national attitudinal surveys in more than 50 countries, with Iraq being added for the first time in the 2006 survey. The survey arrays countries on two key dimensions: traditional/secular-rational and survival/self-expression values. The former dimension "reflects the contrast between societies in which religion is very important and those in which it is not." Other orientations, such as deference to authority and traditional family values, are "closely linked with this dimension."⁶⁴ The second dimension measures the emphasis on material as opposed to subjective well-being, including that of self-expression. Secular-rational and self-expression values are theoretically consistent with democracy and in fact highly correlated with existence of democracy in the countries surveyed by WVS.

Somewhat surprisingly, Iraq is much closer to the mean on the traditional/secular dimension than it is on the survival/self-expression one. With a score of -0.40, Iraqis are below the mean (hence more traditional than secular), but substantially less traditional than the other Middle Eastern countries (other than Israel) included in the study, i.e., Egypt, Iran and Jordan, which had scores of -1.64, -1.22 and -1.61, respectively. So while Iraqis are substantially more traditional (and authoritarian) in outlook than Israelis or Europeans, they are less so than Egyptians, Iranians, or Jordanians. In other words, Iraqi attitudes are not incorrigibly sectarian. On the survival/self-expression dimension, however, Iraqi attitudes may reflect the corrosive impact of a rentier political economy. Democracy is empirically correlated with values that emphasize the need for self-expression rather than material welfare. Iraq's score is -1.68, which places it well below those of all other Middle East countries and indeed the lowest score for all 51 countries surveyed in 2006. Iraqis, in sum, are consumed by the need for material well-being, presumably the result of having so little of it, in turn the consequence in part of access to rents being the primary means of sustaining existence, an inherently precarious situation. Iraqi interest in "self-expression," which can be understood as interest in political values, beliefs and principles, is minimal. Rent seeking may then have displaced other considerations in public life. This narrow focus may in turn reinforce the power of those influencing rent flows, including al Maliki and those running the KRG. Civil society, in sum, has been the victim of the state, so not strong enough now to provide a foundation for it.

Alternative futures for the post, post-colonial state: persisting authoritarian rentierism; transition to democracy; Islam is the solution; or fragmentation?

Although the status quo of authoritarian rentierism is unstable and untenable over the long haul, it might nevertheless persist for a considerable period. Civil society has been corroded by repression and patronage, rents will increase and al Maliki is expanding his personal power base rooted in the coercive agencies. Countervailing evidence is primarily that noted above, namely, that Iraqis are not enamored of sectarian politics, even though they have largely been organized by and within them. Youths are particularly disenchanted with the sectarian status quo, suggesting that rents can buy political quiescence, not souls. Focus group studies conducted in 2010 by an American political scientist reveal young Iraqis to be much less religious than their parents' generation and hostile to religiously based political parties. Those under 30 "do not maintain strong sectarian identities" and are "frustrated as long as the government is controlled by these Islamist parties."⁶⁵ It is presumably youths of this outlook who, like those in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere in the Arab world, provided the backbone of the demonstrations that broke out in Iraq in early 2011 which the regime violently

suppressed. It is worthwhile noting, however, that Lebanese youth have been disenchanted with their country's confessional politics and politicians for years, but with no discernible effect.⁶⁶ As for capacities of Iraqi civil society as measured by the relative magnitude of capital autonomous from the state, hence its "structural power," they are among the weakest in the Arab world.⁶⁷ So while the Iraqi authoritarian rentier regime cannot aspire to popular legitimacy, only to subservience, an inherently precarious existence, it is not yet in mortal danger from the disaffected. While democracy could emerge from elite pacting based on the realization by competitive political actors that their interests are better served by making concessions, incumbent leaders have demonstrated zero interest in compromise since first coming to power in 2005. Their inclinations are unlikely to change absent a dramatic rebalancing of the political equation which currently favors them.

Elsewhere Arab Springs have brought Islamists of various types to the fore. In Iraq they rose to power on the back of the U.S. invasion and with the assistance of external forces, not through a popular upheaval. Indeed, manifestations of the Arab Spring in Iraq are anti-Islamist, as apparently are public attitudes, especially among youths and even the broader population.⁶⁸ Iraqi Islamist parties are vertically organized, patronage-based affairs, with the exception of the Sadr movement, which has been largely marginalized. They reflect the rentier base of the state and the birth of the parties in exile, not an upsurge from within civil society. So Islamism is unlikely to be the solution in Iraq. It is, moreover, inherently antagonistic and divisive in a society cleaved into Sunni and Shi'a in which the latter are further divided by attitudes toward the intrusive neighbor to the East and its special brand of Shi'a Islamism.

Given that a transition to democracy, whether of an Islamist variety or otherwise, seems unlikely in the foreseeable future, and that the status quo is unstable and characterized by widespread violence, the question of Iraq's continued viability as a nation state arises. The possibility of Kurdish secession has become steadily more, rather than less likely, fueled both by increased oil revenues in the KRG and by prospects for a broader Kurdish nation state resulting from the civil war in Syria.⁶⁹ That civil war has also opened up possibilities for some sort of Sunni national entity that incorporates former Syrian and Iraqi territory. That Syria's oil fields are immediately adjacent to the frontier with Iraq, hence in Sunni controlled territory, reinforces speculation about Sunni irredentism in at least Iraq if not also in Syria.⁷⁰ And Iraq is by no means the only Arab country confronting fragmentation. Sudan has already broken in two, Libya is having trouble maintaining national cohesion, and various other Arab countries, such as Yemen and even Saudi Arabia, are having to cope with strengthening centrifugal forces.

The Arab Spring thus seems to be witnessing the formation of a perfect storm that combines popular mobilization, intensification of conflict between social formations,

and repressive but brittle states dependent upon hydrocarbon rents. One of the chief theorists of the resource curse, Michael Ross, presumably would argue that oil rents are the decisive factor in rendering the fragmentation scenario believable.⁷¹ In Iraq's case he could well be correct. The colonial and post-colonial Iraqi states were strong enough to impose center on periphery, their strength due in considerable measure to oil rents. The oil rents, however, simultaneously impeded the further political and administrative development of the post-colonial state, leaving it in a condition of authoritarian rentierism that the post, post-colonial state is itself now seeking to perpetuate. It, however, does not possess such an abundance of rents per capita, and the vertical partitioning of both state and society has weakened the former while intensifying antagonisms between the country's social forces. Oil, while providing insufficient glue to hold the polity and society together, threatens the nation state's integrity by virtue of its attraction to potential break-away regions or states, and by inviting outside forces to meddle in Iraqi affairs, if only to deny others influence over the allocation of those resources. For their part Iraqi politicians, like their Lebanese counterparts, have closer political relationships with their foreign patrons than with their own countrymen. An inclusive Iraqi political community no longer exists. Rebuilding the fractured Iraqi authoritarian rentier state thus faces obstacles that are likely to render that task a fruitless one. Whether an Iraq without oil would have faced a future so bleak is of course a hypothetical question for which a definitive answer is impossible. But then an Iraq without oil would not have been created in the first instance. Being born out of expectations of oil rents, Iraq may die as a result of them.

Postscript

In the event Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki failed in his attempt to rebuild a repressive rentier state dominated by him and his Shi'a sect. The emergence of the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in 2014, with its capture of large swaths of Iraqi territory in the northwest of the country and declaration of an Islamic Caliphate (IS) based in Raqqa, Syria, that summer, stimulated a concerted reaction by interests fearful of the consequences of this dramatic manifestation of radical jihadi power. Those interests included virtually all of the states in the region, the U.S., Europe and even Russia. Most agreed that al Maliki's intransigence and ambitions had fed the Sunni insurgency and therefore that he had to go. Joint American and Iranian pressure, backed by the other interested parties, resulted in him being replaced by a fellow veteran al Da'wa leader, Haidar al Abadi. By early September 2014, al Abadi, backed by these external forces, had managed to cobble together what appeared to be a more inclusive government, which parliament then duly endorsed. The failure to allocate the vital Defense and Interior portfolios, however, reflected continued political tension between the various political forces and the magnitude of the challenge facing the new government in winning the confidence of disaffected Sunnis and Kurds and conquering the IS, even if backed by

U.S.-led external intervention.

In a nutshell, Iraq had by the fall of 2014 become the principal test case in the region of whether former authoritarian rentier states could be reformed sufficiently to gain the popular support necessary to strengthen state institutions so that they in turn could effectively meet the challenge posed by the jihadi Islamism spreading throughout the entire Arab world. That the Iraqi state was still far from that objective was suggested by the fact that its military, which collapsed in the face of the IS challenge, was not called upon to fight alongside American air power and the Kurdish peshmerga in the effort to beat back IS forces. Instead, the government dispatched Shi'a militias to the front, reflecting that its base continued to be restricted to that sect and that state institutions remained profoundly weak. The very willingness of Washington to coordinate its military efforts with those militias suggests its lack of confidence that the Iraqi military could be rebuilt any time soon, to say nothing of the likely impact of this coordination strengthening those Shi'a militias. In sum, despite widespread external support for the creation of an Iraqi state capable of meeting the challenge of jihadi Islamism precisely because at present that state is not perceived as inclusive, accountable and responsive, the prospects for that favorable outcome do not seem great. The implications for other collapsing Arab states, including most notably Libya, Yemen and Syria, are ominous.

Notes

1 For a brief discussion of the situation after Maliki's resignation in September 2014, see the Postscript to this chapter.

2 For an analysis of the oil curse in Iraq in historical perspective, see Yousif and Davis, "Iraq," 227–255.

3 The three "sets" were Hazem Beblawi and Giacomo Luciani, Hussein Mahdavi and Lisa Anderson, who published their works in 1987, 1970 and 1987, respectively. For a review of the concept and its evolution, see Springborg, "GCC Countries as Rentier States Revisited."

4 On elite incentives resulting from oil rents, see Auty, "The Oil Curse: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Implications," 337–348. On the degree to which even comparatively small exporters of hydrocarbons in the Middle East depend upon rents derived from them, see Springborg, "Gas and Oil in Egypt's Development," 295–311.

5 Cordesman, *Economic Challenges*, 54.

6 McArdle, "Doing Business in Iraq."

- 7 Galal and Selim, "The Elusive Quest for Arab Economic Development," 6.
- 8 Ibid., 6.
- 9 "Iraq," *Newnations.com*, Report, October 26, 2012, 16,
www.newnations.com/headlines/iq/php.
- 10 Ibid., 25.
- 11 U.S. Department of Commerce, Commercial Service, and U.S. Department of State, "Doing Business in Iraq: 2012 Country Commercial Guide for U.S. Companies," 3.
- 12 Iraq Economy Profile 2012, *Index Mundi*,
www.indexmundi.com/iraq/economy_profile.html; Cordesman, *Economic Challenges*, 53.
- 13 De Freitas and Johnson, "Formal and Informal Social Protection in Iraq," 9.
- 14 Ibid., 9.
- 15 Cordesman, *Economic Challenges*, 33–34.
- 16 Ibid. 35–37.
- 17 Iraq Economy Profile 2012.
- 18 "Iraq," *Newnations.com*, 25.
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- 20 *World Factbook*. Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2012,
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/iz.html.
- 21 Cordesman, *Economic Challenges*, 7.
- 22 World Bank, World Governance Indicators,
info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/sc_chart.asp.
- 23 "Doing Business in Iraq," World Bank Group,
www.doingbusiness.org/data/exploreeconomies/iraq.
- 24 Ibid.
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data.worldbank.org/indicator/IC.BUS.EASE.XQ.
- 26 *Iraq: Country Profile 2011*. Enterprise Survey. World Bank and the International Finance Corporation, 2011, www.enterprisesurveys.org.
- 27 "Iraq Economic Freedom Score," www.heritage.org/index.

- 28 Cordesman, *Economic Challenges*, 36, 42.
- 29 On his control of coercive forces, see Stansfield, “The Unstoppable Force”; ICG, *Déjà vu all Over Again*.
- 30 Abbas, “Iraq’s Maliki Threatens to Return.”
- 31 Al-Amiry, “The Prime Minister who Plays with Fire”; al-Kifaee, “Between Najaf and Tehran.”
- 32 Human Rights Watch, *Iraq: Country Summary*, January 2012.
- 33 U.S. State Department, *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2011, 2012*, www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/humanrightsreport/index.htm#wrapper.
- 34 Ibid.
- 35 Foreign Policy and Fund for Peace, *Failed State Index 2012*, www.foreignpolicy.com/failed_states_index_2012_interactive.
- 36 Ibid.
- 37 Ali and Elbadawi, “The Political Economy of Public Sector Employment,” 23.
- 38 Ibid.
- 39 Ibid.
- 40 Ibid.
- 41 Ibid.
- 42 Amena Bakr and Peg Mackey, “Iraq, Saudi on OPEC Collision Course over Next Oil Curb,” *Reuters*, December 13, 2012,
www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/12/opec-meeting-idUSL5E8NC30120121212.
- 43 Guy Chazan, “Back in the Flow,” *Financial Times*, December 17, 2012, 6.
- 44 See, for example, “Kurdistan Oil and Gas,” Special Report, *Financial Times*, December 10, 2012, 1–4. On the prospects for Turkish oil and gas companies operating in the KRG, see Patrick Osgood, “Turkey Preparing Major Kurdistan Oil Entry,” *Iraq Oil Report*, November 8, 2012,
www.iraqoilreport.com/politics/oil-policy/turkey-preparing-major-kurdistan-oil-entry-9253.
- 45 On the crude means by which the al Maliki government has sought to influence Exxon-Mobil’s decisions, see Ben Lando, “Baghdad Plotting Retaliation against Exxon,” *Iraq Oil Report*, September 12, 2012,
www.iraqoilreport.com/politics/oil-policy/analysis-baghdad-plotting-retaliation-against-exxon-wayward-iocs-8677. See also Guy Chazan, “Exxon

Seeks Sale of Iraqi Project Stake as Kurdish Oilfields Beckon,” *Financial Times*, November 8, 2012, 16.

46 Cordesman, *Economic Challenges*, 33; and Ben Van Heuvelen, “Turkey Weighs Pivotal Oil Deal with Kurdistan,” *Washington Post*, December 11, 2012, http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-12-11/world/35745217_1_turkish-leaders-senior-turkish-officials-kurdistan.

47 The quota agreed in December 2012 was 30 million bpd, as compared to production of 32 million bpd in the summer of that year. Saudi Arabia decreased production by more than 1 million bpd with prospects for further reductions in store as the OPEC quota in fact appeared to exceed demand by at least one-half million bpd. Saudi Arabia and Iraq were already exchanging harsh words over their respective quotas at the December meeting. See Bakr and Mackey, “Iraq, Saudi on OPEC Collision Course over Next Oil Curb.”

48 See for example Acemoglu and Robinson, *Why Nations Fail*. The classic statement of the correlation between strong institutions and economic growth is North, “Economic Performance through Time,” 359–368. See also Rodrik et al., “Institutions Rule.” For a recent effort to balance the oil curse and institutional arguments, see Elbadawi and Soto, “Resource Rents, Political Institutions and Economic Growth.”

49 Galal and Selim, “The Elusive Quest for Arab Economic Development,” 10–11.

50 Henry and Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development*.

51 See for example Chazan, “Back in the Flow.”

52 World Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/mc_chart.asp.

53 Waterbury, “Endemic and Planned Corruption,” 533–555.

54 That corruption is planned is suggested by the fact that in 2011 over 200 corruption investigations were halted by cabinet ministers, “presumably because they did not want their departments or political allies investigated.” In September 2012 it was revealed that 80 percent of the government’s weekly \$1 billion in foreign currency purchases was being illegally transferred abroad. Katzman, “Iraq: Politics, Governance and Human Rights,” 27.

55 Forced out of office by the prime minister, whistleblower Mohamed Tawfik Allawi, the Minister of Communications, described the level of corruption in Iraq as “huge,” with rates of commission on contracts as high as 70 percent. See

Salah Nasrawi, "Huge Corruption in Iraq," *al Ahram Weekly*, September 20–26, 2012, <http://sites.google.com/site/weeklyahramorgegissue1115/> region/huge-corruption-in-iraq. On the removal of the head of the central bank, see Salah Nasrawi, "Controlling the Money," *al Ahram Weekly*, December 19, 2012, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/News/164/19/Controlling-the-money.aspx>.

56 This observation is based on the author's impressions when he was working as a consultant on dry land farming projects in Iraq and Syria from 1978 to 1981.

57 Baram, "Iraq Past, Present and Future," 4.

58 Maintaining access to electricity is reported by Iraqi managers, for example, as their biggest challenge. *Iraq: Country Profile 2011. Enterprise Survey*.

59 Salah Nasrawi, "Corruption at the Top," *al Ahram Weekly*, October 4–10, 2012, <http://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2012/1117/re8.htm>.

60 The CIM ratio measures not only the capacity of the banking system, but also public confidence in property rights and the rule of law. For the most thorough empirical treatment of it, see Lewis W. Snider, *Growth, Debt, and Politics*.

61 *IMF Financial Statistics*, lines 14a, 34 and 35; and Henry and Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*, 81, 95 and 104, cited in Henry, "Political Economies of Transition," 31.

62 The classic study of the relationship between Iraqi society and its political organizations is Batatu, *The Old Social Classes*.

63 According to Anthony Shadid, "Ayad Allawi represented a future that still looked like what the U.S. imagined when it first invaded: a secular democracy, free of ethnic and religious strife." "Iraq's Last Patriot," *The New York Times Magazine*, February 6, 2011, 38–43.

64 www.worldvaluessurvey.org/index_findings.

65 Deborah Amos, "Wide Gulf Divides Iraqi Youth from Older Generation," National Public Radio, January 3, 2011, www.npr.org/2011/01/03/132631220/wide-gulf0-divides-iraqi-youth-from-older-gene.

66 Asmar *et al.*, "Clash of Politics or Civilizations?" 35–64.

67 On the comparative structural power of capital in the MENA, see Henry and Springborg, *Globalization and the Politics of Development in the Middle East*, 67–112.

68 The 2009 local elections revealed strong antipathy among voters toward the religious parties. See ICG, *Iraq's Uncertain Future*.

69 In mid-December, 2012, a spokesperson for Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki threatened invasion of the KRG if Exxon-Mobil was allowed to drill for oil in disputed territory. Both sides had been mobilizing troops at the border since an incident in the ethnically diverse town of Tuz Khurmatu on November 16. See Ben Van Heuvelen, "In Iraq, Exxon Oil Deal Foments Talk of Civil War," *Washington Post*, December 17, 2012, www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/in-iraq-exxon-oil-deal-foments-talk-of-civil-war/2012/12/17/bdb242c0-4860-11e2-b6f0-e851e741d196_story.html?hpid=z3.

70 Tim Arango, "Syrian Civil War Poses New Peril for Fragile Iraq," *New York Times*, September 25, 2012, A1, A3.

71 For his latest, most comprehensive statement of the oil curse and its propensity to fragment nation-states, see Ross, *The Oil Curse*. For a counter-argument regarding Libya, see Vandewalle, "The New Libya at One," 1–7.