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









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Introduction

It remains a sad fact that terrorism in all its forms remains one of the major threats that continue to dominate the global agenda. The threat is more varied than we have experienced before and staying one step ahead is crucial. Knowledge of the threat, the causes and solutions is an ever more important weapon in our arsenal in our fight against terrorism.

The team at the **University of St Andrews** and **IBC Academy**, who deliver the world renowned online **Certificate in Terrorism Studies**, have brought together excerpts from some core texts in the terrorism and security studies field, all written by respected experts. **These excerpts are available for you free of charge** and will act as a useful primer for anyone considering undertaking the internationally acclaimed **Certificate** or **Advanced Certificate in Terrorism Studies** - but will also prove useful for anyone with a more general interest in this important subject area.

The excerpts explore a diverse range of topical issues and begins with a look at the **Psychology of Terrorism** with a piece by John Horgan on Psychological Warfare. We then move on to a highly stimulating chapter on the **Theories of Terrorism** by Bradley McAllister and Alex P. Schmid, this thought provoking chapter looks at a range of issues such as state sponsored terrorism; terrorism in war; insurgent terrorism and radicalisation. James Lutz and Brenda Lutz explore the **Strategy, Tactics, Weapons and Targets** in an excerpt from their book, Global Terrorism. We have chosen a chapter on the **Dynamics of Dissent** from Dipak Gupta's excellent book, Understanding Terrorism and Political Violence, in this excerpt Dipak provides some thought provoking insights into the often confusing and controversial topic of the root causes of terrorism. The collection is concluded with a chapter from Contemporary Debates on Terrorism where Amanda Munroe, Fathali M. Moghaddam and Jeff Goodwin address the question **Is Religious Extremism a Major Cause of Terrorism?**

We hope you find this collection of chapters interesting, to get the whole picture make sure to check out the full text of the titles excerpted here.

If you wish to formally study the subject to a greater depth, with an amazing choice of fifteen study modules across the **characteristics of terrorism**, **terrorist tactics** to **counterterrorism**, and gain a certificate from the **University of St Andrews**, we invite you to explore the **Certificate in Terrorism Studies** which is delivered by the **Handa Centre for the Study of Terrorism and Political Violence at the University of St Andrews**, with the support of IBC Academy. This 100% online course is utilised by governments, military, emergency services, business communities and interested individuals from all over the world, making it the world's leading on-line professional development programme in the field. For detailed information on the course syllabus and content **visit www.terrorismstudies.com**, where you can also download the **detailed prospectus**.

Psychological Warfare

Chapter 1. Psychological Warfare



Introduction

Pick any debate on any aspect of terrorism. You can be guaranteed that whatever you choose will be shrouded in controversy, inaccuracies and so much polemic that Louise Richardson confidently announced that the only certainty about terrorism is the pejorative nature in which the word is used.[1] Wittgenstein's aphorism "let the use of words teach you their meaning" seems applicable. While we hear of youths who terrorize senior citizens with taunts, or of young children who torture helpless animals, we are unlikely to refer to them as *terrorists*. This we reserve for something else.

Generally speaking, terrorism involves the use, or threat of use, of violence as a means of attempting to achieve some social or political effect. Despite the general tone of this description, this is probably the broadest level on which we can reach consensus on what terrorism is. When we go beyond this, problems tend to arise. From a psychological perspective, an important characteristic distinguishing terrorism from other kinds of crime involving murder, or violence committed for personal reasons (such as, for example, sexually motivated murder, or rape), is the *political* dimension to the terrorist's behavior.

Most terrorist movements are relatively small, (semi-)clandestine collectives built on anti-establishment sociopolitical or religious ideologies. They seek to overthrow or at least destabilize a target regime, or influence it (be it a domestic or foreign-based power) by using violence or the threat thereof to exert pressure. In this sense, terrorism is instrumental in character. Very often, it seems that the goal of terrorism in the short term is simply to create widespread fear, arousal and uncertainty on a wider, more distant scale than that achieved by targeting the victim alone, thereby influencing (in the longer term) the political process and how it might normally be expected to function. The consequences of specific types of short-term actions are designed with the expectation of leading to longer-term outcomes. How terrorist movements do this, however (and whether they actually can; it is quite rare for them to achieve their objectives), is determined by a variety of factors, notably the ideology of the group, its available resources, knowledge and expertise, and a host of other factors. For most terrorist groups around the globe, the gun and the bomb serve to symbolically epitomize their struggle for freedom from their perceived oppressors.

Such popular perceptions of terrorists are often justified, but we must also face some uncomfortable facts. Those whom we call "terrorists" are not alone in the commission of acts that merit this label (assuming, of course, that the essence of terrorism is defined by the *methods* used by terrorists), and this is not simply the issue over who precisely has the monopoly over the use of violence. Not all violence is political in

nature, but non-state groups that use violence will be guaranteed to run the risk of being labeled "terrorist."

Throughout 2011 and 2012, we saw multiple examples of states and governments responsible for equally, and often far more, reprehensible acts of violence on scales unreachable by conventional terrorist organizations. This point is blatantly obvious, yet we choose both to derogate and to label as "terrorism" violence that appears to bubble up from below, rather than being imposed from above. This has not only been the case in so-called conventional wars, but applies to the recent extra-legal responses of several states in attempts to quell civil society protest. On December 11, 2013, adrone-fired missile strike on a convoy in Yemen resulted in the deaths of 52 people celebrating a wedding party.[2] It cannot be unexpected that this would lead to outrage, with onlookers considering it as just another "kind" of terrorism.

An answer to this, and another, alternative defining feature of non-state terrorism, is that for terrorists there is a distinction to be made between the immediate target of *violence and terror* and the overall target of *terror*: between the terrorist's immediate victim (e.g. civilian bystanders) and the terrorist's *opponent* (e.g. a government or ruling authority). Sometimes, terrorists bypass the symbolic intermediaries to target politicians directly, by assassination for instance, but because of this dynamic, terrorism has always been regarded as a kind of communication – a violent, immediate but essentially arbitrary means to a more distant political end. Although al-Qaeda's attacks on 9/11 resulted in the deaths of almost 3,000 people, the more potent immediate and long-term rewards for those responsible for planning and organizing the attacks were the humiliation of the American government, the subsequent psychological arousal for the greater populace and, one could argue, the devastating consequences of the invasion of Iraq cynically framed in the context of efforts to quell terrorism. In any event, the immediate victims in this case may be only tenuously related to the terrorists' opponents. When we consider al-Qaeda's additional expectations of political destabilization and galvanization of extreme Islamic sentiment against Western interests, the allure of terrorism as a psychological strategy and psycho-political tool to otherwise disenfranchised extremists becomes apparent. It would be easy to explain Islamist terrorism exclusively as a civilization clash, but this simplifies the strategic considerations underpinning elaborate terrorist attacks, and exaggerates the role of religion that many presume to "inspire" contemporary political terrorism or to mobilize disaffected populations.

To clandestine groups seeking change, the attractiveness of terrorism as a tactical tool is appreciable. According to Friedland and Merari,[3] terrorist violence is predicated on the assumptions that apparently random violence can push the agenda of the terrorist group onto an "otherwise indifferent public's awareness," and that, faced with the

prospect of a prolonged campaign of terrorist violence, the public will eventually opt for an acceptance of the terrorists' demands. The paradox is that the use of terrorism against a target does not ensure that the target will subsequently be willing to engage in dialogue with, or concede to, the terrorists as a result of what has just happened. The use of terrorism is littered with such paradoxes that illustrate a poor and distant relationship between short-term decision making and long-term planning. The former is a much mentioned but little understood feature of terrorism: the ability (or for some, the aspiration) to create levels of heightened arousal and sensitivity disproportionate to the actual or intended future threat posed by the terrorist. Brian Jenkins[4] is famously cited as having stated that terrorists simply "want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead." What follows from this, however, is that to retain a sufficient grip, the terrorist group must not only create but also *maintain* a general climate of uncertainty and psychological arousal. Maintaining this state often becomes a primary concern for terrorist organizations, even during ceasefires or broader peace processes when immediate goals become obscured. Following its bombing of the British Conservative Party conference in 1984 (in an attempt to assassinate the British prime minister, Margaret Thatcher), the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) issued a statement concluding: "[R]emember we have only to be lucky once. You will have to be lucky always."[5] Of course, maintaining this potent state also plays a core role in sustaining terrorist followers; the criticism of al-Qaeda by its online supporters in 2010–2012 was that the movement's leadership was no longer releasing messages to either its external enemies or its internal constituents.

Schmid[6] describes a core feature of terrorism that gives it potency: a calculated exploitation of people's emotional reactions due to the "causing of extreme anxiety of becoming a victim of [what appears to be] arbitrary violence" (emphasis mine). This is crucial to thinking about the effects of terrorism and is developed further by Friedland and Merari,[7] who describe what they see as two predominant characteristics of terrorism: (1) a perception of the threatened and actual danger posed by terrorists that is *disproportionate* to the realistic threat posed by the capabilities of terrorists; and (2) a perception that terrorism has the ability to affect a set of victims far greater than those suffering from the immediate results of a violent act. The immediate aims and results of terrorist violence (intimidation,injury or death, the spreading of a general climate of uncertainty among the terrorists' audience and target pool) are thus often secondary to the terrorists' ultimate aims (and the hoped-for, from the terrorists' perspective, political change) which are often espoused in the group's ideology or aspirations.

In this sense, and adding to this list of traits, terrorism is often referred to as a form of sophisticated psychological warfare: outside of the immediate event, terrorism might be thought to reflect enhanced arousal and a sensitivity to environmental events associated with violence. For instance, children's drawings (e.g. of bomb blasts,

weapons, soldiers) illustrate this from the child's perceptions, but presumably the children's perspective is equally a reflection of adult concerns. In psychological terms, therefore, it is not terror per se we are dealing with, but arousal. Habituation diminishes arousal over time, so it can be a driving force for escalation of violence where there is explicit use of terrorism to bring forward attainable short-term political agendas. A poorly understood consequence of this heightened arousal is how time-sensitive and politically expedient responses to terrorist violence can lead to interventions that in time are revealed as hastily conceived and disastrously executed – often contributinglittle more than helping sustain support for the terrorist group if and when its members are clever enough to exploit those interventions effectively.

Despite our readiness to identify core features of what we feel constitutes terrorism, however (and, by default, not something else), and furthermore given that terrorism appears to have become a regular feature of contemporary political behavior, academic and policy-related definitions of what constitutes terrorism vary greatly. It is unfortunate that we are all too familiar with hearing the frequently overused "trite and hackneyed phrase[s]"[8] that "one man's terrorist is another man's patriot." Indeed, even systematic and exhaustive attempts to define terrorism have not seen much success.[9] Certainly in the context of the general description given earlier to start the discussion, the use of qualifiers – that is, statements about what is "usually" or "generally" meant by terrorism – permeates discussions of the concept, so much so as to bring into question the value of its continued usage.[10] We are already now beginning to validate Richardson's comment in the opening section of this chapter, as well as to convey several implicit assumptions about the potential and actual misuse of the term terrorism. In essence, to begin to say what "terrorists" do, for many (and not just necessarily in the eyes of the terrorists), carries within it a value judgment even before the actual description itself begins.[11] Certainly, if we rely solely on the criteria given earlier (the use or threat of use of violence as a means of achieving political change) as a guide to explaining what it is that we call *terrorism*, working definitions will never even emerge, let alone evolve. Even at a simplistic level, this is because so broad a description of what terrorism usually involves applies equally to the behavior of groups whom we generally do not want to refer to as terrorists (e.g. conventional military groupings, such as the army of a state).

Discrepancies and confusion arise when comparing different statistical indices of the frequency of terrorist violence around the globe. Different criteria exist not only for what classifies as terrorism per se, but also in terms of what kind of acts should be included in such resources. Long before the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), one of the first major databases on terrorist events, was developed at the University of Maryland, the Rand-St. Andrews Terrorism Chronology, for example, mainly included events of "international" terrorism. These were defined as

> incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets, select victims or targets that have connections with a foreign state (such as diplomats, foreign businessmen, and offices of foreign corporations) or create international incidents by attacking airline passengers, personnel, and equipment.[12]

The database thus excluded "violence carried out by terrorists within their own country against their own nationals, and terrorism perpetrated by governments against their own citizens."[13] Not only are terrorist events themselves the end result of a series of potentially complex acts (some of which in themselves constitute terrorist events, and therefore offenses), as we shall see in later chapters, but this, taken with the inclusion in databases of *successful* terrorist events, presents us with datasets the significance of which is easy to overestimate or misread completely.

Attitudes to terrorism

Embedded in the discourse of definition is one issue that we have not yet fully explored in the literature, let alone understanding its importance for developing systematic policy: we need a willingness to recognize that we are all capable of tolerating ambiguous and inconsistent views. While some of today's terrorism has evolved significantly since 2001, the positive image of traditional revolutionaries, perhaps best typified by Che Guevara, who fueled the imagination of a generation, captures and holds people's impressions, and shapes their image not only of the individuals involved in terrorism, but also of the process and nature of terrorism and political violence. The reality of death and injury, and the legal and moral offenses that terrorism necessarily involves, rarely impinges on the public image of terrorism, or the terrorist. Conversely, in times of media-fueled crises there is for a brief time little to match the public's fascinated reactions to the media's portrayal of the activities of various counterterrorism efforts. Notable examples include the actions of the SAS (Special Air Service) on the sixth day of the Iranian embassy siege at Princes Gate in London in 1980 (when six Iranian gunmen sought the release of 91 imprisoned opponents of Ayatollah Khomeini) and, more recently, the audacious US Navy Seal raid on Osama bin Laden's compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan. In both scenarios, these counterterrorist groups killed the targeted militants, and in the case of the SAS in questionable circumstances.

Some have suggested why we seem hypocritical in our discerning condemnation of certain violent acts, and terrorism in particular. Taylor and Quayle[14] note that acts of violence committed by clandestine, non-state groups seem to strike out and offend people's sense of fairness and "universal" justice. This can be illustrated by the apparently random nature of bombs, a tool used by the terrorist to help sustain a

general climate of uncertainty (i.e. giving rise to sentiments such as "will I, or someone I know, be next?"). They suggest we can understand this inconsistency with reference to the psychological concept of the just world phenomenon. This concept is grounded in social psychology and describes our sense of expectation of universal fairness and order in our world. Undoubtedly, the failure to see "just" and fair outcomes epitomizes the psychological reactions to both the terrorist and his or her victim. The fact that the apparently random victim of this kind of violence is arbitrarily selected to die shocks and sickens people, and this unexpectedness leads to personalization of events even at an individual level. It is seen as terrible and unjust, the way in which anyone, particularly non-combatant bystanders, can be at the wrong place at the wrong time and be killed in the name of some cause that the victim has possibly never even heard of.

Terrorist tactics lend themselves to preferably striking the unarmed or the unsuspecting (e.g. the off-duty police officer or soldier), thus provoking responses typically resulting in the denigration of terrorists as "cowards" – because terrorist victims are killed just to make a point, and are never given a chance to surrender or do something else (e.g. fight back). It has been suggested that perhaps because of this, and certainly facilitated by the personalizing effects of dramatized media coverage, none of us *personally* has any difficulties in deciding what "should" be classified as terrorism and what "should not."[15] Thus, to draw on an underused analogy: not unlike pornography, terrorism is difficult to "describe and define" but we all will continue to know it *when we see it*.[16]

Language and labels

Related to the above, *political violence* is a term intermittently used as a synonym of terrorism. As Heskin[17] argued, while "terrorism is a pejorative term used to describe acts of violence with a political purpose perpetrated by groups without official status," political violence is a "somewhat euphemistic term for the same phenomenon, with the additional meaning that it may include acts and causes for which there is considerable popular sympathy." Bruce Hoffman,[18] in a discussion tracing the use and evolution of meanings of terrorism, concurs:

> On one point, at least, everyone agrees: terrorism is a pejorative term. It is a word with intrinsically negative connotations that is generally applied to one's enemies and opponents, or to those with whom one disagrees and would otherwise prefer to ignore.

Certainly, this pejorativeness does not apply just to how we label different causes as being terroristic or not, but it also is seen to be applied to judgments about the actors

involved in political violence. Hoffman cites Jenkins as writing: "[I]f one party can successfully attach the label terrorist to its opponents, then it has indirectly persuaded others to adopt its moral viewpoint."

US president Ronald Reagan once described the Nicaraguan Contras as "the moral equivalents of our founding fathers," yet, as Schmid and Jongman[19] quote from a three-year study of verified accounts of activities in which the "Rebels" engaged, it is difficult to see the morality of acts that included "a teacher being assassinated in front of his class, . . . women being gang-raped and disemboweled . . . a mother having to watch the beheading of her baby, . . . a Contra drinking the blood of victims." The account thus, Schmid and Jongman feel, "matches in inhumanity anything which the elite press's front pages, chronicling anti-Western international terrorism, have presented us in their selective attention to human victimization."

And herein is another feature of our limited perceptions of terrorism. According to Heskin,[20] two factors determining the nature and extent of people's attitudes towards terrorism and political violence are our individual subjective perceptions of the righteousness of the particular group or "cause" in question, and our physical proximity to direct exposure to terrorism. Therefore, unless we or those close to us are on the receiving end of such apparently random violence (random in the sense that although the terrorist may anticipate casualties, the identity of the individual immediate victim is often truly random), we are often less condemnatory of what we still call terrorist acts. As Taylor and Quayle[21] note,

> how *we* experience the violence of terrorism, how *we* view the rightness of the cause, how much *we* are prepared to see the ends justify the means are critical qualities to how *we* approach the use of violence in the political process.

Many academic researchers agree with the basic notion that terrorism remains a depreciatory label functioning primarily to express condemnation and also perhaps to help legitimize questionable responses. This blurring of the perceived righteousness of terrorism becomes even more obvious when we examine its complex nature. There is a wide variety of targeting strategies and subsidiary activities to be found across the spectrum of terrorist organizations operating in the world today. An example of this can be seen even in the activities of the Animal Liberation Front (ALF), an extreme animal rights group primarily based in Great Britain. The ALF has targeted not only hunters (with letter bombs, razor blade traps and other deadly devices) but, as Veness[22] describes, intensive farmers, meat traders, circuses, the pharmaceutical industry and animal experimentation practitioners, the fur trade, fast food restaurants, marine conservationists and fishermen. Such tactics have won the ALF little sympathy, even in the context of a well-known cause, one widely regarded as noble.[23]

In addition, terrorist groups frequently participate in more obviously criminal activities, such as extortion, theft, robbery, counterfeiting and money laundering. That the purpose of raising such funds is said to be primarily to help the groups to further their politically motivated aims is often the only factor that, from a distance, serves to differentiate such groups from "ordinary" organized criminal conspiracies (groups such as the Italian Mafia, for instance, open to adopting terrorist tactics for their own reasons).

What do terrorists do?

Terrorists still use violence to force political change, and while the motivations of terrorists vary considerably across the plethora of groups, their principal methods remain remarkably consistent. This seems to be the case despite omnipresent and recurring fears about the threatened use of weapons of mass destruction (specifically, chemical, radiological or biological materials) in light of recent technological developments, and changes in the global political world order that began over twenty years ago. While the events of 9/11 signaled a massive shift upwards in the scale of targeting, the group's modus operandi consisted primarily not of using unfamiliar technology or methods, but of exploiting poor security, general complacency and ineffective intelligence sharing, and consequently using the tried and tested method of hijacking aircraft in flight. Indeed, the logic of the event, as with most terrorist incidents, as we shall see in a later chapter, follows a discernible and yet predictable pattern of sub-events, each of which only becomes significant in the context of the final, executed phase of the operation, but each of which from a law enforcement perspective can also be identified and possibly disrupted.

Perhaps counterintuitively, terrorist violence is actually not as innovative in the long term as is implied. It is conducted with weaponry that mostly includes guns and bombs (though the latter have seen quite radical innovation since 2002–2003, with the prominence of the improvised explosive device, IED), the former being traditional yet paradoxical symbols of revolutionary liberation. Yet although the means of terrorism have remained similar for many years, technological developments have meant that there is an ever-increasing array of modalities through which terrorist violence may be expressed and experienced. Although results vary in their effectiveness, particularly when a would-be bomber is exclusively reliant on the Internet and not an apprenticeship with an experienced bomb maker, such information is so easily accessible today that we might usefully ask why there is not even more terrorism as a result.

Interestingly, and despite the billions of dollars of investment in defense programs

aimed at countering the terrorist threat, it has become cheaper to acquire the means to commit terrorist violence. The Oklahoma City bombing by right-wing American extremists in 1995 and the Manchester bombing by the PIRA in 1996 (both major incidents, despite the differences between them in terms of numbers of casualties) involved bombs made from fertilizer compounds, and the components of the Boston Marathon bombings of 2013 were even less intricate. The explosives cited in these examples were those whose primary components can be purchased without any difficulty or major expense. Easily accessible components are the primary ingredients of today's terrorist bombs, just as much as Semtex and other commercial plastic explosives may be. Terrorism is thus not just cost-effective in a commercial sense, but a cheaper avenue to political extremism where either more conventional avenues have failed or a cause lacks popular support. The successful detonation of a bomb guarantees those responsible widespread media coverage, and in the absence of more practical immediate objectives, at least the act will ensure a heightened public awareness of the terrorists' aspirations.

The *targets* of terror are central to discussions of terrorism, and victim qualities are fundamental to this. Often, our images of terrorist victims include frightened airplane passengers or victims of explosions – as stated earlier, people who simply happen to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. The role of such victims in terrorist violence highlights a major aspect of why we employ such a label of discontent for the terrorist. As already indicated, the immediate victims are in many ways not the actual "target." There are consequently three identifiable actors in terrorist violence, each having some degree of interaction with the others:[24] the terrorist, the immediate symbolic target of the terrorist, and the eventual or overall target. For most politically focused terrorist movements, civilians maimed or killed by terrorist bombs are not, in the terrorists' view, opponents (certain terrorist groups with strong politico-religious aspirations view them differently, as we will see); they are primarily incidental victims of the conflict between the terrorists and their enemy (e.g. the targeted regime or source of political influence), but their "role" is such that what happens to them (or what might happen to future potential victims) is assumed by the terrorists to influence the decisions of the political policymakers.

So far, we have considered chiefly personal issues related to how terrorism may be conceptualized or defined, and we have identified some very basic features of terrorism, but before we can arrive at a fuller basis for defining it, other areas also need brief exploration, not least the issue of how terrorism might be distinguished from war and other types of conflict.

Isn't terrorism just war by other means?

Thackrah[25] notes that terrorism is a synonym for "rebellion, street violence, civil strife, insurrection, rural guerrilla war and coup d'état." It can be seen as a form of warfare in general terms, but terrorist campaigns distinguish themselves from what we conceive of as *war-like* campaigns through a number of surface dissimilarities. Traditionally, war is mostly used to refer to conflict between states, whereas terrorists are not state entities in the same sense, in that, to give one rudimentary distinction, they do not have the ability to hold what governments term a foreign policy. Terrorist tactics, from the point of view of the terrorist, *must* differ from those seen in conventional warfare: if terrorists, traditionally small in number and rarely sophisticated in resources, were to engage in warfare with reasonably symmetrical boundaries, they would be destroyed. Terrorists do not have the same level of resources at their disposal, since by the very illegal nature of terrorism they are semi-clandestine individuals serving clandestine organizations. Instead, terrorists adopt "guerrilla-style tactics" in a process of attrition, rather than resembling the victories and defeats of symmetrically based wars in which levels of technical sophistication and resources might, in many cases, be matched. A central aspect of successful terrorist strategy is that by actually determining the "theater" of war (and giving their enemies no choice in the matter), it is the strategic choreography of the terrorists that redresses this imbalance of resources.

Terrorism is distinguished from conventional warfare and other forms of violence used by liberal democratic states and governments in several other basic, but identifiable, ways. Some of these distinctions (even though we might dispute them) will be of benefit later in trying to systematically define terrorism. Bruce Hoffman[26] addresses the distinction as follows:

> Even in war there are rules and accepted norms of behavior that prohibit the use of certain types of weapons (for example, hollow-point or "dum-dum" bullets, CS "tear" gas, chemical and biological warfare agents) and proscribe various tactics and outlaw attacks on specific categories of targets. Accordingly, in theory, if not always in practice, the rules of war . . . codified in the famous Geneva and Hague Regulations on Warfare of the 1860s, 1899, 1907, and 1949 – not only grant civilian noncombatants immunity from attack, but also
>
> • prohibit taking civilians as hostages;
>
> • impose regulations governing the treatment of captured or surrendered soldiers (POWs);
>
> • outlaw reprisals against either civilians or POWs;
>
> • recognize neutral territory and the rights of citizens of neutral states; and
>
> • uphold the inviolability of diplomats and other accredited representatives.

There is no doubt that terrorists' disregard for such boundaries is what contributes to their description as *terrorists*. Al-Qaeda "affiliates" would not recognize any particular guidelines of war and frequently and purposefully attack non-combatant civilians and military personnel who at the time of the attack are either unarmed or considered off-duty. Again, the targets of terrorist violence are symbolic ones and terrorism in this way is very impersonal, but not representative of an unambiguous and discriminate form of violence (which in itself may be an unrealistically achievable ideal, given the vagaries of conventional warfare). Yet, despite this, there is often a sense of implicit boundaries that may not be breached, especially at a local level. Linn[27] adds the following to the discussion:

> When compared to terrorism, conventional war has clear norms: there is a neutral territory which is recognised by the fighting forces, the armed forces are identified . . . there is an awareness that the use of armed forces against civilians is exceptional or aberration. In contrast, terrorism is aimed at the destruction of established norms. Unlike guerrilla fighters who are not only breaking the laws of war, who know who is their enemy and attack only the superior combatants, terrorists blur the combatant–non-combatant distinction by saying that "WAR IS WAR" and that any attempt to define ethical limits to war is futile.

However, as with the distinctions between terrorism and other forms of conflict, there are numerous other gray areas in this debate, not least with regard to defining what properly constitutes a military target. Other obvious questions arise: "The soldier in the tank is a military target. What about one in a jeep escorting civilian vehicles? Or returning on a bus from leave? A bus that may – and was, when a suicide bomber attacked it in Gaza . . . – be carrying civilians too?"[28] The emphasis in mid-2012 on seeking to designate Major Nidal Hasan as a terrorist illustrates this point again. Hasan, a US Army psychiatrist, was charged with 13 counts of premeditated murder and 32 counts of attempted premeditated murder at the Fort Hood Army post in Texas. A bitter controversy ensued about why (or why not) the Fort Hood massacre ought to be specifically designated a "terrorist" act even though his targets were US military personnel.

And yet further to this, although those seeking to overthrow or destabilize a state or regime may use terrorism, it may also be, and is, used by those in control of state power seeking to exercise social control. This may be either over a particular social grouping (a minority), an individual or an element of a foreign power. Terrorism should never be necessarily seen as only violence from "below," an approach epitomized by early analyses of the phenomenon (state-commissioned analyses at that). As a result, describing the differences between warfare as conducted by a state, and terrorism, may

simply be paying lip service to states. There is no doubt that throughout history, states have been responsible for the use of terrorist tactics much more frequently than have the small, anti-state clandestine movements we refer to as terrorist. It may be a surprising aspect of the discourse on terrorism, then, that we do not give as much attention to terrorism as employed by states and governments as we do to terrorism by non-state movements. This, however, may be changing and represents a fundamental change in our perception of terrorism, both as a traditionally viewed tool of the underrepresented weak and as a tool of the authoritarian states in exerting control over internal dissent (as brutally demonstrated in Syria throughout 2012 and beyond), and a growing element as a tactic or overall strategy within conventional forms of warfare, including insurgencies.

Defining terrorism as psychological warfare?

Thackrah,[29] in attempts to tackle the divisive issue of definition, cites political sociologists as arguing that

> no definition [of terrorism] in principle can be reached because the very process of definition is in itself part of the wider conflict between ideologies or political objectives. . . . The problem is not one of the comprehensiveness or degree of detail of definition, but is one of the framework of the definition.

This is a fair point, and one commonly resurfacing in the academic literature at least. Thackrah himself argues that the problem of definition is not simply a matter of semantics, but concludes that the "problem of ascertaining characteristics is vital," both for "guidelines . . . by which social scientists collect and evaluate data on strife incidents"[30] and also for allowing the problem of terrorism to be tackled by law enforcement. It would seem obvious in light of the "Global War on Terrorism" (a term all but discarded by 2010) that a definition of terrorism is for many people now a matter of life or death. Thackrah acknowledges that efforts to combat terrorism based on a *definition* of terrorism will run into difficulty, given one characteristic practice of terrorists: that is, to

produce a terror outcome by threats of violence, *without actual physical injury to any human or non-human target*. Legislative efforts to create a crime of terrorism at the international or state level have to include a definition that r*ealistically mirrors the terror process* [emphasis added].[31]

One way in which terrorism further distinguishes itself from other forms of conflict (as briefly mentioned earlier) is through what we identified earlier as its psychological nature. This dimension is often echoed in the statements of terrorists themselves.

Mohammed Siddique Khan, the ringleader of the al-Qaeda-inspired four-person suicide bombing team that killed 52 people in London in 2005, stated, in his last will and testament video:[32]

> Our words have no impact upon you. Therefore I'm going to talk to you in a language that you understand. Our words are dead until we give them life with our blood. . . . Your democratically elected governments perpetrate atrocities against my people and your support of them makes you responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you'll be our target. Until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people, we'll not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation.

The psychological element of terror may begin to help unify those who form increasing numbers of commentators attempting to formulate a definition of terrorism in terms of the *methods* used by the perpetrators of the act as opposed to interpretations of those methods – so often the basis of conflicting views on terrorist ideologies and their "righteousness," be they small groups of insurgents or large democratic states.

What does it mean to say that terrorism can be a form of psychological warfare? Again, the wording needs examination because the implications are important. "Terror" as a clinical term refers to a psychological state of dread or fearfulness associated with an abnormally high level of psycho-physiological arousal. This is central to what terrorists aim to achieve, since after all, while they have some ultimate set of political objectives, it is an immediate goal of most terrorist groups to *cause terror*. It is no accident that they achieve success primarily in terms of such shorter-term goals rather than in realizing longer-term aspirations, a point regularly made by Abrahms.[33] In psychological terms, the spread of terror and panic through using violence creates the conditions that may give rise to conditions conducive to political change or upheaval.

But while we might experience *arousal* from hearing of a terrorist attack (for fear that there may be further attacks, for instance), we will not experience the terror that the terrorists seek to achieve unless we are subjected to an attack, and even then it tends to be of limited duration. Terrorist groups will try to maintain an overall general level of dread, anxiety or uncertainty, all of which amount to *terror* (in the context of specific events or incidents). To do this infrequently is easily possible: bombings, shootings and interpersonal physical attacks all contribute to a high level of arousal. This can be, and often is, exacerbated by media attention to the event. But to maintain a constant atmosphere of terror is difficult even for the most belligerent of terrorist groups; despite our indirect exposure to terrorist events via multiple forms of media, our memory of terrorist events recedes swiftly.

That a constant state of dread cannot be maintained forever is illustrated through a slow habituation of the terrorist audience to the situation. For the terrorist, audience acclimatization poses problems: if the audience adapts to tactics, the terrorist's influence diminishes. The question arises for the terrorist therefore as to how to maintain this heightened level of anxiety and to *terrorize* effectively.

A small-scale example of the psychological qualities of terrorism and a scheduled pacing of attacks, as adopted by Irish terrorists towards the end of the IRA campaign, was illustrated with a series of shooting attacks in Crossmaglen in County Armagh.[34] Ten British soldiers, including Lance Corporal Stephen Restorick, the last British soldier to be killed by the PIRA before the organization's most recent cease-fire (announced in 1997), were killed by what is believed to be a single PIRA sniper. The gunman used a powerful high-velocity rifle, the Barrett Light .50. Specifically, the area in which the attacks took place has achieved near-legendary status in Republican circles, and the actions of the sniper (as well as the sniper himself) became part of local Republican folklore, with road signs and small murals erected in honor of the sniper to remind any enemy of the Republican movement that they remain uninvited guests. It is a warning that such "unwelcome visitors" to this area (referred to as "bandit country" by British security forces) may be shot and killed. As Keane[35] describes:

> Just outside the village of Cullyhanna in South Armagh, IRA sympathisers have erected an extra road sign. With a silhouette of a gunman, the sign declares that there is a sniper at work in the area. . . . The South Armagh sniper has become the IRA's most efficient weapon against the security forces and is the basis of a propaganda campaign by the Provos. . . . The road sign . . . is one example of the IRA's attempts to undermine the confidence of the security forces. "A sniper is the worst thing for troops, even worse than mortaring . . . because everybody is wondering if they will be next every time they go out on patrol."

Another example can be found by examining recent events in the Syrian conflict.[36] The conflict may represent a general example of a form of terrorism, and even a potential future form of terrorism. For as experienced by the citizens of Syria, for example, they were subjected by the regime and its supporters to what amounts to a series of systematic terrorist attacks which, in its effects, are like those of a sustained terrorist campaign, except on a scale never experienced before. A report released by the Oxford Research Group[37] think tank in late 2013 revealed that over 11,000 children had thus far been killed in the conflict. The highest rate of child deaths was reported in Aleppo, where over 2,000 children died. Many of the deaths and injuries sustained by the children were the result of shelling and bombing. But the Group's report also revealed that almost 400 children had been targeted by pro-regime snipers. Injury through sniping, unlike shrapnel injury, is not random. It requires a deliberate act of aiming the

weapon. This and other evidence suggests that children are deliberately and routinely being targeted as part of this conflict. The reason for this is not because children had some role in the conflict, but presumably because killing them was seen as a strategically effective way of producing fear and despondency in the population at large. The deliberate targeting of children not only illustrates a willingness to broaden the acceptable limits of terrorist violence in order to maintain the overall climate of terror, but also reinforces the message to the audience that it is *worth acceding to*, when faced with either the prolonging of such a campaign of violence or, more chillingly, a possible future escalation of the relentlessness and severity of the violence.

A common belief about why terrorists rarely kill large numbers of people is that either it may be rarely tried, or that attempts at doing so have been foiled by counterterrorist agencies. Another, more potent reason, however, is that support for the terrorist group may be lost if, when the terrorists' objectives seem unreachable, the "acceptable" or expected limits of the effects of a terrorist campaign are exceeded. A myth about terrorist violence in the popular media is that it is often uncontrolled, frenzied and vicious. While terrorism is often vicious, it is rarely frenzied and uncontrolled; when it is, it runs the risk of losing significant support. This point is regularly used to explain the widening gap between al- Qaeda "central" and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi following the latter's involvement and part-orchestration of a series of high-profile and indiscriminate attacks in Jordan, including the 2005 bombing of three hotels, one of which included a wedding party. Similarly, in December 2013 al-Qaeda in Yemen (commonly known as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula) issued an unusual "public apology" in the wake of a callous gun and grenade assault involving suicide bombers on a Sana'a hospital that left over 50 people dead. Realizing that the hospital was not "drone control room,"[38] the movement first tried to deny any responsibility at all. Only when a shocking video of the attackers throwing grenades at hospital staff was shown on Yemeni television did the movement scramble to recover from the outrage. Adept terrorists will never use attacks as an "exercise in meaningless horror."[39] The scale and brutality of a particular attack may obscure political and other dimensions underpinning the strategic considerations of the incident, but they do exist, and we must be aware of them in attempting to make sense of the individual terrorist's behavior, or the behavior of the group or movement directly responsible.

Terrorism: both type and tool of warfare

To advance this discussion, and set the scene for the psychological analysis to follow in later chapters, we need anchor points. If we agree that terrorism is a label, applied by one group to another, then this raises implications for how we might agree on a definition of terrorism. And moreover, for the purposes of a psychology of terrorism the

question arises as to whether there is any valid purpose to defining a concept whose usage as a derogatory label is often so blatantly recognized. The answer, unequivocally, is yes. The confusion surrounding the concept does not mean we discard it. From the preceding discussions, terrorism should be seen as an identifiable phenomenon, for a number of reasons.

First, and most obviously, the violence committed by groups labeled terrorist is distinguished from "ordinary" violence because of the political context to the activities and ideology of the perpetrators and (often) to the nature of the victims and the specific victimizing process.

Second, there are specific immediate aims of terrorism, such as the psychological aspect of spreading fear.

Third, many victims of both state political terrorism and subversive political terrorism are non-combatant civilians, with no responsibility in any conflict, thereby demonstrating one of the blatant disregards that terrorists have for the stated conventions of conflict.

Finally, and a logical next step from these points: can we meaningfully distinguish terrorism from state-run warfare, when, as atrocity after atrocity has shown over the years, state violence often bears too many similarities to behavior we label terroristic? This possibly poses most obstacles for conceptual development, but we can address it.

Schmid[40] distinguishes various areas of discourse on the definition of terrorism. The first of these is the academic context, where one would assume we ought to be able to freely discuss terrorism. The second area of discourse is that of the state, whose definitions of terrorism usually appear to be quite vague and deliberately wide to serve the interests of the state if and when necessary: it is easy to argue that this is so because so often this section sees its own sponsored acts of violence as exempt from such judgment. Third, the public arena, which is largely a diluted and focused reflection of media coverage of the event itself, is often susceptible more to the emotional and psychological reactions to terrorist events as described.

All of these arenas largely differ from the views expressed by the fourth category, that of the terrorists themselves and their sympathizers, who obviously choose not to be known as terrorists, even in the absence of clearer categories. Schmid reminds us of this last category's constant focus on political ends, while their discussions and rhetoric facilitate an avoidance of the particular methods used in terrorism. An example may help to illustrate this. A member of the now defunct Provisional IRA's Army Council (its leadership) gave the author the following account in an interview conducted during the IRA ceasefire. When asked: "what do you think about the word 'terrorism'"? he replied:

> I would define terrorism as a mindless act, without any moral conviction or

> political conviction. Now in a war situation, desperate acts take place, not premeditated as such, right, a bomb going off like Enniskillen and things like that, and innocent people are being killed, a lot of innocent people killed . . . it's . . . the, the Provisional IRA didn't set out . . . I know they didn't set out to kill innocent people, but it happens, like how would, on the other side of the coin, how would one describe, let's say Dresden, is that, is that legitimate? Whereas if the IRA do a small bomb and kill eight or nine people and they, when they kill hundreds of thousands of people, it depends on who presents it, who has the power of the media to present their point of view. Lots of acts that have been put down to the IRA and misrepresented through the media or whatever, portray [it] as if it were a terrorist, a terrorist act. From my own involvement in the Republican movement, I knew that the IRA didn't detonate that bomb in Enniskillen. We can argue the, let's say, whether or not it was right to put the bomb in there in the first place. That is the thing, internally, we would argue, but the intention was to catch the Crown forces. That was the intention. Now as it transpired, somebody detonated the bomb, but it wasn't the IRA volunteers. Whether 'twas by a scanner device or somebody else, whatever, the bomb went off anyway. It's, it's irrelevant who detonated it, but the blame was appropriated to the IRA and it was presented as such, d'you know?

This man, now a senior political figure in government, does not say, and would never say, that he was a "terrorist," given the negative connotations and expectations that the term conveys. His statement may be seen as arrogant, cold, and indifferent to the physical and emotional effects of the bombing on both the survivors of the attack and relatives of the victims. Should what he calls a mindless act, "without any moral or political conviction," be seen as terrorism, and if so, what does this suggest to us? Does it mean that such acts of violence as he describes are not deserving of the label "terrorism" (and all the ramifications that it brings with it, in terms of response from law enforcement and so on) when they are at least supported by an ideology or issue, however distant from reality they may be? The problem still remains. Who is it that will decide on the *mindlessness* of an act, when this so obviously merely represents yet another subjective evaluation?

Schmid makes an encouraging step forward here, and it is one that enables us to narrow the focus while simultaneously retaining the validity of the concept of terrorism. He argues that the best definition is one that most can agree to and that this should be the starting point: conventional war is so called because it is expected to employ rules and guidelines during its conduct. The Geneva Conventions and Hague Regulations formally describe these. Schmid[41] proposes that a narrower definition of terrorism in terms of the *methods* used allows no room for rhetoric as a measure of legitimacy and equally allows no room for states to maneuver behind technical

distinctions. By defining terrorism as "the peacetime equivalent of war crimes," Schmid offers a potential exit from a problem of deciding on the righteousness of violent acts. We can therefore simultaneously escape the choice between a purely criminal model of terrorism, which highlights the illegal means only, and a war model, which portrays terrorism as the trite idea of its being a simple continuation of politics by other available means. By suggesting a legal definition as the peacetime equivalent of war crimes, this would in turn move into the arena of discourse, says Schmid, where there is much more international agreement. Although several local and international treaties have been developed in an effort to increase intergovernmental and interagency law enforcement responses and resolve against sub-state and state terrorism, there have not been significant successes in the development of truly global legislation on what terrorism is, and who the terrorists are. Nevertheless, such a definition of terrorist acts would, according to Schmid,[42] still "narrow what can rightfully be considered terrorism, but broaden the consensus as to the unpredictability of terrorist methods."

Thackrah[43] complements this discussion by restating that the abolition of qualifiers such as "generally" or "usually" disallows the interjection of personal opinion and subjectivity. But if, as Schmid advocates, we focus on the means of the perpetrators, there may be much more room for international consensus. By focusing on the means, we can reliably distinguish "rebels" from "terrorists." Thus, when we reexamine the interview segment included above, the IRA leader's defense of his colleagues with respect to their "accidental" bombing is left with little strength. Schmid[44] offers the following comprehensive definition:

> Terrorism is an anxiety-inspiring method of repeated violent action, employed by (semi) clandestine individual, group, or state actors, for idiosyncratic, criminal, or political reasons, whereby – in contrast to assassination – the direct targets of violence are not the main targets. The immediate human targets of violence are generally chosen randomly (targets of opportunity) or selectively (representative or symbolic targets) from a target population, and serve as message generators. Threat- and violence-based communication processes between terrorist (organisation), (imperilled) victims, and main targets are used to manipulate the main target (audience(s)), turning it into a target of terror, a target of demands, or a target of attention, depending on whether intimidation, coercion, or propaganda is primarily sought.

This definition includes the actions of *states* and governments as well as clandestine anti-state movements.

There is no escaping that Schmid's definition is an academic one and probably unpopular with governments. An important point related to this emerges from the discussion on the use of terror tactics by the warring factions in Syria. While to some

extent the tactics described in the sniping examples were conditioned by Syrian geography, it is because terrorist tactics are *effective* that they are adopted. The second emergent theme, that of the ability to spread fear – a much more diffuse psychological objective – illustrates just how conventional warfare can escalate in its barbarity and produce effects that traditionally have not been explicitly associated with conventional warfare. Taylor and Horgan[45] note (in talking about similar tactics used in Bosnia):

> The level of violence associated with political conflict seems to be a one-way street, drawing strength from breaching the unacceptable. When violence occurs within a terrorist context . . . after a while, what was the unacceptable ceases to be newsworthy, thus ceasing to be effective.

The authors conclude that the attributes of success during such a conflict are not necessarily measured through military objectives, but through psychological objectives, and producing anxiety-provoking responses from the conflict audience certainly appears to meet these.

Conclusions

The complex and slippery impression of terrorism is reflected in problems of definition the depth of which has only briefly been touched upon in this chapter. The fact that a detailed discussion is frequently offered by researchers long before an actual definition is provided is a testament to the challenge of defining terrorism. A central theme that I shall develop in later chapters is the emotional response to the terrorist's actions and how this might shape our view of both the terrorism process itself and those involved in it. It is easy to understand the human nature of the response to terrorism, but this does not affect merely the process of definition. Moreover, as we shall see later, the emotional response to terrorism is just one of the many problems facing even those who wish to study terrorism and terrorist behavior.

Despite the obvious difficulties, there actually are grounds for a more positive outlook, especially when a more substantial, balanced approach is taken to the process of definition. While terrorism is an accepted concept, it remains unclear and inconsistent, not unlike many of its more contemporary synonyms. Depending on where any analysis might start, we might ultimately arrive at very different outcomes, but we must first attempt to work within what frameworks we currently have to the best of our ability. It seems that a useful way of seeing terrorism, then, is as a conscious, deliberate strategic use of violence against a specific type of target to affect the political process. By seeing terrorism as a kind of weapon, capable of adoption by a very wide array of both non-state and state actors (the latter either as, for instance, part of state terrorism, or as a tactic within conventional, "symmetric" warfare, if such a thing exists anymore), we

acknowledge that it is not the sole remit of the non-state actor. By acknowledging this we remove part of the mystery surrounding the processes invoked by our thinking about terrorism, and inevitably accept that it is most useful to see terrorism as something that one "does"as opposed to thinking that the use of terrorism reflects something that one "is."

Schmid's approach remains the most positive and useful step in this regard, and therefore we will bear this approach in mind as a good starting point for both the subject area with which the central arguments of this book are concerned, and, specifically, the use of the word "terrorism" in the chapters that are to follow. The next chapter builds on this debate and presents a brief discussion on some further relevant issues aimed at understanding terrorism as a precursor to the psychological analyses to follow.

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Theories of Terrorism

Bradley McAllister and Alex P. Schmid

Chapter 2. Theories of Terrorism



Bradley McAllister and Alex P. Schmid

Introduction

While terrorism is a practice, it is also a doctrine, and as such has abstract underpinnings reflecting a theory about its presumed effectiveness. Terrorists, however, are not the only ones who have theories of terrorism. Counter-terrorists and academic scholars who reflect on the origins, workings and outcomes of terrorist campaigns also have their own theories. With the proliferation of explanations about terrorism, the body of theories has grown considerably since the 1980s, when Schmid first summarized existing theories.[1] In the following, we shall try to offer a new compendium of theories of terrorism. Before doing so, let us look at what constitutes a theory. Theory, to begin with, is, in the social scientific sense, a heuristic procedure used to determine broad lines of cause–effect relationships. It is, in effect, a simplification of reality that illustrates the dynamics of a relationship with certain inputs and outcomes. More often than not, we do not have fully fledged theories, only some empirical generalizations that are the lowest form of theory.

A good theory, however, should, as Earl Conteh-Morgan reminds us, meet a number of requirements, including these:

1 It must be comprehensive or applicable to various situations, and must include relevant variables.

2 It must be cohesive, with all its segments strongly linked to each other with identical variables in its separate paths.

3 It must be empirical and applicable to concrete situations.

4 As a result of the third requirement, a theory must have the greatest validity or empirical evidence to support it or enhance its explanatory power.

5 It must be parsimonious, or be able to explain the problem or event with as little complexity as possible.

6 It must be open to verification.

7 Finally, it must be clear and causal in the relationship between and among variables, and in terms of considering and linking units or factors at multiple levels of analysis.[2]

It has to be said from the outset that not many theories in the social sciences meet all or even most of these criteria. That is also true of most of the theories discussed below – which, however, does not make them useless. Attempting to evaluate the theoretical

contributions to any academic discipline is problematic. Evaluating terrorism studies is especially so. Few subjects are as plagued by normative questions and infested by politics as is terrorism. The definitional debate has ramifications for the discourse in its entirety, and covers every conceivable aspect of the study, including who is a 'terrorist', what acts qualify as 'terrorism', etc. Further, the complexity of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations sets it apart from many other political phenomena. It is a category of action that includes a wide array of tactics and is undertaken by a broad range of actors in pursuit of a great diversity of goals. Theories of terrorism should, on the one hand, be general enough to address the range of terrorisms, broadly conceived, and narrow enough to usefully analyse a specific aspect of the subject. This complexity is directly related to the need for a multidisciplinary approach to the study of terrorism. Terrorism Studies therefore ought to be – and sometimes is – interdisciplinary. Theories of terrorism therefore come from a variety of backgrounds: international relations, political science, history, psychology, criminology and criminal justice, law, sociology, victimology, military science and communication studies, to name the most prolific disciplines. Each of these academic disciplines draws on a particular research tradition with its own goals and scholarly criteria. For a political scientist or historian to evaluate the theoretical work of a psychologist or lawyer can pose certain problems.

Nevertheless, a meta-disciplinary evaluation of the state of theory in terrorism research is desirable for a number of reasons. Social science theory at its root is an explanatory framework for sociopolitical phenomena and it is the main tool of academics in their quest for understanding the conditions underlying social and political conflict and cooperation. Illustrating the strengths and weaknesses of what has been achieved in Terrorism Studies not only can serve as a roadmap for surveying the existing discourse, but also – by identifying omissions – can point out lacunae in the subject. Filling gaps in our knowledge is a particularly useful way of advancing knowledge; it also offers opportunities for opening new avenues of scholarship. Identifying gaps in our knowledge also paves the way for a more strategic collection of theory-relevant data. All too often, students of terrorism have tended to formulate hypotheses that are testable with available data, rather than generating new data dictated by hypotheses to be tested. The result has often been trivial findings.

As indicated earlier, theoretical progress in Terrorism Studies has historically been retarded by a lack of definitional consensus on the subject. The attempts to reach an academic consensus definition have somewhat diminished this problem, without eradicating it. However, it has enabled researchers to move forward, though cautiously, in conducting more precise research according to a definition that was widely recognized, though not universally accepted. Hopefully, the newly revised academic consensus definition proposed in this volume will further smooth the path towards a universally accepted social science definition.

It is important to state clearly right from the beginning that there exists no general theory of terrorism. One reason for this is the great variety of types of terrorism. As Krumwiede put it in 2004,

In the light of the diversity of the phenomenon 'terrorism' and the multiplicity, and differential weight, of relevant conditions for concrete cases, it is impossible to formulate substantial general hypotheses with broad validity, that is, hypotheses which are valid for all cases or at least most cases.[3]

Most theorizing on terrorism addresses only one type of terrorism, often without the theorist being fully aware of that fact.

Chapter outline

We will divide our discussion into two parts. The first section deals with theories addressing various manifestations of state or regime terrorism, which ranges from repressive violence of the terrorist kind in times of peace, to sponsorship of international terrorist movements. The second section will look at the much larger category (in terms of research volume) of insurgent or non-state terrorism.

In order to manage the latter, we will subdivide the second part into sections organized by level of analysis:

- the agent or individual level;
- the middle-range or organizational level;
- the systemic or structural level of analysis; and
- the dyadic level of analysis (including theories of counter-terrorism).

State or regime terrorism

State or regime terrorism not only has a longer history than insurgent terrorism but also has been much more costly in terms of human lives. Nevertheless, it is decidedly the less well researched of the two major categories of terrorism.[4] A number of reasons come together to make this the case, among them political, academic and practical considerations. In part, this is due to the fact that as politicized a process as defining insurgent terrorism is, defining what qualifies as state terrorism is even more difficult. During the early Cold War period, there was a considerable amount of research and theorizing on the terrorism emanating from totalitarian regimes, generally written by scholars in liberal democratic societies. Since the late 1970s, there has also been a certain amount of writing on terrorism practised by authoritarian polities which were –

and are – often allies of Western democracies in the Cold War period and beyond. Many of these writings have pointed at Western double standards and accused ex-colonial powers and the United States of neo-imperial expansion in the by then largely decolonized developing countries. More often than not, such scholarship has beentainted by ideology, although it has tried to make a legitimate point.

Studies of regime terrorism have to come to terms with the problem of differentiating between legitimate use of force by those claiming a monopoly of violence, and illegitimate state violence. The Weberian definition of statehood assumes a monopoly on the legitimate use of force, but the threshold between a legitimate display of proportionate force for dissuasion and the use of disproportionate, indiscriminate terror for deterrence is often a precarious one to establish. Many young scholars new to the field tended to be attracted by a high-profile topic with ample media coverage and theavailability of government research funds. Research into regime terrorism has proven much harder to fund than anti-state violence. Local scholars living in oppressive societies or under highly repressive regimes are, for obvious reasons, less likely to pursue studies of internal regime terror. Scholars from the outside, with the exception of some anthropologists, are generally not exposed to the consequences of repression. They have often lacked linguistic skills, cultural affinity and access to relevant data for the study of highly repressive regimes, except when the regime terror was part of a recently overthrown regime or dated back to a more distant historical past.

However, there have been a number of outstanding comparative studies, especially of communist regimes in the sphere of influence of the Soviet Union. The Soviet system itself, particularly under Stalin,[5] has received much attention, both during the Cold War and thereafter.

Conceptualizing state or regime terrorism

Because of the large-scale potential for violence in the hands of the state, many scholars consider state terrorism as something sui generis, not comparable to the small-scale terrorism of revolutionary cells acting from the underground. They certainly have a point: the terrorism and political violence of one single regime like the one in Guatemala produced in the country's 36-year civil conflict more casualties (some 45,000 disappearances and 200,000 killed[6]) than all non-state terrorism worldwide in the same period. Its traumatic experience has not been unique, as the following list makes clear. It estimates the number of fatalities from political violence in seven countries:[7]

East Timor (1975–1993)	>200,000

Guatemala (1965–1995)	200,000
El Salvador (1979–1992)	70,000
Iraq (1980–1990)	200,000
Algeria (1992–)	100,000
(Former) Yugoslavia (1991–1995)	110,000
Chechnya (1994–2004)	100,000

The list is far from complete. State terrorism and repression in Chile in the period 1973–1985 killed more than 20,000 people, while in Argentina some 11,000 people, and quite possibly more, disappeared in the period 1976–1982.8 Roughly in the same period, the German Red Army Faction (RAF) killed 31 persons and the Italian Red Brigades killed 334 people in the 1970s and 1980s.[9] In other words, state and non-state terrorism are of very different magnitudes, so much so that some analysts consider them to be different phenomena.

Let us look at the conceptual underpinnings of state or regime terrorism. David Claridge, in his award-winning St Andrews dissertation, begins with the assertion that when regime use of force moves from legitimate to illegitimate, it becomes a means of coercion rather than a means of protection.[10] He elaborates by drawing from existing studies on the psychological impact of fear as a mechanism for social control. According to Claridge, the psychological strategy of state terrorism is not so different from that pursued by insurgent groups. It is mainly the far greater material capability at the disposal of the state that differentiates regime from insurgent terrorism.[11] Claridge's definition of regime terrorism is composed of seven parts and is formulated to take into account only actions strictly determined to be terrorism, rather than more commonplace displays of force:[12]

1 The violence is systematic. That is to say, it is a concerted campaign of violence and not a mosaic of random and unrelated events.

2 It either threatens violence, or is actually violent.

3 The violence is political and not meant to address personal needs or desires.

4 The violence is committed either by agents of the state or by state proxies who carry out their campaigns by using materials provided by the state.

5 The violence is not merely geared towards the liquidation of enemies of the regime, but meant to generate fear.

6 Like insurgent terrorism, the ultimate target is not necessarily the actual victim of aggression, but a wider audience of potential victims.

7 The victims of state terrorism are not armed or organized for aggression at the time the state initiates its campaign of intimidating violence (this rules out cases of civil conflict where the state is acting in self-defence).

Regime or state terrorism is not uniform. There are several, sometimes coexisting, types of regime terrorism:

• Direct domestic state terrorism: the killing of unarmed civilians at home in an overt 'dirty war' by organs of the state (regime of terror, state (controlled) terrorism, repressive terrorism, government or enforcement terrorism, terrorism from above);

• domestic state-supported terrorism: the encouragement or condoning of pro-regime death squads and pro-state vigilante groups;

• direct state terrorism abroad: carrying out clandestine acts of terrorism in foreign countries;

• coercive terrorist diplomacy as in Cold War nuclear threats (balance of terror);

• sponsorship or support of foreign terrorist groups operating abroad;

• the sponsorship of, or acquiescence with, regimes employing terrorism (surrogate or proxy terrorism);

• domestic or foreign false flag operations to place blame for terrorist acts on political opponents.[13]

In a similar vein, Michael S. Stohl holds that terrorism can be either international or domestic, employ agents of the state or like-minded proxies, and be either overt or covert in its execution.[14] Despite the (semi-)clandestine nature of various campaigns of regime terrorism, observable indicators exist for determining when such campaigns are taking place. These include outflow of refugees, the existence of torture, the occurrence of political murder and massacres, the presence of death squads, concentration camps, and disappearances. Reliable data on these phenomena are hard to come by, but just as an illustration of the magnitudes of victimization, here is a list from the UN Working Group on Disappearances in 2006, showing the number of cases of unsolved disappearances:[15]

Iraq	16,000
Sri Lanka	5,700
Argentina	3,400
Guatemala	2,900
Peru	2,400

El Salvador 2,300

George A. Lopez and Michael S. Stohl contend that engagement in regime terrorism can take place at three levels:[16]

1 The state can engage in a direct and systematic campaign, perpetrated by the armed forces and/or state security apparatuses with the intent to repress and terrify sectors of the population.

2 Terror can also be executed using extra-normal legal powers such as martial law, states of emergency, etc.

3 Finally, a state can covertly employ its own domestic security forces.

According to Stohl, within their own societies regimes use systematic state violence and terror (1) as an extension of oppression and repression systems; (2) as a method for the consolidation of power; (3) as a reaction to 'reformist-minded' political, social or economic organizations and their policy demands (challengers to the prevailing system); and (4) as a reaction to an insurgent challenge to the state.[17] The repertoire of repressive tactics of governments is broad and includes, in ascending order of severity and illegality, the following acts:

1 entry and search of homes without a warrant;

2 destruction of private property, e.g. dynamiting houses of suspect persons;

3 suppression of papers and other media;

4 suppression of political parties;

5 physical attacks on opposition party rallies;

6 beatings and physical assaults on individual opponents;

7 excessive use of force during arrests;

8 baton charges by security forces against unarmed and non-provoking demonstrators;

9 arbitrary arrests and incarceration;

10 threats and reprisals against the families of political opponents;

11 forced exile or domestic house arrest;

12 torture and mutilations;

13 political assassinations by death squads or vigilante groups provided with information by the security forces about the whereabouts of the opponent;

14 execution of prisoners without trial or after a fake show trial;

15 disappearances – secret individual abductions followed by torture and murder;

16 pogroms against opposition groups by mobs led by paid provocateurs;

17 premeditated massacres of opposition groups at funerals, mass meetings, etc.;

18 extermination of persons in slave labour camps by means of ration and sleep control, while working them to death;

19 death marches under the pretext of evacuation and deportation programmes;

20 mass terror for the purpose of 'ethnic cleansing'.[18]

Not all acts of repression are illegal, nor are they all terroristic. Deterrence can be achieved by draconian punishment that, like terrorism, can send a message to others who consider challenging state power. However, when exemplary punishment is not only excessive but also exercised against innocent people, it becomes terroristic in nature. Views as to what constitutes legitimate proportionality of punishment might, however, differ in wartime and peacetime, and on opposite sides of the conflict divide.

Domestic terrorism in peacetime

The classical theory of state terrorism was formulated in the early 1970s by Dallin and Breslauer[19], who were addressing the prolific use of state terrorism by totalitarian (read communist) regimes. They hold that regimes ensure public compliance with government directives by virtue of a variety of sanctions. These instruments are as follows:

• normative sanctions, which assume a monopoly on legitimacy and a right to the loyalty of citizens;

• material power, which is a mix of positive incentives such as access to public and private positions, state resources, and civil services;

• coercive power, which includes an inventory of negative or punitive sanctions.

Dallin and Breslauer contend that when communist regimes come to power, they lack normative and material resources. They are, consequently, forced to rely on negative sanctions (often including the use of regime terror) as a means for maintaining control of the state in order to keep rival political organizations, or antagonistic factions within the government, under control. An example is the great purges of communist cadres in the 1930s in the Soviet Union. The following is a list of the number of victims of Stalin's Great Terror in 1937–1938, as estimated respectively by Conquest and Nove:[20]

• arrests: 7 million (Conquest, 1990);

• executions (mostly shot): 1 million (Conquest, 1990); 681,692 (Nove, 1993);

• camp deaths 2 million (Conquest, 1990);

• camp population (1938): 8 million (Conquest, 1990); 3,593,000 (Nove, 1993).

Note that Nove's figure for the camp population covers both gulag camps and NKVD prisons, camps and colonies.

The political scientist Ted R. Gurr assumes that state terrorism reflects, in its essence, a conflict between elites and non-elites.[21] He defines the state as a 'bureaucratically institutionalized pattern of authority whose rulers claim to exercise sovereign (ultimate) control over the inhabitants of territory, and who demonstrate an enduring capacity to enforce that claim'.[22] State claims of sovereignty are either derived from a sense of popular legitimacy, or enforced by positive and negative inducements in the absence of such legitimacy. Terrorism is one such negative inducement in a state's repertoire of control. Echoing Lopez and Stohl's articulation of levels of involvement in regime terror, Gurr maintains that internal state terror in peacetime is facilitated by a perversion of the existing legal and security structures. While the term 'terrorism' implies a lack of legitimacy in regime behaviour, Gurr puts forward criteria for the intent and efficacy of internal state terror. First, the violence must have been intended to actualize a threat and to speak to a broader audience. Second, consistency is necessary to induce fear in the population; thus, an individual act of violence must fit within broader patterns of behaviour. Third, the violence must take place with the state's explicit or implicit approval. Gurr also proposes a proportionality principle whereby the reaction to non-elite challenges should be proportional to the threat posed by those groups. Gurr holds that there are two types of internal state terrorism: situation-specific and institutionalized. Situation-specific terrorism is a response to a specific threat present during a limited temporal span. Institutionalized terrorism, on the other hand, implies a systematic adoption of terror as a mechanism for maintaining state control. The former may be initiated through the imposition of short-term legal emergency measures such as the introduction of martial law. The latter is typically promulgated by the advent of new agencies whose task it is to manage regime terrorism. Gurr proposed a series of hypotheses regarding the breeding grounds that encourage regimes to have recourse to terrorist tactics:[23]

1 The greater the political threat posed by challengers, the greater the likelihood that a regime will respond with violence.

2 The greater the latent support for revolutionary challengers in a population, the greater the likelihood that a regime will respond with terrorism.

3 Regimes are more likely to use terrorism against politically marginal groups than against opposition groups that have influence on or supporters among the elite.

4 Weak regimes are more likely to use violence in response to challenges than strong

regimes.

5 Elites who have secured and maintained their positions by violent means are likely to choose violent responses to future challenges.

6 Successful situational uses of state terror in polarized societies are likely to lead to institutionalized terror and to the pre-emptive use of terror to maintain political control.

7 The initial decision of a challenged elite to use state terror is usually modelled on others' successful use of state terror.

8 Democratic principles and institutions inhibit political elites from using state violence in general and terror specifically.

9 The greater the heterogeneity and stratification in a society, the greater the likelihood that a regime will use violence as a principal means of social control.

10 Minority elites in highly stratified societies are likely to use terror routinely as an instrument of rule.

11 Regimes facing external threats are likely to use violence against domestic opponents.

12 Regimes involved in proxy big-power conflicts are likely to use the most extreme forms of violence against challengers, including state terrorism.

13 Peripheral status in the world system increases the likelihood that regimes that rule by violence can do so with impunity.

Gurr offers one of the most comprehensive approaches to understanding why, how and when regimes turn to internal repression as a mode of governance. He divides structural conditions conducive to terror into four categories, reflecting in turn the challengers, the regime and prevailing ideology, the social structure, and the international system.[24] First and foremost in the decision making calculus of those holding state power looms the nature of the non-elite challenge to the regime. At the most basic level, elites must perceive a threat to the status quo. The existence of challengers alone is not sufficient to prompt such fear, as not all political opposition movements provoke trepidation among rulers. Pursuant to this, the greater the threat posed by the challengers, the greater the likelihood that their presence will provoke violence. Typically this would entail a fairly large opposition whose stated goal is the overthrow of the current elites. The presence of latent support for the opposition within the broader population exacerbates this hostility. Regimes will often opt for violent reactions to non-elite challengers if those challengers themselves use violence as a means for obtaining political power. Challengers emanating from marginal

elements of society are much more likely to be resisted by elite violence.

The nature of the opposition is only part of the equation; the nature of the regime and its political ideology also play a role in the likelihood of resorting to state terrorism. First, weak regimes are more likely to resort to violence than strong ones. Second, a history of state violence is likely to result in a return to violent tactics in the future. Third, a successful use of situational violence will often lay the foundations for an institutionalized campaign later on. Fourth, like insurgents, states typically learn by observation and thus model their domestic campaigns on successful violence by other regimes. Finally, Gurr observes that the presence of democratic institutions and principles inhibits (though does not preclude) the use of state terrorism. The prevalence of state terror is also a reflection of the dominant social structures in placein a state. State terrorism is more likely in heterogeneous or highly stratified societies. Violence might be especially severe if it is perpetrated by a minority regime that is attempting to maintain its position of privilege. Gurr believes this relationship is a result of social distance, which retards empathy and makes the choice to resort to violence easier on the regime.

Gurr does not assume that states operate in a vacuum. On the contrary, the nature of the international environment plays a part in determining when a state resorts to internal violence. For example, Gurr notes a correlation between the use of internal violence and the presence of external threats. Moreover, the choice to resort to violence is often easier in peripheral countries, where the leadership is less likely to provoke international reproach. Finally, client regimes of major powers often become caught up in hegemonic conflict as the powers confront each other via proxy wars inevitably involving domestic violence.

While the comprehensiveness of Gurr's approach sacrifices a degree of parsimony in order to address the complexities of state decision making with respect to internal terror, he offers one of the most useful and generalizable insights into the subject.

State repression and terrorism is, to some extent, quantifiable and measurable. Michael S. Stohl and Mark Gibney *et al*. offer a useful means for rating the severity of internal repression.[25] They use a scale of five levels:

• *Level 1*. Countries under the secure rule of law. People are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare.

• *Level 2*. There is a limited amount of imprisonment for non-violent political activity. However, few persons are affected; torture and beatings are exceptional. Political murder is rare.

• *Level 3*. There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of such imprisonment. Executions or other political murders and brutality may be common.

Unlimited detention, with or without a trial, for political reasons is accepted.

• *Level 4*. Civil and political rights violations have expanded to large numbers of the population. Murder, disappearances and torture are a common part of life. In spite of its generality, on this level terror affects primarily those who interest themselves in politics or ideas.

• *Level 5*. Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.[26]

Mark Gibney maintains a database coding information from the yearbooks of Amnesty International and the US Department of State's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, and places all countries, year after year, in one of these five categories. This has led to interesting findings such as the observation that the level of state repression in all but the 30 relatively rich OECD countries has worsened in the post-Cold War period, 1991–2006, compared to the period 1977–1990. The average score for the post-9/11 years 2001–2006 has been 3 on the five-point scale – a level never reached for more than three consecutive years (1980–1982) in the previous period. Figure 4.1 shows the average political terror scores for 1976–2006 for non-DECD countries.

These averages, however, hide important regional differences. For three regions – East Asia and the Pacific, Latin America and the Caribbean region, and Europe and Central Asia, the average political terror scale declines for the post-1990 period compared to the pre-Cold War period. For three other regions, however – South Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, and the Middle East and North Africa – human insecurity increases quite dramatically. Somewhat counter-intuitively, the decline in security is larger in South Asia than it is in Africa or the Middle East.



Figure 4.1 Average political terror scores, 1976–2006, for all available non-OECD countries.

Before one is inclined to attribute these differences to political culture, it is worthwhile to look at the income levels of the non-OECD countries. From this, it clearly emerges that the higher the income, the lower the use of terrorism and repression by regimes (Figure 4.2). On the basis of this finding, one is inclined to conclude that when there is more distributable income, the fight for scarce resources does not take such a bloody turn. The worldwide recession that started in 2008, combined with the stepping up of counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency in a great number of countries, has probably made repression worse for larger sections of the population.

State sponsorship of terrorism

Theories dealing with state sponsorship of international terrorism were popular during the Cold War period, when war-by-proxies was one of the tactics employed by the rival camps. There are three schools of thought, each denoting a particular more or less ideological take on state sponsorship – specifically, which of the hegemonic powers bore the main responsibility. One school held the view that the Soviet Union was responsible for a sizeable portion of international terrorism, but not for all, or even most, of it. A second school held that 'all roads lead to Moscow', fully blaming the masters in the Kremlin for international terrorism. A third school affirmed (not incorrectly) that some Western governments were also implicated in the backing of insurgent groups using terrorist tactics (e.g. the United States in the case of the Nicaraguan Contras). Serving as a patron of nonstate terrorists, however, is not simply a



Figure 4.2 Average political terror scores, 1976–2006, for non-OECD countries by income level.

privilege of superpowers and former colonial powers. Since supporting client groups abroad is a cheap alternative to conventional conflict waging, terrorism-by-proxy has been utilized by a number of states for a variety of reasons, the most basic being 'my enemy's enemy is my friend'.

Despite the fact that the ability to attract a state sponsor often makes or breaks insurgent terrorists, little non-ideologically driven research on state-sponsored terrorism has been conducted. The outstanding exception is *Deadly Connections: States That Sponsor Terrorism*, by Daniel Byman.[27] Byman typologizes state sponsorship of insurgent movements on several levels: by type of state sponsor, by the type of support given, and by the motivation for support. He divides state sponsors of international terror into strong, weak, lukewarm, antagonistic, passive and unwilling sponsors:[28]

• Strong sponsors adamantly favour the cause of the insurgents and make available a sizeable portion of state resources to further their ends.

• Weak state sponsors are committed to the cause but lack the necessary resources to provide meaningful aid to the insurgents.

• Lukewarm patrons serve as advocates for insurgents but ultimately prove reluctant to mobilize resources to help in the conflict.

• Antagonistic supporters of terrorists wish to use a group to further the state's own aims, and as a result try to control its activities, often to the detriment of the sponsored organization.

• Passive supporters do not actively provide aid to insurgents, but do help by turning a blind eye to insurgent activities.

• Unwilling sponsors may wish to destroy the insurgents, but are too weak to take on the terrorists and reluctantly allow their territory and resources to be exploited by them.

Of these, only the first four can be considered active supporters. Byman observes that the motivation for providing support can be as varied as the degree of support given.[29] Broadly speaking, a state may be driven to come to the aid of a foreign insurgent movement by strategic concerns, ideology, and/or domestic politics. Strategic concerns include efforts to destabilize neighbours, attempts to project power beyond what the state is conventionally capable of, efforts to provoke regime change abroad, and a desire to have a hand in shaping the opposition to hostile regimes. Ideological concerns are less tangible, but nonetheless important. Typically, states may be swayed to support terrorists either as a vehicle for exporting their own political system, or as a means of enhancing the sponsor's international position. Domestic concerns may also persuade a state to sponsor outside insurgencies. Broad support to aid ethnic kin, or to

help co-religionists, often plays a hand in fuelling such conflicts. However, a state may also support an internationally operating terrorist group in exchange for support in dealing with domestic opposition.

The motivation for the sponsorship often dictates the type of support given to insurgent movements. The most common is training and operational support. Money, arms and logistical aid are also valuable resources states can make available to armed client groups. Diplomatic backing can be important, although it is often less crucial to the terrorist group's survival. Sometimes, organizational assistance and ideological direction are sought from state sponsors. The single most important form of sponsorship, however, is the provision of sanctuary, from which insurgents can organize operations with impunity.[30] When determining whether and what type of aid to provide, a primary concern for state sponsors is the threat of escalation.[31] If the threat is strong that a sponsor will be drawn into a conflict on behalf of a violent non-state terrorist actor, then the motivations for support must be very salient (or the efforts for 'plausible denial' very successful). Further, the degree to which a state is inclined to help a terrorist group also depends on the extent to which a state is willing to be linked to insurgent activities. States like Pakistan, Iran, Syria and Sudan are, or have been, in the recent past, linked to the support of terrorist groups acting against neighbouring countries. In the past, Cuba, North Korea and Libya were also listed as 'rogue states'. Venezuela has apparently discontinued its support for the Colombian FARC, following embarrassing disclosures in 2008 that made 'plausible denial' no longer credible. Byman's conceptualization of state-sponsored terrorism is, in our view, a long-overdue new perspective on what was, until recently, a more political than analytical take on state sponsorship of terrorism.

Terrorism in war

While state terrorism as a whole has been under-studied,[32] the role of terrorism in civil and international war is even more neglected. Partly, this is due to the fact that, figuratively speaking, the terrorist 'trees' tend to be overlooked in the 'forest' (and fog) of war. Many of the crimes committed in warfare are much greater than terrorist acts tend to be. Yet certain practices of war, like ethnic cleansing and the creation of refugee flows, are often linked to terrorist tactics. Recently, systematic rape to terrorize and demoralize civilian populations has been added to the repertoire of terrorist tactics, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. However, terrorist tactics like the massacre of prisoners of war, the taking and killing of hostages, or the bombing of civilian populations have a long history. Many such acts are grave breaches of the rules of warfare – that is, war crimes, or even crimes against humanity. Such acts of terrorism often overlap with tactics outlawed by international humanitarian law, as codified in

the Hague and Geneva Conventions and their Protocols, and, more recently, in the Rome Statute (1998), which established the International Criminal Court in The Hague. The main thrust of the international laws of warfare is, however, still geared towards interstate war, while such warfare has become far less frequent than intra-state warfare, with insurgents battling the state. Recently, there has been a trend towards warlords fighting not just each other but the civilian population, with the state sometimes fully or partly absent (as in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of the Congo). Certain features of air warfare, including the use of unmanned drones, often used in counter-terrorist operations, while not deliberately directed against civilians, have caused terror among civilians. For a rural population gathering in a market place, a bomb suddenly falling from the sky from an altitude of 12 kilometres is little different in its terrifying effects from an improvised bomb placed under one of the market stands: there is an apparent lack of discrimination, there are civilian casualties, and while in one case civilians might be classified as 'collateral damage' and in the other deliberately targeted, in either case innocent lives are shattered and survivors traumatized. Contemporary low-intensity warfare has often been characterized by a confluence of tactics and countermeasures: guerrilla ambushes, hit-and-run operations, acts of arson and sabotage, terrorist bombings, kidnappings for ransom or blackmail, rioting by sympathizers and protesters of one side or the other, political demonstrations, industrial strikes, parliamentary actions, individual assassinations, abductions and illegal renditions, raids and mass arrests, massacres, concentration camps and disappearances. The logic of such deadly cocktails of active and reactive violence is difficult to capture with any single theory. Yet the role of terrorism in warfare remains a major lacuna in our knowledge. An important recent contribution has been the study of Andreas Feldman and Victor Hinojosa on terrorism in Colombia, a country that in the period 1970-2004 recorded the highest incidence of terrorism in the world – 5,432 incidents, according to the Global Terrorism Database.[33] Feldman and Hinojosa argue that

> terrorism in Colombia constitutes a specific strategy that can be clearly distinguished from other manifestations of violence. Armed parties, particularly guerrilla and paramilitary groups, have turned terrorism into a pivotal element of their repertoires of action. These parties have not only increased their reliance on this strategy, but have also expanded the range of this practice and introduced new, more refined forms of terrorism, including deterritorialized terrorism. Moreover, the parties have specialized in particular forms of terrorism that suit their general objectives. While paramilitary groups rely mostly on massacres and forced disappearances, guerrillas concentrate on agitational terrorism including kidnappings and indiscriminate bombings.[34]

Feldman and Hinojosa manage to differentiate between governmental or state

terrorism and nongovernmental terrorism. They use the term 'state terrorism' for 'acts perpetrated by state agents or by private groups on the order of or on behalf of a state that seeks to terrorize the population and propagate anxiety among citizens to curb political opposition'.[35] They manage also to differentiate terrorism from guerrilla warfare, following the definition of the latter from the *Encyclopedia of Guerrilla Warfare*, which describes it as 'a set of military tactics utilized by a minority group within a state or an indigenous population in order to oppose the government or foreign occupying forces'.[36] It is worth citing them at some length since confusion about the difference between terrorism and guerrilla warfare is still widespread:

> Guerrilla warfare is a very ancient form of warfare generally used by the weaker parties that must confront superior forces. Unlike terrorism that deliberately seeks to injure civilians violating the International Humanitarian Law (IHL) principle of distinction, guerrilla warfare involves harassing the enemy by avoiding direct confrontation in pitched battles and concentrating on 'slowly sapping the enemy's strength and morale through ambushes, minor skirmishes, lightening raids and withdrawals, cutting of communications and supply lines, and similar techniques'. Guerrillas normally set up small military units and seek to establish liberated zones that may be used to challenge the state militarily. In these enclaves, usually located in the countryside,these groups normally create a parallel state structure. Such acts do not constitute terrorism, provided the perpetrators are constrained by the laws of war and the targets of the violence are combatants. Indeed, the crucial distinction between terrorism and guerrilla warfare is the nature of the act itself, irrespective of the organization or individual that carries out the actions.[37]

Feldman and Hinojosa conclude, looking at the non-state (but in some cases state-linked) activities of paramilitaries and guerrilleros:

> Paramilitary groups have concentrated on massacres and disappearances and used them to drive peasants away from strategic areas they seek to control. These groups resort to terrorism to endorse the political status quo. Guerrillas, for their part, engage in agitational terrorism, including bombings and kidnappings, which seek to undermine the legitimacy and credibility of the state and also to convey the message that the state is incapable of providing security for its citizens. Many of the violent actions carried out by these groups, especially massacres, assassinations, and forced displacement, deliberately seek to instil fear in the civilian population. Additionally, some actions intended to help the organization obtain funds to wage war, such as the widespread practice of kidnapping, while not intentionally intended to spread terror, end up having the same effect. We also posit that waves of terror tend to correlate with

> period of intensified armed conflict . . . and that they materialize in strategic areas that parties seek to control militarily. . . . Civilian immunity, the cornerstone principle of IHL, is wilfully violated time and again by parties who cynically argue that infractions are the unfortunate although inevitable result of warfare in the Colombian context. A careful examination, however, shows that terrorism constitutes a calculated and deliberate strategy that parties undertake to maximize their goals in the general war effort.[38]

This is not new. Even governments fighting for a good cause – like opposing Nazism in the Second World War – have used terrorist tactics. The Allies fighting fascism and national socialism conducted bombing operations through much of the Second World War, killing an estimated 370,000 civilians in Germany.[39] A particularly drastic example was the bombing of Dresden in mid-February 1945, which cost up to 25,000, mostly civilian, lives. The British wartime leader, Winston Churchill, wrote in a secret memorandum drafted for General Ismay and the Chiefs of Staff Committee:

> It seems to me that the moment has come when the question of bombing of German cities simply for the sake of increasing the terror, though under other pretexts, should be reviewed. Otherwise we shall come into control of an utterly ruined land. . . . I feel the need for more precise concentration upon military objectives . . . rather than on mere acts of terror and wanton destruction, however impressive.[40]

Insurgent terrorism

Insurgent terrorism has captured the attention of policy makers, the media and researchers much more than wartime terrorism or peacetime domestic state terrorism. The theories in Terrorism Studies addressing insurgent terrorism cover a wide diversity of actors and actions. Terrorism is often seen by some of them (as well as by some terrorists themselves) as a tactic employed in attempts to trigger or maintain an insurgency.[41] However, insurgent terrorism itself can take many forms. Stepanova,[42] as we saw in the previous, chapter, on typologies, classifies insurgent terrorism according to whether it is global or local and whether or not the campaign of terror is part of a broader political conflict. On this basis, one could distinguish three broad strands of insurgent terrorism. There is what could be termed *stand-alone, peacetime terrorism*, which is often nothing but armed propaganda and agitation for recruitment and mobilization. Then there is *embedded terrorism* – that is, terrorism enmeshed with (other forms of irregular) warfare. Beyond that there is *global terrorism*, as enacted by movements with universal ambitions, of which Al-Qaeda can be seen as a prototype.

Since there is no general theory of terrorism, one has to content oneself with theories

that cover one (sub-)type or other of the phenomenon. While Feldman and Hinojosa have advanced our theoretical understanding of terrorism by guerrilla and paramilitary forces that are often linked to the military, if not the civilian government, theoretical advances regarding the use of terrorism by states in inter-state warfare are still lacking. The problem, however, is one that deserves more study.[43]

For the purpose of this overview of theories of terrorism, we have divided the subsequent section into four sub-sections, according to the level of analysis used in research:

1 The first sub-section will deal with theories of terrorism utilizing the agent (or individual) level of analysis, including psychological theories, rational choice theories, theories of terror propounded by the insurgents themselves, and others.

2 The second sub-section will deal with the organizational level of analysis, analyzing the effects of group dynamics and goals on terror.

3 The third sub-section looks at studies utilizing the systemic level of analysis. These structural theories of terrorism include the 'root cause' debates, analysing economic, political and cultural feeders of insurgent violence.

4 Finally, we will close with an overview of dyadic studies of terrorism, including theories of counter-terrorism.

Insurgent terrorism: agent level of analysis

The agent level of analysis, focusing on the terrorist actor, has been among the more problematic areas in the study of terrorism, as it has often utilized ill-founded theories of terrorism based on individual personality and even physiognomic traits allegedly typical of terrorist criminals.[44] In part, studies of this nature were an outgrowth of a perhaps natural desire to view terrorists as abnormal. In addition, they often allowed states to de-legitimize the goals and aspirations of militant rebels by labelling them madmen. While terrorist groups have their share of psychologically unbalanced individuals, like other populations, it would be detrimental for any terrorist group to admit even borderline cases into its ranks, for reasons of security. However, life in the underground, with the threat of persecution, from both within and without, can create psychological stress which affects the behaviour of previously normal individuals. To the extent that members of terrorist groups use, or are given, mind-altering drugs to 'fire them up' before attacks, their behaviour can also become erratic, especially when embarking on high-risk and suicide missions. In the following, we will review some psychological theories, rational choice theories, the theories of terrorist practitioners, and the extant literature on violent radicalization.

Psychological theories of terrorism

Jeff Victoroff stated that the major deficiencies in the canon of psychological theories of terrorism arose from the fact that much of the research has been based on theoretical speculation or merely anecdotal empirical evidence.[45] Yet Victoroff and other specialists maintain that terrorism can result from identifiable (and malleable) social and psychological factors.[46] The focus of some current psychological research is on why individuals join terrorist organizations, why they leave such organizations and what the effects of membership in a clandestine organization are on the individual member.

John Horgan divides the application of psychology to the terrorism studies into two main categories: that dealing with individual psychology, and that dealing with how individuals are affected by organizational membership.[47] He echoes the concerns of many other psychologists and dismisses the popular notion that terrorists exhibit abnormal psychological traits. In point of fact, detailed studies of terrorists have shown that most of them are normal in a clinical sense[48] (although their atrocities are clearly not normal in a moral sense). Drawing distinctions between the violence of terrorists and the apolitical violence of psychopaths, Horgan shows that the lifestyle of a professional terrorist is not conducive to aberrant personalities. First, terrorist violence is generally undertaken in pursuit of collective goals, not the fulfilment of personal fantasies (except in the case of lone-wolf terrorists). Furthermore, membership in a terrorist organization requires extreme loyalty and commitment – rare qualities among those suffering from, say, extreme narcissism. From an operational point of view, Horgan observes that extreme personalities make individuals stand out in the public eye. As a result, secret organizations will actively avoid recruiting such people. His assertions are supported by Donatella Della Porta's study of female Italian terrorists, which illustrates the pro-social qualities of membership in the violent organizations she studied.[49] Horgan finds that at least three abnormal psychological theories continue to be erroneously applied to terrorists:[50]

1 The frustration-aggression theory. According to this theory, aggression is a response to the blockage of goal attainment. Terrorism, then, is an individual response to the lack of alternative modes of political expression. However, Horgan points out that such theories cannot account for the process by which blockage leads to terrorism, nor can they account for variations in individual outcomes, as only a few frustrated people turn to terroristic aggression. Horgan further notes that many frustration-aggression theorists make methodological errors when mixing up levels of analysis (individual or group).

2 Second, narcissism and narcissism-aggression theories understand violence as the result of enhanced ego concerns. As pointed out before, however, these sorts of personality disorders are not conducive to successful survival in an underground organization where the ego of the individual member is sacrificed to group survival.

3 Finally, Horgan finds that psychodynamic accounts for political violence continue to be employed, based on the assumption that violence is the result of latent desires going back to early childhood experiences. All this is not well supported by the available empirical evidence.

Andrew Silke, corroborating some of the findings of Horgan, points out that the vast number of studies that claim to provide evidence for psychotic personalities come from writers using only second-hand research, not personal interviews conducted by the researcher with individual terrorists in face-to-face situations.[51] Silke maintains that membership in a terrorist organization is the result of certain processes that share common factors[52] and have can be modelled by psychologists. Broadly speaking, a majority of violent extremists tend to come from the more risk-acceptant demographic cohort of young males between the ages of 18 and 25. Social identification with worthwhile others and marginalization are often salient features, with many terrorists identifying with groups (either their own or an adopted one) experiencing some kind of marginalization. Furthermore, Silke observes a process of vengeance seeking at work in the process of individual radicalization. Vengeance in this sense is an extreme manifestation of a primate's natural instinct for justice. The desire for vengeance is tied to feelings of self-worth and can act as a deterrent against further injustice. Silke notes, however, that this sense of injustice does not necessarily have to be personal, but can be vicarious as well, echoing Schmid's identification theory of insurgent terrorism (1984)[53] as well as more recent findings by organizational and structural theorists which will be expounded upon later. Individual radicalization may also be tied to the desire for status and personal rewards. For this to be a persuasive motivation, the group in question must carry the potential for a certain measure of respect among the constituency it claims to fight and speak for. In extremely polarized communities (as well as in prisons), individuals might seek membership in underground organizations as a means of protection from rival groups. If the environment is such that a myriad of different groups are vying for power, individual choice may be abrogated by press-ganging and conscription.

Horgan broadens the scope of psychological inquiry in Terrorism Studies beyond examining the reasons why individuals join violent organizations by focusing also on why individuals are exiting violent groups.[54] He divides the psychological study of terrorism into three stages: becoming a member of a terrorist group, remaining in the underground organization, and leaving terrorism behind by exiting the group.[55] The

process of becoming a terrorist is, according to Horgan, a diverse one and is almost always the result of a gradual (rather than sudden) socialization into violence. Remaining a member of an outlawed organization requires psychological strength, loyalty, obedience and discipline. Groups tend to manage cohesion among their members by enforcing conformity. The process by which individuals leave an organization involves two phases: psychological disengagement and physical disengagement. Psychological disengagement occurs when members begin to mentally question their commitment to organizational membership. This often occurs as a result of the considerable pressures of life in the underground. Membership in outlawed communities tends to replace normal social processes such as dating, marriage, child rearing, etc. with organizational security concerns. As members become older, some eventually seek to reconnect to family-seeking processes. Additionally, the reality of life in the underground lacks glamour and rarely reflects the goals and aspirations that originally led members to join. The resulting disillusionment is often exacerbated by the prevalence of group think in radical organizations. The more detached members of underground organizations become from reality, the more some members are likely to question and rebel against organizational goals. Psychological disengagement may or may not be followed by physical disengagement, which in turn refers to the process by which individuals actually leave a terrorist organization. It can take place through a variety of processes and may or may not entail the revocation of support for the group's goals. It is usually correlated, according to Horgan, with one of the following processes: arrest, specialization in a non-violent role, the eviction of the individual from the organization, or simply a change in priorities on the part of the wavering individual.[56]

Psychologists have also made promising advances in the field of analysing the effects of terrorism on victims of terrorism. Especially since 9/11, there has been a renewed focus on victimological theories. Muldoon's studies look at the impact of low-intensity conflicts (LIC) on societies at large.[57] She finds that psychological effects of prolonged campaigns of violence are diffuse, but in some cases severe. Civilian deaths in LIC have a different effect on individuals from those that occur in conventional military campaigns because low levels of violence over prolonged periods tend to mask the true death toll.[58] In addition, the population at large tends to internalize violence and develop coping mechanisms, among them high levels of social categorization, often reinforced through political affiliation.[59] Nevertheless, prolonged unconventional campaigns take a high toll on community mental health. Ninety-two per cent of those polled by Muldoon reported some degree of mental disturbances.[60] The most common of these were anxiety, depression, phobias and irritability. Children in particular were observed to suffer acute anxiety attacks, nightmares and enuresis. Oddly enough, Muldoon found another angle on Horgan's dismissal of abnormal psychology in terrorism studies and established that there is no evidence that LIC results in higher

levels of psychopathology. In point of fact, some types of aberrant behaviour, such as suicides, seem to go down after attacks.[61] Muldoon also analysed the various coping mechanisms individuals use to deal with large-scale violence. Three primary coping strategies seem to be the most effective. First, she discerns that a commitment to the cause tends to mitigate the psychological effects of violence. Second, distancing and denial also provide some inoculation against pervasive fear. And finally, Muldoon discovers that many individuals possess a high capacity for contextualizing violenceinto everyday routines, and thereby normalizing its effects on their lives.

A recent theory linked to terrorism is the terror management theory (TMT). In many ways, this is a theory of terror in name only, but in other ways it has some useful applications for the study of political violence. TMT takes as its core tenet the assumption that the purpose of fear is to ensure survival.[62] However, this fear is put in the context of intellectual abilities that allow humans to think and communicate in language, imagine potential futures, and engage in self-reflection and self-awareness. This means that we are instinctively programmed to avoid danger and stay alive. However, the tools we are given to further this end simultaneously provide us with the knowledge that we will one day die.[63] We also realize that death can happen at any time and can be quite gruesome. This combination of factors instils in human beings an ingrained sense of terror. In order to deal with this terror, humans contextualize their fear through the formulation of worldviews.[64] A worldview provides individuals with a framework for dealing with the world, as well as an instrument for coping with death. Worldviews give life meaning through cultural roles while allowing for the possibility of transcending death (literally or figuratively). For worldviews to be effective in the mitigation of terror, they must have consensual validation from extant communities. When we meet people whose cultural worldviews differ from our own, our faith is rattled and our ability to manage terror is undermined.

Further studies could obviously have implications for the study of radicalization, but Tom Pyszczynski uses TMT as a means for understanding the US response to 9/11 from a victimological perspective. Pyszczynski states that there are four converging hypotheses of TMT:[65]

- First, more self-esteem and faith in a cultural worldview makes the individual less susceptible to anxiety-related behaviour and thoughts of death.
- Second, reminding people of death leads to a wide variety of behaviour meant to reaffirm cultural worldviews.
- Third, boosting self-esteem lessens worldview fundamentalism.
- Fourth, convincing evidence of an after-life reduces anxiety and low self-esteem.

Pyszczynski claims that these statements, taken together, explain the US reaction to

9/11,[66] namely a heightened nationalism, a greater intolerance for dissent, an increase in hostility showntowards different people, a desire for vengeance, a need for heroes, and a desire to help. Controlled studies of TMT have been conducted by a variety of scholars, with promising results.

To close, researchers such as Andrew Silke, John Horgan and the Norwegian social anthropologist Tore Bjørgo appear to be taking agent-level analyses into new and promising directions. Others, such as Martha Crenshaw, however, have continued reservations about the applicability of psychological theories to terrorism studies. Crenshaw holds that such theories of terrorism are deficient, because the multitude of motivations behind terrorism. Since terrorism is rarely, if ever, the result of a single person, individual preferences and psychological predispositions do not, in her view, enter prominently into the equation.[67]

Theories of radicalization

Radicalization refers to a process of ideological socialization of (usually) young people towards effectuating fundamental political changes, usually through the use of violent tactics of conflict waging against the political enemies and their followers. Studies of radicalization approach the field of extremism and terrorism by focusing on the processes through which individuals become socialized into engaging in political violence without moral restraints. As the late Ehud Sprinzak stated, the study of terrorism is the study of 'human transformation, of a psycho-political passage in time from normal to extra-normal behaviour'.[68] Some theories of radicalization shift the locus of psychological studies away from individual aberrance and concentrate on the ways in which external influences transform otherwise normal individuals into potentially violent political activists. Thus, some theories of radicalization are only marginally agent based, preferring instead to look more broadly at the ways both institutions and structures affect agents in their individual decisions to engage in terrorist violence.

Seminal has been the late Ehud Sprinzak's concept of 'de-legitimization', which he saw at work when individuals move from conventional types of political activism towards more extreme forms. Part of the radicalization process is based on a process of de-legitimization. Terrorism is the pinnacle of this process, but it is not the first stage, nor is it necessarily the last. Sprinzak noted that terrorist groups are often radical splinter groups of existing more legitimate political groups or movements. What theories of radicalization in general, and Sprinzak's theory of de-legitimization in particular, try to illustrate is the movement, both psychologically and politically, from acceptable political activism to terrorism. Sprinzak found that radical groups, regardless

of differences in motivations, share a common structural genealogy, a process of progressive radicalization as they emerge, in many cases, from already existing movements.[69] Yet the radicalization process itself can vary, depending upon the motivating factors behind political agitation. One of the trajectories in the process of delegitimization is, according to Sprinzak, 'transformational de-legitimization' – a process followed by new political groups without ties to former movements. Typically, this takes the form of left-wing radicalism operating within democratic systems. In Sprinzak's observation, such groups represent the most extreme pathway to radicalization as the members of such groups are not predisposed to violence. He noted that transformational organizations are often composed of former advocates of the regime disillusioned with shortcomings in the democratic process. As the motivation for violence is inherently idealistic, the radicalization process is long and tortuous, and tends to go through distinct stages.

The first of these stages is the 'crisis of confidence'. In this phase of radicalization, former regime adherents become disillusioned with the seedier side of democratic political manoeuvrings. The rejection, however, is not geared towards the system as a whole at this point in time; rather, it focuses on those agents within it who are seen as manipulating the democratic process to the disadvantage of an 'other'. The initial reaction from these activists, then, is one of counter-culture but not militancy, though scuffles with law enforcement and other regime elements do occur in the context of the state's reaction to these challenges. A 'conflict of legitimacy' occurs when the activists begin to see the root of political problems not as being the fault of a few corrupted politicians, but rather as being inherent in a system devised to ensure theinterests of a select few over an 'oppressed' majority. The end result of this realization is the perception that the system itself lacks legitimacy and must be changed. The movement, at this point catalysed by a sense of disappointment with the previous phase of activism, begins to break with the authorities by advocating an ideology that delegitimizes the status quo.

This conflict is followed by a 'crisis of legitimacy', at which point the demonization of the system spreads to all those individuals associated with it. The resulting dehumanization creates the psychological preconditions for violence. Those radicals who have progressed to this point from the crisis of confidence begin to outwardly display a broader rejection of society through 'antinomian behaviour', effectively breaking down the barriers between political and personal illegality.[70] Political violence is the logical next step.

'Extensional de-legitimization', on the other hand, unlike 'transformational de-legitimization', requires no rigorous psychological process of radicalization, as it represents an 'extension' of preexisting political antipathies. Most often, these take the

form of ethno-nationalist or secessionist movements and/or movements rebelling against an oppressive authoritarian state system. In such circumstances, the crisis of confidence already exists, and organizational activism begins with the conflict of legitimacy. This phase occurs when the movement in question becomes impatient with too slow a pace of reform.[71] The impatience mounts and creates a crisis of legitimacy when the opposed government rebuffs continuous demands for reform, autonomy and/or independence. Political terrorism in such cases typically begins with the organization of 'self-defence' groups, whose violence is limited only by the rather flexible definition of the limits of what constitutes 'selfdefence'. [72]

'Split de-legitimization' occurs, according to Sprinzak, when a group becomes radicalized in regard to potential opponents. In contrast to the universalistic groups described in the preceding two paragraphs, which direct their violence towards regimes, particularistic terrorist groups target other non-state groups – typically, rival communities.[73] Anti-regime sentiments are secondary to the primary focus on repressing the target community, and are typically a result of the perception that the regime is either protecting these communities or not being active enough in their repression. Accordingly, there are then two processes of de-legitimization.[74]

The primary de-legitimization occurs with respect to the target community. Since the 'other' is considered illegitimate a priori, this begins with the crisis of legitimacy.[75]

A secondary, or 'diluted', de-legitimization occurs with respect to the government.[76] This occurs when a sense of betrayal on the part of the radical group triggers a crisis of confidence with the state.

The terrorism of a particularistic group usually begins with an attempt to foment some form of cultural discrimination. If this fails, or if the group feels ignored by the government, then it will resort to violence. While anti-regime violence is rare among such groups, Sprinzak postulated that some militants-turned-terrorists will, over time, close the gap between the government and the target community.

Several researchers have built on Sprinzak or have been influenced by him. There are various step models. Among them is Moghadam's step model of radicalization, delineating six processes of violent radicalization.[77] In this work, Moghadam utilizes the metaphor of a six-storey building to represent each 'step' in the radicalization process. The ground floor represents a cognitive analysis of the structural circumstances in which the agent finds him- or herself. Here, the individual begins to interpret and ascribe causality to what he or she deems to be unjust circumstances. According to Moghadam, a majority of the population will find themselves on this 'foundational level'. On the first floor, one finds individuals who are actively seeking to remedy those circumstances they perceive to be unjust. In this stage, they explore

various options to improving material or political circumstances. On the second floor, agents begin to place blame for injustice on out-groups. As Moghadam points out, this is often the cause of anti-American sentiment. The third floor involves a moral disengagement from society and a moral engagement within the nascent terrorist organization. Within this phase, values are constructed which rationalize the use of violence by the terrorists while simultaneously decrying the moral authority of the incumbent regime. On the fourth floor, members new to the organization are consolidated not only into the organizational structure of the group, but also (and perhaps more importantly) into its value structure. On the fifth, and final, floor, the organization allows the individual to circumvent his or her natural reluctance to engage in violence and engage in the 'terrorist act'.

While Moghadam's use of metaphor is illustrative and allows us to better comprehend the complex mental processes at work in the radicalization process, for empirical observations the more grounded theory of Silbner and Bhatt is useful. In their study, conducted for the New York Police Department, they envisage four steps:[78]

1 Pre-radicalization: the life situation before vulnerable individuals were exposed to and adopted jihadi-Salafi Islam as their own ideology. The majority of individuals involved in almost a dozen plots began as 'unremarkable', had 'ordinary' jobs, had lived 'ordinary' lives and had little, if any, criminal history.

2 Self-identification: the phase where individuals, influenced by both internal and external factors, begin to explore Salafi Islam, gradually gravitate away from their old identity and begin to associate themselves with like-minded individuals and adopt this ideology as their own. The catalyst for the 'religious seeking' is a cognitive opening, or crisis, which shakes one's certitude in previously held beliefs and opens an individual to be receptive to new worldviews. There can be many types of triggers: (a) economic (losing a job, blocked mobility); (b) social (alienation, discrimination, racism – real or perceived); (c) political (international conflicts involving Muslims); and (d) personal (a death in the close family).

3 Indoctrination: the phase in which an individual progressively intensifies his beliefs, wholly adopts jihadi-Salafi ideology, and concludes, without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support and further the cause. That action is militant jihad. This phase is typically facilitated and driven by a 'spiritual sanctioner'. While the initial self-identification process may be an individual act, as noted above, association with likeminded people is an important factor as the process deepens. By the indoctrination phase, this self-selecting group becomes increasingly important as radical views are encouraged and reinforced.

4 Jihadization: the phase in which members of the cluster accept their individual duty

to participate in jihad and self-designate themselves as holy warriors or mujahideen. Ultimately, the group will begin operational planning for the jihad or a terrorist attack. These 'acts in furtherance' will include planning, preparation and execution.

Silber and Bhatt noted, in nearly a dozen European and American cases of radicalization towards jihadism they studied, that while the first three phases of radicalization may take place gradually (over a period of two to three years), the jihadization component can be a very rapid process (taking weeks or a few months). In general, they found that there was no useful psychological profile to predict who will follow the entire trajectory of radicalization. However, they found that in spite of the differences in both circumstances and environment in each of the cases, there was a remarkable consistency in the behaviours and trajectory of each of the plots across all the stages. Such a consistency constitutes an element of theory and provides a potential tool for forecasting.[79]

A more academic approach has been suggested by Clark McCauley and Sophia Moskalenko. Their analysis of the radicalization process rests on functional and descriptive components. Functionally, radicalization entails 'increased preparation for and commitment to inter-group conflict'.[80] Descriptively, the authors state that 'radicalization means change in beliefs, feelings and behaviours in directions that increasingly justify inter-group violence and demand sacrifice in defence of the in-group'.[81] McCauley and Moskalenko utilize a pyramidal depiction of the radicalization process whereby successively smaller cadres of activists comprise elevated positions on a political pyramid. The base of the pyramid consists of the mass of supporters who conceive of themselves as being in conflict with an out-group. When this perception of conflict leads to the dehumanization of the out-group, hatred results, as well as polarization.[82] The middle range of the pyramid contains the radical groups. These organizations radicalize according to several processes:

1 First, there is the phenomenon of groupthink, whereby concentrations of like-minded actors tend to move towards extreme interpretations of reality.

2 Second, groups operating under isolation and threat tend to be suffering from closed information loops, compounding the negative effects of groupthink on decision making.

3 Third, the conflict with those holding state power helps to create a selection bias in group membership. When a group enters into conflict with the authorities, the majority of the more moderate members will tend to drop out, as the costs of dissident group membership become disproportionately high, given individual values. Those self-selecting to remain in an organization will invariably be the more radical members who place a higher value on the group's goals; they more readily accept violent action as a feasible pathway to fulfilling radical group objectives.

4 Finally, McCauley and Moskalenko observe that group competition tends to promote fractionalization, resulting in what Mia Bloom terms 'outbidding', or an escalation of violence in order to reaffirm organizational salience in situations of inter-group competition.[83]

Individual radicalization is spurred by personal grievances and experiences of the kind that encourage potential terrorists to associate with radical organizations. Radical group membership provides an additional escalatory effect on the individual – first, because such membership often provides a slippery slope to more offensive forms of political expression, and second, because the bonds of in-group identity promote radicalization, as most individuals tend to be recruited via close personal connections.[84] Each successive level of this pyramid represents both a more extreme form of political expression and a more exclusive cadre of active participants. The terrorist him- or herself represents only the extremist tip of a pyramid composed of like-minded, though less risk-seeking, activists and radicals.

A synthesis of current knowledge on radicalization can be found in a concise report of the European Commission's Expert Group on Violent Radicalisation, completed in May 2008. Its findings are based on common structural features of the radicalization process across jihadist as well as left- and right-wing movements. Defining radicalization as 'a socialization into extremism which manifests itself in terrorism',[85] the Expert Group identified the following common themes of violent radicalization:[86]

• All radicalization processes incubate in enabling environments wherein at risk individuals share a widely held sense of injustice. The exact nature of this perception of injustice varies with respect to the underlying motivation for violence (i.e. from secular extremism to takfiri jihadism), but the effects on the individual are surprisingly similar.

• The process of radicalization itself begins when these enabling environments intersect with personal 'trajectories', allowing the environmental causes of radicalism to resonate with the individual's personal experience.

• Terrorism itself is a minority-group phenomenon, not the work of a radicalized mass of people.

Echoing the pyramidal concept of McCauley and Moskalenko, the Expert Group concludes that violence is always perpetrated by a relatively small amalgam of radicalized individuals generally claiming to speak on behalf of a larger wronged community.

Much of the recent literature on the radicalization process is marked by its attempt to discern patterns for possible utilization in de-radicalization campaigns.[87] Thus, the relevant literature tends to focus on critical junctures in the radicalization process with the potential for intervention measures. It is perhaps for this reason that many of the

more recent approaches lack the breadth and depth of earlier works such as Sprinzak's ground-breaking de-legitimization theory. Nevertheless, there is broad agreement on a number of points regarding the process of radicalization into violence. First, most researchers agree that terrorism and political violence are not phenomena unto themselves, but the outgrowth of a cycle of political activism. Second, most conclude that the terrorist's 'philosophy' is an aberrant extreme of more widely held beliefs. Finally, most research concludes that structural causes of discontent alone are insufficient for radicalization to take off. To make the leap from aggrieved individual to a fanatical terrorist, the enabling environment must resonate with the individual. Radical propaganda and the recruitment process often act as facilitators of this 'resonance'.

Rational choice theories

At first sight, there appears to be little rationality for a suicide bomber who is striving for a certain political goal to blow him- or herself up and thereby deprive him- or herself of being part of the hoped-for political results. Often, such individuals appear to be driven by feelings of revenge or painful humiliation rather than strategic calculations. The terrible deed that costs the lives of enemies can, however, provide the bomber with great emotional satisfaction. If he or she is a religious terrorist, there might be an expectation of rewards in paradise and possibly some earthly compensation for his or her family (in cases when a terrorist organization or its state sponsor offers rewards). However, there is something irrational about terrorist attacks that go beyond risk taking and involve certain death. Nevertheless, researchers have come up with expected utility and rational choice theories to explain terrorist behaviour.

Rational choice offers an economic evaluation of individual decision making. In its most reduced form, rational choice assumes that political outcomes are the result of individual rational calculus.[88] The inputs into this decision-making process are the universe of potential options, the assumed costs of the various potential options or choices, the likely benefit from given choices, and the probabilities of successfully pursuing various courses of action. The individual then makes the choice that appears to maximize expected outputs. What applies to the individual can, under certain circumstances, also be extended to the group. In the words of Dipak Gupta: 'When we consider the group as a single entity, we can assume that it behaves "rationally", that is, it aims at maximizing its own welfare.'[89]

A common misperception of those unschooled in rational choice theory is equating rationality in the economic sense with rationality in the humanities – implying the

acquisition of truth through reasoned debate. Rather, rationality in the sense used here, is purely amoral.

> From an economist's viewpoint, rationality is not determined on the basis of the desirability of an agent's objective or tactics. We consider terrorists to be rational actors who respond in an appropriate and predictable fashion to changes in their constraints as they optimize their objective while confronting an adversary who is trying to outwit and defeat them.[90]

Crenshaw analysed terrorism not primarily in expressive terms but in terms of instrumental violence. Instrumentalism assumes that terrorism is a rational strategy designed to bring about a shift in the political position of the government. It aims to modify political behaviour by manipulating the options of the opponent – in most cases the government. It is not a strategy intended to destroy (or indeed capable of destroying) military capabilities in a decisive way.[91] Terrorists themselves engage in the production of terror as a vehicle for political change for a number of reasons. While the value of the presumed outcome is thought to be extremely high, the production costs of terrorism are seen as low relative to those associated with alternative available political strategies. In their eyes, the status quo is simply intolerable, which raises the relative value of political change. Under certain circumstances, the probability of success of terrorist campaigns could be judged to be relatively high, as was the case during the decolonization period when one colonial power after the other withdrew from overseas territories, lacking the stomach to put up a major fight to keep what were in most cases peripheral possessions of declining economic importance.[92]

Rational choice theory, despite its plausible logic and parsimony, has some serious drawbacks. It assumes a fixed definition of rationality, when in fact there is none that is uncontroversial.[93] The resulting imprecision allows researchers to subsume a large number of behaviours under the rational choice label. This makes falsifying the claims of rational choice theory difficult. Additionally, rational choice has a problem in accounting for a number of human behaviours, including altruism (which may be applicable to extremist endeavours) and akrasia (seemingly non-rational decision-making based on abnormal moral reasoning, which may or may not have a bearing on certain types of violence, such as suicide terrorism). The broader discipline of International Relations has circumvented many of these pitfalls by assimilating rational choice into more nuanced theories of political action. Tellingly, the assumption of rationality underpins all mainstream theories of International Relations, including neo-realism and neo-liberalism, while the crux of the theory explains the origins of agent preference. In a similar vein, rational choice may prove of limited use on its own, but may be incorporated into other theories of terrorism.

Terrorist theories of terrorism

Theories of terrorism that are wrong would seem to be of little use in explaining terrorist behaviour – unless the terrorists themselves believe in them and, as a consequence, base their activities on them. Terrorists, or at least their leaders, are often intellectuals and as such are not averse to theorizing. A study of their writings is as important as a study of their behaviour in order to understand what makes them 'tick'. Brian M. Jenkins was right when he stated that 'unless we try to think like terrorists we are liable to miss the point'.[94]

Nearly every incarnation of militant movements espousing terror has published tracts on the presumed benefits of, and justifications for, this type of political violence. Among the first were Russian and European anarchists and socio-revolutionaries. They were later followed by the anticolonial agitators. Twentieth-century Marxists such as Mao Zedong also wrote at length about the employment of various forms of political violence in revolutionary struggles. Some Marxists, while officially favouring mass action, also saw utility in terrorism, and one of them, Leon Trotsky, even wrote a book in defence of the Red Terror of the Bolshevik Revolution (which was, in reality, not so much a mass revolution as a coup d'état followed by massacres of political opponents, leading to a civil war).[95] He argued that '[t]he man who repudiates terrorism in principle, i.e. repudiates measures of suppression and intimidation towards determined and armed counterrevolution, must reject all idea of the political supremacy of the working class and its revolutionary dictatorship'. Trotsky also made a bold comparison between war and revolution:

> The problem of revolution as of war consists in breaking the will of the foe, forcing him to capitulate and accept the conditions of the conqueror. . . . The question as to who is to rule . . . will be decided on either side, not by references to the paragraphs of the constitution, but by the employment of all forms of violence. . . . War, like revolution, is founded upon intimidation. A victorious war generally destroys only an insignificant part of the conquered army, intimidating the remainder and breaking their will. The revolution works the same way: it kills individuals and intimidates thousands.[96]

Currently, some Salafist ideologies (who borrowed from Leninism the idea of a vanguard) have become proponents of terrorism as asymmetric warfare against the 'near enemy' (Arab regimes) and the 'far enemy' (the United States and its allies). Despite the fact that insurgent terrorism has evolved in many ways (e.g. through the use of the internet), careful readings of the early theorists and practitioners of terrorism yield the insight that terrorism has not changed as much as some adherents of the 'new terrorism' school assume.

While there were individual theorists of terrorism like the German-American Karl Heinzen, author of *Murder and Liberty* (1850),[97] the first non-state group to truly articulate a coherent 'theory' of terrorism was Narodnaya Volya (People's Will). Its party programme of 1879 stated:

> Terrorist activity, consisting in destroying the most harmful person in the government, in defending the party against espionage, in punishing the perpetrators of the notable cases of violence and arbitrariness on the part of the government and the administration, aims to undermine the prestige of the government's power, to demonstrate steadily the possibility of struggle against the government, to arouse in this manner the revolutionary spirit of the people and their confidence in the success of the cause, and finally, to give shape and direction to the forces fit and trained to carry on the fight.[98]

Narodnaya Volya persuasively argues for the utility of terrorism as a revolutionary tool, especially as 'propaganda of the deed'. Exemplary deeds of violence were meant to illustrate government weakness while creating a semblance of counter-power for the revolutionary group claiming responsibility, thereby forming a rallying point for others inclined to proceed from words to deeds in opposing a tsarist regime seemingly incapable of change. Morozov, writing in the 1880s on behalf of the People's Will, offers a slightly more in-depth analysis of the instrument of terror and in so doing illuminates a number of concepts that still comprise integral components of contemporary theories of terrorism:

> [T]erroristic struggle has exactly this advantage that it can act unexpectedly and find means and ways which no one anticipates. All that the terroristic struggle really needs is a small number of people and large material means. This presents really a new form of struggle. It replaces by a series of individual political assassinations, which always hit their target, the massive revolutionary movements. . . . The movement punishes only those who are really responsible for the evil deed. Because of this the terroristic revolution is the only just form of revolution.[99]

Morozov's philosophy strives first and foremost to place terrorism within a broader revolutionary movement. Unlike successive practitioners of political violence, Morozov holds that terror is the primary vehicle for revolution. Partly in reaction to the failed Paris Commune, Morozov is the first to speak of terrorism as a form of collective jujitsu, using the strength of the state (namely the technology of state forces and the proliferation of assets to be viewed as targets) to the advantage of the revolutionary. The high costs in lives as a result of the disastrous War of the Barricades in Paris in the early 1870s gave Morozov cause to give preference to a conspiratorial revolutionary vanguard over mass mobilization. Rather than risk the brutal repression of a mass

uprising, Morozov proposes to use the technology of modern militaries (the bomb and the pistol) as a panacea, obviating the need for mass mobilization. More succinctly, terror allows for selective violence to replace more extreme forms of revolutionary upheaval. Nevertheless, the appropriate application of force can serve both to undermine the power of the regime and to foment wider revolution by communicating political alternatives to the status quo. Morozov underlines that the success of the terrorist is largely reliant upon the ability of the group to project blame for violence onto the state. The 'selectivity' of Morozov's violence seeks this end. The concept of the 'just revolution' implies that terror is the inevitable result of tyranny. The terrorist, then, is simultaneously absolved for blame in the conduct of violence and elevated to the status of revolutionary hero in his or her role as the harbinger of a more just order.

While Morozov saw terrorism mainly as armed propaganda, other theorists saw terrorism as a form of irregular warfare, targeting also the enemy's armed forces. An example is General Grivas, who fought in the 1950s against the British occupation in Cyprus. He wrote:

> The truth is that our form of war, in which a few hundred fell in four years, was more selective than most, and I speak as one who has seen battlefields covered with dead. We did not strike, like the bomber, at random. We shot only British servicemen who would have killed us, if they could have fired first, and civilians who were traitors or intelligence agents. To shoot down your enemies in the streets may be unprecedented, but I was looking for results, not precedents. How did Napoleon win his victories? He took his opponents in the flank or in the rear; and what is right on the grand scale is not wrong when the scale is reduced and the odds are against you a hundred to one.[100]

The pattern of shifting blame sounds apologist in nature – and Grivas's campaign was not as discriminating as this particular text would lead the reader to believe – but it plays an integral role in terrorist campaigns, where ideology is used to maintain cohesion and facilitate recruitment in the absence of more formal modes of control and conscription. In terms of tactics, the need to perpetuate this illusion of innocence has profound implications for the employment of force. Ironically, the mismanagement of violence proved the eventual undoing of Grivas's EOKA. After successfully obtaining independence from British rule in 1960, the second campaign of EOKA-B was meant to unite Cyprus with the Greek mainland. The result was not a union, but a Turkish invasion producing 280,000 Cypriot refugees, and the division of the island into separate Turkish and Greek polities. Grivas was not the only terrorist whose strategy misfired. As Seth Jones (of the RAND Corporation) has pointed out, in a study surveying the rise and fall of 268 terrorist groups active between 1968 and 2006, only 10 per cent of them managed to achieve victory.[101] In other words, the failure rate of non-state

terrorist groups is very high, partly because their strategic theory is inapplicable in most situations.

Another theorist was Carlos Marighela, the Brazilian communist. His work was influenced by the Cuban experience of Fidel Castro and Che Guevara, building on the voluntarist concept of a revolutionary foco – a spark that would ignite the revolution. In his 'Mini-manual of the Urban Guerrilla', Marighela states:

> There are two main ways in which revolutionary organizations can grow. One is through propaganda and ideology – by convincing people and arguing over documents and programmes. . . . The other way . . . is not through proselytism but by unleashing revolutionary action and calling for extreme violence and radical solutions. . . . The basic principle of revolutionary strategy in a context of permanent political crisis is to unleash, in urban and rural areas, a volume of revolutionary activity which will oblige the enemy to transform the country's political situation into a military one. The discontent will spread to all social groups and the military will be held exclusively responsible for all failure.[102]

Marighela opted for a strategy of using revolutionary violence as the catalyst for mass upheaval. Relabelling terrorism as urban guerrilla war, he echoed earlier practitioners of violence in his association of terror with propaganda of the deed. Marighela also adds another dimension to the theme of blame projection. His allegation that terrorist acts were not meant to upset the people was in actuality hypocritical, since he alleges later in the same text that one of the goals of violence is to provoke state repression against the people. It is by these means that the preconditions for revolution in the countryside will be met, he hoped. He was wrong, but never saw the full result of his miscalculation, as he was killed in 1969.

This dual function of terrorism, propaganda for the masses on one hand, and an increase of state repression intended to force the masses into participation on the other, found imitation in many other urban guerrilla campaigns. Horst Mahler, a theorist of the West German Red Army Faction, admitted, 'The strategy of the terrorist nuclei was aimed at provoking the overreaction of the state in the hope to stir the flames of hate against the state and to channel new recruits into the armed underground.'[103] In fact, the 'urban guerrilla' experience turned out to be quite different from that predicted by urban guerrilla theory. The 'overreaction' of the state, it transpired, should not have been taken for granted, and in those situations in which states did react disproportionately to insurgent challenges, they proved more likely to destroy the group in question than to mobilize involuntary mass support for the revolution. Nevertheless, the pressures of urban insurrection – the need for secrecy and the division of the group into small functional cells – moulded the textbook organizational style of terrorist groups. It has only begun to be challenged today by organizations such

as Al-Qaeda, which apply a network concept and utilize elements of the leaderless resistance theorem.[104]

The rise of militant religious terrorism in the 1980s and 1990s has caused some students of terrorism to question whether or not more conventional notions of strategy still apply to contemporary faith-based movements like Salafist jihadists, Christian Identity militias, and esoteric cultic movements such as Aum Shinrikyo. Of particular concern to scholars of terrorism studies has been the apparent abandonment of constraints on violence previously observed in non-state terrorism. Bruce Hoffman remarks on the rationale behind the intense quality of religious terrorism:

> The reason that terrorist incidences perpetrated for religious motives result in so many more deaths may be found in the radically different value systems, mechanisms of legitimization and justifications, concepts of morality, and worldviews embraced by the religious terrorist and his secular counterpart.[105]

However, the thesis that Islamist terrorist groups tend to commit more high-casualty attacks has recently been modified by James Piazza. On the basis of empirical comparisons, he concluded that casualty rates of attacks vary widely across Islamist terrorist groups. He suggested that group organizational features and goal structures explain differing casualty rates better than does the overarching ideological type. Piazza found that strategic groups among them function similarly to secular national-liberation and regime-change movements, whereas 'abstract/universal groups' affiliated with the Al-Qaeda network do produce higher casualty rates.[106]

Early research into violent religious movements pointed to a lack of revolutionary strategy compared to more secular organizations. The inference was that the ritualistic violence of religiously motivated groups was part of a larger 'grand strategy'. Rather, religious violence was not thought of by researchers as revolutionary, but eschatological. As Bruce Hoffman states,

> Whereas secular terrorists regard violence either as a way of instigating the correction of a flaw in a system that is basically good or as the means to foment the creation of a new system, religious terrorists see themselves not as components of a system worth saving, but as 'outsiders' seeking fundamental changes in the existing order.[107]

More recent scholarship, however, has challenged this. Stout comments:

The written works of a small but intellectually vigorous community of Salafi Jihadist thinkers in and associated with al Qaida provide proof that strategic thought exists within their terrorist movement. This strategic thought is grounded in the mainstream of world thought on revolutionary warfare.[108]

Contrary to the assertions of Hoffman (and Juergensmeyer), Stout holds that Islamist terrorists are in fact quite enamoured of revolutionary (Marxist) military theory. First, this is due to the fact that most Salafists base the rhetoric of international jihadism on Qutbism. Sayyid Qutb, in turn, was writing in the 1950s and 1960s, and while he was not a Marxist, communist theory and vocabulary nonetheless permeated revolutionary minds in the Third World at the time. Marxists wrote many of the works on revolutionary warfare in the twentieth century.[109] Lia and Hegghammer have noted that Salafist theorists have had little hesitation in importing non-Islamic doctrines in order to make the jihad more efficient from a political and military standpoint.[110] As a point of illustration, Abu Sayyaf (a Filipino group with Salafist underpinnings) even titled its handbook for the conduct of irregular warfare the 'Mini-manual for the Urban Mujahadeen', borrowing Carlos Marighela's use of 'mini-manual' and simply replacing 'guerrilla' with 'mujahadeen'.[111]

The analytical work of Brynjar Lia supports the notion that there are two camps in the current international Salafist movement: the fundamentalist purists and the more opportunist Jihadis.[112] While the purists are more concerned with doctrinal conformity, even to the point of fomenting schisms in the Salafist movement, the pragmatic opportunists among the jihadists have pursued military outcomes based on a more mundane logic of action.

Insurgent terrorism: institutional level of analysis

Political scientists have long observed that organizations significantly affect individual behaviour. Institutions aggregate interests, solve collective action problems and fall victim to principal-agent problems. Underground organizations and the environments in which they operate have also been the subject of a substantial amount of research. Organizational-level analysis allows the researcher to concentrate on issues of central concern to the discourse such as how institutions frame goals, mobilize resources, articulate strategies, recruit and maintain members, and (from a counter-terrorism perspective) what factors initiate institutional decline.

In the following, we will briefly outline major works in a number of theoretical approaches to studying terrorist organizations, including organizational process theory, the study of institutional motivations for insurgent violence, suicide terrorism, theories of asymmetrical conflict, communication theories of terrorism, and theories of social identity formation.

Organizational process theory

Of the canon of literature addressing the organizational level of terrorist groups, the works of two authors stand out in terms of the impact they have had on the discipline. The first is Martha Crenshaw's work on organizational process theory, and the second is David Rapoport's 'wave theory'.[113]

Framing the institutional debate in Terrorism Studies is undoubtedly Crenshaw's work on organizational process theory (OPT). Crenshaw defines organizational theories by way of comparison with agent-based instrumentalist theories. Counter-intuitively, she asserts that the end goal of any organization is not a priori the ends for which it was formed, but rather the maintenance of the organization itself.[114] Thus, some interests of the violent organization are inherently different from the disaggregated interests of the individuals who comprise the group. Crenshaw draws from a wider literature on principal–agent problems in the institutionalism discourse and applies their findings to terrorist organizations. She begins this analysis by defining similarities between violent activism and other forms of voluntary organizations.[115] First, terrorist groups have a defined structure and a systematic process by which decisions are made. Second, the organization's membership is divided according to function or role. Third, each organization has recognized leaders and authority. And finally, organizational goals are pursued collectively.

Political change, be it revolutionary or reformist in scope, represents a public good. Being non-excludable, it is subject to collective action problems. Institutional arrangements are therefore necessary to solve for the collectively undesirable outcomes resulting from individually rational free-riding on the part of agents. Violent organizations, according to Crenshaw, promulgate themselves by manipulation and aggregation of the divergent desires of their constituent members.[116] Leaders take on such roles out of a desire for prestige, a commodity inextricably linked to the standing of the organization. Members, however, react to incentive structures. Further, there are incentives to join as well as incentives for staying. These range from the desire to belong to a group, a quest to gain social status, the appeal of comradeship and adventure, and of course material benefits. In order to promote the prestige of the organization, the leadership manipulates incentives in order to prompt continued support. Broadly speaking, there are two types of incentives: structural and purposive. Structural incentives refer to environmental triggers for radicalism. Crenshaw is reticent about structural theories, however. She finds their explanatory power limited as structure is constant while the level of violence varies across time and geography. According to Crenshaw, then, it is the presence of the organization that accounts for terrorism.[117] Organizational behaviour can be explained through an analysis of the ways in which organizations manipulate purposive incentives. These can be the pursuit of a single goal, ideological incentives, or redemptive goals. Single goals, reflecting single-issue terrorism, being narrower in scope, are far more likely to achieve some

measure of political success. Oddly enough, however, they have proven among the most resilient of radical groups as a result of the ease with which they have switched goals (moving, say, from environmental issues to animal rights issues, to human rights issues, etc.). Ideological incentives, on the other hand, generally involve a comprehensive rejection of the status quo. Membership in ideologically driven organizations requires a complex set of beliefs and implies a revolutionary goal. Redemptive motivations involve a belief in a fundamentally flawed system. Such movements are typically defined by eschatological or millenarian goals, and view political violence as an individual duty required for salvation, however esoterically defined.

Organizations are not static entities whose goals remain unchanged over time. By reducing organizational goals to the primary one of survival and longevity, Crenshaw accounts for a wide number of seemingly irrational behaviours observed in violent organizations. Crenshaw notes that with time, ideology loses salience as a dominant incentive for group membership, giving way to solidarity. Groups will often engage in spoiling activities designed to sabotage peace negotiations in order to perpetuate conflict, which, in turn, promulgates the continued salience of the organization. Moreover, groups will begin to emphasize material benefits (and concomitant criminal practices) over normative goals in order to maintain membership. Additionally, groups often shift their motivations over time in order to maintain relevance with sympathetic communities.[118]

There are, however, differences between terrorist organizations and other voluntary organizations. [119] The goals of a terrorist organization are much more ambitious than those of most conventional organizations. They often attempt, in some way, shape or form, to fundamentally redefine the status quo. As opposed to bona fide voluntary groups, terrorist organizations pursue their ends through illegal and violent means. Owing to the illegality of their actions, non-state terrorist groups are necessarily clandestine. Finally, most terrorist groups are extremely small in terms of membership and scope. This is a result of the clandestine nature of such groups, and the social marginality inherent in extremism itself.

The behaviour of a group is, in no small way, a result of the organizational choices it makes. When opting for an illegal mode of political protest and struggle, non-state terrorists by default organize in secret cadres. This necessitates a decentralized command-and-control structure, and such groups typically organize according to a functional compartmentalization of group members into cells. This results in a number of behaviours.[120] First, the leadership has a limited ability to tightly control organizational functions. The resulting independence of operational cells can lead to intra-organizational friction. Second, small groups, especially often substitute functional differentiation and complex structures for simpler organizational designs such as

autonomous cells. While this enables a relatively small group of individuals to engage in political violence and, in some cases, avoid prosecution by the state, it makes it almost impossible to organize mass support. Such organizations often attempt to rectify their low profile in the community by escalating their violence.

In summation, Crenshaw states that organizational process theory sheds light both on how organizations view violence and on the processes by which organizations turn to violence as a strategy of political action. Not all terrorist groups view the utility of violence in the same way. Various organizational concerns determine the manner in which a given group employs violence.[121] The four primary concerns delineated by Crenshaw are:

1 how the organization views the resources available to it;

2 how the organization views opportunities;

3 how the organization views threats (these can be threats from state responses to those emanating from rival groups); and

4 how the organization chooses to react to its environment.

The choice to resort to violence is usually the result of one of two processes.[122] First, individuals often join an organization at its periphery, either through the covert organization's overt political arm, or through radical student movements, etc. Members move towards the clandestine core or centre over time. The process of radicalization for group members is therefore a gradual one requiring socialization into violence. Alternately, a pre-existing and formerly legal organization may opt for violence collectively. In such cases, the decision to engage in terrorism will be the result of intense debate, often resulting in a schism within the group.

Institutional motivations for terrorism

Walter Laqueur observed that sweeping theories of terrorism are impossible, as terrorism is far too heterogeneous a political phenomenon to be accounted for by a single general theory. Nevertheless, he maintained that a comparative analysis based on social scientific rigour is possible, provided it takes as point of departure a realistic typology of terrorist groups.[123] In response, the authors have detailed below numerous theories which differentiate terrorist organizations based on the motivation for violence within the extremist group. This section begins with an overview of Rapoport's 'wave theory', and then compliments this with critiques of the 'new terrorism' school, theories of ethnic terrorism, and Crenshaw's theory of revolutionary terror, respectively.

One of the more widely accepted delineations of terrorist movements by motivation for

violence, and arguably one of the greatest contributions to the study of terrorism in the past two decades, is David Rapoport's 'wave theory'.[124] The theory was first conceived in terms of three historical waves of terrorism, but the current incarnation depicts four distinct waves, taking into account religious extremism. Rapoport's wave theory has proven useful not only because of its historical periodization of non-state terrorism, but also in its observation that the motivation for violence in each wave necessarily affected the nature and quality of the violence employed by groups in successive movements.

Rapoport's four waves span more than a century (Table 4.1) and include four broad political movements, each of which produced a plethora of related terrorist groups. He begins with nineteenth-century anarchism. The anarchists and social revolutionaries were supplanted by the post-First World War anti-colonial national liberation movements. Following the Second World War, these were gradually replaced by left-wing radical groups, mostly Western. More recently, international Islamist Salafist groups have become the most prominent of the right-wing/religious terrorists of the fourth wave. Rapoport does not imply that these represent discrete categories where one era consisted of one and only one form of terrorism. On the contrary, there was quite a degree of overlap from one wave to the next. However, a dominant movement, spurring in turn a proliferation of like-minded groups, defines each wave. Rapoport observed that very few organizations were able to outlive their epoch, each of which proved to last roughly a generation.

Each successive wave was prompted into being by a historic incident or a series of such incidents. Two factors inspired the first wave: the communication and technological revolution of the late nineteenth century, and the spread of a doctrine or culture of terrorism. The former included the proliferation of the telegraph, rotary press-produced cheap newspapers, and steamships and railways (which facilitated the spread of diasporas and expatriates, who played a major part in the internationalization of anarchism). In the second half of the nineteenth century, a distinct terrorist doctrine, based on the concept of 'propaganda of the deed', emerged. The more violent among the anarchists built their doctrine partly on the ancient tradition of tyrannicide, which was now made much easier thanks to the handgun and the invention of dynamite. They saw the modern-day equivalent of Greek tyrannicide as a substitute for the 'battles of the barricades' which nineteenth century urban revolutionary crowds had used at a great cost in lives.[125] Pursuant to this end, early incarnations of anarchist groups were modelled along the lines of conspiratorial societies in the style of Blanqui and Buonarotti.[126] Anarchists attempted to compensate for their lack of mass mobilization potential by embracing the concept of 'propaganda of the deed'. The basic idea was simple: deeds speak louder than words. Voluntary revolutionary actions can, or so they hoped, act as catalyst for mass uprisings. Drawing partly on J.-J. Rousseau's notion of the

Table 4.1 Rapoport's 'four waves of terrorism'

Focus	*Primary strategy*	*Target identity*	*Precipitant*	*Special characteristics*
Anarchists, 1870–1920s	Elite assassinations, bank robberies	Primary European states	Failure/slowness of political reform	Developed basic terrorism strategies and rationales
Nationalists, 1920s–1960s	Guerrilla attacks on police and military	European empires	Post-1919 de-legitimization of empire	Increased international support (UN and diaspora)
New Left/Marxist, 1960s–1980s	Hijackings, kidnappings, assassination	Governments in general; increasing focus on USA	Viet Cong successes	Increased international training/cooperation/ sponsorship
Religious, 1970s–2020s	Suicide bombings	USA, Israel, and secular regimes with Muslim populations	Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan	Casualty escalation. Decline in the number of terrorist groups

Source: Based on D.C. Rapoport, 'The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism'. In A.K. Cronin and J.M. Ludes (eds), *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, pp. 46–73; as summarized by K. Rasler and W.R. Thompson, 'Looking for Waves of Terrorism'. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21(1), 2009, p. 31.

'revolutionary hero', the anarchists circumvented the need for institutional capacity building by promulgating a particular strategy of mass radicalization. Anarchist violence not only was geared towards the elimination of political enemies in government but also served as a means of demonstrating the precarious nature of a regime's control on society. The anarchist deed was meant to be exemplary, setting an example for others to follow. There was an element of self-sacrifice present. The refusal of many activists to flee after having committed an attack on a dignitary was also meant to refute the notion that anarchist violence was, in some manner, criminal. One of the lasting contributions of the anarchists to the annals of political violence was the creation of a 'science' of revolutionary warfare, achieved by combining armed strategy with propaganda for political agitation. While strategies and ideologies did change with successive movements, the basic crux of a revolution built around a core of a revolutionary vanguard did not.[127]

The second wave, according to Rapoport, was a result of the First World War and its concluding peace treaty of Versailles. In early 1918, partly as a response to the Bolshevik Revolution, the American president, Woodrow Wilson, had postulated a number of principles for post-war reordering of the world, including one of national self-determination. It was soon adopted by nationalists in European colonies. However, when it was originally formulated as part of Wilson's Fourteen Points, it was mainly meant as a political tool useful only for breaking up the empires of enemy countries. Accordingly, in the post-First World War peace treaties it was to be applied only to European territories, such as the Austrian-Hungarian Dual Monarchy. Non-European territories of defeated belligerents were instead meant to become League of Nations

mandates. As a consequence, a number of powers, such as Germany, were forced to let go of overseas territories. The trend towards de-colonization was greatly accelerated by the outcome of the Second World War. In Palestine, Jewish underground organizations were among the first to talk the language of national liberation. Menachem Begin, leader of Irgun terrorist organization, was one of the first to refer to his members not as terrorists but as 'freedom fighters',[128] quickly setting an example for others, including the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which of course opposes Zionism.

The nature of much of anti-colonial violence was decidedly different from that of the anarchists of the first wave. While the latter rejected the state, the national liberation fighters embraced the concept of a state of their own. Targeting was likewise different. Rather than pursuing campaigns of assassinations in line with previous movements, many of the anti-colonialists instead began targeting the security forces. Since the police were a major vehicle of colonial control, drawing them into a conflict for which they were ill-prepared prompted their replacement with more heavyhanded military and paramilitary units. Thus, the anti-colonialists were the first to successfully pursue terrorism as a strategic game, hoping to force the state (or occupying power) into utilizing counter-productive indiscriminate violence. The anti-colonialists also had an advantage over previous (and future) terrorist groups through the presence of large sympathetic local communities. This wellspring of support often enabled the second-wave terrorists to utilize guerrilla tactics along with terroristic violence in pursuit of their ends. Furthermore, the anti-colonialists were able to take advantage of the inherently international dimension of their conflict and use, for the first time, systematic campaigns intended to provoke the application of international pressure on opponent regimes.[129]

Invariably, most studies place the Vietnam War as the catalyst for the rise of Western left-wing terrorism (what Rapoport conceives of as the third wave). The American intervention in South- East Asia offered a potent mixture of signals to would-be radicals. First, it appeared to be a manifestation of 'Western (neo-)imperialism'. Second, the failure of the United States to subdue the insurgency in South Vietnam appeared to point to an internal weakness of Western imperialism. Third, and perhaps most importantly, it showed the potential efficacy of protracted resistance, as exemplified by the North Vietnamese-supported and -led Viet Cong rural rebels. Leftist terrorist groups and guerrilla movements began to emerge in developing countries, especially Latin America, but soon found sympathetic Marxist radicals in Europe (and to a lesser extent in the United States). These (mainly) student radicals often viewed themselves as something of a fifth column fighting for the interests of Southern emancipatory movements in the 'belly of the beast' – the 'imperialist' North. For many of them, after the fall of Saigon in 1975 the PLO replaced the Viet Cong as a model for revolutionary activism.

The third wave, like the two previous ones, placed its own mark on revolutionary violence. First, women were brought back in, having been largely absent in the second wave. Some of these women began to assume leadership roles, as they had in the first wave, especially among those from the nineteenth-century Russian intelligentsia involved in terrorism. Second, the operational environment of the third wave was such that violence was not usually perpetrated against military targets, as had been the case in the second wave, but took more the form of theatrically enacted spectacles focusing on symbolic targets and involving publicity-generating hijackings and hostage takings. Third, left-wing terrorists in a number of instances engaged in ordinary crimes, especially for fund-raising. Carlos ('the Jackal') and the Japanese Red Army under Ms Fusako Shigenobu, among others, found mercenary terrorism in the service of rogue-state sponsors to be a lucrative endeavour. The proliferation of potential state sponsors in the context of Cold War wars-by-proxy tended to exacerbate this phenomenon. Though many groups were able to take advantage of modern media as a means of gaining and maintaining a high profile, most eventually fell prey to the lack of popular backing that had already spelled the end of anarchist terrorism.

Rapoport suggests that the rise in Islamist violence, and the fourth wave of terror in general, can be traced to three defining events. Much of early Islamism was based on Shi'ah radicalism, which in turn was inspired by the Islamic revolution in Iran in 1979. Sunni militants had their galvanizing experience of success a few years after their Shi'ite counterparts when Soviet troops withdrew from Afghanistan towards the end of the 1980s. The arrival of a new Islamic century – al-Hijri 1400 (the year 1980 in the Gregorian calendar) added a millenarian element to both Shi'ah and Sunni radicalsm.

The nature and character of the fourth wave have caused a considerable amount of debate among scholars. However, there are a few empirical observations that deserve mention. To begin with, the fourth wave has been largely characterized by its most catastrophic strategy, suicide terrorism. This tactic, begun by Shi'ite groups in Lebanon, has spread to more than two dozen fourth-wave actors. Second, Rapoport, Hoffman and others note that while the number of active groups has dropped precipitously, the average size of the remaining groups has grown. Finally, organizational longevity has likewise increased among fourth-wave groups (usually, most terrorist groups do not survive beyond a year or two after being set up).

Not all aspects of the fourth wave are agreed upon, however. These debates usually centre upon the effect of religion on violent political movements. At one end of the spectrum are scholars who argue that the (re-)introduction of religion into political violence has fundamentally changed the nature of terrorism. At the other end are those who hold that religion simply acts as a collective action solution, and the ends of contemporary terrorism remain political change or reform in this world, not salvation in

another world.

Magnus Ranstorp states that the rise of religious terror follows historically the rise of terror as a form of warfare.[130] However, Ranstorp maintains that a number of things differentiate religious radicals from more conventional terrorists. First, religious radicals feel themselves to be located at a critical juncture in history, an idea also expounded upon by Mark Juergensmeyer. These groups revolve around a spiritual guide, who may be separate from the leadership of the group itself (as in the case of Sheikh Yassin and the leadership of Hamas prior to his assassination by Israel). In addition, they are, more so than their secular predecessors, defined by an uncompromising attitude that Ranstorp believes is the inevitable result of having a Manichean belief that worldly events represent a struggle between good and evil.

Ranstorp disagrees, however, with Rapoport's characterization of the founding events of the fourth wave. He claims that Islamic radicalism actually evolved in certain phases, each of which was triggered by a distinct historical event.[131] Yet he is in agreement with Rapoport that the Iranian Revolution of 1979 provided a template for revolutionary Islam. In addition, it was with Iranian (and Saudi) assistance that Islamist violence was internationalized in the succeeding decades. Sunni radicals forged the networks necessary to garner international headlines during the jihad against the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. An event not mentioned by Rapoport, however, which Ranstorp finds to be central, is the Islamic Salvation Front's imminent election victory in Algeria in 1991. The subsequent nullification of the results helped to radicalize Islamic movements, especially in North Africa, and to disillusion their adherents with Western democratic principles. Writing in 1996, Ranstorp viewed the then current wave of spoiler terrorism as a direct result of the Palestinian–Israeli General Agreement on Principle, which he claimed undermined the Islamist goal of liberating Jerusalem. Given the now defunct status of this agreement, it is debatable how central this event would be viewed in the wider history of Islamist Radicalism.

Bruce Hoffman has also written at length regarding the 'new terrorism', and begins by drawing attention to the fact that Rapoport's wave theory speaks only to contemporary terror and that religion was, in actuality, an original motivation for non-state violence. It was in fact Rapoport's first wave in the nineteenth century[132] that secularized non-state terrorism. Hoffman argues that the rise in mass-casualty terror in the fourth wave is a result of the fact that religious terrorists see violence as a sacramental act, and that it is undertaken as the result of a theological imperative.[133] This results in a number of behaviours tending towards escalation in terms of lethality of attacks. First, the transcendent aspects of religious violence free radicals from the social and moral constraints faced by secular groups. Further, religious groups seek the elimination of a broadly defined enemy. Most terrorists have potential constituencies only, but religious

radicals define that in-group more parochially. Finally, the 'new terrorism' school believes religious radicals are an extreme example of Crenshaw's redemptive groups. Religious extremists reject society wholesale and seek a radical path of spiritual revitalization.

Bruce Hoffman's work focuses on religious terrorism as part of a broader comparative analysis of contemporary terrorism. A narrower analysis of the new terrorism can be found in Mark Juergensmeyer's 'cosmic war' hypothesis. Juergensmeyer's hypothesis was driven by two trends in religious violence: a tendency towards mass-casualty violence, and an apparent lack of grand strategy in the employment of violence.[134] His answer to these puzzles was that the 'new terror' was an example of 'cosmic war', which in turn was an outgrowth of 'cosmic struggle'. According to Juergensmeyer, religion inherently deals with the struggle between order and disorder, the latter being intrinsically violent.[135] Religious violence is justified because it places terror in the context of the 'cosmic struggle' between order and disorder. Religion typically deals with conflict in the abstract. However, Juergensmeyer delineated five ways in which cosmic struggle can escalate to cosmic war, and thus actual violence.[136] First, the religious struggle alluded to must be perceived by the radical organization to be playing out in real time. Second, believers must be able to identify personally with the conflict, and are thus motivated to act on religious sanction. Third, since cosmic struggles cannot be won in real terms, believers must subscribe to the continuity of religious struggle in order to maintain commitment to the cause. Fourth, the extremists must perceive that the struggle has reached a point of crisis. Finally, the group must impute violence with a cosmic meaning. In short, Juergensmeyer conceives of religious violence as an abstracted Manichean struggle between good and evil, scripted by radical interpretations of theology. Thus, according to Juergensmeyer, violence is not strategic but dramatic, a piece of theatre playing to three audiences: victims, ingroups and a wider audience. Terrorism as drama can be either a performance event meant to make a symbolic statement, or a performative act that actually tries to change things. Since drama is about metaphor, and metaphor requires an interpretation, acts of terror mean different things to different audiences. Drama also requires stage, dramatic time and audiences.

Juergensmeyer's testing of his theory is plagued, however, by conceptual stretching that calls into question his findings. First, his case studies span Aum Shinrikyo, Al-Qaeda, Babar Khalsa and the Irish Republican Army (IRA). While the first is only nominally political (and thus it is debatable as to whether its activities quality as political violence), the last two might be only nominally religious, calling into question whether their actions can be ascribed to 'cosmic warfare'. Certainly those of the IRA cannot. Second, Juergensmeyer's contention that terrorism is performance rather than strategic seems to be based on the notion that prior instances of terror were not marked by

symbolic violence. Given the asymmetric power between terrorists and their opponents, symbolic targets have often been a mainstay of violence. Further, many of the symbolic targets mentioned by Juergensmeyer – banks, centres of commerce, transport hubs – have always been prone to terrorist violence, and also serve the strategic end of disrupting the economic activity of target regimes.

Another researcher, the late Ehud Sprinzak, subdivided religious militancy into millenarian and post-millenarian (or messianic) camps. Sprinzak accounts for the variance in escalation to violence among radical religious movements by looking at particular attributes of each. Millenarian groups tend to focus on the redemptive qualities of eschatological events. Thus, redemption comes after divine intervention, often in the form of an apocalypse. The emphasis in such groups is therefore not on action but on correct living preceding judgement. Post-millenarian groups typically believe that divine intervention comes only after certain preconditions have been met. The radical Jewish movements analysed by Sprinzak often believe that the rebuilding of the Temple of Solomon will accomplish such ends. Regardless of the form of action required, messianic groups have, according to Sprinzak, grown impatient with the slow pace of redemption. They are therefore inclined to take 'historical shortcuts'.[137] As a result, they are far more prone to violence than their millenarian brethren.

Rapoport's wave theory represents a broad periodical classification of modern non-state terrorism. As noted earlier, it is perhaps the closest to a general theory of terrorism found in the current literature. Its breadth, however, comes with problems of specificity. By speaking of movements rather than individual groups, there are ambiguities to be found in its accounting for particular instances of political violence. For example, the same Marxist thought that drove the first wave informed much of the anti-colonial movements. And a strong argument could be made that the poster children for left-wing radicalism in the 1960s and 1970s (the Viet Cong and PLO, respectively) were in fact (also) anti-colonial,[138] rather than purely leftist. Perhaps the biggest shortcoming of Rapoport's wave theory is that it excludes non-state groups that managed to take state power – as in the case of the fascists and communists – and successfully engaged in large-scale state terrorism for long periods of time. Nevertheless, Rapoport's theory remains powerful in its ability to illustrate the relationship between motivations for violence and modes of violent activity. It has also has received empirical support in a statistical test relating to the last two waves, performed with ITERATE data.[139]

A much simpler periodization than Rapoport's four waves theory is provided by those who simply distinguish between an 'old terrorism' (ending at the latest on 9/11) and a 'new terrorism' that is religiously inspired. Authors adhering to this cleavage usually refer to up to a dozen alleged quantum changes since 11 September 2001:

1 attempts to acquire weapons of mass destruction;

2 religious fanaticism;

3 catastrophic terrorism;

4 border porosity;

5 global communication;

6 diaspora bridgeheads (portable conflicts);

7 kamikaze suicide terrorism;

8 expansion of range of targets (ICRC, UN);

9 links with organized crime;

10 new sources of financing;

11 failed and weak states as *de facto* safe havens;

12 new types of weapons (e.g. MANPADs).

However, many theorists call into question the stark division between religious terrorism and more secular political violence. Fawaz Gerges, for example, sees definitive organizational motivations behind the apparent lack of grand strategy in international Salafist movements. The substitution of localized revolution with anti-Western rhetoric and violence does not signal to Gerges a shift from conventional terrorism to 'cosmic war'. Rather, it is a strategy derived from the need to maintain organizational salience at a time when local conditions are not favourable for domestic revolt. It is not necessarily a signal that such movements are not revolutionary, merely that reality has dictated that they shift their respective raison d'être for the time being[140] – as would have been predicted by Crenshaw's organizational process theory. Contentions that radical religious organizations are as insensitive to constraints on violence as previous groups have proved false in a number of cases. The implosion of the Christian Identity movement in the United States following the public relations fiasco of the Oklahoma City bombing (in 1995) can be seen mirrored in the Indonesian backlash against the Bali bombings by Jemaah Islamiyah (in 2002), the Salafist reaction to GIA atrocities in Algeria (in the late 1990s), and perhaps even with Al-Qaeda, whose Iraqi subsidiary is currently on the ropes, largely as a result of its heavy-handed tactics. Brynjar Lia's work tracking the internal debates between al-Suri and al-Qatada illustrates that many in Salafist circles are keenly aware of their need to keep their violence within acceptable bounds. These debates are echoed even at the top echelons of the Al-Qaeda organization, as depicted in admonitions of Ayman al-Zawahiri to al-Zarqawi, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Iraq and architect of the more atrocious Al-Qaeda tactics such as videotaped beheadings and anti-Shi'ah violence.[141]

Ethnic terrorism

Ethnic conflict figured large in twentieth-century history, but ethnicity-based terrorism remains understudied despite the fact that it is often central to 'ethnic cleansing' – the expulsion of unwanted people with the help of atrocities that make people decide to flee their land. There are relatively few theories of ethnic terrorism. Here we will focus on two of them: Dan Byman's 'logic of ethnic terrorism' and Jeff Kaplan's 'fifth wave'.

Daniel Byman's work on the logic of ethnic violence is by far the most succinct new addition to the discourse at large. Beginning by way of differentiating ethnic terrorism from other forms of terrorism, Byman at once signals the uniqueness of ethnic terrorism, and the ways in which these exceptionalities affect the qualitative attributes of such violence.

The primary distinction between ethnic and other forms of political violence is that ethnic terrorism is geared towards forging an ethnic identity and serving as a facilitator of ethnic mobilization.[142] These ends are often accompanied by an advocacy of secession, or the elevation of one ethnic group to a privileged position within a state at the expense of other groups in the population. Since ethnic terrorist groups are by definition selective, they differ from other groups in that they limit membership to a specific sub-set of the population.[143] As a consequence, unlike many other groups, ethnic terrorists have a pre-existing receptive audience for the message underlined by their violence.[144] As noted previously, common approaches to ethnic terror often subsume their violence within studies of organizations with broader motivations such as religious movements. However, Byman maintains that ethnic terrorist groups are not strictly comparable with religious terrorists, though there is often overlap: whereas the latter are, in principle, universalist, the former are nationalistic and particularistic. Nor are such groups akin to social revolutionary organizations, as they do not attempt to reshape the whole of society. Rather, they serve the interests of a narrow section of the population (usually a minority, rarely a majority in a minority position).[145]

The effects of ethnic terrorism, according to Byman, are twofold.[146] First, ethnic terrorist groups seek to create a communal bloc in response to state retaliation. Second, as solidarity grows by virtue of the shared experience of persecution, so too does adhesion to 'the cause', as well as recruitment and financial support. The main strategy of ethnic terrorism is to sow fear among rival population groups.[147] This polarizes the political environment and marginalizes moderates. One of the main effects of such a strategy, however, is the fostering of a homogenization through the process of more or less 'voluntary emigration'. This, in turn, changes the demographic and political realities on the ground in favour of the demands posed by the ethnic group.[148] Where salient

ethnic schisms do not pre-exist, the ethnic struggle is combined with a process of strengthening identity formation.[149] While there are typically a variety of potential claims on identity, those formulating ethnic identities reject competing claims. Byman notes that this is difficult, but, if successful, the organization responsible for ethnic polarization tends to exhibit a substantial staying power. This in turn helps to explain the longevity of ethnic groups when compared to some other types of organizations engaged in political violence. However, like other terrorists, ethnic extremists attempt to shift blame for violence to other parts of the community. Ethnic terrorism is always articulated by its leaders in terms of a cultural defence meted out as the result of marginalization: real, perceived, or merely possible at some future date.[150]

Some other theorists see problems with the disaggregation of ethnic terrorism from other forms of violence, upon which Byman bases his arguments. David Little, in particular, sees problems in differentiating ethnic conflict from religious conflict,[151] as ethnicity is inherently about genetic, linguistic and cultural peculiarities, with religion being a dominant component of the latter.[152] Little derives his concept of ethnicity from the Weberian premise that inherent to ethnicity is a comparative evaluation of the 'self' versus the 'other'. The idea of being a 'chosen people', or somehow relating culture to exceptionality, has, in Little's view, an intrinsic religious dimension to it.[153] Little bases such claims on an analysis of the Sri Lankan case. He finds that the notion of Sri Lanka as the land of Sinhala Buddhism was incompatible with the reality of a multi-ethnic state (including Tamils, Muslims and smaller minorities), resulting in the revival of Sinhala nationalism and ultimately the implementation of the Sinhala-only legislation in 1956, which sparked the 1984–2009 separatist Tamil insurgency.[154]

Slightly more contentious has been Jeffrey Kaplan's attempt to carry further David Rapoport's four waves theory. Kaplan posits that theorists have overlooked the emergence of a fifth wave.[155] This wave, according to Kaplan, is made up of groups that have broken off from more mainstream movements of the previous waves. These groups have as their defining characteristic an idealized, utopian vision of society, which motivates their radicalism. Kaplan holds that the defining event (accepting Rapoport's premise that all waves have one) was the rise of the Khmer Rouge in 1973, though it was not until the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), from 1987 to the present day, that the first true fifth-wave terrorist group was formed.

These movements are notorious for their extreme violence. Jeffrey Kaplan explores the reasons for this, listing 14 elements, including the following:

1 These groups are marked by a physical withdrawal into wilderness areas.

2 Groups pursue a radical quest for purity, though how they define this is relative.

3 In-group ideology is characterized by a belief in human perfectibility and a resulting

radical utopianism. It is this belief that lays the groundwork for genocidal behaviour, as it results in a belief in the 'new man' (or woman). The old order is by default dehumanized, and this emphasis on the 'new' race enhances the role of women as both symbols of the new order and progenitors of the new man.

4 By virtue of their relative innocence, children tend to represent the 'vanguard of the new'.

5 Rape is a signature tactic of fifth-wave violence.

6 New recruits are initiated into the movement by an institutionalized process of rape and violence that not only inures them to violence itself but simultaneously cuts them off from the possibility of return to their civilization.

7 Fifth-wave movements are authoritarian, and leadership is centralized around charismatic rulers.

8 Most fifth-wave groups are deeply religious in nature and have millenarian doctrines as their theological cornerstones.

Kaplan concedes that ideal types of fifth-wave movements are hard to find, but suggests that the LRA in and around Uganda is the closest, with the genocidal Janjaweed in Sudan a distant second. However, a number of problems exist with this conceptualization of the fifth wave. To begin with, it is based on a broad definition of terrorism. Many scholars could counter that most of these movements are in fact more complex than simple terrorist outfits, representing guerrilla groups, warlord militias or even governments (as in the case of the Khmer Rouge). Second, Kaplan's list is based upon a litany of characteristics drawn specifically from the worst attributes of a few armed movements operating in and after the Cold War. Kaplan admits that few if any actual movements fit his description in its entirety. Rather, he conceives of the fifth wave less as an actual historical phenomenon, as Rapoport does, and more of a conceptual ideal type that movements at a variety of historical junctures may or may not move towards. Thus, he is engaging in a different social scientific exercise altogether and should preferably not be linked to Rapoport's four waves. While the phenomena observed by Jeff Kaplan exist(ed) in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Sierra Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo), we are dealing here with social formations that are more complex than stand-alone terrorist groups of the third wave, or embedded terrorist groups of the fourth wave. The widespread use of child soldiers, the mass rape of women in some of the more recent armed conflicts and the total lack of respect for neutral actors like the Red Cross and other humanitarian organizations in combat zones is a very worrisome feature of some post-Cold War conflict waging. Yet while it contains multiple acts of terrorism, terrorism itself is probably not the chief characteristic of such ultra-violent movements.

Revolutionary terrorism

A seminal, though oft-overlooked, theory of terrorist violence is Martha Crenshaw's theory of revolutionary terrorism, developed from her research on the Algerian independence struggle (1954–1962). By 'revolutionary terror', Crenshaw is referring to a brand of non-state insurgency wherein the goal of the organization is to seize control of the (colonial) state, and in so doing to promulgate widespread social and political change.[156] Though much of the post-9/11 discourse has focused on ritualistic or expressive aspects of the 'new terror' (as previously discussed), Crenshaw explained in her dissertation research that when the motivation for violence encompasses far-reaching goals, the tactics and quality of violence change as well. Accordingly, revolutionary terrorism must have the following properties:[157]

• Terrorism is part of a revolutionary strategy the end of which is the seizure of state power.

• Terrorism is manifested in socially unacceptable violence. It is more effective when the violence is unpredictable, but such unpredictability should not lead the researcher to misconstrue the violence as being random.

• The victims of terrorism are representative of a larger audience.

• The violence is intended to change a target group's behaviour by affecting its members psychologically.

Crenshaw's theory of revolutionary terrorism views political violence along T.P. Thornton's lines: as a process of violent action represented by a spectrum of activities that begins with terrorism, moves on to guerrilla warfare and subsequently expands into a civil war, with the end goal of the insurgent movement being to seize state power.[158] Crenshaw states that in the end, the group will utilize all three types of violence. The concept of revolutionary terrorism is elaborated upon by Price,[159] who details three targets of revolutionary violence;[160] victims, groups who identify with the victim, and the so-called 'resonant mass' represented by those who could be swayed by either the victim or the victimizer. Price provides greater detail in his analysis of revolutionary violence by dividing the opposed political system into three types, each with its own particular conflict of legitimacy:[161] the independent nation-state (atarget of ideological violence), the colonial territory (a target of anticolonial violence) and the internal colonial state (a target of ethnic terrorism). Terrorist tactics of revolutionary extremists vary as well, ranging from armed robbery to attacks on state military apparatus, to kidnappings, selective assassinations and indiscriminate attacks in public spaces.[162] With respect to the later strategy, however, Crenshaw cautions that terrorists

must walk a fine line, as terrorism does not always produce terror. If the violence dulls or numbs a society to violence, the terrorists might provoke hostility rather than fear.[163] This tolerance results from two factors, which in turn prompts a move from 'fear of' to 'hostility towards' the terrorists:[164] the duration and magnitude of the campaign, and the inability of the organization to effectively communicate reasonable demands and realistic political alternatives.

Suicide terrorism

Despite the fact that a great deal of work on suicide terrorism has been done by psychologists using an agent-based approach, we will discuss suicide terrorism (or martyrdom operations, as some of its advocates call it) under the institutional level of analysis. The reason for this is twofold. First, most scholars concur that there is no evidence of major psychological deviance at the individual level of analysis. As an overview of relevant literature indicates, individual suicide bears little resemblance to the use of suicide as a tool of political terrorism. Meaningful insights psychologists have been able to offer have typically been in the realm of group rather than individual psychology, representing the ways in which human collectives can subject vulnerable individuals to pressure and offer them or their families incentives to throw away their lives while killing enemies. Second, most social scientists contend that organizations are nearly always responsible for individual acts of suicide, while individual acts of self-destruction combined with mass murder tend to be part of broader campaigns of violence. One early finding was that about 95 per cent of all suicide attacks were conducted by an organization as part of a concerted campaign. However, Ami Pedahzur cautions that this might be changing as transnational movements start to use it more than local domestic groups.[165]

Studies suggest that suicide terrorism began in earnest in the 1980s, with currently at least 32 groups spread out across 28 countries adopting this fearsome tactic.[166] Researchers have taken note of this phenomenon primarily as a consequence of its enhanced lethality (which tends to be markedly higher than in the case of merely placing a bomb on a site and then removing oneself from the crime scene or triggering the bomb by remote control). According to data gathered by Pedahzur and Perlinger, the average number of victims in a terrorist incident in which small arms are used is about three casualties (3.32). An attack using a remote-controlled bomb elevates the average number of victims to almost seven deaths and injured (6.92). When the perpetrator uses a suicide belt of explosives, however, this number increases significantly. If the suicide bomber is using an explosiveladen car or truck, the number goes up to almost 100 casualties (97.81) per attack.[167] In a way, the suicide bomber is the poor man's asymmetric equivalent of a guided missile or remotely controlled drone firing its rocket

based on visual identification of the target. However, whereas those using drones and guided missiles, bound by humanitarian law, try to avoid civilian casualties, most contemporary suicide terrorists have no such qualms.

Scholars have found defining suicide terrorism difficult for many of the same reasons that make defining terrorism difficult. Assaf Moghadam has investigated a number of potential terms for use by scholars and concluded that 'suicide terrorism' is too narrow and pejorative. 'Homicide bombings', a potential alternative, is also too narrow. 'Martyrdom operations', terminology borrowed from the perpetrators themselves, Moghadam found too normative. In the end, he found 'suicide operations' to be the most value free of the available terms. Yet what qualifies as a suicide operation is still up for debate.[168] In its broadest sense, suicide operations could be used to refer to any lethal operation involving also the deliberate death of the assailant. A narrower reading, and one perhaps championed by the majority of relevant researchers, would refer only to those operations that make the death of the perpetrator a prerequisite for success. Still others believe that an even narrower reading is preferable. Israeli offers what is perhaps the most parochial label in the form of 'Islamikaze', which will be investigated in somewhat greater detail shortly.

Conceptualizing suicide terrorism only begins with the definitional debate. From this initial point of departure, a variety of theoretical approaches to the subject have emerged. Among those deemed most seminal are Gambetta's organizational studies approach, Atran's policy-oriented approach, Israeli's 'Islamikaze' thesis and the rational choice frameworks of Pape, Elster and Bloom.

Gambetta begins his work with the assumption that all suicide missions are perpetrated by organizations. From an academic perspective, then, organizational motivations for suicide campaigns should take precedence in security studies.[169] These motivations span a wide gamut, running from the impetus of religious radicals to the self-interest of secular states, as well, as much in between.[170] However, campaigns of suicide terrorism tend to share common denominators. First, Gambetta claims that all organizations that use suicide missions view such actions as one component in a broader strategic campaign of violence.[171] Second, the organizations that employ suicide missions typically either have very broad constituencies or lack any constituency whatsoever.[172] Third, Gambetta points to his observation that only the weaker side in a conflict utilizes suicide missions as proof that suicide missions are in fact rational and strategic.[173] Suicide missions are not, however, merely a means of last resort. Gambetta's studies show that sometimes such campaigns can be an effective strategy of organization building as these missions communicate to an appropriate audience the organization's fatalistic resolve to continue the struggle.[174] Finally, despite the fact that many secular organizations have utilized suicide missions,

Gambetta found that 89.9 per cent of suicide missions directly target those of different religions from the perpetrators of the attack,[175] pointing to an even greater need for rationalizing such attacks within the organization.

Scott Atran focuses on the process of radicalization and socialization into suicide attacks, most notably the recruitment process of jihadists responsible for filling the ranks of shaheeds (martyrs). He also looks at the processes by which organizations manage to radicalize their members into suicide missions. In terms of recruitment, Atran makes several counter-intuitive observations. First, he finds that jihadi recruiters target that segment of the population, young Middle Eastern males, with the highest percentage of pro-American cultural values.[176] Second, Atran found that the profiles of jihadists are markedly different from those of other right-wing militants. Whereas the latter typically appeal to marginalized individuals who lack father figures, are unemployed, etc., the former are culled from largely middle-class, well-educated and tightly knit families. Atran surmises that the lack of personal marginalization and the lack of a cultural context of extreme violence point to the fact that the radicalization process into suicide terrorism is likewise different and follows the lines of Arendt's 'banality of evil'. Thus, suicide terror is less a product of personal animosity and more a result of a 'manipulation of contexts', engineered by organizations in order to manipulate agent choice (comparable to Stanley Milgram's electro-shock tests in the 1960s).[177] Atran's observations into this process offer a useful critique of agent-based analyses of suicide terrorism. According to the researcher, the majority of suicide terror work stating that one can explain individual behaviour by simply looking at personality traits suffers from the fundamental attribution error. In fact, Atran states that suicide attacks are the result of institutional manipulation, geared towards furthering organizational goals.[178] Israeli's work on suicide terrorism echoes the findings of Atran, among others, and makes a case for conceiving of suicide terrorism as a phenomenon unto itself.

Israeli disagrees with the term 'suicide' terror, however, since the agents responsible for these actions do not display any of the pathological behaviours of suicidal individuals.[179] In short, they are not suffering undue psychological distress and their actions are not done to avoid humiliation. Rather, what the discourse terms suicide terror is actually the result of socio-cultural impetuses, analogous to the Japanese Kamikaze who fought for their country towards the last days of the Second World War.[180] Far from suffering the feelings of extreme shame and isolation that drive suicidal behaviour in individuals, suicide terrorists, like the Kamikaze of the Second World War, fulfil a social-familial ideal, either by bringing honour to their households or by preparing the way to paradise for their kinsmen.[181] Further, suicidal individuals seek to maximize the damage they inflict upon themselves. In Kamikaze attacks, the individual seeks to maximize the damage done to his or her opponents while

minimizing the damage done to him- or herself, conceived of as being, in effect, the organization or state.[182] Thus, Israeli differentiates between agent-based suicide and organizationally or culturally motivated suicide, and rejects the term 'suicide' altogether. Israeli adopts in its stead the term 'Islamikaze'. Drawing distinctions between suicidal actions and Islamikaze actions, Israeli provides a useful psychological critique of the discipline. He begins by delineating the steps of a clinical build-up to a suicidal mindset:[183]

1 A thought of killing oneself.

2 The presence of a plan, i.e. how to proceed, what are the precise steps to be taken, their sequence and timing, etc.

3 An energy level of the suicidal individual must exist, i.e. his capacity to carry out the plan.

All of these steps stand in stark contrast to the build-up of the Islamikaze ideology.184
1 . . . identify the enemy.

2 . . . strengthening the value of jihad as the religious duty of every Muslim against the enemy.

3 . . . instigating the Islamikaze to show personal valor, and self-sacrifice for the attainment of the prescribed goal.

While useful in terms of its provision of a straightforward and convincing comparison between suicidal behaviour and suicide terrorism, Israeli's thesis is troubled by its simultaneously general and parochial applicability. The term 'Islamikaze' itself emphasizes the relationship between insurgent and statist violence. At the agent level of analysis, this draws interesting parallels between the motivations for state-sanctioned suicide missions and those of suicide terrorists. However, the study is flawed on two levels. In the first instance, Israeli's comparison draws from two different levels of analysis. The suicidal individual is detailed at the agent level, and the Islamikaze is explored by virtue of institutional action (action is the result of an indoctrination process carried out by the sanctioning organization). Perhaps more importantly, however, Israeli's study obscures the differences in strategic rationale for suicide bombing between state agents and insurgents. States have historically employed suicide missions to some effect in military campaigns aimed at crippling the capabilities of rivals. Suicide terrorism, on the other hand, though definitely more lethal than conventional terror, nonetheless shares terrorism's inability to thwart an enemy by itself. Rather, suicide terrorism is a form of psychological war meant to further the ends of terrorist organizations through the imposition of fear in an opponent.

Few studies of suicide terrorism have gained the prominence of Pape's research into

suicide terror as a function of strategic choice. Echoing other studies, Pape stipulates explicitly that suicide terror does not emanate from individual choice.[185] Further, it is not a function of religious indoctrination, nor is it a result of a psychological predisposition to such acts. In so doing, Pape takes the common tack in International Relations theories of applying rational choice theories to the institutional level of analysis. Rendering all agents functionally similar allows Pape to ignore the individual level of analysis. The agent may or may not be psychologically abnormal. It doesn't matter, since the strategy is planned by the organization, whose leadership is not.[186] Pape is addressing opponents to rational choice who charge that suicide terrorism represents akratic, or altruistic, actions, behaviour not well explained by rational choice predictions.[187] In order to address this challenge, Pape draws upon Schelling's 'rationality of the irrational' by stating that what is individually irrational is sometimes collectively rational.188

Pape conceives of suicide terrorism as the most destructive of three forms of terrorist violence.[189] The first and least destructive form of terrorism is '*demonstrative*' terror. Since demonstrative terror is meant to promulgate sympathy for the organization and its goals, it typically makes an attempt to avoid fatalities. *Destructive* terrorism represents a more aggressive incarnation of political violence and is geared towards mobilizing support and coercing opponents. *Suicide* terrorism, according to Pape, pursues coercion at the expense of popular support, which is lost not only because of the high death tolls associated with suicide terror (which arguably is the primary rationale for using the strategy) but also as a result of the contentious nature of suicide in religious or cultural scripts.

Pape delineates his study into five principal findings.[190] First, he concludes that suicide terrorism is strategic: it is usually conducted in waves or campaigns and it is used to pursue goals which have been articulated by organizations. Second, Pape maintains that suicide terrorism is designed to elicit concessions from democratic governments concerning issues related to national self-determination. Third, the use of suicide terrorism is rising because organizations observe that it is an effective tactic of rebellion. Fourth, Pape observed that moderate campaigns of suicide terrorism lead to moderate concessions from states. However, extreme campaigns are not likely to result in extreme concessions. Fifth, Pape's analysis of counter-terror solutions to suicide campaigns finds that military actions and concessions are not likely to thwart a suicide terror campaign. Rather, governments should focus their resources on limiting the ability of suicide missions to be successful.

Pape finds that, in its essence, suicide terrorism is an inversion of conventional strategic thought, since in international conflict the dominant state is traditionally the coercer. In order to coerce a rival, a state has one of two strategies: either to punish the other

state, or to deny victory in such a way as to illustrate the futility of resistance. Since in suicide terror campaigns the coercer is the weaker party, denial is impossible, so the aggressor must seek a strategy geared towards punishment[191]. Suicide terror compounds the material punishment with stress, created by the promise of future violence. Thus, suicide attacks are only effective as part and parcel of broader campaigns[192]. They are credible in their threat of more attacks to come, and, by violating the norms of violence considered acceptable in armed conflict, suicide terror raises the target's expectations of future costs. In conclusion, Pape highlights three properties of suicide terrorism: it is always part of a consistent campaign; it is always directed towards achieving territorial independence, however defined; and it is used against democracies.[193] Pape is struck by the seeming success of suicide terror campaigns. Of 11 suicide terror campaigns since 1980, 6 ended in concession – indicating at least partial achievement of terrorist objectives.[194] Since states are successful at coercion only one-third of the time, a greater than 50 per cent success rate appears quite striking. Pape's findings and his data have been challenged by other scholars studying the phenomenon of suicide terrorism, and more recent data derived from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan appear not to fit well with his hypotheses.

Another approach to suicide terrorism from the rational choice camp is John Elster's work on the motivation and beliefs underpinning suicide missions.[195] Elster takes a novel approach to the subject by disaggregating the key actors, individuals and organizations and looking at the interplay between them. Thus, it is not purely an organizational level of analysis. Elster believes this complication is necessary as suicide attacks are a result of the interaction between agents and the institutions sponsoring them. Additionally, each level has its own skill and constraint requirements.[196] Whereas agents need opportunities, skills and destructive technologies, organizations need opportunities (in the form of targets), funds, skills and volunteers. Different actors also have different motivations for violence.[197] Individuals have a fully instrumental appreciation for suicide bombing. They wish to kill as many as possible with their sacrifice. According to Elster, this wish could be motivated by either hatred or revenge. Elster contradicts the assumptions of some rationalists and states that religious imperatives and/or a desire for posthumous support for one's family typically helps make the decision, but only by alleviating key concerns such as 'Who will take care of my family when I'm gone?' However, it is never the primary motivation for an agent's decision to embark on a suicide mission. Organizational motivations, however, are not as narrow. Terrorist groups can see either an instrumental or an intrinsic benefit in suicide missions: it is instrumental if recruits are few and the organization needs to maximize effectiveness with scarce resources. On the other hand, suicide terror can have an intrinsic value for the organization as it demonstrates a resolve to continue the fight.

Elster's work is original and intuitively convincing. However, it does suffer from the more tautological inclinations of rational choice theory, at least at the agent level of analysis. By conflating desires for revenge and personal animosity with rational motivations for violence, the approach verges on having an overly broad definition of rationality, veering towards conceptual stretching.

Another influential work on suicide terrorism has been Mia Bloom's *Dying to Kill*, an empirical investigation of the subject. Bloom finds that suicide terrorism is mainly being driven by two elements: the failure of other forms of resistance previously employed by the group in question, and (more originally) the presence of intense inter-group competition. Bloom shows that Pape's assertion that terrorists lose support when conducting suicide operations is not always the case. Rather, suicide campaigns often develop in the latter stages of intense conflict in areas where groups have constituencies receptive to the targeting of civilians. Like those of Pape, Bloom's findings have been challenged, primarily on the grounds that inter-group rivalry as an explanatory factor has been overemphasized in her studies.

Theories of asymmetrical conflict

With a few notable exceptions, many theorists of terrorism neglect the relationship between terrorism and other forms of political violence. Nevertheless, one segment of the discourse focuses specifically on terrorism as a form of asymmetrical conflict, and in so doing draws parallels between terrorism and broader manifestations of violence. These theories can be generally disaggregated into one of two categories: those theories that look at terrorism as a tactic of asymmetric conflict, drawing from the military sciences (e.g. Liddell Hart's Strategy: The Indirect Approach) in order to understand tactics and strategies of terrorist organizations, and those theories that broaden the scope of the term 'asymmetry' in ways meant to elaborate the nature of the conflict between states and terrorist groups.

Of the former group, the largest contribution has come in the form of various analyses of organizational designs in terrorist groups, specifically the contemporary adoption of network-centric operational paradigms. Throwing this phenomenon into relief for the first time was the work of RAND researcher John Arquilla, author of the influential monograph The Advent of Netwar.[198] He later elaborated his thesis in subsequent volumes co-authored with RAND colleague David Ronfeldt.[199] The premise of the netwar doctrine is based in part on military science research into the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)[200] and on an emerging literature studying parallels between information-age business practices and modern incarnations of political violence.[201] Arquilla and Ronfeldt analysed the ways in which information revolution innovations

were simultaneously changing the ways in which contemporary societies generate capital as well as wage war. As it relates to terrorism, netwar proponents contend that innovations in communication, transportation and weapons technologies have shifted advantage in conflict from hierarchical to networked organizations, the latter being defined as institutions whose command and control structures are flattened and decentralized as opposed to the vertical hierarchies of traditional political organizations such asstates. These networked designs may take the form of chain networks, where individual nodes are connected linearly to other nodes of the organization, hub and spoke networks, where franchised cells collaborate with the core organization vis-à-vis a centralized command node, and the so-called full-matrix or all-channel network, wherein all nodes of a network are directly connected to all others (see Figure 3.11 in the previous chapter). According to netwar doctrine, these highly interconnected organizations have a number of operational advantages over hierarchically organized adversaries. First, they are able to share information more effectively across organizations, increasing the effectiveness of individual cells. Second, they are more resilient to attack than hierarchical organizations, as the destruction of all but the most critical cells will have little effect on remaining segments of the organization. And third, given their amorphous nature, distributed organizationsare more adaptable and flexible than the rigid hierarchies of conventional armed forces, enabling them to institutionalize 'lessons learned' more quickly than their state foes.

While the netwar hypothesis has raised many interesting critiques of the statist reaction to the threat of terrorism, network theorists have in some instances a fundamentally flawed approach to the study of terrorist organizations. On methodological grounds, two issues come to the fore. First, there is little definitional debate regarding what precisely constitutes a 'network'. This allows researchers to use overly broad definitions of an organization, including in their analysis those elements of a movement with only tangential (indeed, sometimes only ideational) attachments to the organization being studied. It is impossible to accept a social scientific assessment of an entity (in this case a terrorist organization) without a clear idea of what constitutes that entity): that is, the core organization, external supporters, constituent communities, etc. Second, such studies overwhelmingly use as their case study the ill-understood and amorphous Al-Qaeda organization. This is problematic not only because of the atypical nature of Al-Qaeda (it is in many ways unlike any other terrorist organization, transnational or otherwise), but also because there is no clear consensus of what actually constitutes Al-Qaeda 'the organization'. This term has been used to refer to the high command in Pakistan (probably reduced to fewer than 100 core members) and those directly linked to them alone, or has been broadened to include allied organizations such as Al-Qaeda in Iraq, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Jemmah Islamiyyah in South-East Asia and others, or even wider still, the takfiri Salafistjihadist

movement which takes as its brand name 'Al-Qaeda' despite the lack of any formal connection between local start-ups and the Bin Laden- and al-Zawahiri-led organization founded in 1988. Theorists have been able to support hyperbolic claims regarding the effectiveness of contemporary terrorist organizations largely by simultaneously referencing all three aspects of Al- Qaeda and assuming a priori that effective communication takes place between all relevant nodes. Since few if any broader studies of organization design have been conducted across a variety of cases, the claims of the netwar theorists are at present still unsubstantiated.

In terms of theory, netwar assumptions are problematic, as they tend to equate organizational success with levels of violence and/or organizational longevity. While these assessments address important facets, they do not address the key fact that terrorist organizations are political institutions and thus must procure political goods in order to maintain organizational salience. Historically, it has been the more hierarchical organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, the IRA, as well as a host of ethno-nationalist movements that have proven adept at providing the social and political goods associated with successful organizations. Highly distributed groups such as Al-Qaeda and the American Christian Identity community provide few if any political goods for constituent communities, either in the form of social welfare programmes or in terms of clear political victories in the organization's struggle against the state – reflected in obtaining tangible political or territorial concessions. The reason for this is twofold: decentralized command and control arrangements make it difficult for organizations to articulate a coherent political platform, while decentralized operational arrangements make coordinating sophisticated terrorist campaigns difficult.

The concept of 'leaderless resistance' is a distinct, but not altogether dissimilar, theory of terrorism that surfaced in the 1990s. The strategy was originally conceived of and propounded by American right-wing radical Louis Beam as a means of 'making a virtue out of weakness and political isolation'.[202] It called for the establishment of a radical movement composed of atomistic cells of like-minded activists rather than a distinct organization. Kaplan traces the origin of this strategy to the peculiar trajectory of the American radical right in the latter part of the twentieth century. Following several high-profile setbacks, including the assassination of George Lincoln Rockwell on 25 August 1967, much of the original cadre of national socialists disavowed violent activism in favour of legal modes of protest and propaganda.[203] Shortly thereafter, however, American Nazi movements begin to realize that ideals would never be palatable to a broad audience in the United States. The movement decomposed into a series of loose ad hoc groups. Faced with a political landscape hostile to his goals, and a movement largely decimated by internal decay and external pressure from law enforcement agencies, Louis Beam based his call for a strategy of 'leaderless resistance'

on Colonel Ulius Amoss's work regarding the likely strategies of US resistance to a Soviet invasion in a Cold War context. While the leaderless resistance strategy failed to lift the American right-wing movement from obscurity, a number of single-issue left-wing groups such as the Earth Liberation Front and the Animal Liberation Front have used the concept to some effect in campaigns in both the United Kingdom and the United Statesto some effect in campaigns in both the United Kingdom and the United States.

Pursuant to the discussion on network-centric warfare, which spawned the discourse on both netwar and leaderless resistance, is the use of Kenney's organizational learning theory. It underscores the institutional similarities between narco-trafficking networks and international terrorist networks.[204] In brief, Kenney's theory analyses how organizations react to new information, store information and create routines that consistently produce good enough (note: not optimal) results.[205] Strategic advantage, according to Kenney, is accrued by those organizations best able to exemplify the traits of a 'learning organization'. Kenney states that an institution becomes a learning organization when it embeds institutional knowledge into its routine,[206] meaning that organizational activities are informed by storage of, and reflection on, organizational experience. The method of subsequent knowledge diffusion, however, depends upon the type of knowledge being dealt with.[207] Kenney breaks down organizational knowledge into two discrete categories: *techne* and *metis*. *Techne* represents abstract technical knowledge such as bomb making, document forging, etc. This sort of complex technical knowledge requires formal instruction and cannot be gleaned from books and distance-learning by internet alone. *Metis*, on the other hand, is experiential and intuitive knowledge such as targeting, law enforcement evasion and other modes of tradecraft. *Metis* comes from learning by doing. Becoming a learning organization requires a commitment to (or professional need for) innovation in day-to-day operations, as well as formal organizational processes for disseminating relevant information to various nodes in the organization. This contention of Kenney stands in contrast with what netwar theorists assume; he finds that loosely coupled networks lack connectivity and thus have a limited capacity for organizational learning.[208] Distributed networks, while potentially more resilient, have handicaps as they are not fully informed. At present, Kenney has only published the first book of a two-volume set investigating his theory. The completed volume reflects his study of narco-trafficking networks and has only marginally been tested with terrorist organizations. It remains to be seen, however, whether his theory is applicable beyond organized crime groups.

Among the most seminal studies on terrorism in recent years have been two small volumes by Marc Sageman.[209] Sageman begins with a methodological critique of current theories of terrorism and divides the approach according to three levels of analysis for terrorism studies:[210] a micro level, focusing on the individual; a macro level,

focusing on the environment in which radicals operate; and a middle range, focusing on the nature of relationships within terrorist networks. The individual level of analysis is substandard, according to Sageman, as it cannot determine the scope of the problem.[211] As a result, it makes the false assumption that terrorists are fundamentally different from other segments of a given population, it neglects the structural factors faced by an organization, it assumes people understand what they are doing and why, and individual investigations contain no control cases.[212] Sageman likewise dismisses the macro or structural level of analysis because it assumes that people respond to structural imperatives similarly. Sageman maintains that they do not. Some of the work of Horgan suggests that organizational dynamics have a systematic effect on individual behaviour.[213] Some authors maintain that religion has little independent effect on radicalism. Sageman states as evidence that contemporary jihadis often have little if any religious training, echoing similar findings by the RAND organization in its studies of the links between Marxist doctrine and Viet Cong militants fighting inspiration during the Vietnam War.[214] Sageman, in turn, makes the case for the mid level of analysis, which he states focuses on the nature of relationships in terrorist networks.[215]

Of particular importance to investigators are the processes of interactions among disparate members of the organization. The processes Sageman delineates are radicalization, mobilization, motivation and separation.[216] The first of these, radicalization, is prompted by moral outrage caused by a major moral violation that prompts, in turn, a moral judgement. Sageman is quick to point out that this is not humiliation, as has been assumed by many studies, as such a reaction typically causes passivity and apathy rather than the rage associated with political violence. As it relates to the international Salafist networks studied by Sageman, this usually takes the form of a perceived 'war against Islam'. This is because moral outrage alone is insufficient to result in radicalism. Rather, the violation must be placed in the context of an ongoing conflict. Further, the radical agenda must resonate with personal experience. Many are exposed to radical beliefs. But for these to be internalized, they must resonate personally. It is for this reason, according to the researcher, that diasporas are so often fertile breeding grounds for radicalism, as their members find themselves marginalized (economically and/or culturally) in their host countries. Individuals, however, require opportunity structures to engage in political violence. This is achieved by the mobilization of at risk individuals by underground networks. As it relates to Al-Qaeda (which Sageman defines rather loosely), there are two types of peer networks: face to face and virtual. Face-to-face networks typically occur vis-à-vis immigration patterns, radical student groups or radical mosques. Virtual mobilization, however, takes place by virtue of internet chat-rooms, the self-selection and anonymity of which typically serve the radicalization and mobilization process by creating the illusion of numbers.[217]

These uneven modes of mobilization in large part result in what is arguably Sageman's greatest theoretical contribution to terrorism studies: the delineation of global Islamism into three stages,[218] each with its peculiar characteristics, strengths, and limitations. The 'first wave' consists of the Afghan jihadis, those veterans of the war against the Soviets who received formal training in insurgency and benefited from an abundance of experience in the anti-Soviet jihadi campaign of the 1980s. The 'second wave' joined in the 1990s and was motivated by a broader spectrum of political events, namely the conflicts in Chechnya, Bosnia and Kashmir. Those in this second wave did not have the benefit of the Afghan jihad as a learning experience, but they did benefit from interactions with the first-wave jihadis in training camps located in North Africa and Central and South Asia. The 'third wave' is the first to have little to no contact with prior waves. This third wave represents the current manifestation of jihadi violence and can in turn be broken up into two distinct groups, the Middle Eastern radicals and the European radicals. Sageman's most controversial conclusions come from his study of this last group, which he states lacks the professionalism of prior waves. In so doing, Sageman largely discounts much of the discourse on the new terrorism and states that the current jihadi phenomenon is waning.

Homer-Dixon applies network analysis in a different manner, choosing instead the complex nature of modern societies as a subject for investigation.[219] He takes an opposite tack to most of the netwar school, and instead of focusing on the growth of capabilities in non-state groups, studies the growing vulnerabilities of modern states. Just as Arquilla and Ronfeldt apply network theory to terrorist organizations, Homer-Dixon views modernized states as networks of networks, a system of interconnected parts within a complex whole. These social, economic and political interconnections serve to multiply the vulnerabilities of states through the production of 'feedback loops', or the propensity for disruptions in one aspect of a network to have echo effects across a number of interdependent nodes in the system. Thus, an attack on one system could have resounding effects across a number of other systems, effectively multiplying the destructive powers of non-state groups, which simultaneously are benefiting from technological advances in weapon systems.

As was stated previously, however, other researchers have broadened the notion of asymmetrical conflict and have drawn on a number of other attributes of conflict to address the relationship between states and insurgents. Stepanova explicitly defines terrorism as a form of asymmetrical conflict, yet states that there are three types of asymmetry.[220] The first asymmetry is that of power, and, according to Stepanova, it always favours the state. The second is an asymmetry of status, affording one party (almost always the state) a monopoly on legitimacy, not only at the domestic level but also internationally. Additionally, however, Stepanova takes note of a third type of asymmetry termed two-way asymmetries. Defined as vulnerabilities directly related to

the strength of the dominant party, this asymmetry accrues to the advantage of the weaker side, because of ideological and structural disparities between terrorists and states.[221] These two-way asymmetries are fourfold. First, terrorists have an asymmetric ability to solve collective action problems.[222] This stems from a number of factors affecting the decision making of states fighting terrorist groups. Governments are overconfident and underestimate the need for interstate cooperation. Governments also often cannot agree on what constitutes a terrorist group. Finally, governments, specifically liberal democracies, usually make decisions based on electoral cycles and not on the long time horizons envisioned by Islamist terrorists. Second, Stepanova, echoing Homer-Dixon, points out that wealthy modern states represent an asymmetry of available targets. Third, states (at least, liberal democratic states) are restrained in their response to terrorist provocations, while terrorists appear to have no such restrictions. Fourth, terrorists have an asymmetry of knowledge regarding the states. Whereas governments often know very little about their non-state adversaries, terrorists are often very knowledgeable about the targeted state, its decision-making process, its human capital, its material weaknesses and its capabilities. Homer-Dixon's study is limited in its applicability because of his choosing to focus on state vulnerabilities rather than terrorist targeting, using as a point of illustration the North American rolling electricity blackouts of 2006, rather than an historical accounting of terrorist targeting of critical infrastructure. Thus, his study represents less of a risk analysis of modern society than a vulnerability assessment.

Among those mentioned in this section, Stepanova's work stands out in its holistic approach to asymmetric conflict, taking into account the relative advantages of both states and insurgents, expanding upon the unidimensional findings of Homer-Dixon while avoiding some of the hyperbole of Arquilla and Ronfeldt. It is therefore worth quoting Stepanova at some length:

> [T]he asymmetry dealt with here is a two-way asymmetry. One party to this asymmetrical confrontation is the state (and the international system in which states, despite the gradual erosion of some of other powers, remain key units). The state is faced with the toughest of its violent non-state anti-system opponents – the supranational, supra-state resurgent Islamist movement of the multilevel, hybrid network type. While the movement's ultimate utopian, universalist goals are unlikely to be realized, it can still spread havoc through its use of radical violent means, such as terrorism and especially mass-casualty terrorism. . . . This Research Report argues that these asymmetrical advantages of violent anti-system non-state actors employing terrorist means are their extremist ideologies and structures.[223]

Of all the authors mentioned above, Keohane applies the most esoteric use of

asymmetry to the study of political violence in his analysis of theories of international relations in the wake of 11 September.[224] Terming such activity 'informal violence' in order to circumvent the definitional debate surrounding 'terrorism', Keohane uses the events of 11 September as an illustration of the shortcomings of mainstream international relations theories such as realism and liberalism, namely their relentless secularism, outdated concepts of geographic space and restricted notion of sovereignty.[225] According to Keohane, the significance of 11 September is that it proves that the information revolution has globalized informal violence in much the same way as the atomic revolution globalized state violence in the 1950s. This shrinking of geographic space brings the United States (or conceivably any superpower) into constant contact with hostile social forces at the same time as globalization itself creates friction between the United States, as hegemon, and those self-same forces. Thus, terrorism is empowered by globalization at the same time that it is a reaction against it. One of Keohane's more interesting contributions to Terrorism Studies is his contention that the threat of informal violence lies in the fact that it redefines the way theorists of international relations conceive of power. Conventional definitions conceptualize power as an 'asymmetry of interdependence', whereas informal violence exploits an asymmetry of vulnerability, stemming in turn from dual asymmetries of information and belief. In a similar vein to Stepanova's two-way asymmetries, asymmetry of information refers to the superior knowledge exercised by terrorists regarding their opponents than states exercise regarding terrorists. Asymmetries of belief, as described by Keohane, are slightly more abstract, and refer to the non-rational motivations behind terrorism, namely the theological imperatives of jihadist radicalism. Keohane does not state how these necessarily outweigh the rational desire for security emanating from states, however. In summation, Keohane notes that theorists of international relations have 'overemphasized states' and 'overaggregated power', requiring a re-examination of international security in the information age which, according to the author will require an increasing emphasis on multilateral responses to insecurity rather than the unilateral application of traditional hard power.

Terrorism as communication

Terrorism can be conceptualized as a violent language of communication. Violence always demands attention – owing its life-threatening character – and impresses those at the receiving end as well as immediate and secondary witnesses. Communicative theories of terrorism focus on the persuasive and dissuasive effects of terminal violence or conditional violent intimidation of one group on various other witnessing audiences as well as the role of mass media in this signalling process. In *Violence as Communication: Insurgent Terrorism and the Western News Media*,[226] published originally

in 1980, Schmid, the principal author of this volume, formulated a communication theory of terrorism, based on what the terrorists themselves had to say about terrorism as 'propaganda by the deed'.[227] He found that violence and propaganda have much in common. Violence often aims at behaviour modification by coercion. Propaganda aims at the same by persuasion. Terrorism can be seen as a combination of the two. Eugen Hadamovsky noted as early as 1933, in his book *Propaganda and National Power*, that '[p]ropaganda and violence are never contradictions. Use of violence can be part of propaganda'.[228] Terrorism, by using violence against one victim (group), seeks to intimidate, persuade and coerce others. The immediate victim is merely instrumental and victimization serves to achieve a calculated impact on a variety of audiences.[229]

Each act of terrorism is performed with an eye to sending a specific (set of) message(s) to impress or influence specific audiences in one way or another. The message to the adversary can be: this is only the beginning and we have plenty more prepared for you if you do not listen to us. The message to the constituency of the adversary can be: your government cannot protect you and you will be targeted again if you do not put pressure on your government to change its policies. The message to the victims and their families, in turn, can be: we have warned you before and you did not listen. That's why you have to pay the price. The message to those who identify with the victims because they share common characteristics can be: see what we can do, you had better change your ways or you will be next. The message to neutral audiences can be: you cannot be neutral: either you are with us or we are against you. The message to the terrorist's real or imagined constituency is likely to be: see what we can do for you, you had better join our ranks and increase your support for us. The message to sympathizers can be: we are the wave of the future, you had better supportus or else. . . . The message to other terrorist groups might be: we are doing very well, why don't you either work for us or get out of the way? The message to members of the terrorist organization could be: we are capable of all that, let us do even more. Finally, the hidden message to the news media is likely to be: 'You had better report fully and accurately about what we do and why we do it. If you cooperate, we provide you with plenty more scoops. If not, some of your journalists will pay for it with their lives.' The relationship between terrorism and the media has been characterized by Brigitte Nacos, a journalist and a scholar herself, in these words: '[T]he news media and terrorists are not involved in a love story; they are strange bedfellows in a marriage of convenience'.[230]

One of the problems terrorists have is that different audiences have different needs, and one act of terrorism is unlikely to produce the desired message for all of them. Much depends on the selection of the target and the success of the terrorist attack itself. Even more depends on the momentum a series of attacks can generate during a terrorist campaign. Successful acts will attract new recruits, new sponsors and new

sympathizers. Seen in this light, terrorism is a violent communication strategy whereby the violence creates news value, which in turn provides free publicity. That publicity might be largely unsympathetic, but bad publicity is still better than no publicity for an underground organization needing the cooperation of the mass media to draw attention to its existence. While a terrorist act might intimidate opponents and fill them with terror, the same act also serves to legitimize the terrorist cause among those who share the terrorist goals even if they do not fully approve of the methods chosen. Either way, the terrorist act propagates the movement's message to a wider audiences. With the arrival of the internet and its interactivity, terrorist groups (or their sympathizers and supporters) can fine-tune the message, and raise their profile by propaganda among sympathetic audiences. The speed with which the news of a terrorist atrocity spreads in society and across the globe is great, and millions can be reached in a matter of minutes, either indirectly, via the public and private media, or directly, through targeted messages on the internet. In a politically polarized environment, the terrorists, with their demands and deadlines (e.g. after a prominent kidnapping), can set the political agenda, can apply pressure on the government by releasing video footage of hostages pleading for their lives, and can win sympathy, respect and support from those who share their goals if not always approving of their methods. On the other hand, they can demoralize the public by showing people how impotent the government apparently is in fact against a clandestine enemy acting furtively from the underground. The news media, with their commercial news values, fall again and again for the propaganda of the terrorists, acting on well-established news selection principles such as 'If it bleeds, it leads' (meaning that violence is to be reported on the first page or as first item in the audio-visual media) or 'Good news is bad news and bad news is good news', meaning that negative stories sell more newspapers (or TV advertisements) than good, prosocial stories. As a public display of power over life and death, many acts of terrorism are high drama, making it almost irresistible for the media to report them. As one terrorist put it, 'We give the media what they need: newsworthy events. They cover us, explain our causes and this, unknowingly, legitimizes us.'[231] That legitimization bit might be wishful thinking, but in many ways the terrorists manage to hijack the news system again and again.

A communication theory of terrorism fits best the provocational terrorism of 'propaganda of the deed'. However, for other types of terrorism – terrorism as irregular warfare, terrorism as state repression, terrorism for criminal intimidation – its explanatory power becomes less. Nevertheless, since the publication of Schmid and de Graaf's *Violence as Communication* (1982), increasing use has been made of a communication theory approach to explain the rise of appeal of non-state terrorism, either as stand-alone terrorism in peacetime or as terrorism embedded in an ongoing low-intensity armed conflict. In either case, the media act as the global nervous system,

and shocking violent news cynically produced by the terrorists greatly amplifies their power, as Bin Laden himself explained:

> Terror is the most dreaded weapon in [the] modern age and the Western media is mercilessly using it against its own people. It can add fear and helplessness in the psyche of the people of Europe and the United States. It means that what the enemies of the United States cannot do, its media is doing that.[232]

Already in 1996, Osama bin Laden had announced, 'God willing, you see our work on the news', viewing Western news media as his greatest allies. Despite the media's complicity in producing terror for the terrorists, a serious discussion about modifying our current news value system has yet to begin. A good starting point would be the introduction in public reporting of a distinction between bona fide news and malign pseudo-news, the latter being public performances that are staged for the purpose of forcing free access into the news system by means of violence (or the threat thereof) against civilians.

For a brief look at the importance of media and communication for Al-Qaeda, see Appendix 4.3 at the end of this chapter.

Social identity theory

Theories of social identity, as applied to terrorism studies, focus on the ways in which in-group identity formation influences an organization or social movement in the collective decision to resort to violence. At its most basic level, the process of identity formation requires that the in-group draw distinctions between themselves and others, highlighting the positive attributes of the in-group while simultaneously denoting the inferiority of out-group populations.[233] For identity formation to result in conflict, two processes need to occur: a formulation of group membership, and an articulation of cultural distance between groups, allowing for the dehumanization necessary to victimize out-groups. In each instance, the organization is a central tool for facilitating the trajectory towards collective violence.

Tajfel stipulates that group membership is determined by three components.[234] First, there is a cognitive component whereby the individual recognizes that he or she is part of a group. This is followed by an evaluative component wherein agents register that group membership has either a positive or a negative value. Finally, there is an emotional component where membership prompts either love or hate towards the in-group as well as rival populations. In the end, social identity is a result of these evaluations reinforced through the use of stereotypes.

Brannan *et al.* explain identity formation in the context of cultural difference, where

emic (indigenous) attributes are contrasted with etic (outsider) points of view.[235] Group differentiation results from two factors:[236] social categorization (the process of increasing the similarities among members of the in-group while drawing distinctions between the in-group and the out-group, and social comparison (the process of defining a positive image of the in-group resulting in an in-group bias, and negative connotations for the out-group). The inevitable result of these processes is in group favouritism and out-group discrimination.

Conflict, however, results not simply from in-group identity but from the differentiation of cultural attributes, resulting in social distance.[237] Hofstede puts forward five variables for characterizing national cultures.[238]

1 the significance of an individual group;

2 the differences in gender roles within the group;

3 the manner in which a group deals with inequality;

4 the degree of tolerance for the unknown held by members;

5 the trade-off between the long- and the short-term gratification of needs.

The additive component of these theories of social identity formation is that they articulate the psychological need for a rationalization for violence. Underscoring psychological theories of violence, social identity theorists concur that terrorists are not individually abnormal. Rather, they suffer from the same psychological aversions to violence as are found in the general population. Nevertheless, they are able to engage in violence via a process of redefining humanity, whereby the normal inhibitors of violence (empathy, sympathy, etc.) apply only to members of the in-group. If indeed identity formation is a key function of the radicalization process, then it merits meticulous research by students of (counter-)terrorism.

Insurgent terrorism: systemic level of analysis

Debates about terrorism at the systemic level of analysis invariably revolve around questions regarding the 'root causes' of terrorism. Oddly enough, structural feeders of violence have been harder to identify than casual observers might expect. Comparative studies experts and area study specialists have long held that structural attributes such as underdevelopment, autocratic political systems, the enabling environment of democratic political processes, and foreign intervention are responsible for creating the preconditions necessary for insurgent terrorism. However, broader studies controlling for a number of such relevant variables have found that terrorism flourishes in any number of environments and is perpetrated by a vast array of diverse agents by diverse

means and for diverse ends. Indeed, the ranks of terrorist groups are filled with peoples of every class and ethnic background operating within and across a wide range of political environments. Nevertheless, a strong and diverse field of study has been developed around the investigation of systemic causes of insurgent violence. Fundamentally, the authors have discerned three primary categories of root causes plus a fourth which actually represents a fusion of the primary three. The primary classifications of structural feeders of violence are economic, political and cultural. However, the fourth category, globalization, carries with it economic, political and cultural attributes, yet nevertheless represents a phenomenon warranting separate consideration.

Economic theories of terrorism

Among the more popular theories of terrorism are those that try to link terrorism with economic underperformance, or marginalization. However, in fact the relationship between the two is far from obvious or direct. Gurr offered the first systematic analysis of the relationship between political violence and economic marginalization in his theory of 'relative deprivation'. Rather than illustrating a straightforward relationship between political violence and economic marginalization, Gurr's theory saw rebellion as a result of political frustration that in turn was derived from the gap between the perception of individual entitlement, and the reality of goal attainment.[239]

A number of external factors have the capacity to induce such discrepancies. Egypt's Islamist problem in the 1980s has been linked to the introduction of radically increased numbers of college graduates into a depressed labour market in the 1960s and 1970s, underscoring the fact that increasing educational attainment without a concomitant increase in employment opportunities can result in widespread discontent and potentially lead to terrorism – which has often been portrayed as a mode of fighting typical of the intelligentia.[240] Alternately, situations in which two asymmetrically privileged groups coexist under the same national umbrella can lead to frustration on the part of either the 'aggrieved' or those who fear their privileged status might be in jeopardy. Tessier suggests that such an interplay between two such countervailing actors – the predominantly Hindu Tamils and Buddhist Sinhalese respectively – is to blame for the severity of the violence in the Sri Lankan context.[241]

Since the publication of Gurr's work, however, a number of notable small-*n* studies have challenged his findings. First, Berrebi's study of the biographies of 335 deceased Palestinian suicide bombers[242] discovered that only 16 per cent of the sample proved to have an income rated below the poverty line – while 31 per cent of Palestinians as a whole are classified as impoverished.[243] Further, Berrebi showed that of the sampled

extremists, no fewer than 96 per cent had achieved a high school diploma, while a further 65 per cent had benefited from at least some form of higher education. This stands in stark contrast to the Palestinian population at large, only 51 per cent of whom have a high school education and only 15 per cent have some higher education.244 Finally, Berrebi shows that unemployment itself was not a factor, as 94 per cent of the studied terrorists had employment, as opposed to only 69 per cent of the broader Palestinian population.[245] Counterintuitively, Berrebi's evidence suggests that suicide bombers tend to be less deprived than the average Palestinian.[246] Krueger and Maleckova found similar patterns not only among Hezbollah members in Lebanon but also within the cadres of Israeli settlers who engaged in anti-Palestinian violence.[247] However, Li and Schaub's[248] criticism of the latter is applicable to the former as well. Since both works focus on groups operating in or against Israel, a generalization of their respective findings is questionable. Further, Li and Schaub postulate that the screening process for suicide terrorists could result in a selection bias that other forms of terrorist operations would not exhibit. Finally, these studies focus on the individual as a unit of analysis. When aggregated to a higher level, the findings may not hold.I

Rather than looking specifically at economic well-being as a static position of wealth attainment, some authors have rooted the origin of terrorism as a reaction to a lack of development, conceived of as a process. In other words, radicalism is less a reaction to a perceived state of underdevelopment than a result of a state's inability to achieve a reasonable rate of economic growth. Thus, non-state terrorism is not a result of poverty but a result of a lack of legitimacy on the part of the state – a symptom of government incompetence, corruption and/or ineffectiveness. This line of reasoning represents a substantial component of Li and Schaub's argument (explored in greater detail in the globalization section) regarding the impact of globalization on international terrorism.[250] Gerges, however, cautions against such a reductionist understanding of (specifically) Islamist sentiments and motivations by drawing attention to the case of Egypt, which, having achieved a substantial degree of economic reform by the mid-1990s, did not see support for the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al- Jama'a wane.[251]

A prominent debate in contemporary Terrorism Studies has revolved around Sageman's contention that radicalization results not from relative but from 'vicarious deprivation'. Sageman thus effectively sidesteps the empirical debate surrounding the relationship between poverty and terrorism and states that it is neither an absolute nor a relative sense of impoverishment that drives terrorism and political violence, but, rather, an empathetic attachment with the dispossessed.[252] Sageman contends that this explains not only the lure for jihadism among the middle and professional classes, but also the prominence of Western left-wing radicals among the sons and daughters of middle- and upper-class parents. While Sageman's theory is plausible and even compelling, it

still lacks broader social scientific testing. Operationalizing soft indicators such as measures of empathy proves more difficult than regressing simple events-based data against economic indicators. Suffice it to say the concept of vicarious deprivation, first introduced by Schmid in 1984,[253] still needs more rigorous testing.

Blomberg *et al*. utilize a more specific approach to the relationship between terrorism and economic standing in their analysis of internal threats to 'peaceful status quos'. In their analysis, such status quos are interrupted by violent organizations purporting to represent groups who want to increase either their share of material wealth or their agenda-setting power in the economic sphere.[254] This would qualify as a strict rational choice analysis of agent choice except for the fact that Blomberg *et al*. root the catalyst for such actions in negative external economic shocks.[255] Thus, endogenous attributes of terrorism, such as ideology, are merely rationalizations for aggressive rent-seeking behaviour, which in turn is made rational by negative externalities in the broader marketplace. To forward their point, Blomberg *et al*. break violence down into two forms, rebellion and terrorism. The former reflects a concerted effort to overthrow the government, and the latter represents a narrower form of violence performed by a small band whose purpose is to increase the economic voice of a group. Whether a given polity then suffers from terrorism or rebellion is, in Blomberg *et al*.'s view, a function of the relative strength of the state itself. Where the state is strong, one would expect to see terrorism, and where the state is weak, one would expect to find rebellion. This could explain why civil war is more often to be found in Africa and terrorism in Western liberal democracies. While this approach is interesting for its originality, it raises theoretical as well as methodological issues. Theoretically, by equating all desire for political influence with economic goals (since the former could lead to the acquisition of the latter), Blomberg's theory tends to be tautological. Using simple events data, researchers cannot disaggregate organizational motivations. Equally problematic is that Blomberg et al. use ITERATE data (which refer to international terrorism only, not domestic terrorism) as the basis for their analysis. This raises the question of how robust such findings may be, given that terrorism geared to promote agenda-setting power would most likely be targeting domestic political systems.

Political theories of terrorism: the democracy/authoritarian rule issue

Political theories of terrorism have traditionally revolved around questions regarding the enabling or motivational aspects of various regime types with respect to non-state violence. To put the matter succinctly, some theorists argue that certain attributes of democratic regimes make them more susceptible to terrorist violence, while others, notably those tied to policy circles, maintain that elements of authoritarian governance

create grievances within radical populations (or even create the radical populations themselves), which in turn make terrorist activities more likely. Other avenues of investigation, while less visible in academic debates, have caused an equally large stir in policy circles. These studies focus on the relationship between 'state failure' and terrorism.

Gurr256 was among the first to note that recourse to violence is more likely when individuals lack democratic avenues of goal attainment.[257] However, like the relationship between underdevelopment and terrorism, the effects of democratic systems on levels of terrorism and political violence have proved more amorphous than learned opinion would suggest. Schmid offered a theoretical framework for the inherent questions in this research, which can then be used to judge the empirical tests that have followed. He asserted that democracies have some strengths with which to avail themselves against the threat of terrorism. However, these advantages are largely offset by inherent vulnerabilities within not only democracies, but also the open market systems that often accompany them.[258] Among those attributes that democracies can count as strengths are free and fair elections, which reduces the need for political violence; an elite that is open to criticism and the concomitant recourse of public protest afforded to aggrieved communities; and independent judiciaries, with judges who often allow for the hearing of minority grievances even if elites are uninterested in or even hostile to such concerns.[259] In so far as the vulnerabilities of democracies are concerned, terrorists avail themselves of a freedom of movement not heard of in authoritarian states, a freedom of association that has proved conducive to the organization of underground societies, the proliferation of targets resulting from open societies, and the legal constraints imposed upon law enforcement in democratic regimes.[260] Additionally, Schmid also associated open markets with increased likelihood of terrorist operations. Among the attributes of capitalist economies are inequalities, which in turn fuel grievances, the diffusion of arms through a globalized arms industry, open borders that are ineffective barriers against smuggling operations (particularly in arms and people), and profit-based media that are drawn to violence, as it increases circulation and audiences.[261]

Eubank and Weinberg were the first to rigorously test the assumptions laid out by Schmid. To avoid the possibility of a selection bias in democratic countries that are more likely to allow terrorist violence to be reported than closed polities, Eubank and Weinberg opted to supplant events-based data with the presence or absence of terrorist organizations as a dependent variable.[262] Generally speaking, these authors found that one is 3.5 times more likely to encounter domestic terrorism in democratic than in non-democratic regimes.[263] Further, the following attributes of democratic systems were found to be highly correlated with terrorism: high civil rights indicators, the number of political parties, high levels of political protest, rapid economic growth,

and high levels of wealth disparity[264] The first of these indicates that the relationship between terrorism and democratic governance largely revolves around the constraints imposed upon law enforcement by civil society. The second and third of these, the number of political parties and high levels of political protest, imply, one intuitively feels, that levels of political polarization and fragmentation are correlated with political violence. The fourth and fifth, rapid economic growth and high levels of wealth disparity, seem to undergird Schmid's assumptions regarding the radicalizing effects of open markets. Eubank and Weinberg are to be commended for bringing advanced statistical analysis into terrorism studies. However, their use of bivariate correlations does not adequately control for all relevant variables affecting the efficacy of terrorism, and thus leaves something to be desired in terms of robustness. Li conducted a moresystematic evaluation of the links between terrorism and democracy, beginning with the assumption that empirical relations between terrorism and democracy did in fact exist (as had been ascertained by Eubank and Weinberg), but that these links had yet to be explored more rigorously.[265] Interestingly, Li finds that the presence or absence of democracy and an associated increase in terrorism is in fact a spurious correlation. In point of fact, it is institutional constraints on state action, which one often finds in democratic systems, that have a positive effect on levels of terrorist violence.[266] These facilitating institutional constraints are policy deadlock, which plays a hand in increasing the frustration of minority political movements, and the inability of law enforcement agencies to implement stringent counter-terror campaigns, as well as the fact that targeting civilians in democratic regimes is more effective for non-state terrorists as doing so tends to influence institutional behaviour more directly.[267] Theoretically, Li's careful analysis has yielded great insight into the nature of the relationship between regime type and non-state political violence. However, methodologically, there are significant shortcomings directly resulting from his use of ITERATE data in his research design. First, one must bring attention the selection bias inherent in this data set. Democracies are more likely to be more developed and as a result have more interests abroad. Thus, they are more likely to incur the ire of transnational terrorist movements. Second, autocratic systems would be more likely to incur the wrath of domestic groups. These would not be picked up by the ITERATE data. Finally, Li's analysis ignores the theoretical argument made by those who encourage democratization as a panacea against terror. This argument states that given democratic alternatives to air political grievances, individuals will be less tempted to engage in political violence. International terrorist organizations, however, are often playing to other than the domestic political system. As Schmid held, the proper functioning of a democratic system will inhibit domestic terrorism, while simultaneously leaving open democratic societies more open to threats from abroad.[268] Thus, a research design utilizing only ITERATE data does not adequately test the notion

that democracy has a pacifying effect.

State failure, as a concept, has for better or worse been tied to the discourse on terrorism following the attribution of the 11 September attacks on the United States to Al-Qaeda, an organization that used the respective sanctuaries of Sudan and Afghanistan as staging areas for a series of terrorist actions against US interests, including the 9/11 attacks. The basic idea behind the state failure concept is that terrorist organizations take advantage not only of the geographic sanctuary provided by the near-collapse of effective governance, but also of the black markets that spring up to replace licit enterprises, giving terrorist organizations a convenient vehicle to both earn and transfer funds as needed. The robustness of this case, however, is inevitably tied not only to the definition of state failure but also to the selectivity of case studies. While caveats might be raised regarding the appropriateness of tying transnational terrorism to state failure, a more concrete correlation can be drawn between state disintegration and the rise of warlordism, a form of political violence distinct from terrorism, yet utilizing terrorism as a mainstay of political control.

One of the best definitions of state failure has been provided by Rotberg, who states that failed states are

> convulsed by internal violence and can no longer deliver positive political goals to their inhabitants. Their governments lose legitimacy, and the very nature of the particular nation state itself becomes illegitimate in the eyes and in the hearts of the growing plurality of its citizens.[269]

Rotberg is careful not to draw sharp distinctions between functioning and non-functioning governments, but instead suggests that there are gradations of state capacity to deliver political goods. These variations in turn differentiate between strong and weak states, and weak and failed states.[270] Furthermore, Rotberg establishes a hierarchy of political goods, with security being the most important. While other goods and services, such as the rule of law, the protection of private property, political participation, and the establishment and maintenance of critical infrastructure, are necessary for the proper functioning of a strong state, the provision of security is a precondition for all others.[271] Strong states are able to produce all of these goods, and weak states do so only unevenly. Failed states are unable to guarantee security, and the result is an erosion of all other services as well.[272] Some weak states perform poorly in all categories and subsequently fail. Others maintain strong security at the expense of all other goods.[273] Collapsed and failed states exhibit chronic insecurity, rule (in so far as rule is possible) by a parochial elite, and a symptomatic steep decline in GDP.[274]

Contrary to the claims of many scholars, Krasner275 holds that state failure is actually quite a rare phenomenon, and one which terrorists have yet to exploit fully. According

to Rotberg, only Somalia currently qualifies as a full-scale failed state. The arguments regarding the relationship between Al-Qaeda and Sudan and Afghanistan respectively do not hold according to even loose criteria for state failure. Both were experiencing severe internal conflict during the times in which they hosted Bin Laden, but the activities of Al-Qaeda therein almost always took place well within the bounds of the authority of Khartoum and Kabul, respectively. The only other potential example would be the use of Lebanon's Bekaa Valley by the PLO and associated organizations. However, even these activities took place under the auspices of Syria and with the blessing of Damascus. Thus, in all cases we are dealing with state-sponsored terrorism rather than organizations operating in the grey areas between governance and chaos. The argument that Afghanistan under the Taliban was more of a terrorist-sponsored state than a state sponsoring terrorism is a potential riposte to this criticism, but the importance of Al-Qaeda (with its fewer than 1,000 members before 9/11) for the Taliban has generally been overestimated.

Located somewhere in between state and guerrilla violence is warlordism, a form of political violence that has evolved hand in glove with the failure of state governance in some geographic spaces. Utilizing extreme terrorism as a matter of course, warlordism, according to Rich, represents the breakdown of formal modes of war and the introduction of informal and more complex modes of conflict.[276] This form of political violence is characterized by discipline and by a hierarchy localized round a single personality, who orders wanton and systematic violence as a vehicle for maintaining power. Under warlords, authority structures are of either an authoritarian/tribal or a hierarchic/ gangster type. Warlords are different from revolutionaries in that they do not aim to supplant the state, in a Weberian sense. In some instances, they may actually avoid doing so, as they do not wish to inherit the civil service responsibilities inherent in such a role.[277] As Chan states, warlordism does not necessarily evolve as other forms of political violence do. It is not a conscious strategy of rebellion. Warlords fill a vacuum left by the state, and supplant state institutions with their own institutions and rituals, often out of realist necessity.[278] And yet, warlordism is more than organized criminal violence, as the ability to undertake illicit economic activity is in fact tied to the ability to exercise political control over specific territory. This political control is garnered through the systematic and copious use of terrorism.

Cultural theories of terrorism

Cultural theories of terrorism are, for obvious reasons, among the weakest of the structural theories of terrorism. Many revolve around what Mamdani refers to as the 'good Muslim–bad Muslim' debate,[279] which is actually less a theory than a meta-disciplinary critique of a series of counter-terror policies aimed at

de-radicalization efforts pitting moderates and non-violent Salafists against jihadis. More interesting approaches look at the ways in which terrorist organizations assess and manipulate cultural processes in order to further their radical agenda. Walter Laqueur was the first to assume that culture played a hand in radicalism when he asserted that terrorism is always inherently populist, and by extension is an outgrowth of the cultural Zeitgeist of the moment.[280] This observation is valid; however, one might ask how some of the early nihilist and anarchist terrorists, who operated with little, if any, popular support, fit into this framework. Tololyan takes a more specific tack and conceives of terrorism as a social act produced by societies, with the terrorist him- or herself being socially constructed within a specific social context.[281] The researcher uses the case of Armenian terror and examines this phenomenon through the lens of 'projective narrative'.[282] These narratives use stories of the past to develop outlines for future action. This has the effect of elevating contemporary actions of 'transcendent collective values'. According to Tololyan, this approach addresses a shortcoming in political science in that it reduces all actions to political (read instrumental) acts.[283] This diminishes the complexity of social phenomena, and this reduction in turn lacks the concept of 'mediation', or past events which have become not merely political events but cultural narratives that have an element of morality attached to them. This line of reasoning may explain the longevity of certain groups that are able to tap into cultural narratives as a justification for violence. As the author states, 'Terrorism that has an authentically popular base is never a purely political phenomenon.'[284] How one assesses this assertion empirically is another question.

Globalization and terrorism

Disentangling globalization from other potential structural feeders of terrorism is difficult, as it has political, economic, and cultural features. Further, the nature of the effect of globalization on terrorism has proven difficult to pin down. Some argue that transnational terrorism is a reaction to globalization, others that local terrorism globalizes as the world does.[285] Thus, it is both a motivation for and an enabler of terror. It serves as a motivation for violence in so far as it promotes the cultural and economic interpenetration some scholars have cited as the main impetus behind the current wave of transnational violence.[286] It is an enabler of violence in that globalization not only allows for the movement of persons but also permits the global diffusion of potentially destructive technologies. Lia argues that terrorists are empowered by globalization in terms of geographic scope as well as destructive capabilities. Thus, while they are symptomatic of globalization, they are also important international actors, and thus affect globalization in their own right.[287] According to Lia, the future of globalization is central to the future of terrorism, as political violence is

the result of both permissive and countervailing forces. To understand the future of terrorism, we must understand how future societal developments may affect these forces and, by extension, terrorism.[288] Lia broadens the scope of his study, however, as he maintains that these permissive and countervailing forces affect all forms of collective violence. Thus, it is of little use to look at terrorism in isolation from other forms of political activism, as they share the same underlying causality.[289] Lia ranks a series of causal relationships with respect to terrorism. Those variables that can be adversely affected by globalization are relative deprivation and inequality, the contagion theory, mass media and terrorism, rapid modernization, democratization, the ecology of terrorism,[290] hegemony, and economic and cultural globalization. Mass-casualty terrorism is also affected by globalization, as it is largely a function of social geometry, since massive violence is more likely when there is greater social distance between affected groups.[291] This is why homogeneous societies experience only rare terrorism. At present, globalization decreases physical distance but not social distance. Fawaz Gerges echoes the social geometry argument by stating that the internationalization of the jihad was necessary to re-energize the movement at a point at which it was beginning to weaken.[292]

Li and Schaub were the first to offer a thorough quantitative evaluation of the relationship between globalization and terrorism through an analysis of various national-level indicators (trade, foreign direct investment, and financial capital flows) and their effects on levels of transnational terrorism.[293] Like Lia, Li and Schaub differentiate between the countervailing theoretical arguments made with respect to terrorism and globalization. Theoretically, according to the authors, globalization acts as an enabler of terrorism, driving down the costs of terrorist campaigns relative to other forms of political action. Alternatively, however, globalization tends to promote the economic development necessary to deprive local radical organizations of their recruitment base.

The theory supporting the relationship between globalization and an increase in terrorism rests upon the assumption that terrorist activities depend on three factors: the relative costs of legal and illegal activity, the relative gains expected from legal as against illegal activity, and the resources available to the group in question.[294] Further, the authors assume that globalization results in three trends that adversely affect the aforementioned values: increased trade, resulting in increased smuggling; increased financial flows, resulting in more funding and laundering opportunities for terrorist networks; and increased foreign investment, resulting in a concentration of foreign targets, specifically making transnational incidents more likely.

In short, Li and Schaub postulate that groups operating in countries with relatively high levels of integration into the global economy will find terrorism more expedient than

groups operating in more isolated locales. The findings, however, proved counter-intuitive, as Li and Schaub discerned no correlation between transnational terrorism and levels of economic globalization.[295] Further, as stated previously in this chapter, the authors did find a negative correlation between transnational terror and the level of economic development in a country. Thus, in so far as globalization enables development, the spread of global markets could have the indirect effect of lowering levels of international terrorism.

Li and Schaub's findings are intriguing, and their methodological astuteness enables them to control for a number of shortfalls that have plagued previous work. However, their theory tests only one aspect of the relationship between globalization and transnational terrorism – globalization as a technological enabler of violence. It takes for granted the motivation for political violence. Since their study does not speak to motivation, it stands to reason that domestic terrorism should be empowered as much as transnational groups. However, Li and Schaub use ITERATE data, which cover only transnational events. As Dugan, LaFree and Fogg have pointed out, ITERATE contains only a fraction of the events contained in global databases such as WITS or GTD, which include both domestic and international events.[296] Thus, it remains to be seen whether Li and Schaub's findings hold in an analysis using a more representative sample. Additionally, the research design utilized does not adequately address all theoretically relevant hypotheses regarding the relationship between terrorism and globalization. Neo-imperialist or cultural globalization arguments should utilize both domestic and transnational events data. What is also necessary is a dyadic level of analysis disaggregating indicators of economic globalization by country of origin, and focusing on transnational events directed against the 'encroaching' power. At present, such an examination has yet to be carried out.

The dyadic level of analysis: theories of counter-terrorism

Many, perhaps even most, theories of terrorism do not approach the phenomenon in terms of interactions between terrorists and their opponents. Yet as Crenshaw stated, the very nature of the conflict between the state and the insurgents is defined by the state's response, as it defines the nature and structure of the conflict, frames the realm of possible action and defines the issues at stake and the grounds for terminating the conflict.[297] Theories of counter-terrorism, on the other hand, tend to focus more on the interplay between action and counter-reaction, on the part of the state as well as of the challenging organization. Lum *et al*. have attempted to evaluate the state of the discipline in counter-terrorism studies utilizing a Campbell review process.[298] This review found that counterterror theories could be delineated into four broad categories according to state strategy: preventive measures, detection-oriented measures,

managerial measures and response-oriented measures. The review found a number of shortcomings. First, the largest single topic (18.9 per cent of all articles) is the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), a strategy of terrorism that has proved exceedingly rare. The second largest volume of work did not address counter-terrorism per se but rather dealt with specific issues such as the Palestinian–Israeli conflict. Third, the literature reflected political responses to terrorism. And finally, sociological studies of terrorism were the fourth largest category, focusing on motivations for violence, root causes for radicalization, and the like. Ultimately, Lum et al. found few empirical evaluations of the legal aspect of terrorism, or of state responses to terrorism. Because of these short-comings, Lum et al. proposed an evidence-based strategy to appraise counter-terror policies and state responses to terrorism in general.

This section utilizes their framework to evaluate those theories of counter-terrorism that use state action as the unit of analysis, taking into account the strategic nature of the dyadic level of analysis.

Preventive counter-terrorism

Preventive counter-terrorism focuses on establishing obstacles between terrorists and their objectives. These obstacles can be in the form of defensive measures, law enforcement capabilities, legal reform, etc. Several authors, including Paul Bremer, hold that terrorism will never be completely stamped out. Therefore, the ends of counter-terrorism are to reduce terror to such levels that they no longer seriously divert attention away from other policy matters.[299] Accordingly, the end of preventive measures is invariably to raise the costs of terrorism relative to other modes of political expression and conflict waging. Thus, it focuses less on the destruction of the organization in question and more on complicating the strategy of terrorism writ large.

Among the best theories of preventive counter-terrorism are Martha Crenshaw's investigations of instrumental and organizational counter-terrorism. Instrumentalism, as previously discussed, is based on rational choice theory and takes as its crux for counter-terrorism the concept of 'substitution'. [300] Assuming that terrorism is a rational strategy geared towards maximizing an agent's expected utility, one also assumes that terrorism is but one of several potential avenues for political agitation. Substitution occurs when either the probability of successfully completing a terrorist act relative to other political acts becomes extremely low, or the costs of terrorism compared to other political strategies become relatively high. Thus, a radical is prompted to substitute his or her choice to pursue terrorism with a less destructive alternative with a higher success rate and/or a lower price tag.

There are two main types of counter-terrorism promulgated by instrumentalism:

defence and deterrence.[301] Both of these strategies are geared specifically towards lowering the likelihood of successfully completing a terrorist attack. By defence, Crenshaw is referring to '[f]orcefully preventing an enemy from attaining physical objectives'.[302] Defensive measures can be either active or passive. Active measures include preemptive or preventive uses of force, differentiated by the time lag between the state action and the likely manifestation of the terrorist threat. A preemptive action is a move against an organization that is believed to be in the final stages of planning an attack. Preventive action is taken against organizations that are believed to pose a threat at some undetermined point in the future. Passive measures do not include the overt use of force, but rather actions that reduce the probability that a terrorist action will be successful. Such measures include target hardening and the imposition of border controls, etc. Deterrence as a strategy seeks to raise the costs of terrorism in an effort to promote substitution by less expensive forms of political protest. The two most common strategies of deterrence are denial and retaliation. The former is similar in practice to passive defence. However, it is not intended to make terrorism impossible, merely to raise the costs of terrorist strategies. Retaliation is more straightforward. Retaliatory acts can be either symmetrical or asymmetrical, but they must be weighed against the knowledge that provoking retaliation is a major strategy of terrorist violence.

A major problem with counter-terror policies that are aimed at substitution is that these can backfire on the counter-terror practitioner in one of two ways. Either they can prompt escalation as opposed to de-escalation, or they can result in transference instead of substitution.[303] If no other avenue is open to a terrorist organization, then it is likely that increasing the desperation of the terrorists will result in an escalation of violence, as there are no political alternatives. Transference occurs when a terrorist shifts tactics as opposed to strategies and opts for softer targets rather than alternative political activity.[304] In addition to tactical transference, it can also be temporal (wherein the organization lies low until such time as terrorism is more cost-effective), or geographic (a shift to locales where terrorism is more cost-effective). In order to reduce the chances of transference, governments must either make all modes of attack more difficult, or deplete the human, financial and material resources of the terrorist group.[305]

Organizational process theory moves away from the effects of state action on the rational calculus of individuals and concentrates on the ways in which state action can exacerbate internal turmoil within organizations. Crenshaw begins by positing that there are two reasons for organizational decline: exit and voice.[306] Exit occurs when individuals or small cadres either leave the violent struggle altogether or, more likely, either splinter into new organizations or join rival factions.[307] Voice refers to the internal process of vocalizing dissent.[308] Almost all organizations strongly discourage

voice, as underground movements place a high premium on ideological conformity. In some of the more extreme ideological organizations, voicing opposition is all but impossible. Crenshaw explicitly states that the key vulnerability of violent organizations is the inability to attract and retain (new) members rather than the inability of a group to achieve political goals.[309] Thus, counter-terrorism should address the recruitment and retention rates of terrorist organizations. The two main avenues open to states in this respect would be affecting exit through amnesty programmes, proactively draining recruitment pools, and provoking schisms within and among clandestine organizations.

In a similar vein, Ross and Gurr argue that levels of terrorism are a result of group decisions. These decisions, in turn, reflect the socio-political environment in which the group operates. As a result, the decline or increase of terrorism is the result of common dynamics applicable to all groups, past, present and future. In short, terrorist groups die as their capabilities are eroded, either by state action or by the interaction of different intra-group factions.[310] The three major causes of organizational decline, according to Ross and Gurr, are preemption, deterrence and burnout.[311] Thus, while they focus on organizational decision making, they utilize the agent choice model Crenshaw applies to her instrumentalist approach. To this they add 'burnout', another term for exit that is sparked by factionalization, a growing risk aversion with the organization, a shift in organizational objectives from political action to predation, as well as a backlash against less than productive attacks.[312] Ross and Gurr are less specific, however, in their delineation of specific state strategies that may exacerbate these processes to the benefit of the counter-terrorist.

Managerial responses to terrorist violence

Managerial responses to terrorism include crisis management. However, these theories mostly deal with the practical aspects of public policy – that is, getting power grids back up after an attack, reopening transport terminals, treating victims, and the like. More interesting for a dyadic evaluation of terrorist versus counter-terrorist interactions are those theories dealing with political responses to terrorism. As Bremer states, rather than engaging terrorist organizations only directly, the strategic objective of counter-terrorism should be to make the political, economic and psychological environments in which terrorists operate more hostile to terrorist organizations.[313] His application of this far-reaching approach is, however, more narrow, as he demurs that the target of counterterrorism then is not the terrorists themselves, but the 'community of nations and the overall strategic environment in which terrorists must act'.[314] Logically, then, the main crux of US counter-terror, once it shed its defensive posture left over from the 1970s, was to put pressure on governments that sponsor terrorism, and to erode the legitimacy of terrorism as a mode of political action.[315] This implies

dealing with terrorists with judicial systems and treating the actors themselves as criminals. While Bremer's comments have theoretical weight, they are framed in such a way as to impute that the threat of terrorism is a state-centric issue, a stance that stands in contrast to a substantial body of scholarly research on terrorism.

Nevertheless, terrorist organizations are embedded in their relative environmental circumstance. The exogenous structures to which they are exposed both constrain and enable political violence. Finding mechanisms that strengthen the former and disable the latter is the subject of a wide body of literature on counter-terrorism. For instance, Karin von Hippel echoes calls for a structural approach to counter-terrorism. Like others, she holds that a multilateral, long-term response to terrorism is the best way to erode this type of violence in the long run.[316] Drawing from Weinberg's emphasis on the fact that terrorism is the result of long-term indoctrination and training, Von Hippel draws attention to the 'root causes' debate and claims – correctly – that counter-terrorist theorist have not appropriately addressed these.[317] She is, in the end, however, reluctant to propose a single course of state action, as all pertinent 'root causes' of terrorism either are only ambivalently supported by empirical research, or represent trends that are extremely difficult for state action to speak to. The first of these is poverty, whose direct relationship to terrorism, as the structural section of this chapter has already illustrated, is not supported by empirical research. The same can be said for the second – education. However, Von Hippel proposes that the content of education needs to be reformed, as the issue is not an increase in an average level of attainment. Assessing the impact of educational content on radicalization is, unfortunately, more difficult than straightforward analyses of grade-level attainment among radicals. There are a number of possible root causes of terrorism addressed by Von Hippel. Al-Qaeda in particular has proved astute at using grievances to gain footholds in foreign territories. Fundamentalist charities have also proved a boon to transnational terrorists, specifically jihadis exploiting the *zakat* system. Since *zakat* must be given discreetly, to avoid the humiliation of recipients, reform in this sector is made difficult. Cracking down on aid distribution, rather than charitable giving, however, is a useful avenue for reform and could bear many of the same fruits as end-user certificates have afforded the non-proliferation community. Further, addressing the social and economic marginalization of diasporas in Western countries could possibly reduce transnational recruitment.

Gompert and Gordon draw attention to the need to correctly frame state responses to violence in political terms. Stating that the 'global war' is the idea of the jihadists, the United States should try to diffuse this concept, not try to fight and win a war defined by its opponent, as this invariably plays into the jihadists' hands.[318] Instead, these authors suggest that the response should be defined as a global counter-insurgency. Insurgencies, according to Gompert and Gordon, have structural predictors, which are

currently present in the Muslim world.[319] Effective counter-insurgency, then, should seek to address these structural predictors rather than just try to erode the material capabilities of the rebel organizations in question. These predictors are a lack of representative government, inept or corrupt government, insurgents committed to destroying regional governments, and a significant popular base of support for the insurgency. To undermine these factors, the authors suggest three counter-insurgency strategies.[320] The first of these is a carrot-and-stick approach based on a conditional distribution of civil services to local populations. The second is a 'hearts and minds' strategy based on a generous sharing of public services. Finally, Gompert and Gordon suggest 'transformation', by which they mean the creation of governance structures that undermine the rationale for insurgency. Many of such suggestions stumble, however, on the issue of sovereignty. While domestic governments have the ability to manipulate internal policy in such a way, outside powers can usually do so only by routeing aid and technical assistance through the very corrupt and inept powers that gave rise to the insurgency to begin with. Alternately, transformation can be effected by regime change or political pressure, both of which are easily construed as hegemonic arrogance, once again playing into the terrorists' hands.

It is useful to note, however, that the above-mentioned political responses are meant to speak to macro-level grievances rather than the (typically) more specific goals of terrorist groups. This is due to the fact that a response to root causes of violence should not be misconstrued as a call to engage terrorists in a quid pro quo that could be mistaken for concessions. As Crenshaw notes, the topic of concessions is a tricky one with potentially counter-productive results.[321] Not only could such activity represent a severe loss of face for the state, but it also signals to future terrorist groups that terrorism pays.[322] Further, the granting of concessions only after radicals resort to violence, can be counter-productive, as under these circumstances it not only undermines the authority of the state and hands the insurgents an easily recognizable victory, but also grants authority and legitimacy, if not to the terrorists themselves, then at least to their goals and aims.[323]

Crelinsten takes a markedly different approach in advocating political reactions to terrorism. His is a communication-driven theory of counter-terrorism.[324] He divides modes of political activism along an axis into deviance, dissent, crime and revolution, and assigns a corresponding mode of political control for each of these activities. The standard government responses range on the same axis from social control, to government, to criminal justice, to internal war, respectively.[325] If these modes of provocation and control can be arranged along two parallel structures, then communication can be said to take place up and down (with government institutions and political dissidents speaking to those directly above or below them), diagonally (police dealing with protesters as well as criminals), as well as horizontally (radicals

dealing with rival groups).[326] If communication channels to the left are blocked by state action, activists might opt for movement to the right. Thus, state policies can potentially have an escalatory effect.[327] However, effectively blocking violent avenues can make dissidents move left across the spectrum to less destructive modes of political activism. The critical juncture, according to Crelinsten, lies between the activist choices of crime and revolution, and the concomitant state responses of criminal justice and internal war. This point is called the mobilization threshold. As radicals move to the right, they pass through political crime, insurgent terrorism and insurrection stages before moving into revolution. The state counters each individual stage with a movement rightward of its own, from political justice, to state terrorism, to counter-terrorism, and then to internal war.[328] The horizontal axis Crelinsten devised reminds one of the spectrum of political action Alex Schmid developed in the early 1980s – a revised version of which was presented earlier in this volume.

Response-oriented measures

Response-oriented measures taken by states are broadly, if somewhat misleadingly, referred to as retaliation. Brian Jenkins draws attention to the fact that how states view the insurgent problem determines the nature of the state response. Echoing the strategic concerns of a dyadic level of analysis, he stipulates that if the state does not understand how the insurgent views the conflict, then the state reaction can actually play into the terrorist's hands.[329] By way of illustration, Jenkins draws attention to the disconnect between US policy and Al-Qaeda's objectives. Accordingly, he states that the US approach to terrorism defines actors in terms of actions, not in terms of motives.[330] Al- Qaeda's violence and rhetoric, however, are geared towards formulating a transnational Islamist identity based on a Manichean clash-of-civilizations paradigm.[331] Jenkins holds that the failure to view the purpose of Al-Qaeda's strategy has meant that the United States unwittingly conceptualizes the war on terror in terms that mirror those of the jihadist terrorists. Further, there is a temporal disconnect between the two belligerents. Al-Qaeda does not view the conflict in the same finite temporal modes that the United States does. For the United States, the conflict began with 9/11 and will end at some point in time. For Al-Qaeda, it began long ago and continues to be ongoing, though the enemy will change faces.[332] Thus, the 'genius' of Al-Qaeda is that it utilizes a salient ideological message to mobilize those who are discontented with the current status quo (conceived of in macro terms).[333] US responses to Al-Qaeda that project American hegemony, such as the invasion of Iraq, inadvertently reinforce the message of Al-Qaeda. However, as the invasion of Afghanistan has shown, terrorist organizations must walk a fine line between inciting reactions that aid in organizational recruitment, and inciting reactions that result in the destruction of the

organization. Al-Qaeda's leadership did not expect the strong US reaction to its provocation of 11 September 2001, and was arguably saved from destruction chiefly by the US invasion of Iraq.

Crenshaw states that an incumbent power (defined as the state) has three ways in which to view captured terrorists: as political criminals, as common criminals and as prisoners of war.[334] Each choice carries with it particular strategies of counter-terrorism ranging from political repression, to law enforcement, to paramilitary reactions. Crenshaw articulates that incumbent powers have two broad limitations with respect to counter-terror operations.[335] The first of these are limitations imposed by constituencies. Whereas terrorists generally have only potential constituents, states have a multitude of vested interests that could be affected by any number of counter-terror strategies. The second of these are limitations imposed on regimes regarding the ways in which they can employ force. Specifically, democratic regimes are constrained to socially acceptable forms of counter-terror activities. Ultimately, Crenshaw states that there are three broad determinants of the state's response.336 First, institutional realities have to be taken into account, as the internal decision-making arrangements of the system have a profound impact on the state's choice of retaliatory measures. Second, a state must take into account international opinion, as this has the potential to create political and material support bases for terrorists. Finally, the military establishment has an impact on state responses – specifically, the proximity of the military to centralized decision making, the institutional culture of the military establishment, and, of course, the material capabilities of the military have an effect on potential strategies of counter-terrorism. While the approach is inherently broad, Crenshaw offers a framework for evaluating counter-terror responses outside the narrow scope of Western responses to Salafist jihadism, and lays the groundwork for empirical evaluations of counter-terror strategies.

Perhaps no other form of terrorism challenges government counter-terrorism policies more than ethnic terrorism.[337] As was previously noted, when governments face ethno-nationalist sentiments the provocation of governmental overreaction is a central aim of the insurgent organization. Broad and blind retaliation fosters community identity among the targeted population on whose behalf the terrorists operate, or claim to operate. It also raises the visibility of the aggrieved community, marginalizes moderate political forces and often leads to uncontrolled vigilantism. As a result, traditional counter-terrorism is often futile, if not downright counter-productive.[338] If the terrorist group sees itself as instrumental to cultural survival, then attempts to delegitimize it through moral outrage alone fail. Conventional law enforcement often does not work since it must be public to be effective, but publicity often tends to serve the interests of the insurgents. Likewise, crackdowns play into the terrorist group's hands. Concessions as well as intransigence can create incentives for future violence.

According to Daniel Byman, there are but three counter-terror options when dealing with ethno-nationalist movements:[339]

1 Governments can attempt to manipulate identities as well, such as through the promulgation of nationalism.

2 Governments can implement sweeping punishment across the ethnic community as a whole in an attempt to dissuade these groups from providing assistance to the terrorists.

3 Finally, governments can promote in-group policing.

The first of these options has proved very difficult, as governments have a limited ability to promote identity formation. The second of these options, as previously discussed, tends to radicalize communities and can also play into terrorist hands. The final method, in-group policing, is often the most adequate,[340] as it simultaneously places the onus of counter-terrorism on the ethnic community itself (thus deflecting blame from the government) while utilizing the presumed support network of the terrorist organization as the instrument of its defeat. Where this third strategy has been properly implemented, it has proved generally effective against ethnic terrorists.

A strategy of deterrence, through the threat of retaliation, is strongest when addressing organizations with extensive infrastructure and interests, which can be held to ransom. Thus, it is best utilized when addressing the problem of foreign state sponsorship of an insurgency. Whereas targeting the interests, personnel and material capabilities of terrorist organizations might prove difficult for states with asymmetric top-sight in regard to their non-state opponents, terrorist-group-sponsoring states represent target-rich environments for the application of both soft and hard power. Byman notes that the target state's counter-terror response needs to be geared to the specific motivation a sponsoring state has in aiding the group in question, but should also address the social, political and economic challenges faced by the belligerent state.[341] Byman's delineation of rationalizations for state sponsorship of terrorist groups has been listed in the section dealing with state terrorism. From this list, he has extrapolated a series of counter-terrorism measures geared towards offsetting any interest a rival regime may have in sponsoring terrorist organizations.[342] These include engaging the sponsor in a diplomatic manner; the extreme option of regime change; the punitive use of force, though on a smaller scale than regime change; the credible threat of force; economic sanctions; backing an insurgent organization against the sponsoring regime (if one is to be found); and diplomatic isolation. The more salient motivations for state sponsorship will require more extreme measures to offset, whereas economic or marginal rationalizations for insurgent sponsorship might be offset by more modest applications of soft power.

Conclusion

If we look at the theories that have been discussed in this chapter, one cannot fail to see (and deplore) the lack of common ground. Partly this is due to the absence of a generally accepted definition of terrorism and the conceptual stretching of 'terrorism' into many other forms of political violence and conflict waging. Partly it is also due to the fact that the scientific discussion of terrorism has been influenced strongly – and negatively – by the politicized discourse on terrorism. Despite much theorizing, there is no general theory of terrorism. If it existed, it would have to be a sub-theory of general theories of violence and conflict. Most theorizing not only fails to make that link, but is even negligent of the obvious link between non-state terrorism and governmental counter-actions. How scattered thinking on terrorism is comes out most clearly when one looks at the root cause debate – in a way, the heart of the theoretical discussion of terrorism. Here the wide variety of alleged root causes of terrorism illustrates how far apart academic and political observers of the phenomenon of terrorism still stand. However, this situation is not unique; the same applies to theories of crime and theories of war.

The reader will find two catalogues of alleged root causes of terrorism in two of the three appendices to this chapter. One is based on findings from the Club de Madrid conference in March 2005 – one of the largest ever gatherings of eminent academics and political leaders.[343] There were five workshops addressing the root causes of terrorism. They came up with nearly 50 (partly overlapping) causes of, and risk factors contributing to, terrorism.

A recent review of the literature by Brynjar Lia, an eminent Norwegian researcher, lists a similar number of causes or factors (46, while the Club of Madrid listed altogether 48 causal factors) in three categories. Most of these hypothetical causes and factors have never been tested empirically. Many of them are, in fact, not testable in their present formulations. They are brought together here to provide researchers with an inventory in the hope that more of them will be empirically tested.

Any reader of these two appendices might at this point well-nigh despair in the face of this multitude of possible explanations to the simple question 'why terrorism?'. Yet the situation is not altogether hopeless. One has to keep in mind that, as Tore Bjørgo, the editor of the volume *Root Causes of Terrorism: Myths, Reality and Ways Forward*,[344] noted:

> Because there are different types of terrorism with highly disparate foundations, there are very diverse types of causes and levels of causation. The notion that there is one single 'prime mover' behind terrorism is therefore not tenable. . . . What seems likely is that certain forms of terrorism are outcomes of certain

combinations of factors: some of which may be more fundamental than others.[345]

Bjørgo, summarizing the findings of the contributors to his volume, distinguished between the following:

• *structural causes* (demographic imbalances, globalization, rapid modernization, transitional societies, increasing individualism with rootlessness and atomization, relative deprivation, class structure, etc.);

• *facilitator (or accelerator) causes*, such as the evolution of modern mass media, transportation, weapons technology, weak state control of territory, etc.;

• *motivational causes* – the actual grievances that people experienced at a personal level, motivating them to act;

• *triggering causes*, such as a political calamity, an outrageous act committed by the enemy, or some other events that call for revenge or action.[346]

This typology of causal factors is sound, and indicates that it is possible to bring some order in the often chaotic debate on the causes of (non-state) terrorism. Despite the shortcomings alluded to above, all in all, the theory formation in the field of Terrorism Studies has to a considerable degree matured since Schmid first summarized the state of theory formation in the 1980s.[347] Yet there is still a long way to go. What needs to be done to reach a better understanding of terrorism can be summarized in ten postulates regarding research quality desiderata:

1 more and better comparative case studies of terrorist organizations based on (anthropological) fieldwork in conflict zones;

2 more and better historical and longitudinal research into terrorist groups, their decision making and their life cycles in the nineteenth and twentieth century;

3 more and better research based on the internal and external communications of terrorist organizations and their supporting constituencies;

4 more and better research that is cultural and linguistically attuned to the objects of investigation;

5 more and better research that looks at the interaction between terrorist organizations and their governmental and vigilante opponents;

6 more and better research that looks at the similarities between criminal gangs, religious sects and terrorist groups;

7 more and better research into conflict parties that share the goals of terrorists but choose other methods of advancing their causes and comparing their relative success

with that of terrorist groups;

8 more and better research into the theories of terrorists and counter-terrorists themselves and how these guide their (re)actions;

9 more and better research into the role of ideology, religion and media in inspiring and instigating terrorism;

10 more and better research integrating theories of terrorism with theories of violence, crime and (armed) conflict.

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Appendix 4.1 Psychological, Political, Economic, Religious and Cultural (Root) Causes of Terrorism, According to Scholars Gathered at the Club de Madrid Conference of 2005

In March 2005, more than 200 leading scholars and expert practitioners discussed the causes and underlying factors of terrorism at a conference in Madrid. They debated root causes in more than a dozen workshops addressing psychological, political, economic, religious and cultural factors potentially responsible for the emergence of terrorism. The following five lists summarize hypotheses suggested by participants. For more information about the International Summit on Democracy, Terrorism and Security, see http://english.safe-democracy.org/causes/.

First, according to the Club of Madrid Workshop,[1] the following are potential psychological causes of terrorism:

1 There is a multiplicity of individual motives: for some, it is to give a sense of power to the powerless; for others, revenge is a primary motivation; for still others, it is to gain a sense of significance.

2 The leader plays a crucial role in identifying the external enemy as the cause; he draws together alienated, frustrated individuals who would otherwise remain isolated

and aggrieved.

3 A religious fundamentalist leader can use his authority to interpret religious scripture so as to justify extreme acts of violence.

4 A culture of martyrdom contributes to suicide terrorism.

5 Many Muslim immigrants and refugees in the diaspora suffer from an existential sense of loss, deprivation and alienation from the countries in which they live. Extreme ideologies can radicalize some of them and can facilitate re-entrance into the path of terrorism.

Second, the following are potential political causes of terrorism, according to Club of Madrid Workshop:[2]

1 Terrorism is rooted in political discontent.

2 Ideologies are associated with nationalism, revolution, religion, and defence of the status quo.

3 Contagion processes may operate cross-nationally and result in the spread of terrorism from the point of origin to locales with different conditions.

4 Globalization, for example, facilitates the spread of terrorism, but it is not a direct cause.

5 Historical contingencies and the perceptions and intentions of small, radicalized political conspiracies are most important in explaining terrorism.

6 Highly contentious polities and divided societies are likely to be associated with a greater risk of terrorism.

7 Among the different types of regimes, transitional or new democracies are the most fragile and more likely to experience terrorism because of either unresolved grievances or state weakness.

8 Causes of terrorism are international as well as domestic.

9 Some failed or failing states become hosts for radical conspiracies that both impede stabilization and export terrorism to other targets and audiences.

10 A state's susceptibility to terrorism is determined not just by how it treats its citizens at home but also by its actions abroad. When such actions lack international legitimacy and local populations perceive them as unjust, radical groups come to see terrorism as an appropriate response.

11 Disillusionment over the possibility of change through non-violence or through violence other than terrorism (e.g. guerrilla warfare) contribute to the choice of

terrorism.

12 Nationalism has reappeared as a cause of terrorism.

13 The rise of intolerance, particularly on the right, could spawn new terrorist movements, at least in Europe.

14 Governmental success in promoting accommodation is likely to provoke terrorism from groups that continue to reject compromise and from factions that splinter off from the groups that accept dialogue.

The following are potential economic causes of terrorism, according to the same workshop:[3]

1 Terrorism is most likely to emerge in societies characterized by rapid modernization.

2 The increase in the proportional size of the young male population (a youth bulge) facing insecure employment prospects is a pervasive risk factor in developing societies. Low relative educational status and political participation of women are associated with higher levels of political violence and instability.

3 Structured inequalities within countries are breeding grounds for violent political movements in general and terrorism specifically. Structured inequalities across the interdependent global system have similar consequences.

4 Ethno-nationalist and revolutionary terrorist movements usually emerge in the context of larger political conflicts that are centred on the grievances of groups that see themselves as economically or politically marginalized.

5 Semi-repressive regimes contribute to the escalation of political conflicts to terrorism.

6 Some militant groups choose terror tactics in the expectation that governments will increase repression, leading to a shift in public support from the government to the terrorists' cause.

7 A specific hostile event that calls for revenge may result in a wave of terrorist attacks. Provocative government actions can cause a backlash that precipitates terrorism.

8 Diasporas may also promote terrorist tactics, especially when they see that non-violent political action is ineffective in dramatizing injustices and create imperatives for reform.

9 The presence of charismatic ideological leaders able to transform widespread grievances and frustrations into a political agenda for violent struggle is a decisive factor behind the emergence of a terrorist movement.

10 A collective or individual desire for revenge against acts of repression may be

motive enough for terrorist activity.

11 The process of globalization has vastly increased incentives and opportunities for terrorism and makes it easier to organize, finance and sustain terrorist strategies.

12 Growing inequality may lead to terrorist acts by the perpetrators in the name of a more equitable distribution of wealth.

13 Globalization increases opportunities for militant and terrorist groups.

14 Education without opportunities for employment is an explosive combination; even more explosive is the expansion of traditional Islamic education that provides no skills for participation in modernizing societies but sanctions jihadist resistance to modernization and its agents.

The following are potential religious causes of terrorism:[4]

1 Political and economic grievances are primary causes or catalysts, and religion becomes a means to legitimate and mobilize.

2 Even though religion may not be the sole cause of terrorism, it can exacerbate the situation. Religion brings to a situation of conflict images of grand struggle and an abiding absolutism. Religion is often centred on themes that can be inherently polarizing – concepts of truth, notions of good, of absolutes and ultimate realities.

3 Religion can contribute to a culture of violence where violence becomes a 'defining issue' in the identity of activist groups.

4 Examples of religious terrorism can be found in all religious traditions. No one religious tradition holds a monopoly on violence, and all religious traditions can be used to justify acts of destruction and aggression.

5 Regarding its role in conflict, religion is seldom the problem, but the role of religion can be problematic.

Finally, the workshop put forward the following as potential cultural causes of terrorism:[5]

1 A culture of alienation and humiliation can act as a kind of growth medium in which the process of radicalization commences and virulent extremism comes to thrive.

2 Narratives and historical memories can give terrorists what they see as 'just cause' to engage in violence.

3 Alienation produced out of long-standing and deep cultural conflict constitutes an underlying condition for terrorism to flourish.

4 Local conflicts, as well as broader cultural ones between and within religious groups,

or even between tribes and clans, set the stage for recruitment to terrorist groups.

5 The global jihadi movement has emerged out of 'deculturation'. It is not an expression of a given culture under siege, but a reflection of globalization and uprooting.

6 Forceful actions against external terrorist base areas may provoke potential internal actors into decisively changing their allegiances and moving to active violence in opposition to the West.

7 American and European prisons where Saudi charities now fund organizations that preach radical Islam are one source of recruits for violent extremist groups. Prisons are also a place where terrorist organizations recruit and make connections with organized criminals and other terrorist organizations.

8 Some groups which do not necessarily advocate or legitimize violence, such as Hizb-ut-Tahrir, a global Islamist organization, and Tablighi Jamaat, a revivalist group that aims to create better Muslims through 'spiritual jihad' (good deeds, contemplation and proselytizing), function as 'gateway organizations' to terrorist groups.

9 The perception that Western governments have been willing to play along with brutal dictators in the Middle East has increased the widespread resentment of the West.

10 Festering conflicts – and the state failure and weakness they induce – are important risk factors for terrorism.

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Appendix 4.2 Insights and Hypotheses on Causes of Terrorism Identified on the Basis of a Survey of the Literature on Terrorism

Brynjar Lia

Why terrorism occurs is one of the most difficult questions facing terrorism researchers. Terrorists may be deprived and uneducated people, or affluent and well educated. Even if young males are usually highly over-represented in most terrorist organizations, one

also finds terrorists among people of both sexes and of most ages. Terrorism occurs in rich as well as in poor countries; in the modern industrialized world and in less developed areas; during a process of transition and development, or prior to or after such a process; in former colonial states and in independent ones; and in established democracies as well as in less democratic regimes. This list could easily be extended, but it suffices as a demonstration of the wide diversity of conditions one needs to consider when trying to develop an understanding of the causes of terrorism. Obviously, this diversity makes it difficult to generalize about terrorism, since there are many 'terrorisms'. Different forms of terrorism also have different causes. We may distinguish between international and domestic terrorism; socio-revolutionary terrorism; and separatist terrorism. Socio-revolutionary terrorism spans different ideologies, including leftist, rightist and even religious trends. It is also important to recognize that what gives rise to terrorism may be different from what perpetuates terrorism over time.

When analysing the causes of terrorism, one is confronted with different levels of explanations. There are explanations at the individual and group levels, of a psychological or, more often, sociopsychological character, such as those that identify why individuals join a terrorist group, and why terrorist groups continue to resort to violence. Explanations at the societal or national level primarily attempt to identify non-spurious correlations between certain historical, cultural and socio-political characteristics of the larger society and the occurrence of terrorism. For example, the impact of modernization, democratization, economic inequality, etc. on terrorism falls into this category. Explanations at the world-system or international level seek to establish causal relationships between characteristics of the international state system and relations between states on the one hand, and the occurrence of international terrorism on the other.

The following are some psychological explanations of terrorism:[1]

1 There are a multitude of situations capable of provoking terrorism. What gives rise to terrorism may be different from what perpetuates terrorism over time.

2 The greater the political inequality of minority groups within a state, the more terrorism a state is likely to face (Lai).

3 Terrorism is most likely to occur under conditions of high levels of 'social distance' or 'social polarization' between perpetrators and victims, including a high degree of cultural and relational distance, inequality, and functional independence (Senechal de la Roche).

4 Suicide bombing is one result of hating one's sexual impulses (Baruch).

5 Both political and criminally motivated violence are overwhelmingly the work of young unmarried men (Buvinic and Morrison).

6 The choice of terrorism represents the outcome of a learning process from own experiences and the experiences of others (Crenshaw).

7 The failure to mobilize popular support for a radical political programme may trigger the decision to employ terrorism in order to engineer a violent confrontation with the authorities.

8 The decision to employ terrorism stems from the 'useful agenda-setting function' of international terrorist acts ('we force people to ask what is going on').

9 A sudden downturn in a dissident organization's fortunes may promote an underground organization to act in order to show its strength and potential.

10 Radical members of coalition groups will choose to resume and even escalate hostilities with a view to preventing a compromise between the moderate factions on both sides, and to undermine the government's confidence in ongoing negotiations (Stedman).

11 Terrorist groups and their enemy government often become locked in a cycle of attacks and counter-attacks, and the driving force is less the logic of deterrence and more their respective constituencies' demands that their victims must be avenged.

12 Periodic 'waves' of terrorism may be partly explained by the desire of terrorists to guarantee newsworthiness and consequently, media access (Weimann and Brosius).

13 Successful operations in one country are imitated by groups elsewhere.

The following are some societal explanations of terrorism:[2]

1 Modernization has dissolutional effects upon existing social norms and structures, through the rise of a society in which individuals find themselves alienated from social bonds, without any recognized structures of organization and influence, to the mobilization of frustration into terrorist activity.

2 Rapid economic modernization, measured in growth of real GDP, has a strong, significant impact on levels of ideological (as opposed to ethnic) terrorism in Western Europe (Engene).

3 There is a positive relationship between political deprivation of groups and the level of terrorism against the state, while economic measures of average individual deprivation in a state appear to have little effect (Lai).

4 Any connection between poverty, education and terrorism is indirect, complicated, and probably quite weak (Krueger and Maleckova).

5 The sheer number of terrorist and insurgent groups in countries with extreme poverty is overwhelming.

6 Despite claims to the contrary, the Palestinian–Israeli conflict also seems to confirm that poverty reinforces motivations for terrorism (Khashan).

7 Islamist terrorism in Egypt was not simply based on religious extremism. Rather, this movement grew out of the socio-economic conditions as well as the cultural and political tensions existing for the poorest of Egypt's poor (Nedoroscik).

8 The occurrence of terrorism in Western Europe is systematically related to low measures of freedom and democracy. This relationship is particularly strong for ideological (non-separatist) terrorism, but less so with regard to ethnic terrorism (Engene).

9 Ethnic terrorism in Western Europe is more likely in the less proportional democracies than in open, proportional systems, suggesting that the threshold for using violence depends on the existence of alternative channels of influence (Skjolberg).

10 Many developing countries today are ravaged by ethnic violence and terrorism after embarking on a transition process to market democracy. The causal link runs from the new free-market reforms, which allow ethnic minorities to accumulate disproportional wealth via political liberalization, permitting the spread of violent propaganda and the empowerment of the impoverished majorities, to the proliferation of ethnic violence (Chua).

11 Semi-authoritarian or semi-democratic countries, even without an ongoing democratization process, have the greatest risk of experiencing violent conflicts and terrorism (Ellingsen and Gleditsch).

12 Failed democracies that do not become consolidated authoritarian states are likely to experience tremendous amounts of terrorism (Lai).

13 Strong states capable of repressing terrorist and insurgent groups on their territory may do so only at the risk of transforming them into transnational terrorist organizations attacking targets abroad.

14 There is a strong association between ethnic diversity and ethnic terrorism in Western Europe (Engene).

15 Modern terrorism occurs because modern circumstances make terrorist methods exceptionally easy (Kegley).

16 Modern mass media is not the cause of terrorism per se, but it has considerable impact upon patterns of terrorism, once it has emerged. Important shifts in terrorism have coincided with the emergence and proliferation of new media technologies.

17 The presence of transnational organized crime groups creates a more permissive

environment for transnational terrorism.

The following are some explanations linked to the international system:[3]

1 The global diffusion of certain political cultures and ideas, such as the concept of individuality, organization, and social action, provides local aggrieved parties with a conceptual model for rebellion and violent activism (Lizardo).

2 State sponsorship rarely explains the very occurrence of terrorism, with the important exception of state intelligence operatives perpetrating covert attacks abroad.

3 Serious foreign policy setbacks tend to increase the propensity for state-sponsored terrorism by authoritarian regimes (O'Brien).

4 Increased US dominance constrains the options for revisionist actors to alter the status quo through traditional means of influence, making terrorism a more attractive choice (Sobek and Braithwaite).

5 The projection of military power plants seeds of later terrorist reactions, as retaliation for previous American imperial actions (Bergesen and Liyzardo).

6 The contemporary wave of Islamist terrorism should be seen as an anti-colonial insurgency, rather than a religious backlash against modernity.

7 An international system dominated by hegemonic powers is likely to experience high levels of terrorism. A bipolar system is more likely to foster high, transnational anti-systemic terrorism.

8 Transnational terrorism thrives on armed conflicts. A central characteristic of terrorism is that terrorist acts often occur as part of a wider armed conflict.

9 Terrorism also occurs as part of widespread civil violence during intercommunal conflict.

10 Transnational terrorism reflects a civil war taking place between a government and its opposition movements, while foreign nationals and interests are targeted because of their assumed politicomilitary alliance with, or interventions on behalf of, the government in question (Doran).

11 If insurgent groups are unable to establish a domestic front, and are forced to flee, international terrorist attacks – whether on targets associated with the enemy regime or on its foreign allies – may often be the only possible way in which armed struggle can be pursued.

12 International attacks may also occur for agenda-setting purposes to past or ongoing wars.

13 The war in Vietnam appeared to contribute both directly and indirectly to the rise of

radicalized leftist movements in the West, from which numerous terrorist groups emerged, many of which outlived the causes that had propelled them into action.

14 Participation in war intensifies social-political relations in a state, which in turn fosters radicalization of politics and the emergence of political violence groups. States participating in wars are likely to experience higher levels of terrorism (Lai).

15 States have facilitated international terrorism by fighting proxy wars through open or tacit support for insurgents and terrorist organizations operating in or against a foreign state (or states) (Byman).

16 One finds a relatively coinciding pattern of ebbs and flows of armed conflicts and international terrorism. Although terrorist tactics are used in one form or another during nearly all armed conflicts, only a minority of today's armed conflicts contribute heavily to international terrorism. When they do, factors such as direct foreign military presence or involvement (or in some cases lack of involvement) in the conflict appear to be critical, in addition to ideological and identity factors, such as the existence of politicized diasporas and refugee communities, and radical ideologies providing theoretical justifications for international attacks. Armed conflicts and terrorism are interlinked in multiple ways, and trends affecting the former will also impact on the latter.

Notes

1 Brynjar Lia, *Causes of Terrorism: An Expanded and Updated Review of the Literature*. Kjeller: Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, 2005, pp. 8–21.

2 Ibid., pp. 21–48.

3 Ibid., pp. 49–71.

Appendix 4.3 Al-Qaeda Communiqués by Bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri: A Chronology

Donald Holbrook

Terrorism consists of violence and propaganda, and the two should be viewed next to each other and analysed in their interaction. To illustrate the propaganda dimension, this appendix lists the communiqués of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leaders of the core of Al-Qaeda.[1]

> Many international media agencies corresponded with us requesting an interview with us. We believe this is a good opportunity to make Muslims aware of what is taking place over the land of the two Holy Mosques as well as of what is happening here in Afghanistan of establishing and strengthen the

> religion, and applying Shari'a. It is obvious that the media war in this century is one of the strongest methods; in fact, its ratio may reach 90% of the total preparation for the battles.
> *Osama bin Laden, undated letter to Mullah Umar, the leader of the Afghan Taliban*[2]

Recognizing the impact of propaganda and the importance of engaging with the media has been central to the strategy of the Al-Qaeda core leadership from the very beginning. Such messages seek to supplement, strengthen and justify the violent faith-based strategy. Appeals are made to the Muslim population (as a whole or within specific areas), who are urged to rise up against alleged oppression, secularism and immorality. Identified enemies are intimidated, threatened, but occasionally given conditions for the cessation of violence. Finally, Al-Qaeda distributes messages demanding support for the creation of a Shari'ah state, and justifies the violent tactics employed in reaching its goal, although it struggles to justify Muslim casualties.

Giving interviews to curious journalists was no longer an option in the wake of the 11 September attacks, prompting an increased emphasis on the indigenous message output. At first, some difficulties were encountered with distribution and the favoured method was sending material to satellite TV channels to achieve the desired global reach. Gradually, however, and with the help of internet forums and upload websites, the dedicated media wing, As-Sahab ('the clouds'), began distributing increasingly sophisticated videos online. The output leapt from 6 videos in 2002 to 97 five years later, although it has since abated.[3] Many other 'media production wings' have since emerged, attached to individual movements or the global militant Islamist cause in general.

The list that follows provides an overview of most of the Al-Qaeda messages by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri. However, some of the earlier Zawahiri messages are more likely related to his capacity as 'Amir' of Egyptian Islamic Jihad, although the distinction is sometimes difficult to make. The decision to focus on Zawahiri and Bin Laden only was based on the way in which an analysis of their output provides a degree of continuity and thus the opportunity to grasp the extent of divergence over time. Several figures may have been just as, or even more, influential in terms of militant Islamist thinking.[4] Other individuals are also becoming increasingly prominent, especially Bagram escapee Abu Yahya al-Libi, whose statements are sought after on sympathetic internet forums.

The data collected are mostly from open sources and, given the increased use of the internet for distribution, increasingly easy to locate. For translations, publications such as the IntelCenter volumes have been a valuable source of material. In some cases, however, communiqués have been secured from more restricted sources, especially the Foreign Broadcast Information Service, now Open Source Center, which remains out of

reach for most researchers outside the United States. One database that has been made publicly available is the Harmony Database component of larger Department of Defense-based databases, which provides researchers with interesting and valuable background data. Al-Qaeda output is also being monitored by various organizations, with the Nine- Eleven Finding Answers foundation being particularly prominent. Finally, the numerous books written about Al-Qaeda communiqués can often prove helpful. The overview includes several communiqués that were published in two particularly helpful volumes, *The Al-Qaeda Reader and Al-Qaeda in Its Own Words*.[5]

The timeline of the data reviewed is presented in the accompanying graph (Figure A4.3). It shows how Zawahiri has gradually taken over from Bin Laden in the dissemination of messages, providing detailed commentary on current events and justification of methods, while the shorter, less frequent, Bin Laden messages reiterate the basics. Tellingly, however, the graph also shows how a safe haven, direct access to reporters, and the opportunity to interact with them with impunity, resulted in considerable proliferation in the number of messages from Bin Laden in the 1990s. Relative freedom of operation in the Pakistani tribal areas, along with the benefits of technology, has seen output increase once more. Given the importance of such 'media operations' for the Al-Qaeda leadership, the need for researchers and the counterterrorism establishment to comprehend, monitor and counter this component of militant Islamism should be clear.

Table 4.1 Rapoport's 'four waves of terrorism'

Focus	*Primary strategy*	*Target identity*	*Precipitant*	*Special characteristics*
Anarchists, 1870–1920s	Elite assassinations, bank robberies	Primary European states	Failure/slowness of political reform	Developed basic terrorism strategies and rationales
Nationalists, 1920s–1960s	Guerrilla attacks on police and military	European empires	Post-1919 de-legitimization of empire	Increased international support (UN and diaspora)
New Left/Marxist, 1960s–1980s	Hijackings, kidnappings, assassination	Governments in general; increasing focus on USA	Viet Cong successes	Increased international training/cooperation/ sponsorship
Religious, 1970s–2020s	Suicide bombings	USA, Israel, and secular regimes with Muslim populations	Iranian Revolution, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan	Casualty escalation. Decline in the number of terrorist groups

Source: Based on D.C. Rapoport, 'The Four Waves of Modern Terrorism'. In A.K. Cronin and J.M. Ludes (eds), *Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a Grand Strategy*. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, pp. 46–73; as summarized by K. Rasler and W.R. Thompson, 'Looking for Waves of Terrorism'. *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 21(1), 2009, p. 31.

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	*AQ figure*	*Description*	*Source*
00/01/1991	AAZ	'The Bitter Harvest: The Brotherhood in Sixty Years'	Raymond Ibrahim, (2007) *Al-Qaeda Reader*. Broadway Books, 2007 + G. Kepel and J.-P. Milelli (eds), *Al-Qaeda in Its Own Words*. Harvard U. Press, 2008.
00/01/1992	AAZ	'The Black Book: An Account of the Torture of Muslims in the Time of Husni Mubarak'	*Militant Ideology Atlas Research Compendium*, November 2006
00/01/1993	AAZ / Al-Jihad	'Advice to the Community to Reject the Fatwa of Sheikh Bin Baz Authorizing Parliamentary Representation: Published Under the Supervision of Ayman al-Zawahiri'	Kepel and Milelli (eds) (2008)
09/03/1994	OBL	'Osama bin Laden Denies "Terrorism" Link'. London *Al-Quds al-'Arabi* in Arabic 9 Mar 1994, p. 4	FBIS compilation 1994–2004 [*FBIS Report: Compilation of Osama bin Laden Statements 1994 – January 2004*]
12/04/1994	OBL	'Our Invitation to Give Advice and Reform'	CTC/Harmony [see www.ctc.usma.edu/harmony/harmony_docs.asp]
07/06/1994	OBL	'Saudi Arabia Supports the Communists in Yemen'	CTC/Harmony
11/07/1994	OBL	'The Banishment of Communism from the Arabian Peninsula: The Episode and the Proof'	CTC/Harmony
19/07/1994	OBL	'Quran Scholars in the Face of Despotism'	CTC/Harmony
08/08/1994	OBL	'Saudi Islamic Opposition Opens London Office'. London *Al-Quds al-'Arabi* in Arabic, 8 Aug. 1994, p. 1.	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
12/09/1994	OBL	'Saudi Arabia Unveils its War Against Islam and its Scholars'	CTC/Harmony
16/09/1994	OBL	'Urgent Letter to Security Officials'	CTC/Harmony
15/10/1994	OBL	'Higher Committee for Harm!!'	CTC-Harmony
29/12/1994	OBL	'Open Letter for Shaykh Bin Baz on the Invalidity of His Fatwa on Peace with the Jews'	CTC/Harmony
29/01/1995	OBL	'Second letter to Shaykh Abd Al Aziz Bin Baz from the Reform and Advice Foundation'	CTC/Harmony
12/02/1995	OBL	'Prince Salman and Ramadan Alms'	CTC/Harmony
09/03/1995	OBL	'Saudi Arabia Continues its War Against Islam and its Scholars'	CTC/Harmony
00/04/1995	AAZ	'Our Stance Towards Iran: Response to the Accusation of Cooperation Between the Salafi Jihadi Movement and Renegade Iran'	*Militant Ideology Atlas Research Compendium* November 2006

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	*AQ figure*	*Description*	*Source*
06/05/1995	OBL	'Scholars are the Prophet's Successors'	CTC/Harmony
11/07/1995	OBL	'Prince Sultan and the Air Aviation Commissions'	CTC/Harmony
03/08/1995	OBL	'An Open Letter to King Fahd on the Occasion of the Recent Cabinet Reshuffle'	NEFA [+ see also other sources, e.g. Hegghammer (*FFI Rapport* 2002/01393)]
11/08/1995	OBL	'The Bosnia Tragedy and the Deception of the Servant of the Two Mosques'	CTC/Harmony
00/01/1996	AAZ	'Healing the Hearts of Believers: On Some Concepts of Jihad in the Islamabad Operation'	*Militant Ideology Atlas Research Compendium*, November 2006 + Chr. Hellmich 'Al-Qaeda – Terrorists, Hypocrites, Fundamentalists' in *Third World Quarterly* (2005) + Azzam Maha, Al-Qaeda: 'The Misunderstood Wahabi Connection . . .', RIIA *Briefing Paper* no. 1 (2003)
17/06/1996	OBL	'Osama bin Laden Reportedly Interviewed in London'. Cairo *Rose al-Yusuf* in Arabic on 17 June 1996 on pp. 25–27	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
10/07/1996	OBL	'Interview With Saudi Dissident Bin Laden'. London *Independent* in English, 10 July 1996, p. 14	FBIS compilation 1994–2005
02/09/1996	OBL	'Bin Laden Declares Jihad on Americans'. London AL-ISLAH in Arabic, 2 Sep. 1996. ['Message From Usama Bin-Muhammad Bin Laden to His Muslim Brothers in the Whole World and Especially in the Arabian Peninsula: Declaration of Jihad Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Mosques; Expel the Heretics From the Arabian Peninsula'	FBIS compilation 1994–2005 + www.kimsoft.com/2001/binladen war.htm
00/10/ 1996	OBL	'Mujahid Usamah Bin Laden Talks Exclusively to "*Nida'ul Islam*" About The New Powder Keg in The Middle East'	*Nida ul Islam* (iss. 16 October–November 1996) [islam.org.au]. See also Hegghammer (*FFI Rapport* 2002/01393)
27/11/1996	OBL	'Bin Laden interviewed on Jihad against the US'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
20/02/1997	OBL	'Correspondent meets with opposition leader Bin Laden'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
01/03/1997	OBL	'Peter Arnett interviews Osama bin Laden'	CNN
03/03/1997	OBL	'Bin Laden cited on Prince Sultan's US visit'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	*AQ figure*	*Description*	*Source*
15/03/1997	OBL	'Bin Laden charges US involvement in China bombings'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
18/03/1997	OBL	'Pakistan interviews Osama bin Laden'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
22/03/1997	OBL	'Muslim leader warns of a new assault on US forces'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
16/04/1997	OBL	'The Saudi Regime and the Reputed Tragedies of the Pilgrims'	CTC/Harmony
06/06/1997	OBL	'Osama bin Laden dares US commandos to come to Afghanistan'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
20/10/1997	OBL	'Osama bin Laden backs Harkatul Ansar against US'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
27/11/1997	OBL	'Daily reports Osama bin Laden's threat against Americans'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
17/01/1998	OBL	'Bin Laden claims foiling of UN's Afghan conspiracy'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
16/02/1998	OBL	'Bin Laden condoles with al-Bashir on Salih's death'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
23/02/1998	OBL & AAZ	Text of fatwa urging jihad against Americans	FBIS compilation 1994–2004 + Federation of American Scientists (FAS) + Walter Laqueur: *Voices of Terror*. Reed Press, 2004
23/03/1998	OBL	'Bin Laden urges "expulsion" of invaders'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
31/03/1998	OBL	'Interview with Osama bin Laden reported'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
15/04/1998	OBL	'Bin Laden warns against Richardson mission to Afghanistan'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
07/05/1998	OBL	'Supporting the Fatwa of the Afghani Religious Scholars of Ejecting the American Forces from the Land of the Two Holy Mosques'	CTC/Harmony
14/05/1998	OBL	'Bin Laden backs Afghan fatwa on US forces'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
18/05/1998	OBL	'Bin Laden sees US terrorism listing as good for Taliban'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
19/05/1998	OBL	'World Islamic Front' statement urges jihad on America, Israel'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
28/05/1998	OBL	'Bin Laden creates new front against US, Israel'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
28/05/1998	OBL	'Bin Laden declares jihad against US troops'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
00/05/1998	OBL	'Usama bin Laden answers questions from supporters	PBS Broadcasting
01/06/1998	OBL	Bin Laden congratulates Pakistan on nuclear weapons'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
15/06/1998	OBL	Article on interview with Osama bin Laden	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
21/07/1998	OBL	'Bin Laden calls for "jihad" against Jews, Americans'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	*AQ figure*	*Description*	*Source*
23/08/1998	OBL	'Bin Laden warns Clinton "battle has not yet started"'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
02/09/1998	OBL	'Bin Laden praises Pakistan for love of Islam'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
12/09/1998	OBL	'Osama bin Laden sends message to anti-US conference'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004 + Hegghammer (*FFI Rapport* 2002/01393)
18/11/1998	OBL	'Bin Laden: expel Jews, Christians from holy places'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
00/12/1998	AAZ	'Interview with Jamal Ismail'	Hegghammer *(FFI Rapport* 2002/01393)
24/12/1998	OBL	'Bin Laden denies role in bombing of US missions'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
04/01/1999	OBL	'Associate Press carries excerpts from Bin Laden interviews'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
06/01/1999	OBL	Journalist interviews Bin Laden	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
11/01/1999	OBL	*Time* magazine interviews Bin Laden	FBIS compilation 1994–2004 + *Time* magazine
13/01/1999	OBL	CBS releases interview with Bin Laden	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
14/01/1999	AAZ	'Muslim Egypt Between the Whips of the Torturers and the Administration of Traitors'	*Militant Ideology Atlas Research Compendium* November 2006
01/02/1999	OBL	*Esquire* interview with Bin Laden	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
20/02/1999	OBL	May 1998 interview with Bin Laden reported	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
19/04/1999	AAZ	'Letter to Abu Yasir'	Al-Qaeda's Secret Emails' *Al-Sharq al-Awsat* articles by Mohammed Al-Shafey, published 12/06/2005
08/06/1999	OBL	'Osama bin Laden pens a letter in support of Kashmir jihad'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
10/06/1999	OBL	Al-Jazeera programme on Bin Laden	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
25/07/1999	OBL	'Bin Laden calls on Muslims to declare jihad on US'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
12/09/1999	OBL	'OBL orders mujahidin to shoot US commandos "on sight"'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
28/09/1999	OBL	'OBL denies providing military aid to Kashmiris'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
09/01/2000	OBL	'Osama bin Laden denounces US-sponsored "world order"'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
02/05/2000	OBL	'OBL sees holy war in "every street" of US'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
22/06/2000	OBL	'Supporters of Shariah website publishes Bin Laden "speech"'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
26/06/2000	OBL	'Osama bin Laden renews calls for jihad'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
20/08/2000	OBL	Interview with *Ghazi* magazine	*Through our Enemies Eyes* by 'Anonymous' (2003)
21/09/2000	OBL	'Bin Laden, others, pledge "jihad" to release prisoners in US, Saudi jails'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004 + Hegghammer (*FFI Rapport* 2002/01393

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	*AQ figure*	*Description*	*Source*
13/11/2000	OBL	Interview with *al-Ra'i al-'Amm*, a Kuwaiti newspaper	Hegghammer (*FFI Rapport* 2002/01393)
07/01/2001	OBL	'Daily prints Osama bin Laden "letter" calling for "Global Islamic State"'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
03/03/2001	OBL	'Ausaf receives Bin Laden's poem on resolve to continue jihad'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
07/03/2001	OBL	'Bin Laden implicitly praises USS *Cole* bombing at son's wedding'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
01/04/2001	OBL	'Letter from Usama Bin Laden to the scholars of Deyubende in Peshawar in Pakistan'	Harmony Database/CTC + NEFA
03/04/2001	OBL	'Osama bin Laden regrets restrictions imposed by Taliban'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
10/04/2001	OBL	'Bin Laden calls on Muslims to invest in Afghanistan, join jihad'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
07/05/2001	OBL	'Transcript of Bin Laden's speech at his son's wedding'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
17/05/2001	OBL	'Osama bin Laden would make life "miserable" for United States if Taleban allows'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
27/06/2001	OBL	'OBL sends "message voice" to Palestinians, vows not to let them down'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
16/09/2001	OBL	'Afghanistan: Bin Laden denies involvement in terrorist attacks in US'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
20/09/2001	OBL	Al Jazeerah TV broadcasts Osama bin Laden's 1998 interview	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
24/09/2001	OBL	'Text of Bin Laden's letter to the Pakistani people, 24 Sept.'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004 + Hegghammer (*FFI Rapport* 2002/01393)
07/10/2001	OBL	'Al-Jazirah carries Bin Laden's address on US strikes'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004 + Hegghammer (*FFI Rapport* 2002/01393) + Ibrahim (2007)
03/11/2001	OBL	'Bin Laden condemns the UN, talks of Crusader-Zionist war against Muslims'.	Hegghammer (*FFI Rapport* 2002/01393)
10/11/2001	OBL	'Osama claims he has nukes: If US uses N-arms it will get same response' – Interview with Hamid Mir'	*The Dawn* + Hegghammer (*FFI Rapport* 2002/01393)
02/12/2001	AAZ	'Knights under the Prophet's Banner: Mediations on the Jihadist Movement'	FBIS Report of original article from *Al-Sharq Al-Awsat* also available from Islamist websites with new cover
13/12/2001	OBL	Al Jazeera airs video statement by Usama bin Laden	Al Jazeera + Archive.org / Islamist websites
27/12/2001	OBL	'Bin Laden speaks out against military operations in Afghanistan'	Hegghammer (*FFI Rapport* 2002/01393)

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	*AQ figure*	*Description*	*Source*
00/02/2002	OBL	Al Jazeerah TV website reports on 'row' with CNN over Bin Laden's tape	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
17/04/2002	OBL	MBC TV carries video of Bin Laden, aides supporting 911 attacks	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
18/04/2002	OBL	Al Jazeerah airs 'selected portions' of latest Al-Qa'ida tape in 11 Sept. attacks	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
19/05/2002	OBL	*Sunday Times* obtains film vowing revenge on UK, US, others. British-based Islamic news agency receives encrypted Bin Laden video	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
00/06/2002	OBL	'Al-Qaeda's Declaration in Response to the Saudi Ulema: "It's Best You Prostrate Yourselves in Secret". Purported OBL, or close affiliation'	Ibrahim (2007)
27/06/2002	OBL	'Website posts Bin Laden's statement on Saudi Crown prince Abdallah's initiative'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
11/08/2002	Unkn.	'The "constitutional charter" of Al-Qaeda and the format of the pledge of allegiance to AQ'	CTC/Harmony, initially Defense Intelligence Agency
00/09/2002	AAZ	'The Interview of Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri'	ITSTIME + *IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri* vol. 1 (2008)
06/10/2002	OBL	'A Message Addressed to the American People'	*IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden* vol. 1 (2008) + FBIS
09/10/2002	AAZ	Message from Zawahiri which AP news agency received on a CD marked 'As-Sahab Foundation for Islamic Media'	Hegghammer (*FFI Rapport* 2005/1428)
14/10/2002	OBL	'Al-Qa'ida issues statement under Bin Laden's name on Afghan war anniversary'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
26/10/2002	OBL	Islamist site publishes Bin Laden's 'Letter to the American People'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004 + Ibrahim (2007)
12/11/2002	OBL	'Osama bin Laden hails recent operations in Bali, Moscow, Jordan'	*IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden* vol. 1 (2008) + FBIS compilation (p. 227) + Hegghammer (*FFI Rapport* 2005/1428)
28/11/2002	OBL	'Bin Laden urges "Arabian Peninsula" people to prepare for "all-out war" '	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
30/12/2002	AAZ	'Al Walaa wa al Baraa' (Loyalty and Enmity: An Inherited Doctrine and a Lost Reality' [Ibrahim's translation]), 'Loyalty and Separation: Changing an Article of Faith and Losing Sight of Reality' (Kepel and Milelli)	Ibrahim (2007) + Milelli (2008)

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	*AQ figure*	*Description*	*Source*
19/01/2003	OBL	'Bin Laden message urges Islamic factions to unite, fight "external" enemy'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
21/01/2003	OBL	Full text of interview held with Al-Qa'ida leader Osama bin Laden on 21 Oct. 2001	FBIS compilation 1994–2004 + Hegghammer (*FFI Rapport* 2005/1428)
01/02/2003	OBL	'On the obligation of Jihad for everyone, the weak foundations of America, the plot to annex Saudi Arabia and establish a Jewish superstate'	*IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden* vol. 1
11/02/2003	OBL	'A Message to Our Brothers in Iraq'	*IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden* vol. 1 + FBIS compilation, p. 247
00/03/2003	OBL	'Bin Laden's statement calls for revolt against Saudis, death to Americans, Jews'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
09/04/2003	OBL	'Pakistan: Osama bin Laden urges Muslims to launch "suicide attacks" against US'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
09/04/2003	OBL	Kashmiri daily reports OBL's message urging jihad against Pakistan, Arab States	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
21/05/2003	AAZ	Attack on Arab support for US war in Iraq. Call for attack on Norway *et al.*	Hegghammer (*FFI Rapport* 2005/1428)
29/05/2003	OBL	'Bin Laden threatens "terrible response" if death of 2 Saudi clerics is confirmed'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
11/06/2003	OBL	Saudi sources: 'OBL denied involvement in Riyadh bombings in message to his mother'	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
03/08/2003	AAZ	Audiotape about Guantánamo prisoners	Hegghammer (*FFI Rapport* 2005/1428) + *IntelCenter Ayman Al-Zawahiri* vol. 1
10/09/2003	OBL & AAZ	Al Jazeerah Airs Bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri Tape on Anniversary of 11 Sept. Attacks	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
28/09/2003	AAZ	'Message to Muslims in Pakistan and Afghanistan'	Hegghammer (*FFI Rapport* 2005/1428)
18/10/2003	OBL	Al Jazeera carries Bin Laden's audio messages to Iraqis, Americans	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
18/10/2003	OBL	'Second letter to the Muslims of Iraq'	Kepel and Milelli: *Al-Qaeda in its Own Words* (2005, 2008) + see also FBIS
16/11/2003	OBL	Al Jazeera TV: Al-Qa'ida claims responsibility for Istanbul bombings	FBIS compilation 1994–2004
04/01/2004	OBL	Bin Laden warns of 'grand plots' against Arabs, criticizes Gulf rulers	FBIS compilation 1994–2004 + the *Observer*
24/02/2004	AAZ	'Zawahiri on the state of the union speech and the French headscarf ban'	Hegghammer (*FFI Rapport* 2005/1428)
08/03/2004	AAZ	Audiotape recognizing the two-year anniversary of the battle of Tora Bora	Hegghammer (*FFI Rapport* 2005/1428)

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	*AQ figure*	*Description*	*Source*
25/03/2004	AAZ	Audiotape calling for Musharraf overthrow	Hegghammer (*FFI Rapport* 2005/1428)
14/04/2004	OBL	'Offer of peace treaty to Europeans'	Ibrahim (2007)
15/04/2004	OBL	'Peace offering to Europeans'	*IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden* vol. 1
06/05/2004	OBL	'People of Iraq'	*IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden* vol. 1
30/10/2004	OBL	'Message to Americans. On 9/11, how the idea (allegedly) was formed, and the policies of the two presidents Bush'	*IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden* vol. 1 + also ITSTIME and MEMRI + *Al-Qaeda in its Own Words* (ed. Gilles Kepel and Jean-Pierre Milelli, trans. Pascale Ghazaleh).
16/12/2004	OBL	'Message concerning Saudi Arabia'	*IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden* vol. 1 + Archive.org/Al-Hesbah
27/12/2004	OBL	'To the people of Iraq Muslims. On the Allawi regime, elections'	*IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden* vol. 1 (2008)
11/02/2005	AAZ	'The Freeing of Humanity and Homelands under the Banner of the Quran'	Jihadunspun.com + forums.Islamicawakening.com
09/06/2005	AAZ	Zawahiri letter to Zarqawi	Director of National Intelligence
17/06/2005	AAZ	'On the need to rid the Muslim world of Crusaders and their supporters, implement Sharia. Need to unite Iraqis'	*IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri* vol. 1
04/08/2005	AAZ	'Al-Qaeda Leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri Calls to Get Rid of Islamic Regimes'	MEMRI
15/11/2005	AAZ	'Wills of the Knights of the London Raid'	Ibrahim (2007)
06/12/2005	AAZ	'The Victory of the Islamic Religion in Iraq'	ITSTIME + *IntelCenter: Words of Ayman Al-Zawahiri* vol. 1
07/12/2005	AAZ	First interview with Ayman al-Zawahiri	Ibrahim (2007) + *IntelCenter: Words of Ayman Al-Zawahiri* vol. 1
10/12/2005	AAZ	'Obstacles to Jihad'	ITSTIME + *IntelCenter: Words of Ayman Al-Zawahiri* vol.1
19/01/2006	OBL	Bin Laden truce offer to the Americans	Ibrahim (2007) + IntelCenter + MEMRI + Archive.org/Islamist websites
20/01/2006	AAZ	'Zawahiri presents a poem from Maulawi Muhibbullah al-Kandahari'	Globalterroralert.com
30/01/2006	AAZ	'Bajawr Massacre and the Lies of the Crusaders' – Response to attempted attack on Zawahiri's location in the FATA (the village of Damdula, in Bajuar) which killed 18 people	Ibrahim (2007) + *IntelCenter: Words of Ayman Al-Zawahiri* vol. 1
04/03/2006	AAZ	'The Alternative is Da'wa and Jihad'	*IntelCenter: Words of Ayman Al-Zawahiri* vol. 1
12/04/2006	AAZ	'Four Years Since the Battle of Tora Bora – From Tora Bora to Iraq'	*IntelCenter: Words of Ayman Al-Zawahiri* vol. 1

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	*AQ figure*	*Description*	*Source*
23/04/2006	OBL	'Oh People of Islam'	*IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden* vol. 1 + Al-Jazeera + Archive.org/Islamist websites
28/04/2006	AAZ	'Letter to the People of Pakistan'	*IntelCenter Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri* vol. 1
23/05/2006	OBL	'A Testimony to the Truth'	*IntelCenter: Words of Osama Bin Laden* + Archive.org / Al-Hesbah
09/06/2006	AAZ	'Support for Palestinians'	*IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri* vol. 1
21/06/2006	AAZ	'American Crimes in Kabul'	*IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri* vol. 1
24/06/2006	AAZ	'Lamentation of Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi – 'Elegizing the Ummah's Martyr and Emir of the Martyrs Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, May Allah Have Mercy on Him'	ITSTIME + see also IntelCenter
27/06/2006	AAZ	'The Zionist Crusader's Aggression on Gaza and Lebanon'	*IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri* vol. 1
29/06/2006	OBL	'Elegizing the Ummah's Martyr and Emir of the Martyrs, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi'	*IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden* vol. 1
00/07/2006	OBL	'To the Ummah in General and to the Mujahideen in Iraq and Somalia in Particular'	*IntelCenter: Words of Osama bin Laden* vol. 1
02/09/2006	Zawahiri + Gadahn/ Amriki	'An Invitation to Islam'	As-Sahab/Al-Boraq.com
11/09/2006	AAZ	'Hot Issues with Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri'	ITSTIME + see also IntelCenter
29/09/2006	AAZ	'Bush, the Vatican's Pope, Darfur and the Crusaders'	*IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri* vol. 1
22/12/2006	AAZ	'Realities of the Conflict 'Between Islam and Unbelief'	*IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri* vol. 1
30/12/2006	AAZ	'Congratulations on the Eid to the Ummah of Tawhid'	*IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri* vol. 1 + Laura Mansfield
05/01/2007	AAZ	'Rise and Support our Brothers in Somalia'	*IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri* vol. 1
22/01/2007	AAZ	'The Correct Equation'	You Tube + Laura Mansfield + *IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri* vol.1
13/02/2007	AAZ	'Lessons, Examples and Great Events in the Year 1427'	*IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri* vol. 1
11/03/2007	AAZ	'Palestine is the concern of all Muslims'	You Tube, forums, ITSTIME + see also *IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri* vol. 1
05/05/2007	AAZ	'The Empire of Evil is About to End, And a New Dawn is About to Break Over Mankind'	ITSTIME + see also IntelCenter
23/05/2007	AAZ	Announces the death of Taliban leader Mullah Dadullah Akhund	ITSTIME + see also IntelCenter

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	*AQ figure*	*Description*	*Source*
25/06/2007	AAZ	'Forty Years since the Fall of Jerusalem'	*IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri* vol. 1
04/07/2007	AAZ	'The Advice of One Concerned'	*IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri* vol. 1 + Archive.org
10/07/2007	AAZ	'Malicious Britain and its Indian Slaves'	*IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri* vol. 1
11/07/2007	AAZ	'The Aggression Against Lal Masjid'	*IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri* vol. 1
07/09/2007	OBL	'The Solution: A message from shaykh Osama bin Laden to the American people'	As-Sahab/You Tube/Al-Ekhlass/ NEFA also ITSTIME + IntelCenter
20/09/2007	OBL	'Come to Jihad: a Speech to the People of Pakistan'	NEFA foundation + see also IntelCenter
22/10/2007	OBL	'Message to the People of Iraq'	NEFA foundation + see also IntelCenter + Archive.org / Al-Hesbah
30/11/2007	OBL	'Message to the People of Europe'	Laura Mansfield/You Tube/ As-Sahab (Al-Ekhlaas forum)/ NEFA + see also IntelCenter + Archive.org
14/12/2007	AAZ	'Annapolis – The Betrayal'	NEFA foundation + see also IntelCenter
16/12/2007	AAZ	'A Review of Events' – As Sahab publishes fourth interview with Zawahiri	NEFA foundation, ITSTIME + see also IntelCenter
29/12/2007	OBL	'The Way to Frustrate the Conspiracies'	NEFA + IntelCenter
00/01/2008	AAZ	'Exoneration: A Letter Exonerating the Ummah of the Pen and the Sword from the Unjust Allegation of Feebleness and Weakness' or 'Exoneration: A treatise on the exoneration of the nation of the pen and sword of the denigrating charge of being irresolute . . .'	Open Source Center
27/02/2008	AAZ	'An Elegy to the Martyred Commander Abu al-Layth al-Libi'	NEFA Foundation + see also IntelCenter
06/03/2008	AAZ	'Letter to Abu Umar al-Baghdadi of the Islamic State of Iraq'	Foundation for Defence of Democracies – 12http://www.defenddemocracy.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=11782255&Itemid=353
19/03/2008	OBL	'May our Mothers be Bereaved of us if we Fail to Help our Prophet (Peace be upon Him)'	NEFA foundation, You Tube, LiveLink + see also IntelCenter
20/03/2008	OBL	'A way for the salvation of Palestine'	NEFA foundation, You Tube, forums + see also IntelCenter + Islamist forum
23/03/2008	AAZ	'A Call to Help Our People in Gaza'	NEFA foundation + see also IntelCenter

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	*AQ figure*	*Description*	*Source*
02/04/2008	AAZ	'The Open Meeting with Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri, Part One'	*IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri* vol. 1 + NEFA + Islamist websites / Archive.org
17/04/2008	AAZ	'Shaykh Ayman Al-Zawahiri – On the fifth anniversary of the invasion and torture of Iraq'	NEFA foundation, forums + see also IntelCenter
21/04/2008	AAZ	'The Open Meeting with Sheikh Ayman al-Zawahiri, Part Two'	*IntelCenter: Words of Ayman al-Zawahiri* vol. 1
16/05/2008	OBL	'Reasons of the struggle on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the founding of the occupying state of Israel'	ITSTIME
18/05/2008	OBL	'A Message to the Muslim Nation'	Open Source Center + ITSTIME
04/06/2008	AAZ	'On the Anniversary of the Naksa . . . Break the Siege of Gaza'	Open Source Center
10/08/2008	AAZ	'A Message from Shaikh Ayman al-Zawahiri to Pakistan Army and the People of Pakistan'	NEFA + You Tube
24/08/2008	AAZ	'In Lamentation of a Group of Heroes'	NEFA
19/11/2008	AAZ	'The Exit of Bush and Arrival of Obama'	Archive.org / Islamist websites
21/11/2008	AAZ	'Al-Azhar: The Lions Den: Interview with Shaykh Ayman al-Zawahiri'	NEFA + Archive.org / Islamist websites
00/12/2008	AAZ	The Martyrdom of Heroes and Betrayal of our Rulers'	Global Islamic Media Front + see also NEFA
06/01/2009	AAZ	'The Massacre of Gaza and the Siege of the Traitors'	Archive.org / Islamist websites + NEFA
14/01/2009	OBL	'Call for Jihad to Stop the Gaza Assault'	Archive.org / Islamist websites + NEFA
13/02/2009	AAZ	'The Sacrifices of Gaza . . . And Conspiracies'	Global Islamic Media Front
22/02/2009	AAZ	From Kabul To Mogadishu'	Islamist websites
00/03/2009	AAZ	'The Crusade Sets Its Sights on the Sudan'	Islamist websites
14/03/2009	OBL	'Practical steps to liberate Palestine'	Islamist websites
19/03/2009	OBL	'Fight on, O Champions of Somalia'	Islamist websites
20/03/2009	AAZ	'Six years since the invasion of Iraq and thirty years since the signing of the Israeli Peace Accords'	Islamist websites
24/03/2009	AAZ	'The Crusade Sets its Sights on the Sudan'	Islamist websites
02/06/2009	AAZ	'The Floggers of Egypt and the Agents of America Welcome Obama'	Islamist websites
03/06/2009	OBL	Audio recording aired on Al Jazeera (subsequently distributed on Archive.org)	Reuters + Al Jazeera + Archive.org

Date (dd/mm/yyyy)	*AQ figure*	*Description*	*Source*
Unknown	AAZ	'Response to a Grave Uncertainty from Shaykh al-Albani Regarding Silence in the Face of Apostate Rulers'	Militant Ideology Atlas Research Compendium November 2006
Unknown	OBL	'Methodological Guidelines (1) According to the Guidelines of Bin Laden: We Proceed in the Way of Manhattan in Order to Defy America and Put an End to Their Controlling Evil'; (2); (3)	Militant Ideology Atlas Research Compendium November 2006
Unknown	AAZ	'The Forbidden Word'	Militant Ideology Atlas Research Compendium November 2006
Unknown	OBL	'Letter from OBL to Mullah Omar'	NEFA + DoD
Unknown	AAZ	Introduction in new journal – Characteristics of Jihad	CTC-Harmony
Unknown	AAZ	'Jihad, Martyrdom, and the Killing of Innocents' [Purported AAZ – Ibrahim claims it was 'overseen' by Zawahiri]	Ibrahim (2007)

Glossary
AAZ – Ayman al-Zawahiri
CTC – Combating Terrorism Center
DoD – Department of Defence
FBIS – Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FFI – Norwegian Defence Research Establishment
ITSTIME – Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues and Managing Emergencies
MEMRI – Middle East Media Research Institute
NEFA – Nine/Eleven Finding Answers
OBL – Osama bin Laden

Notes

1 For analyses of Al-Qaeda's internet presence, see Nico Prucha, 'Die Stimme des Dschihad' ('The Voice of Jihad'), '*Sawt al-gihad': al-Qa'idas erstes Online-Magazin*. Interdisziplinäere Schriftenreihe zur Islamwissenschaft, vol. 5. Hamburg: Verlag Dr Kovac, 2010: and Judith Tinnes, Internetnutzung islamistischer Terror- und Insurgentengruppen unter besonderer Berüecksichtigung medialer Geiselnahmen im Irak, Afghanistan, Pakistan und Saudi-Arabien', Phd thesis, Universitet des Saarlandes, Saarbrücken, 2010.

2 Harmony Database (AFGP-2002-600321), US Department of Defense.

3 Craig Whitlock, 'Al-Qaeda's Growing Online Offensive', *Washington Post*, 24 June 2008. Available at www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/06/23/AR2008062302135.html. See also: Christine Bartolf and Bernard I. Finel, 'Are we Winning? Measuring Progress in the Struggle Against al Qaeda and Associated Movements', 09 Report, American Security Project, 2009.

4 The Combating Terrorism Center's *Militant Ideology Atlas* views these individuals as peripheral when it comes to assessing such influence; see William McCants *Militant Ideology Atlas,* West Point, NY: Combating Terrorism Center, November 2006.

5 Raymond Ibrahim, The Al-Qaeda Reader. Portland, OR; Broadway Books, 2007; Gilles Kepel and Jean- Pierre Milelli (eds), *Al-Qaeda in Its Own Words.* Cambridge, MA Belknap Press, 2008.

Strategy, Tactics, Weapons, and Targets

Chapter 3. Strategy, Tactics, Weapons, and Targets



The definition and typology from Chapter 2 (of the featured book) provide an essential starting point for understanding terrorism. There are other elements often common to the groups that practice political violence, regardless of their religious, ethnic/national, or ideological orientation. The ends may be different, but frequently the means can be very similar—not just with the initial decision to resort to the use of terrorism but in terms of the types of attacks that are undertaken and the broad strategies. Dissident organizations may use similar techniques, use similar weapons, and select similar targets. Local conditions and circumstances, however, are more likely to determine choices rather than the goals of the dissident group using violence. Available resources (financial and otherwise) may be more important in determining which weapons, tactics, or targets are preferred rather than the political goals of the organization. All of the selections ultimately are made from possibilities that almost any group with sufficient planning skills, funding, weapons, and personnel may attempt to undertake. Broad strategies will be discussed first. Techniques will then be analyzed. The weapons that can be used will be discussed next, including a consideration of the possibility of groups using weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear bombs, chemical poisons, or biological agents. Clearly concerns about the possibilities for the use of these weapons in the twenty-first century have increased. Finally, the possible types of targets that can be chosen and which are chosen will be discussed. Included in this discussion will be a consideration of the possibility that democratic countries are more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than non-democratic ones.

STRATEGIES

A number of different kinds of strategies have been attributed to terrorist groups. Kydd and Walter (2006) have suggested that virtually all terrorist organizations over time have followed patterns that fall into five basic strategies. These are (1) attrition, (2) intimidation, (3) provocation, (4) spoiling, and (5) outbidding. Of course, it is possible for groups to change their strategies over time or to utilize a combination of these basic strategies as part of their efforts to achieve their goals. The same basic strategies can involve an almost infinite number of variations in terms of choice of targets and outcomes. The attrition strategy is one that is designed to wear down the government and convince political leaders to change policies in a direction preferred by a terrorist organization. The attacks are intended to force the government to see that changes in policy will be easier than absorbing the damage created by the terrorist group. The costs of the terrorism will lead to the desired changes. One possible result of such a strategy is the creation of an opportunity for other techniques of political change—via

elections, coups, or rebellions. Terrorism is more successful in destroying the power of others, including the government, than it is in taking power (Harmon 2008 : 46). The attacks are likely to end if the necessary changes occur. Attrition strategies can be focused on economic targets in many cases as a means of weakening the government. Intimidation strategies are directed toward the public as the key audience, and the objective is to convince the population at large that the government is weak and can no longer provide protection to important groups or society at large. Every successful attack suggests that the government is weak; government authority and legitimacy are undermined (Rid and Hecker 2009/10: 7). The ultimate strategic objective is to undermine public support for the government. The declining public support will permit changes in the government and perhaps a complete change in the political system or political boundaries. In these circumstances, the terrorist group is unlikely to end its campaign if the government is only willing to change its policies.

Provocation is a more intermediate strategic approach that is basically intended to get the authorities to overreact. A terrorist group is trying to goad the government or its security personnel into actions that will alienate a portion of the population. If government personnel can be induced to launch indiscriminate attacks against groups in society or arrest and detain members of a religious, ethnic, economic, or ideological group, or limit civil liberties for the society as a whole, the dissident organization may be able to attract additional supporters and at the same time weaken the government. When this strategy works it can be a very effective means of attracting recruits and financial support if heavy-handed actions by the police or security forces alienate individuals or groups. This type of provocation can, of course, be combined with the other strategies.

Spoiling and outbidding are usually more intermediate strategies intended to strengthen an organization for a longer struggle or to avoid what the group sees as a negative situation. The spoiling strategy is frequently designed to prevent an outcome such as a truce or peace negotiations between the government and moderate opposition or some other group of violent dissidents. The terrorist group may believe that a truce or a peace settlement will permit a competing dissident group to gain power or that a settlement would undercut a long-term objective by a premature end to the hostilities. Groups following a spoiling strategy have to believe that they will win in the long term. Outbidding refers to efforts by competing groups to gain the allegiance of dissidents or others in the population who are not satisfied with the current situation or potential foreign supporters. Neutralization of competing groups and rivalry for supporters can become the most important goal (Stern and Modi 2008 : 39). The leaders of different dissident groups in these circumstances are acting in much the same fashion as politicians who compete for votes or for access to or control of many of the same resources.

TECHNIQUES

The same techniques are generally available to all dissident organizations, regardless of the type of government they are fighting or the political goals they seek. Of course, some techniques might be more effective against one government and less effective against another. A brutally repressive government may be less concerned about attacks on civilians than one that is trying to fairly represent its population. Personal assaults on individuals can take place with a variety of weapons, but the goal is to indicate to the public and to specific groups that are supporting the government that there is a level of vulnerability or risk present. These attacks as part of an intimidation strategy for example, do not need to involve sophisticated weaponry; very simple weapons may suffice. In some cases the personal assault need not be deadly. The terrorist may only wound their chosen targets, as might occur with breaking bones or shooting people in the legs or kneecaps. Choosing to wound rather than kill targets demonstrates to the population at large that the dissidents are not out to kill people. Such attacks show that the terrorists could kill since it is more difficult to get close enough to successfully wound a target. The technique of wounding a target demonstrates greater abilities and that the terrorist group has an even greater potential to disrupt the political life of the society than if it had simply killed an individual.

Kidnappings are another tactic available to any dissident group with sufficient resources to capture and hide the victim. The kidnapping may be designed to embarrass the government by demonstrating the ease with which some prominent individual may be taken. Kidnapping can also provide days or even weeks or months of publicity for an organization (Neumann and Smith 2008 : 48). The kidnapping also demonstrates how vulnerable persons in a target audience in the country may be to the political dissidents. Such kidnappings may also raise funds by ransoming the victim. The government, family, or business may be pressured to exchange money for the victim. In other cases the group may offer to release the kidnapped individual in exchange for imprisoned comrades or for government policy concessions. The publicity, financial gain, or political concessions can all be very beneficial to any dissident organization. Success demonstrates the capabilities of the dissidents and the weaknesses of the government. Other techniques are widely available. Bank robberies are commonly used to finance dissident movements in many countries. Not only do they raise money, but they may embarrass the government as well. The robberies will qualify as terrorism when the funds are devoted to the organization rather than to the private luxuries of the dissidents. Extortion (revolutionary confiscations) occurs when groups have the opportunity to do so during temporary occupations of buildings or villages. Such action may have a short-term advantage in that necessary finances are

generated, but they could have negative long-term costs if the population is alienated from the dissident movement. If the money is taken from groups that are not likely to ever support the dissidents, the cost in terms of alienated segments of the population will be negligible. Financial support can also come from involvement in smuggling or in drug trafficking.

Hijackings, including those with hostages, have been used by a wide variety of groups. Airliners have become frequent targets for hijackings. Such hijackings are not a new phenomenon. The first recorded instance was in 1930 when Peruvian revolutionaries used a hijacked plane to drop propaganda leaflets (Piszkiewicz 2003 : 2). Skyjackings became quite common for a period of time, and culminated, of course, in the attacks of 9/11. The key to the takeover is usually not the vehicle in question but the crew and passengers that are on board. These individuals become hostages who can be used in the political struggle between the dissidents and the government they are targeting. They are bargaining chips in any negotiations. For example, the release of the hostages is offered in exchange for the release of imprisoned members of the organization. Many governments, however, have been very hesitant to make such trades since they might encourage further hostage-taking efforts or make the government appear to be weak. Hijackers are also frequently willing to exchange hostages for the publication of demands or manifestos. These demands have normally been met lest the government appear to be indifferent to the lives of the hostages. This publicity is frequently a goal of the groups as they seek to make their cause known. Such publicity may be invaluable in attracting support for the dissident cause or in weakening support for the government. Hijackings in the past usually ended with the release of the hostages and some agreement to permit the hijackers to be transported to some other country. The hijackers have gained their immediate goal by publicizing their cause and demonstrating their ability to successfully undertake a political action.

The occupations of government offices or other buildings with the taking of hostages have also occurred. Such occupations can provide an indication of the strength of the dissidents and the weaknesses of the government. The dissidents can then negotiate with the government for publication of demands or release of persons in prison. Arranging for the safe escape of the terrorists may also be part of the negotiations. While the circumstances are generally analogous to hijacking aircraft or ships, occupying buildings is more difficult. The hostages are naturally concentrated on an aircraft or ship, and a few terrorists can control access. Buildings, however, have more exits, and they are more difficult to control. Thus, the occupation will require a larger number of activists, risking a larger portion of the human assets of the dissident group. Embassies or consulates are targets at times because the occupation generates greater publicity, but such buildings, once occupied, may be easier to control since they have often been designed for greater security with limited access. Seizing an embassy may

also introduce international complications for a domestic government. A repressive government may be indifferent to the fate of its own citizens, whereas when foreign citizens are held hostage the government may have to be at least somewhat more open in terms of what actions are taken or at least have some willingness to negotiate.

It should be re-emphasized that all the above techniques are available to any dissident organization that chooses to use them. Groups, in fact, will often choose tactics that reflect their capabilities even if these tactics are less suited to their political objectives than some others (L. Freedman 2007: 324). There may be good terrorist tactics, or at least tactics that can be judged to be less evil (kidnapping instead of death; hijacking a plane rather than blowing it up), but these tactics remain available to freedom fighters and terrorists alike. No one type of group has a monopoly on any particular technique. Terrorism as a general technique can be emulated by different, unrelated groups (Enders and Sandler 2006 : 15). The spread of techniques to different groups around the world has been facilitated by the availability of rapid means of communication and transmission of information (Weinberg 2006 : 46). Once a particular technique proves to be effective, it is quickly copied by groups elsewhere, including those that have nothing in common with the group originating the technique.

Many techniques used by terrorists are copied once they prove to be successful (Nacos 2009). Campaigns of assassinations as a technique spread in the later nineteenth century (Enders and Sandler 2006 : 15). Modern technology and communications can speed up the emulation process. Car bombs, for example, have rapidly spread as a technique. Hijacking airliners to publicize a cause became quite common, and groups used them with a wide variety of political interests. There were even civilian airliners from behind the Iron Curtain that were hijacked and fl own to “freedom” in the West. The hijackers in these cases were then considered refugees, and heroes, rather than international criminals. One consequence of widely different groups using the same type of tactic is that it becomes more diffi cult for any country to actually enforce absolute rules about never granting landing rights to hijackers or refusing to grant them asylum. Political reality and public opinion can require that countries treat hijackers differently, depending upon their religion or ethnicity, or their political values and the goals that are sought.

WEAPONS

Weapons and techniques are related, of course, and weapons availability will influence what kinds of actions a terrorist group can even attempt. A dissident group that wanted to eliminate the top leadership in a country all at once would like to have a cruise missile or other type of smart bomb that it could direct to the opening session of

parliament or to a meeting of the ruling military council. Such a strike would create the chaos that would give the dissidents greater opportunities to take power or otherwise influence government policy. Of course, dissident organizations do not have access to such weapons, forcing them to find other weapons for carrying out their attacks. The consideration of weapons that might be used will first deal with more conventional weapons that are available to dissident organizations. Then, weapons that have come to be termed weapons of mass destruction will be considered. The possibility that terrorist organizations would gain access to such weapons and use them to inflict mass casualties has been of increasing concern in recent years.

Conventional weapons

Most weapons used by dissident organizations are designed to inflict casualties or disruption on a small scale. Terrorist groups normally have little difficulty acquiring personal weapons. A terrorist can attempt to kill a chosen target with a pistol or knife. Since such weapons are only accurate at close range, the apprehension of the attackers will be easy unless the attack takes place in an isolated location away from other people. Rifles are also readily available in many countries and could be used with precision by a marksman from a distance. Various kinds of automatic weapons and assault rifles have also become increasingly easy to obtain. Use of such assault weapons could lead to higher casualties if the attack occurs where many people are present. The advantage of these automatic weapons is that they require less training and precision to use and that the intent of the dissidents to attack the government can be readily demonstrated. The cause is publicized, and a target audience may become aware of the goals of the terrorist organization. These kinds of weapons can be purchased, stolen from the security forces or police, or captured in raids on armories. Increasing lethal weapons have also become available with the stockpiles of "surplus" arms left over after the end of the Cold War (Chalk 1999 : 158). Personal weapons will be necessary not only for attempts to inflict casualties but also for activities such as kidnappings, extortion, and bank robberies.

Various kinds of bombs have been a mainstay of terrorist groups for many years. Approximately half of all terrorist attacks involve bombs (Enders and Sandler 2006 : 7). It is not surprising that typical cartoons from the latter part of the nineteenth and into the twentieth century portrayed the terrorist as a bearded, scruffy individual with a lighted bomb in hand. Bombs can range from simple devices such as a grenade or a Molotov cocktail that is thrown at targets to more sophisticated devices that can be detonated by remote control or by timers. The more sophisticated devices can be used more selectively against particular targets. A mine that can be detonated by remote control, for example, can be used against a particular vehicle, whereas a regular land

mine will detonate when the first vehicle of sufficient weight passes over it. Terrorists, of course, can still use the normal type of land mine since the intent might be to disrupt the transport system, to demonstrate to the general population that the government is unable to provide protection, or to target a particular region or particular group. With increasingly compact explosives, letter bombs and package bombs can be used to attack individuals. If all the letters or packages in the national mail system become suspect, the terrorists have already had one of their desired effects on behavior by inducing widespread fear.

Some kinds of bombs can be especially deadly. Bombs that are intended to go off in planes in the air are obviously designed to kill people. In the past, these bombs usually involved timers, but the bombs had sometimes detonated prematurely on the ground due to rough handling. In other cases because of flight delays or because the luggage had been misdirected (i.e., lost), the bomb exploded while still on the ground, causing much less damage than intended. With access to modern technology, the bombers came up with new methods. The bombs that were built were pressure sensitive so that they would go off when the air pressure in the cargo hold of the airliner had decreased to a particular level. Such pressure sensitive devices would even be linked to timing devices so that the process started at a particular altitude but the plane would be over the ocean before detonation. Security agencies for airliners or airports, in turn, developed machinery to simulate this reduced pressure level so that luggage with suspicious materials could be tested on the ground. The development of bombs and detection mechanisms is an ongoing contest between terrorists (and criminals) and the security agencies. As one type of potential attack is rendered ineffective, a new weapon is developed. The battle between bombers and security will go on. As technology provides more opportunities to inflict damage, it will also provide better mechanisms to detect explosives before they can kill and destroy.

Car bombs have been a relatively recent addition to the armory of terrorist groups. Vehicles packed with explosive can do considerable damage and kill and wound many people. Thirteen vehicle bombs that were set off in Bombay (now Mumbai), India in February 1993 killed more than 400 people and injured over a thousand people (Hoffman 2001 : 421). In other cases car bombs have been driven into targets on suicide missions, as happened in Lebanon to US marines and French paratroopers trying to end the Lebanese civil war. Vehicle bombs have also been left to go off with a timer or to be detonated by remote control. The first bombing of the World Trade Center in New York City in 1995 utilized such a bomb with a timer, as did the attack on the federal building in Oklahoma City. Car and truck bombs have been used with some regularity in the Middle East and Northern Ireland for many years. Their use increased when the techniques for using large amounts of fertilizer to produce a massive blast became widely known and available. Terrorists no longer needed to access high-grade

explosives when a ton of fertilizer can be easily obtained. Car bombs have one advantage for terrorists in that one vehicle can easily blend in with a large number of similar vehicles on a street, in a parking facility, or in a parking area. It will be impossible for local authorities to continuously check all such vehicles. Using civilian airliners as flying bombs has increased the potential for casualties (see Box 3.1).

BOX 3.1 CIVILIAN AIRLINERS AS BOMBS IN SUICIDE ATTACKS

The use of airliners as suicide vehicles in peacetime was seen as a unique occurrence when it happened on September 11, 2001. The plans for the attack were well thought out. The hijackers knew enough about flying to reach and crash into their targets. Four airliners were hijacked at virtually the same time. They were all early flights so that the chances of delays were minimal. Even with this planning, the United flight that crashed in Pennsylvania, however, left later, throwing this part of the attack off schedule, giving the passengers a chance to rush the cockpit. The hijackers in this case did not have an alternative plan. The flights were also hijacked on a Tuesday, rather than a Monday for example, because there would be fewer passengers to deal with. All four flights were chosen because they were flying from the East Coast to the West Coast and thus their fuel tanks were full given the distances involved. The additional fuel was intended to add to the destruction when they were crashed into the buildings.

The total destruction of the World Trade Center towers was much more than Osama bin Laden had apparently anticipated, although he was not upset by the more extensive damage (Robbins 2002 : 357–7). There had been earlier indications that hijacked airliners might be used in this fashion. In 1986 a TWA plane was seized in Pakistan. The hijackers reportedly intended to have the plane fl y to Israel where it would be crashed in the center of Tel Aviv (Hoffman 2002b : 306). The plane never had the opportunity of leaving the ground after refueling, but it is unlikely that it could have successfully made the long flight to Israel to launch the attack. The Israelis shot down a Libyan airliner over the Sinai Peninsula in the 1970s that had overflown Cairo and was heading towards Israel. The plane did not respond to any communications, and the Israelis feared that the plane was going to be used against an Israeli target. The Israelis feared the same thing when they shot down a small plane from Lebanon near Tel Aviv in 2001 (Karmon 2002 : 197). In 1994 Algerian dissidents hijacked an Air France flight. They intended to crash the plane in Paris, perhaps with the Eiffel Tower as the target. The goal of the attack was to force the French to stop supporting the Algerian government. The effort was short circuited when French commandos recaptured the plane while it was on the ground in Marseille (Shapiro and Suzan 2003 : 81). It is not known at present how much information Al Qaeda might have had about these earlier hijackings or possible hijackings. It does appear quite likely that the organization was aware of the plan to use the Air France flight against a target in Paris.

There is little chance, of course, of a similar hijacking succeeding today. The 9/11 hijackers took advantage of standard operating procedures that specified that pilots and crews should cooperate with hijackers. Such cooperation is no longer the standard operating procedure for airlines! The flight crews and passengers are much more likely to resist. There has been another instance of the use of an aircraft as a bomb since 9/11. An individual in Austin, Texas flew his private plane into the Internal Revenue Service building in the city in an apparent protest against his problems with the agency and his taxes. It is difficult, at best, to prevent such occurrences with small private planes; however, attacks that do occur will not be as destructive or deadly as the 9/11 attacks.

Suicide bombings have become prevalent for some terrorist groups. They are in some respects an extreme form of psychological warfare (Moghadam 2003 : 75). They increase the credibility of future attacks since it is obvious that they cannot be deterred (Pape 2005 : 29). They have resulted in increased casualties as well whether it be by driving a car into a building, by crashing an airplane, or by an individual exploding a bomb on his or her person in a crowded street. Suicide attacks provide an advantage over other bombs since the explosives can more readily be delivered to a location that might otherwise be inaccessible while the timing of the detonation can be more effectively controlled (Dolnik 2003: 20). Suicide bombings also are a relatively low cost method (except for the bomber or driver or pilot) of inflicting damage on opponents. Activists can even consider suicide attacks to be an effective method of providing a better life for their children or relatives (Azam 2005). The suicide attacks have other functions than just casualties. They can mobilize supporters and build solidarity among groups that may support the terrorist organization (Hoffman and McCormick 2004 : 246, 250). In some cases the reliance on suicide attacks represents outbidding strategies by groups competing to gain greater support from the same population (Bloom 2004). While there are a number of reasons why people become involved in suicide attacks, the individuals involved in suicide missions frequently are retaliating for the injury to or the death of family members or friends (Moghadam 2003 : 72). Even though such personal motivations will lead people to join terrorist organizations, their actions are part of the larger campaign directed against a target audience.

Modern technology has also provided potential terrorists with many more weapons options. Surface-to-air missiles can be used against commercial aircraft. The roof of any building along the flight path for an airport could become a site for the launching of such missiles. The successful firing of such a missile is not as simple as it may appear, but the necessary training can be acquired; consequently, such an attack remains a very real and dangerous possibility. There have been at least twenty-fi ve attacks against aircraft with these missiles, usually with military aircraft as the targets. About 60 percent of the attacks have been successful (Wilkinson 2000b : 214). Civilian airliners have also been brought down by guerrillas in the former Rhodesia and the Sudan, and a Russian missile brought down a civilian airliner in Sri Lanka (Hoffman 2002b : 312). A surface-to-air missile was also used in a failed attempt to bring down an Israeli airliner in Kenya in 2003 (Cilliers 2003 : 101). The United States attempted to reacquire the Stinger missiles that it had channeled to the Afghan rebels to minimize future uses of such weapons. In 1982, Italian police found four powerful ground-to-air missiles when they raided a terrorist hideout (R. Drake 1989: 145). Security forces in Turkey also found Stinger rockets in an arms cache of a Kurdish dissident group (Criss 1995 : 29). The biggest disadvantage of these weapons for terrorists is that while there are opportunities to acquire them, it is difficult to get them in sufficient quantities to

permit members of the terrorist group to practice by actually firing the weapons. There has been increasing usage of sophisticated devices to launch attacks. In 1991 the Irish Republican Army (IRA) used remote control mortars to attack Number 10 Downing Street, the residence of the British prime minister. John Major, prime minister at the time, and the rest of the cabinet were actually in a meeting when the attack occurred. The mortar tubes had been hidden in a van parked in the vicinity. The shells landed harmlessly in a courtyard, but the attack demonstrated what was possible, and it might have killed or wounded the British prime minister and many cabinet ministers. The IRA members were able to escape undetected. Formulas for explosives, directions for building bombs with fertilizer, instructions for creating remote control devices, and materials on other ways of creating havoc are all readily available in books and on the internet. The spread of knowledge has also included the spread of the necessary information for creating greater terror and more lethal attacks.

There are some additional possible weapons that reflect technical sophistication. Computer systems have become more and more essential in modern states. Breaking into a computer system and changing commands or introducing a virus could create havoc. These kinds of weapons have been referred to as weapons of mass disruption given the scope of dislocations that could occur. Computers programmed to provide incorrect information could not only create economic difficulties but could also take a great deal of time to fix. Interference with computers or other electronic elements of the modern world could become a very effective terrorist weapon (Bunker 2000). Such disruptions could lead to injuries and death if hospital computers, air traffic control systems, or power grids were affected.

Weapons of mass destruction

There has been increasing concern recently that terrorists might begin to use weapons of mass destruction to inflict large numbers of casualties on the targets as a means of attempting to obtain their political objectives. Such weapons have generally included biological and chemical weapons, radiological bombs, and even nuclear devices. To date there has been no evidence that any terrorist organization has gained access to nuclear devices or to any appreciable amount of weapons grade uranium or plutonium. One fear has been that with the breakup of the old Soviet Union such weapons had become more readily available with weaker security measures and safeguards at Soviet nuclear stockpiles (B. Jenkins 1998 : 234). Further, there was a fear that some well-funded organization might purchase a nuclear device from one of the successor states. The security guards were usually underpaid—if paid at all—and thus could be susceptible to bribes to let a nuclear device “disappear” (Schmid 2000). There has been no evidence that any nuclear devices have been “lost” or stolen. Probably a greater danger is that as

the knowledge of how to construct nuclear weapons has spread, the chances that a terrorist organization could construct such a device have increased. For the present, the greatest nuclear danger might be an assault on a nuclear power facility that is designed to create conditions that would lead to a meltdown or a heat explosion similar to the Chernobyl disaster in the old Soviet Union. In point of fact, nuclear hoaxes or contamination with radioactive materials seems much more likely than the use of nuclear weapons by terrorists (B. Jenkins 1998 : 233). There is also the greater danger of a radiological weapon or a "dirty bomb" where a conventional bomb is loaded with radioactive materials that would make the bomb more lethal. This is probably the easiest weapon of mass destruction that terrorists could construct and use (Cameron 2004 : 83).

Chemical and biological weapons have generated even more concern. Some observers have considered these emerging weapons to be the weapons of the future for terrorists. Terrorists using such weapons would be able to spread fear and chaos and cause massive casualties. This fear has been particularly great among policy-makers who would have to deal with such attacks (Dishman 2001: 304). This concern increased with the 1995 attack on the Japanese subway with a sarin gas, chemical nerve agent, which resulted in a few fatalities and many more hospitalizations. In 2001, in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks in the United States, letters containing anthrax were sent to members of Congress and to persons involved in the news media. Less than a dozen people died in these attacks, but more could have been potentially affected. Although it was initially presumed that the mailings were from someone associated with Osama bin Laden, analyses of the anthrax used indicated that the material was likely to have originated in the United States. The source of the anthrax and the purpose behind the attacks has never been definitively determined, but it appears to have been an action in pursuit of a personal agenda— a disgruntled scientist who had lost his research funding and may have hoped to have it restored.

While the use of nerve gas and anthrax demonstrates the possibilities of biological and chemical weapons, it also has demonstrated the limitations. Chemical weapons may not be especially lethal. For example, it would take a ton of sarin nerve gas released by aircraft under ideal weather conditions to kill 3,000 to 8,000 people in an urban area (Sokolski 2000 : 211). Disseminating a ton of the gas, however, would be difficult even under ideal circumstances. Similarly, biological agents or chemicals released into water systems are unlikely to work because of existing filtration systems and chlorination (Tucker 1996: 174). Tons of chemicals or biological agents would be required to effectively contaminate a municipal water supply given the dilution that would occur in the lake or reservoir (Gurr and Cole 2000 : 65). It is also very difficult to effectively disperse biological agents (Mueller 2005 : 218). Insurgents, however, have used chlorine gas in combination with explosives to increase casualties among target populations

with some success (Hoffman 2007 : 316). Anthrax is actually quite limited as a biological weapon because it is not contagious. It cannot be spread by human contact, so even though it can be deadly in some forms, it cannot start an epidemic. The more deadly type of biological weapon would be one that was both deadly and contagious. The 2001 anthrax attacks did lead to disruptions in mail delivery, and they shut down government offices for various periods of time, and they spread fear throughout the United States. The loss of life, however, was no greater than might have occurred with letter bombs or package bombs left in corridors of government offices or other places. Letter bombs might even have had a similar effect in terms of generating fear, but the anthrax scare was probably more effective in terms of spreading fear since it was a new weapon and less well understood by the general public and since it came directly after the 9/11 attacks when public fear was at its height.

In actual fact, the threat of chemical and biological weapons may well be exaggerated. Tucker (2000) collected cases dealing with various efforts or presumed efforts to use biological or chemical weapons by persons knowledgeable about the individual efforts. Out of fifteen cases of presumed or possible attacks using these weapons, in only three instances were such weapons actually used on targets, and only the subway attack resulted in significant casualties. In the other cases, the groups either failed in their efforts to produce the weapons or failed to produce significant amounts. There have been some efforts to develop ricin, a deadly poison. While it will kill, the victims have to come into physical contact with the poison; thus, it is not likely to be an effective weapon for producing a large number of casualties. Such weapons have been considered easy to create, but the evidence would suggest otherwise (Rosenau 2001 : 297). As is the case with nuclear weapons, credible hoaxes rather than actual use may be the greatest threat with biological and chemical weapons (Veness 2001 : 409).

Even though biological weapons have not been effective weapons of mass destruction in the past, their lethal potential exists. The use of a biological agent that is contagious raises its own set of problems. The biological agent may be slow acting. This may make it easier for the terrorists to escape detection (Tucker 2000 : 264). Such slow acting weapons also do not generate the media attention that terrorists often desire. The greatest difficulty with a biological weapon is that it can quickly get beyond the control of the dissident group that used it, and the dissidents could become victims as well. Handling such weapons is also dangerous, and the terrorists could become victims before the rest of the population if there were an accident or ineffective isolation mechanisms. Such weapons might become more deadly if they were used as part of a suicide attack.

Any attempt to use biological and chemical weapons faces other difficulties as well. The political demands of the terrorist organization must be communicated to a

government or a public audience, yet doing so means facing possible retaliation. A government facing a rampant plague might be willing to take extreme measures to punish the dissidents and is unlikely to compromise. A group that has caused massive casualties in the population is likely to be in a poor bargaining position to achieve its objectives since public anger at the group would make it difficult for a government to make any concessions (Claridge 2000 : 142). The damage will already have been done, leaving the government with little incentive to make concessions or to negotiate. If, however, the attack is intended to paralyze, disrupt, and disorient the government and general population so that some other political goals can be achieved more readily, then a group need not specifically acknowledge its role in causing large number of deaths. In such circumstances, a group might well be tempted to use a biological or chemical weapon if it is available. Those organizations that are already seeking or willing to accept a large number of dead or are even intent on causing mass casualties might use such weapons. Groups that have been willing to use conventional weapons to cause many deaths might be tempted to use biological or chemical weapons, especially if the weapon could be controlled or limited to a target population—most likely concentrated in a specific geographic area.

Pragmatic concerns probably provide the most important reasons why terrorists have refrained from using biological and chemical weapons (Laqueur 1998 : 50). Efforts to acquire such weapons may come at a significant cost since key operatives of the organization may be more susceptible to capture by the authorities (Ivanova and Sandler 2006 : 424). The use of chemical or biological weapons has not spread because terrorists frequently prefer the familiar, tried-and-true weapons (Cameron 1999 : 279). Organizations that might with great effort be able to gain access to such weapons might not be willing to commit the personnel and other resources in efforts to do so (Dolnik 2008 : 5). The knowledge for building bombs, simple or sophisticated, is there. If the bomb explodes, anywhere—with or without casualties it is a success since the government and the public will not know whether the intended target was actually destroyed (B. Jenkins 1998 : 243). The terrorists can claim success even if the attack miscarried in some fashion. There is little incentive to try to develop new weapons, which may or may not be effective and which may or may not be controllable. Investing in new unproven weaponry could stretch the resources of many dissident organizations (Claridge 2000 : 143). The use of hijacked airliners in the destruction of the World Trade Center towers and the assault on the Pentagon has demonstrated that terrorist groups can cause mass casualties with familiar techniques used in a new way.

Even though the use of biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction is not as likely as some have feared, there is still a danger. Efforts to make such weapons have occurred. A number of terrorist organizations have apparently sought to acquire such weapons, including Al Qaeda, the PLO, the Red Army Faction in West Germany, Hizballah

in Lebanon, the Kurdistan Workers' Party in Turkey, and neo-Nazi groups in Germany (Cronin 2002 /3: 48). The associated threat that a terrorist organization can successfully manufacture or acquire such weapons is likely to increase. The focus on the possible use of such weapons of mass destruction may even have encouraged terrorists to think about obtaining them (Merari 2005 : 64). Terrorist organizations are very much aware of the psychological impact that such weapons can have (Dolnik 2008 : 9). Terrorist groups may be unwilling to use these weapons because of technical difficulties or expense, but clearly some groups are willing to inflict mass casualties. With the passage of time there will be a learning curve, which will probably lead to greater knowledge of the problems involved with the development and use of such weapons—and solutions to these problems. Any such weapons will become more effective as terrorist groups learn from their own past mistakes and the mistakes of others and as the knowledge and technology for the use of such weapons diffuse even further. Since terrorists do emulate each other, the successful use of weapons of mass destruction by one group could trigger similar attacks by others (Stern 1999 : 74). There is a possibility that some governments might make effective biological or chemical weapons available to a dissident organization. While a number of states that have supported terrorists have chemical or biological weapons capability, none have transferred this capability to terrorist groups since such a move would have negative repercussions for the state (Byman 2005 : 52). If the country or its government is facing a major crisis or the threat of defeat in war, however, it might be willing to provide the weapons to a terrorist group.

Suicide attacks

Suicide attacks have become an especially effective tactic for terrorist groups. They normally are more deadly than other bombs. Suicide attacks have been very lethal, accounting for approximately half of all deaths from terrorism since 1968 (de la Corte and Gimenez-Salinas 2009: 12). Of course, the 9/11 attacks explain part of this figure, but even taking into account this particularly lethal incident, suicide attacks still account for a large number of deaths. With suicide bombers, the person controlling the bomb can detonate it when casualties would be greatest. If he or she is in danger of being apprehended by police or security personnel, the device can be exploded and still cause casualties while preventing the bomb from being disarmed. Suicide attacks can also demonstrate the determination of the organization to achieve its goals and that the struggle will continue. Women have been occasional suicide bombers, and their attacks can generate even more publicity than suicide attacks by males (de la Corte and Gimenez-Salina 2009: 16). Further, compared to other types of actions, suicide attacks can be quite cost effective (Dolnik and Bhattacharjee 2002).

Terrorist groups can attract volunteers for suicide attacks because membership in a terrorist organization is inherently high-risk with a significant chance of death or capture. Individuals in the group have already demonstrated a willingness to take chances and make sacrifices for a cause. Casualties among terrorists involved in non-suicide actions can be high; therefore, becoming involved in a suicide mission may not be as major a step as normally thought. Individuals who engage in such attacks have not been predominately poor or uneducated. It is rare for the individuals to have been brainwashed or coerced into becoming suicide attackers. Suicide bombers do not usually demonstrate suicidal tendencies. In fact, there is very little that distinguishes the volunteers from other members of the organization. Further, the planning of a suicide attack is essentially a group phenomenon. Group interactions and characteristics explain suicide attacks, not the personalities or characteristics of the suicide bomber (Merari *et al*. 2010 : 97). In the same vein smaller groups or even individuals have adopted the tactic as part of a campaign of leaderless resistance (de la Corte and Gimenez-Salina 2009: 16).

Suicide attacks could become especially deadly if combined with weapons of mass destruction. A suicide attack would eliminate some of the difficulties that occur with such weapons since, for example, the dangers of contamination from handling are reduced. To date, there has been no evidence that there have been any planned attacks that would have used such weapons. A volunteer with a contagious biological disease could infect a significant number of people in a target population, although the danger of the contagion getting out of hand would still be present. A terrorist who does not seek to escape a chemical weapon can be more certain that it is deployed and used effectively.

TARGETS

One of the most significant choices that any dissident group has to make is the selection of targets for a terrorist attack. Targets can be chosen in order to cause the greatest damage, generate the most fear, or to attract recruits (Heymann 2003 : 52). Where will the attack take place? Should the targets be human or simply physical objects? Should the targets include buildings or people associated with foreign countries? Should the targets be chosen on the basis of their symbolic value or because they are representative units of a larger group defi ned in political, social, or economic terms by the terrorists? The appearance of randomness increases anxiety in target audiences (Enders and Sandler 2006 : 3). That appearance of indiscriminate violence may be essential for achieving the desired psychological effects on the target audience (Neumann and Smith 2008 : 36). What is very rare is the situation in which targets are really random despite the common misperception that terrorists do not care

who or what the targets are. Terrorist groups are very rational in their choice of targets, evaluating strengths and weaknesses, costs and benefits; target choice is rarely indiscriminate (C. Drake 1998 : 53). The targets that are chosen have at least some linkage with the goals and objectives of the terrorist groups. Dissident groups can also strategically use terror as a force multiplier. No matter how barbaric the actions appear, they serve a rational purpose (Vinci 2005).

The use of weapons and the choice of targets available to terrorist groups can change. If attacks with few casualties or little damage fail to achieve the objectives of the organization, then the group is likely to escalate the violence (Neumann and Smith 2005 : 588). The escalation can take the form of techniques that are likely to cause more casualties or to choose targets where the damage could have greater impact. Escalation, for example, might go from assaults to assassinations to bombs intended to cause more casualties to attacks designed to kill many people. Escalation can also occur as a group becomes more effective in carrying out its attacks. Groups that manage to survive after the initial terrorist actions often become more dangerous. Suicide attacks may represent a final escalation of violence by a terrorist organization when all other methods have failed (de la Corte and Gimenez-Salina 2009: 13).

Structures and people as targets

Terrorist organizations will at times restrict themselves to efforts to damage property. In fact, the vast majority of terrorist incidents are not directed at people. Between 1968 and 2001, there were either no fatalities or only one fatality in almost 96 percent of international incidents (Stohl 2003 : 86). Buildings will be bombed when it is expected that no one is inside. The building may have a very specific connection with the political concerns of the dissident group. It could be a government office or a party headquarters in a one party state or even in a democracy where the party in question is considered to be closely tied to the establishment. It could be a religious building associated with the dominant group or a minority religion that is seen as a threat. The offices of a particular business could be the target because of its links to a group or party in power. Newspapers, labor union offices, radio stations, professional associations, and other buildings could all be potential targets in a particular national context. The target possibilities with buildings are legion, but they will vary according to local circumstances and the political goals of the organization that has opted to use violence. The large number of possible targets will usually be far too many to be effectively guarded by police, troops, or private security personnel.

Some targeted buildings or structures such as national monuments could have symbolic value. Their damage or destruction would indicate that any part of a society is

vulnerable as part of an intimidation strategy. If a highly regarded national monument can be successfully attacked, then almost any property or building would be in danger. If a government cannot protect obvious targets, it is not likely that it will be able to guard the less obvious ones. A separatist group or a national liberation movement would have the most incentive since likely supporters would be indifferent to the loss of someone else's national monument. A non-separatist group, however, might be less likely to attack such a symbolic target since it would alienate potential supporters. A terrorist group concerned with global or national capitalism or simply globalization in general could target a particular corporate office or regional headquarters that is a symbol of the free enterprise system (Ford, Coca-Cola, British Petroleum, IBM, Microsoft, Volkswagen, Phillips, or Nestlé). Any government building might be bombed to indicate the vulnerability of such offices. A stadium, statue, or other building project associated with a particular ruling party, leader, or group would have such high salience that the symbolism would be obvious. The two attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, even though designed to cause large numbers of human casualties, also represented a symbolic target. The World Trade Center served as a symbol of American economic might, the global importance of US capitalism, and of all the changes that come with modernization. The symbolism was even greater for the second attack in 2001 since the first attack was largely a failure. The second attack demonstrated that even if a building survived one attack, it could succumb to a second. Similarly, the attack on the Pentagon targeted an important symbol of the United States. Most other countries also have structures with similar symbolic values as targets—Westminster Abbey, the Eiffel Tower, the Taj Mahal, the Colosseum in Rome, the Acropolis in Athens, the Imperial Palace in Japan, or the Hermitage in St Petersburg. Attacks on such symbolic buildings would spread the fear that many terrorist groups seek and generate the media attention that is often so essential for broadcasting their message to the world.

While terrorist organizations may restrict their attacks to property as a means of demonstrating their concern for the safety of the population and to try to maintain popular support, many organizations will eventually move on to attacks on people. It is a rare circumstance in which property attacks alone will be sufficient to force a government to change policies, to create a new political system, or to allow a region to become independent. If a dissident group perceives conditions to be so oppressive that attacks on property are required, graduation to attacks on people is likely. The human targets can be specific, symbolic, and more general, just as property attacks can be. Specific attacks on individuals may be undertaken because of their particular action as individuals. Assassinations of especially unpopular individuals may also serve the positive benefit of creating support for the terrorists and reaffirming the support of members of the organization (C. Drake 1998: 54). Of course, eliminating an extremely unpopular individual may be counterproductive since one source of popular irritation

with the government will have been removed. A judge will be killed or wounded because he or she sentenced members of the group to death or to long prison terms. A member of the security forces with a reputation for torture is killed as punishment for his activities. For the assassination to be terrorism, however, there does have to be a target audience, which could include other judges or police officials. Any police official or judge may be targeted because of his or her position supporting the (oppressive) legal system of the state. Similarly, a member of the national legislature could be the victim because he or she is a member of a class of politicians who are refusing to make the appropriate changes in government policy. Business executives, labor leaders, journalists, government workers and teachers, and officials of political parties could also be chosen if they are perceived to be representatives of groups that are supporting or collaborating with the government. The wide range of potential targets provides dissidents with a major advantage. There are far too many individuals to be effectively protected.

Some attacks will be successful, although effective security agencies may be able to track down the persons involved once they have struck. Human targets may be chosen for their symbolic value. Members of a royal family may have no political power or influence, but they may symbolize the nation or institutions under attack. High-ranking clerics or media personnel, actors or musicians, or others may also have similar symbolic value. When an IRA bomb killed Lord Mountbatten near his country home in the Republic of Ireland, it was a symbolic attack. Mountbatten was a hero from World War II, and a cousin of Queen Elizabeth II. He played no role in policy-making in the United Kingdom, and he was actually retired. He did, however, symbolize the long-standing British presence in Ireland. The potential target group can be even larger. If ethnic, linguistic, or religious differences divide a society, any members of groups that the terrorists oppose may be considered targets. The attacks could be intended to eliminate group support for disliked policies or government leaders or even to convince members of these groups to leave a particular region of the country or even the country altogether as part of a policy of ethnic cleansing. The general population can serve as potential targets for the terrorists to publicize their goals and to seek to change the government. Actions causing significant casualties and disruptions will be intended to indicate to the population at large that the existing government cannot protect them. The government will have failed to provide security, a primary function of government (P. Chalk 1998b: 376). Even if dissidents set off the bombs, the government could be held doubly responsible for the carnage. First, the government either created the situation that led to the creation of the terrorist group or allowed a situation to continue that led to the violence. Second, the government will have been unable to prevent the violence. The end to the violence will require that the general population stops supporting the government in power, requiring that government to change

policies or permit the dissidents to establish a new government.

None of the above situations involve random violence. The attacks are designed to inflict casualties on a particular group, and the group may indeed be an entire national population. The violence and death is not undertaken to inflict pain for the pleasure of doing so but to send specific messages to target audiences. If an entire population begins to fear, the goals of the terrorist may have been achieved. At times they will simply be average citizens in the wrong place at the wrong time when a car bomb explodes in a shopping area. If average citizens are the chosen targets, it would indicate that the terrorists are seeking to induce fear in as large a portion of the population as possible as part of an intimidation strategy to indicate that virtually no one will be safe. Compromise by the government or even surrender becomes more credible to the population if fear becomes widespread. Since many terrorist groups have failed in their political objective, the loss of life may indeed be pointless, but these circumstances do not mean that the attacks were random.

Other types of attacks can focus on economic targets as a means of reducing the capacity of a government to meet the demands of its citizens. Such economic warfare is primarily part of an attrition strategy, but it can involve elements of other strategic approaches as well. Al Qaida's strikes against the United States clearly had a goal of inflicting economic damage as well as generating terror (Harmon 2008 : 52). The attacks can involve attacks on industry, infrastructure, natural resources, and other targets that have economic value to the government (J. Lutz and B. Lutz 2006b). The direct effects of terrorism will have the potential to weaken the government, and there can be indirect effects as well. Government funds may also be diverted to less productive investments such as counter-terrorism efforts or greater funding for security forces (Gaibulloev and Sandler 2008 : 411). Fewer resources for the government ultimately provides greater opportunities for the dissidents. Attacks on foreign interests can also be part of a logical campaign to undermine a domestic government. Like other terrorist attacks, these attacks will not be random but part of a planned effort. External countries may be providing significant support to the government in power, perhaps even making it possible for the regime to survive (Byman 1998 : 161). The aid might be as direct as providing arms, anti-terrorist equipment for the police, training in interrogation techniques, and providing intelligence data on dissidents living abroad. Attacks against the foreign interests may persuade the foreign government to cease support because they realize there is real domestic opposition or simply because it thinks its local ally is incompetent. Personnel involved in the provision of economic aid could also be likely targets for two reasons. First, economic aid is likely to strengthen the government in its struggles with dissidents by increasing its capacities to offer resources to wavering groups or to appease the population in general with items such as subsidized food or fuel prices, increased wages, or new infrastructure projects in a

politically volatile region. Thus, economic aid can be a direct threat to the dissident organization. It can also be an indirect threat as well. Some foreign countries will not supply military aid to a government; they limit aid to economic projects in an effort to avoid increasing the military or repressive capacity of the government. Every million dollars of economic aid, however, may permit a government to divert a million dollars of locally raised revenues to buy arms or increase the size of the security forces. As a consequence, economic aid projects that simply seek to help the people may, in fact, provide benefits to the government in terms of its ability to coerce or defeat internal dissidents. When the hand of the government security forces is strengthened in this fashion, it is much more difficult for the internal dissidents to achieve their goals.

With such economic warfare, foreign economic activity may become a target for terrorists (J. Lutz and B. Lutz 2006b). Terrorist attacks can lead to reductions in foreign investment, especially when attacks are directed at foreign facilities (Enders and Sandler 1996). Foreign workers in key industries may be targets as well. If selective attacks on technicians or other workers can disrupt key industries or the extraction of natural resources, then the tax base of the government and the revenues available will be reduced. Tourists have become targets in some countries. The attacks on tourists have sometimes been seen as random and to be a reflection of the fact that the terrorists enjoy violence. These attacks, however, have a clear purpose. Any successful attack, and even unsuccessful ones, severely hurt the tourist industry. In some countries tourism brings in badly needed foreign exchange and provides additional revenue. A successful attack leads to tour cancellations and a drop off in revenues (Enders *et al*. 1992). Tourism has been a target because of the economic impacts, not necessarily the tourists themselves. Tourists also are a soft target for the terrorists (Mubarak 1997 : 321). The resource base of the government is hurt and a political message is sent to the world at large. The bombing in Bali in Indonesia in 2002 clearly had such an effect, even if the principal reason for the attack was anti-Western. Tourism clearly declined in the aftermath of the bombings. The Jakarta stock exchange lost 10 percent of its value and the loss to the Indonesian economy was approximately 1 percent of total GDP (Abuza 2003b : 3). There was even some expectation that the economic downturn from the drop in tourism revenues would increase recruitment for violent dissident groups since individuals are more susceptible to recruitment efforts in hard times (Abuza 2003b : 166). Attacks against tourists by Muslim groups in Egypt have had exactly these kinds of effects on government revenues (Shultz 1994 : 295). Tourism in Egypt declined by 53 percent in the wake of such attacks, and there were the obvious negative effects on the possibilities of obtaining foreign currency (Gurr and Cole 2000 : 88). In Corsica, bombing campaigns have hurt the local tourist earnings (Soeters 2005 : 2). The frequency of such attacks rather than their severity has so far had the greatest negative impact on tourism (Pizam and Fleischer 2002 : 339).

It has also been logical for groups to launch attacks abroad in many cases—to internationalize the terrorism. In national liberation struggles it makes sense to carry the battle to the colonial power whenever possible. Attacks in other countries may be logical in other circumstances. When a foreign government is supporting the local domestic regime, attacks abroad as well as in one's own country can be part of the effort to change polices. Such attacks could be upon government offices, commercial targets, or the population in general. The violence sends a message to a target population, in this case a general audience in the foreign country. It is also possible for the attacks against the foreign supporter of the domestic regime to be undertaken in third, "neutral" countries. Thus, a dissident movement in Country A may regard Country B as an important supporter of the domestic elite in power in Country A. It may then launch an attack against a corporate office of a company from Country B or a consulate of Country B in Country C to send the message to the target audience that Country B is vulnerable around the world and will be forced to pay a price for supporting the regime in Country A. Country C may be chosen for the attack because of the presence of local supporters, because of limited security for the target, because of the minimal security and intelligence forces in Country C, or other factors. The choice of Country C for the attack is simply a matter of convenience for the dissidents. Kurdish dissidents have attacked Turkish offices and diplomats in West Europe as part of a campaign to challenge government policies in Turkey. The attacks on the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania by Al Qaeda operatives were directed against the United States because of limited security. Al Qaeda had no issues with Kenya or Tanzania. Dissidents in exile could also provide a local support network and local information for attacks in a foreign country, or the terrorist group may also have established links with a like-minded group in that country.

Vulnerability of democratic countries

Terrorist attacks may be launched in some countries more frequently than others, either by groups of domestic dissidents or by foreign groups seeking to attack their regime in more convenient locations. It has been suggested that democratic countries are more vulnerable to terrorist attacks than other kinds of political systems (Posen 2001 /2: 41). Democracies have been more likely to be targets for all kinds of terrorist incidents (Piazza 2008a : 37). Democracies with a commitment to civil liberties and basic rights find it more difficult to gather intelligence on citizens, to arrest, to interrogate, and to extract information. Freedom of press allows for information on terrorist actions to spread (Nacos 2012 : 5). It is difficult for governments to even limit communiqués and other announcements from terrorist groups because of press freedoms (Geipel 2007 : 458). The whole range of protections generally available in democracies makes both

prevention of terrorist actions and the apprehension of terrorists after the fact more difficult. Even when alleged terrorists are arrested, convictions are not automatic. Rights accorded to the accused may mean that there will be insufficient evidence for a conviction. Democracies also provide legal proceedings for any terrorists who are caught. Conviction is not guaranteed, although it may be likely. The courtroom can also provide a valuable platform for the terrorists to publicize their cause (P. Jenkins 2003: 72). The effectiveness of the courts can also be undermined by the intimidation of witnesses or other illegal actions (Schmid 1992b : 19). It is also possible that it may be easier to acquire the weapons or explosives needed for a terrorist action in a democracy, although the international market in weapons is often sufficient to supply the needs of many groups. For all these reasons democracies can also become ideal sites for dissidents attacking their government abroad. Bombing a building, kidnapping a business leader, or the assassination of a diplomat will occur in the democracy because it is easier and even safer to make the attack there than it would be in the home country.

Democracies face other difficulties when dealing with terrorist threats. The limited possibilities for surveillance and detention all combine to encourage terrorist actions on their soil. In dealing with terrorist threats, democratic societies have to be careful to maintain the essence of their system—the rights of individuals. There are dangers of overreaction in democracies since publics will want their governments to take action against the terrorists (Kydd and Walter 2006 : 71). A society facing terrorist attacks may develop a siege mentality and permit actions that are contrary to the whole democratic system. A desire for expedited justice can lead to the creation of military tribunals with lesser standards for convicting terrorists (Chalk 1998b: 377). The country may also adopt procedures to provide for detention of suspects for lengthy periods of time without the fi ling of formal charges and overreactions by the government may even increase support for the dissidents (Reinares 1998: 363, 368–9). There can also be cases of rushes to judgment where suspects are poorly treated and confessions are coerced and other rights bypassed (B. Lutz *et al.* 2002). Even with problems such as these, however, the legal systems in democracies give suspected terrorists many more rights than other systems. All of these factors may make democracies a more suitable setting for groups initiating violence.

In non-democratic countries, dissident organizations are more constrained. The least democratic governments with the most limited participation have been the least bothered by terrorism (Laqueur 2001 : 220). In a totalitarian system where the government has comprehensive security agencies and informers everywhere, opposition is much more difficult to organize. Once suspicion focuses on an individual or a group of individuals, activities can be monitored, mail opened, phone lines tapped, and so on. Searches, for example, can be arbitrary and undertaken at any time. Persons

can be arrested on suspicion and questioned indefinitely. Torture and drugs can be used to extract information from persons in custody. The investigation and arrest of suspects can proceed with relatively few limitations. Once the official agencies become convinced of the guilt of a particular individual, a conviction will be arranged (unless the state sees no need for a trial). In fact, the greatest threat to totalitarian rulers will come from attempted coups by fellow elite members rather than from domestic groups that rely on terrorism (Wilkinson 1975 : 108–9). If the dissidents themselves cannot be readily caught, the government has other options. It can retaliate against family members and friends or hold them hostage or use other similar measures to convince terrorists to surrender or go into exile (Chalk 1998b: 386). Such regimes can also launch attacks abroad against the dissidents or their family members. Groups considering political violence will be quite limited under these circumstances, and the likelihood of surviving to conduct a long campaign of political violence is very low. Casualties among the group members are also likely to be very high. The deterrence that is present with totalitarian systems is fairly obvious in a number of cases. In the old Soviet Union, ethnic tensions such as those present in Chechnya today were not possible. The desires for autonomy and independence were clearly present, but the Soviet system had the capabilities to deal with any dissent quickly and effectively. Many of the successor states to the old Soviet Union are now dealing less effectively with dissident groups that are organized on the basis of nationality and ethnic differences or in terms of a different religious background from the regime elite or the majority of the state. Similarly, the violence in what used to be Yugoslavia did not occur until after the national communist regime collapsed. Prior to that time ethnic differences had been contained by the power of the central government and the security apparatus at its disposal.

Authoritarian governments may have similar state capacities to control dissidents. If the security forces are active and well run, it will be difficult for opponents of the regime to use violent actions successfully. The biggest difference in occurrences of terrorism is between the most authoritarian states and all the rest (Kis-Katos *et al*. 2011 : 525) If they do so, they are likely to be caught. But not all authoritarian systems have the resources to detect and capture terrorists with ease. In a poor country, there may simply be too few resources to fund an effective security apparatus. Poverty, however, is no guarantee against efficient security forces. Haiti while governed by François Duvalier ("Papa Doc") was one of the poorest countries in the world and one in which dissidents and opponents were never permitted to organize (or to live). In poorer countries dissidents may have one advantage in that there are likely to be relatively isolated areas or limited transport and communications facilities available. Thus, a terrorist group might be able to retreat into the countryside and survive for at least a period time to mount attacks against the government. In other cases, the authoritarian

regimes may be unwilling to use sufficiently harsh measures to control dissidents, and thus they will open themselves up to terrorist attacks. Authoritarian regimes, as a consequence, may be very capable of dealing with potential terrorist threats in some cases, and less effective in others. Before 2011, Egypt would have qualified as a mildly authoritarian system that had been unable to eliminate Islamic domestic opponents. Iran, a somewhat repressive authoritarian system, has been effective in dealing with disgruntled domestic opponents.

Although democracies have been found to be vulnerable, there are differences in the vulnerability. One study found no linkages between democracy and terrorism in the Middle East (Dalacoura 2006). Another study found regional variations exist with democracies in some areas, such as the Middle East, suffering more from terrorism while in other regions there was no enhanced vulnerability for democracies (J. Lutz and B. Lutz 2010). Other studies have found that well-established democracies may become a target less often but that it is newer democracies that are more vulnerable (Eyerman 1998). The terrorists will also frequently gain the necessary attention if democratic governments maintain constant alerts or broadcast information about threats; if this situation occurs, then the terrorist groups will have achieved both the desired publicity and the heightened perception of threat that could lead to a desired increase (from the terrorist perspective) in the psychological effects of their operations. Pape (2005) noted in a variety of contexts that suicide attacks have only occurred in democracies. While there may be some exceptions (Lebanon during its civil war, Pakistan in 2007), it is clearly a phenomenon most prevalent in democracies. It would also appear that while weapons of mass destruction have problems in terms of their usage, they are more likely to be used in democratic states (Ivanova and Sandler 2006 : 433). Thus, not only are democracies more likely to be the scene of terrorist attacks, they are perhaps likely to be more deadly. Obviously, the linkage between terrorism and democracy is relatively complex, but it does appear likely that in at least some sets of circumstances the presence of democracy will contribute to terrorist violence.

Democratic states provide one more advantage for the dissidents. Fundraising opportunities may be more easily undertaken there. Civil rights and liberties will often make it difficult for the government to restrict such efforts, especially if the fundraising is undertaken in conjunction with supposed charitable operations. If funds are being raised locally, at least symbolic attacks may be launched in that country as well to spur the effort to collect financial support for the group. If the dissident groups continue to be successful, it will receive funds from exiles, as it becomes the centerpiece of opposition to the regime at home. If the organization is successful, a democracy (or weak authoritarian system) may provide a situation in which the group can levy “taxes” on exiles to fund the effort back home. Funds could even be extorted by selective kidnappings to send a warning to other exiles. The kidnappings themselves can only be

marginally considered terrorist activities, but they are being undertaken in the democratic society to pursue the political violence at home. For these efforts to succeed, publicity would again be key.

Other political systems can face greater dangers as well. Long-established authoritarian regimes where control mechanisms begin to loosen may be especially susceptible (Schreiber 1978 : 28). Another type of political system that might be more likely to be chosen as the location for attacks, at least in the short term, would be a country in transition—one in which one type of ruling group is being replaced by another (Weinberg and Eubank 1998 : 114). Even a transition from one type of authoritarian regime to another could leave a country temporarily vulnerable. Once the changeover is complete, however, the new authoritarian regime may be quite capable of dealing with challenges to its legitimacy. An authoritarian system shifting toward becoming a new democracy could be subject to attacks as well. Protests against policies or government personnel can become more radicalized for countries undergoing a democratic transition (Bjorgo 2005b : 9). New democracies that lack strong political institutions may be especially vulnerable (Cronin 2006 : 43). In any of the cases of a political system in the process of changing, if the old security forces have been discredited and eliminated with the fall of the old system, terrorists could have some important temporary advantages. Even if the weaker authoritarian system or systems undergoing transformation are not the targets of terrorist attacks as such, they could still be chosen for attacks against embassies or symbolic targets of other countries since their security apparatuses could be quite weak. Ineffective security arrangements in democracies and weaker authoritarian systems have, in fact, been considered to be a permissive cause (rather than an underlying cause) of increased terrorism (Crenshaw 2003a: 94).

There are some additional reasons why democracies or weaker authoritarian systems might be chosen for attacks. Terrorist groups seek an audience, and it is imperative that knowledge of the actions reaches that audience. If the group is attempting to reach potential supporters among citizens living abroad in exile or the population of the home country, information on the attack has to be disseminated. A totalitarian or strong authoritarian system might be able to repress or control the news if the attack occurs within its own boundaries, limiting the effective influence of even successful terrorist actions. In some countries, the news of the assassination of a local official in a state where news is controlled can officially become a traffic fatality or a heart attack. Other incidents can be ascribed to a variety of causes rather than political violence, effectively limiting the public attention that the terrorist action was designed to gain. The government will know the truth, but potential supporters of the dissident organization will remain in the dark. If the action is undertaken in a democratic society, however, the media attention will not be controlled since freedom of the press is

present (Schmid 1992b : 16). The incident may only be minor news—hence the tendency of groups to undertake more noteworthy actions—but it will not be suppressed. If the action is spectacular enough, the media attention is likely to bring the political goals or the demands of the dissidents to public attention. Terrorist organizations have become quite adept at using the media and the internet to spread their message (Rid and Hecker 2009/10: 10). In a democracy, politicians will be under greater public pressure when the media publicizes the terrorist actions (Piazza 2008a : 29). With increased press attention groups may be able to raise funds abroad and to begin to pressure the government back home to change policies, at least by threatening to create global embarrassment or to indicate to the world at large that not all citizens are happy to live in a controlled, non-democratic setting. In the world of today with fax machines, the internet, and 24-hours news broadcasts via satellites in orbit, it is even possible that potential dissidents within the authoritarian or totalitarian state will become aware of the presence of like-minded people and what appears to be the existence of an effective dissident group.

Terrorism in different regions

Between 1998 and 2010 Southeast and South Asia was the region with the greatest terrorist activity in terms of the number of incidents (see Table 3.1). The region has also seen significant levels of fatalities and injuries (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3). The high levels of activity reflect ongoing conflicts in Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, and unrest in India, including problems in Kashmir. The Middle East and North Africa has also had a large number of incidents. The casualties from the region have also been high, including years in which the fatalities have been higher than in regions that had a greater number of incidents, especially in the years from 2004 to 2008. The upsurge in casualties in the region reflects the high levels of terrorist violence in Iraq in the aftermath of the US invasion in 2003. These two regions have accounted for most of the terrorist activity during the years in question.

West Europe, North America, and the former Soviet Bloc countries have had many fewer incidents and fewer casualties. The most obvious exception for North America was the death toll for 9/11. The injured figures for 2001 for North America are quite unstated. While there has been an official estimate of the death toll from the attacks, there has never been an estimate for the number injured even though the total number would have to have been very high in terms of those in the building who got out, those on the ground who were injured, and injuries among the fire and police personnel who responded. West Europe had many more incidents in the 1980s (Chalk 1996: 174). Many Middle East organizations in this period found it easier to attack their home governments on democratic soil in West Europe. They also were able to achieve greater

TABLE 3.1 INCIDENTS OF TERRORISM BY REGION, 1998–2010

REGION	YEAR												
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Sub-Saharan Africa	84	120	127	107	65	50	28	55	103	249	171	147	175
South and Southeast Asia	167	269	456	393	407	433	388	729	1104	1107	939	897	1075
East Asia	9	3	14	17	2	3	3	3	2	0	17	3	1
Latin America[1]	111	108	106	131	101	106	41	50	53	45	57	18	52
North America[2]	29	53	34	40	32	30	9	17	13	18	19	4	8
Middle East and North Africa	234	251	187	255	257	236	401	738	1038	1195	776	492	376
Australasia and Oceania	1	3	1	3	2	3	0	0	2	1	3	1	1
Former Soviet Bloc[3]	126	132	166	207	91	81	47	71	66	57	99	97	112
West Europe	134	200	173	168	86	110	48	93	90	64	100	94	77
TOTAL	892	1139	1264	1321	943	1052	967	1756	2471	2736	2181	1750	1877

[1] Central America, Caribbean, and South America

[2] United States, Canada, and Mexico

[3] Successor states of the USSR and former communist systems in Eastern Europe

Source: START (2012), Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland, http//www.start.umd.edu/gtd accessed January 2012.

TABLE 3.2 DEATHS DUE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS BY REGION, 1998–2010

REGION	YEAR												
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Sub-Saharan Africa	1526	784	649	782	290	320	271	368	910	1196	555	430	378
South and Southeast Asia	1285	665	1382	1053	1152	995	1744	1380	2881	3378	2217	2072	1997
East Asia	51	1	1	27	0	0	2	13	1	0	12	185	7
Latin America[1]	600	235	209	243	251	183	120	132	11271	42	8	4	
North America[2]	5	5	0	3004	3	2	0	2	8	24	15	3	3
Middle East and North Africa	995	562	310	632	906	844	2134	3447	4712	8754	2305	1782	1257
Australasia and Oceania	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	0
Former Soviet Bloc[3]	168	454	231	238	379	283	634	102	50	41	66	88	162
West Europe	48	11	30	29	9	5	195	58	4	78	1	10	5
TOTAL	4678	2717	2812	6008	2991	2632	5100	5502	8678	13542	5203	4581	3813

[1] Central America, Caribbean, and South America

[2] United States, Canada, and Mexico

[3] Successor states of the USSR and former communist systems in Eastern Europe

Source: START (2012), Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland, http//www.start.umd.edu/gtd accessed January 2012.

TABLE 3.3 INJURIES DUE TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS BY REGION, 1998–2010

REGION	YEAR												
	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010
Sub-Saharan Africa	4339	553	438	514	205	104	150	304	348	881	445	450	555
South and Southeast Asia	1623	1596	2620	1836	2449	2246	2905	3428	5286	5690	4916	4386	3566
East Asia	51	1	1	27	0	0	2	13	1	0	12	185	7
Latin America[1]	181	237	131	236	384	558	253	109	104	152	134	17	27
North America[2]	6	16	37	24	4	1	3	0	33	6	111	5	15
Middle East and North Africa	1240	709	373	1005	1948	2045	4683	6238	8698	12166	5392	5659	3796
Australasia and Oceania	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	50	0
Former Soviet Bloc[3]	214	713	592	524	378	791	1200	255	78	136	242	129	544
West Europe	270	216	107	474	82	129	1852	938	29	27	28	41	31
TOTAL	7924	4041	4299	4640	5450	5874	11048	11285	14577	19058	11280	10922	8566

[1] Central America, Caribbean, and South America

[2] United States, Canada, and Mexico

[3] Successor states of the USSR and former communist systems in Eastern Europe

Source: START (2012), Global Terrorism Database, National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, University of Maryland, http//www.start.umd.edu/gtd accessed January 2012.

publicity if they launched attacks in this region (Weinberg and Richardson 2004). While the former Soviet Bloc countries did not have a high number of incidents, the casualty figures were higher. Part of the reason for these figures is the conflict between the central government in Russia and the rebels in Chechnya. A number of Chechen groups have mounted high-casualty attacks over the years as part of their efforts to achieve an independent state.

Among other regions, East Asia and Australasia managed to avoid attacks during the years covered, and none of the attacks generated a large number of fatalities or injured. Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa had a relatively low number of incidents compared to some other areas. Terrorist activity in Latin America was much higher in the 1970s and into the 1980s when leftist movements were much more active. Activity in sub-Saharan Africa was much more deadly. The attacks against the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 are reflected in the high casualty figures for that year. There are solid reasons to believe that the overall figures for sub-Saharan Africa are underreported. The present and past databases rely on media reports about incidents and casualties, and media coverage of many parts of sub- Saharan Africa is spotty at best. Conflicts in places like Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Congo have involved all types of violence, but these are locations where field reporting is dangerous even when it is possible. Thus, many kinds of activities are likely to be underreported. The databases also are less likely to report violence between ethnic groups over territory where the government is not involved as a target, yet such violence is often intended to induce terror in a target audience.

The figures in the various tables actually understate the importance of the United States as a target. While incidents on American soil have been rare, US interests abroad are often targeted. The United States has the dubious distinction of being the most favored target of international attacks (Wilkinson 2003: 110). The target of the Kenyan and Tanzanian attacks was clearly the United States and not the local African countries. Terrorism has negatively affected Americans abroad for many years, long before the attacks of 9/11. In the 1980s and the 1990s there were 666 Americans killed in incidents of international terrorism—most of them in attacks launched abroad, while 190 died from domestic terrorism (Pillar 2001 : 19). Fatal attacks occurred in thirty-seven different countries (Neumayer and Plumper 2011 : 3). American targets abroad can be targeted in democracies or weak authoritarian states given the greater vulnerability in these countries. The bombing of the two US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 reflected such calculations. Tanzania was partially democratic while a single party with a pretense of democracy governed Kenya. Neither country has special ties with the United States or would be considered an ally, nor was either one of them on bad terms with the Muslim world. In fact, Tanzania has a substantial Muslim population of its own. Both, however, had relatively limited security services available,

making any early detection of the preparations for the bombing operations very unlikely. Both countries also had citizens of Middle Eastern descent in their populations, making it easier for the persons involved in the attacks to blend in with the population. In effect, these two countries were chosen for attacks because they were convenient for the terrorist organization in question. Some other terrorist group with a grudge against the United States or with a desire to bring about a change in US policy could just as easily have chosen embassies in some other country with limited security and intelligence services.

There are a variety of reasons for the targeting of the United States. It is a media center, so if publicity is important the effect is greater if US interests are somehow involved than in the case of an attack on smaller democracies. The United States is also symbolic of the West, modernization, democracy, capitalism, and multinational corporations. The United States with its long-standing tradition of distrust of government has meant that tracking "suspicious" individuals is difficult, even in the wake of the attacks of September 11. There is no national ID card, and while social security numbers have been used in that capacity, Americans are not typically required to present their social security card. National government agencies are limited by law in their ability to exchange information among themselves. Literally, the right hand does not know what the left hand is doing much of the time, and it is often difficult for the right hand to fi nd out what the left is doing. The CIA and the FBI as the most important national investigatory agencies (Homeland Security could perhaps now be added) lack any institutional base for working together. Even when there are closer links between domestic and foreign operations, there can be similar problems. In the United Kingdom the Security Service (MI5) deals with domestic threats while the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) (think "M" and James Bond) undertakes foreign operations. The two agencies may disagree and have different agendas. In addition, in the United States the American system of federalism limits the effective responses that can be undertaken in some cases. A handful of national agencies, the state police of the fi fty states, and countless thousands of local police forces must cooperate, a process that can be difficult at best and tremendously inefficient at worst.

The United States as the only superpower becomes a more appealing target for some terrorists. Attacking the only surviving superpower in the world is a means of demonstrating the potential of the dissident organization and its abilities. The threat to target audiences is greater as a consequence. The United States is involved in political situations throughout the world. Terrorist organizations will attack because of US foreign policy decisions. Anti-American terrorism has been higher in countries where US military support has been greater (Neumayer and Plumper 2011 : 4). In some regions the antagonism towards the United States as the symbol of the West is so high that any US activity is seen as having some malignant purpose (Mousseau 2002 /3: 23).

What terrorists believe the United States is doing is very important, and mistaken beliefs are not easily changed even when there are modifications in US policy (Pillar 2001 : 67). In other cases, whatever the United States does or does not do can make it a target. Not all decisions of the US government in any given time period are always the best, but even decisions to undertake an action that is appropriate or decisions to stay uninvolved that are wise can generate adverse reactions by a dissident group. Groups supporting a side that the United States fails to aid may target US interests, even if the United States does nothing to help the opposing side. The question as to whether the US government made the right decision is, of course, tremendously important, but equally important is the view of dissident groups abroad. If they disagree with US actions, for good reasons or bad, they can choose to launch attacks against the country.

SUMMARY

Clearly the strategy, tactics, targets, and weapons available to terrorists can vary. Sophisticated weaponry is not essential to begin a struggle, even if it would be of great value. The range of potential targets is very great. The resources of the terrorist organization and existing security measures will often influence the choice (C. Drake 1998 : 54). Ultimately, "terrorists always have the advantage. They can attack anything, anywhere, at any time. We cannot possibly protect everything all of the time" (B. Jenkins 2001: 323). Terrorist groups operate in a target rich environment. Groups look for vulnerabilities and opportunities—they are not always looking for a chance to make spectacular attacks (Pillar 2010 : 11). If the weapons available are limited, if the planning is poor, or if the security and intelligence forces are on their toes, the initial attempts will fail and the organizations will be crushed. If the attacks succeed, then the organization may grow in strength, gaining additional funds and adherents to strike again. Many more terrorist efforts fail than succeed, for terrorism is a weapon of the weak. A campaign of terrorism will not often change the balance of power between the government and the challengers. Some groups have been successful in bringing about changes, while others ultimately failed when the state opted for repression rather than compromise. A terrorist group that has some initial successes will have more scope to make choices in its activities. The choice of targets will have to continue to be non-random if the group is going to continue to be successful. Choices about weapons, strategies, techniques, and targets will become important in these contexts. Poor choices could result in the organization losing its momentum and eventually failing, even after a promising start.

TERMS

anthrax

attrition strategy

Osama bin Laden

Chechnya

dirty bomb

François Duvalier

intimidation strategy

Lord Mountbatten

outbidding strategy

provocation strategy

ricin

sarin

spoiling strategy

weapons of mass destruction

weapons of mass disruption

FURTHER READING

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CHAPTER 4

The dynamics of dissent

A theoretical perspective

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

> Our war on terror begins with al-Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated.
>
> President George W. Bush (2002)[1]

> We are in strong and brutal battle, between us and the Jews, with Israel being the spearhead, and its backers among the Zionists and the Crusaders. So we have not hesitated to kill the Jews who conquered the sanctuary of the Prophet (Jerusalem, the third holiest shrine of Islam). And those who kill our children, women, and brothers day after day, and whoever stands in the aggressor's ranks, has only himself to blame.
>
> Osama bin Laden[2]

The puzzle of the "root causes"

The search for the root causes of terrorism has been both controversial and confusing. It is controversial because some argue that given the reprehensible nature of the acts, where terrorists target non-combatants including innocent men, women and children, there is no need to understand the causes that led them to commit these heinous crimes. In fact, the critics fear that any attempt at understanding the root causes may lead to sympathy for the perpetrators. For instance, in June 2005, the presidential advisor Karl Rove criticized the liberals for trying to "understand" the reasons for the 9/11 attacks.[3] In fact, Rove's argument is typical of regime supporters facing threats of terrorism all over the world. This view, however, does not have much credence in the academic community since the steps separating understanding, sympathizing, and advocating are well marked.

The confusion over the search for the root causes arises because none of the usual suspects, such as poverty, religious devotion, or lack of political opportunities, seem to explain fully the outbursts of terrorism. When such hypotheses are tested empirically, they almost always produce weak correlations. On 11 March 2004 a series of bombs exploded in and around the central train station Atocha in the heart of Madrid, which took the lives of nearly 200 commuters during a busy rush hour. On the first anniversary of this 3/11 attack, 65 of the best-known scholars and terrorism experts in the world were assembled in Madrid. Their combined effort was published in a book. Reflecting the collective frustration of this august gathering Louise Richardson was frank in her assessment:

> the search for the underlying accuses of terrorism is a complicated endeavor. The difficulty of the task must serve as an inducement to sustained and rigorous research on the subject—not as an invitation to throw in the towel and deal simply with the symptoms that present themselves.[4]

Poverty

To most of us, the link between poverty and terrorism (or more broadly, sociopolitical violence) seems almost self-evident. Beginning with Aristotle, poverty has been the prime suspect in fomenting political violence for at least two thousand years of recorded scholarship. Yet Krueger and Maleckova, in a thorough study, examined the issue with a great deal of precision and found little correlation between poverty and terrorism.[5] The problem of establishing a correlation between poverty and political violence, however, is that it is not very clear how we should define poverty. Does poverty mean individual poverty, where the poor being tired of not having its fair share of the national wealth starts a violent rebellion? In that case, information on those who take part in violent movements—gleaned from police reports or face-to-face interviews—should clearly demonstrate that the ranks of the revolutionaries are filled by frustrated men and women mired in economic destitution. In psychological terms this is known as "egotistical deprivation." Much of the information for these studies is gathered from direct interviews of the participants in terrorist activities[6] or from other secondary sources, such as arrest reports.[7] Empirical evidence, however, does not establish the case that those who take part in terrorism are from the poorest segments of the community. In 2002 the Pew Research Center conducted a survey of public opinion in the Muslim world.[8] From this survey, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita correlated the following question:

> Some people think that suicide bombing and other forms of violence against civilian targets are justified in order to defend Islam from its enemies. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that this kind of violence is often justified to defend Islam, sometimes justified, rarely justified, or never justified?[9]

By using the answer to this question to the various economic, demographic, and political indicators, Bueno de Mesquita found that a person's perception of the economy (either from personal standpoint or in the aggregate) "is essentially uncorrelated with his or her support for terrorism."[10]

The accumulated information from this and other empirical works is fairly clear. Most of the studies of individual (or egotistical) deprivation find the counter-intuitive result: those from the poorest segments of the population do not typically fill the ranks of the violent revolutionaries. Rather it is the scions of the middle- and upper-middle-class families who get disproportionately involved in politically motivated violence. The profiles of the most recent attackers, the participants of the 9/11 attacks, the London underground train bombing (the "7/7 attacks"), along with the involvement of the

doctors in the failed plot to bomb various targets in the UK, provide strong anecdotal examples of the involvement of the middle class as opposed to the poor in acts of terrorism.

We can also attempt to establish a correlation between poverty and terrorism by measuring poverty with aggregate data within nations. Thus, we can hypothesize that the nations with the highest percentage of people under the official poverty line would produce the most deaths and injuries from terrorism. I have plotted the log of fatalities and injuries from terrorism in the vertical axis and the percentage of people under poverty from 110 countries (Figure 4.1). As can be seen from this diagram, the plot does not show a strong pattern. A simple statistical test also corroborates this observation.[11]

We may also define poverty as a national phenomenon, where poorer countries with low per capita GDP are expected to produce more terrorism. A large number of empirical studies have examined this hypothesis and have generally found a weak correlation between the two.[12] Figure 4.2 plots the casualties of terrorism against per capita GDP, and once again, as can be clearly seen, the correlation between the two is weak.[13]

Another group of studies focuses on "fraternal deprivation" or deprivation felt by



Figure 4.1 Plot of national poverty rates, and deaths and injuries from terrorism (2002–2007).

Source: MIPT database and CIA *World Fact Book*.

individuals as members of a group.[14] This is a situation where individual actors might feel that while they may not have personally experienced discrimination, poverty, or humiliation, their intense sense of deprivation is the product of a shared concept felt by an entire community. For instance, the plight of the Palestinians in Israel has spawned frustration and anger in the Muslim communities throughout the world and has prompted many to take up their cause even when they themselves have not faced poverty or other forms of economic deprivation.[15] A number of studies have found close links between this aspect of deprivation and terrorism and political violence.16

In sum, despite the age-old suspicion linking poverty to political violence, empirical evidence draws a much more complex picture.

Lack of democratic freedom

Immediately after the devastating attacks of 9/11 the following question was on everybody's mind: why do these people hate us more than they love their own lives? The quick response that came from President Bush, which resonated well with the grieving US public, was that "they hate us for our freedom." These terrorists are from freedom-deprived nations and our ability to choose our own destiny has somehow



Figure 4.2 Plot of GDP per capita and deaths and injuries from terrorism (2002–2007).

Source: MIPT database and CIA *World Fact Book*.

evoked a deep sense of envy among these people. Unfortunately, this line of reasoning allowed the Bush administration to embrace the cause of spreading democracy around the world with the zeal of a religious crusader.17 Democracy was seen as the perfect antidote for the citizens of the despotic nations. The result of this unquestioned understanding of the root causes of terrorism saw the invasion of Iraq. The transplanted seeds of democracy in the deserts of Iraq were going to sprout and eventually cover the entire Arab/Muslim world, making us safe from terrorism for ever.

Alas, like all other supposed causes of terrorism, this too failed us. The democracies of Great Britain and Spain not only suffered the devastating effects of terrorism, but what shocked many the most was that the perpetrators, unlike the ones who took part in the 9/11 attacks, were not foreigners, but homegrown. Even a number of US citizens were found to have strong links with the al-Qaeda abroad. Although it is a matter of folk wisdom that democracies don't go to war against each other, no such assertion can be made about terrorism. Even if we forget the anarchists, the new left groups in the 1970s, the recent experiences of India, Israel, and Sri Lanka, and the partially democratic nations of Russia, Pakistan, and many others around the world should dispel any myth about democracy as an antidote to terrorism. In fact, based on Pew Research Center's survey data, Bueno de Mesquita found that "attitudes toward democracy as a system of governance for the respondent's home country, and support for terrorism are close to uncorrelated."[18] For a clear demonstration of this overall lack of correlation, I have plotted terrorism data against index of democracy and, once again, as we can clearly see, there is no discernable pattern between the two (Figure 4.3). A statistical test demonstrates the apparent lack of correlation.[19]

What about the hypothesis that democratic nations are the primary targets of the terrorists? Pape[20] has generated controversy by claiming that the democracies are the primary targets of suicide bombing.[21] Although democracy is not a binary concept and nations fall on a continuum of democratic values, many countries with questionable democratic roots are the biggest targets of suicide attacks. These countries would include Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iraq, Morocco, and Russia. Despite having very low democratic values and institutions, these countries have suffered enormously from suicide terror.

Geography

Does geography influence the course of an insurgency? Fearon and Laitin argue that civil wars are not explained very well by the levels of grievances, such as income inequality, poverty, or discrimination in the society.[22] Nor is the lack of democratic freedom or the extent of ethnic or religious differences or any other form of "clash of



Figure 4.3 Democracy and deaths and injuries from terrorism.

Source: MIPT database and *The Economist*, Democracy Index (2007).

civilizations" an excellent predictor of civil wars, insurgencies or protracted low-intensity warfare. Rather, they demonstrated that these events are best explained by a number of physical attributes such as bad roads and rough terrains. Civil wars are also prevalent in weak nations, without a strong military or bureaucratic infrastructure.

The findings of Fearon and Laitin suggest that the armies of the poor nations with crumbling or non-existent infrastructure offer a weak presence.[23] Furthermore, since the population is not dependent on the government for livelihood it has low opportunity costs for joining the forces of violent opposition, who might provide them with not only security, but also with all the rudimentary public goods that all of us grow accustomed to expect from our governments. From their research we can deduce an interesting conclusion: while insurgency, guerrilla warfare, and civil war, where at least some form of an assembled rebel force collectively challenge the government, are the products of rural, mountainous nations with poor infrastructure, terrorism, whereby a small group of non-state actors carry out attacks against noncombatants, is the more prevalent in the relatively wealthy urbanized nations.

State failure

One of the most dreaded events in a nation's history takes place when the power of the

central government weakens or becomes close to non-existent. The hallmark of an organized society is that the state carries the monopoly of the right to use power.[24] In the face of a prolonged armed conflict, many countries around the world become "a mere geographic expression, a black hole into which a failed polity has landed."[25] Countries like Lebanon during its civil war, and Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq are prime examples of failed states, at the time of writing this book.[26]

Although the term "state failure" may imply that an entire country has descended into anarchy, it also may happen that an otherwise functioning state with ample central control will contain parts that are lawless. For instance, the "wild west" of the Western Frontier Provinces has only nominally been part of the political structure of Pakistan since her independence. Even the much-vaunted Pakistani army, much less the police and civilian bureaucrats, dare not venture into these areas. O'Donnell calls these the "brown areas" of state control.[27]

Napoleoni aptly describes the failed states and the "brown areas" as follows:

> They are ravaged by internal flights, torn apart by savage conflicts between communities (as has happened in Kosovo); their borders are uncontrolled and undefined; the ruling power (either warlords or dictators, such as Mobutu, or the



Figure 4.4 Plot of state failure and terrorism.

Source: MIPT database (2002–2007) and State Failure Index, *Foreign Policy* (2006).

Note: the higher the index, the greater is the extent of state failure.

ruling political elite, such as the Taliban) prey on their own citizens; corruption is endemic; per capita as well as regional GDP is falling rapidly; violence and crime are rife and uncontrollable. Anarchy is the norm.[28]

In a failed state or in a "brown area," the calculation of costs and benefits of terrorist organizations goes through a radical shift. Since the government is unable to enforce the law, terrorists and all other organizations that operate outside the legal structure carry on their activities with impunity; the costs of participating in illegal activities plummet and all kinds of nefarious activities, including terrorism, flourish. In 2006, the journal *Foreign Policy* developed a cross-national index of state failure, based on 12 factors of governmental control. [29] As we can see, Figure 4.4 shows a clear positive relationship between the extent of state failure and terrorism. The regression results also corroborate this strong relationship.[30]

Solving the puzzle

o, now we are back to square one in our quest for the root causes of terrorism. If it is not poverty or lack of democracy, then what are the causes of terrorism? Surely, physical geography is a facilitating factor for insurgency, but it cannot be seen as the root cause. Moreover, rough terrain and broken-down infrastructure may promote civil wars, but they are not causally linked with terrorism.

The reason the measures of economic deprivation—relative or absolute, egotistical or aggregate national—do not show a strong correlation with the occurrence of political violence is because of the presence of the so-called "collective action" problem.[31] That is, just because an individual feels deprived does not mean that a rational actor will automatically join a dissident movement. In fact, I argue that the factors of deprivation only provide the necessary condition for mass violence. For *sufficient condition,* we need to look at the role that political entrepreneurs play in framing the issues to produce a strong enough collective identity. The strength of collective identity, which clearly identifies the "in" and the "out" groups—the "community" and its "enemies"—prompts people to take part in violent actions in the name of their group. In other words, it is not enough for an individual to turn to terrorism because of the frustration resulting from his own economic condition until he is certain that his misery is caused by the machinations of a well-defined group whom he identifies as his enemies. Unlike an individual's self-identity, collective identity is not stable. It is contextual and multiple. The political entrepreneurs bring about violent collective actions by "connecting the dots" for their followers by creating a consistent story by borrowing from religion, history, and mythologies. When this story resonates with a large number of people, they adopt such a collective identity and a mass movement is born.

There are numerous examples of abject poverty and deprivation that did not bring out violent political movements. For instance, Gupta argues[32] that the achievement gap between the Euro-Americans and the African- Americans remains as wide as in the days when Martin Luther King Jr. was marching, the major metropolitan cities were ablaze with widespread race riots, and black radicalism was rampant among groups, such as the Black Panther[33] and the Symbionese Liberation Army.[34] Yet, after the assassination of King, Malcolm X, and other radical leaders, and the dismemberment of the SLA and Black Panther movement, black political movements, both peaceful and violent, came to an end. The Los Angeles riot of 1992 was a disorganized, free-for-all expression of anomic frustration rather than a cohesive action against a racist society.35 Even the Nation of Islam, under the firebrand leadership of Louis Farrakhan, eschewed all kinds of violent collective actions. In October 1995, when a large number of African-American men assembled for the Million Man March in Washington D.C., Farrakhan urged them to take personal responsibility in the face of a long litany of economic grievances. The need for collective action, radical or otherwise, was simply forgotten. To be sure, there have been small regional issue-oriented protests against racism, often led by Rev. Al Sharpton or Jesse Jackson, but they have been episodic and did not produce any nation-wide movement.

The absence of radical political movements is the result of not having a strong enough collective identity within the African-American community after the passage of the Civil Rights legislation and the abolition of signs of overt discrimination. In the absence of the water cannons, police dogs, and club-wielding white county sheriffs, the community saw a slow dilution of the notion of both "us" and "them" factors of collective identity.

There is no doubt that the African-American community has a distinct identity or a separate worldview. The nature of the chasm in perception was laid bare during the trial of O.J. Simpson.[36] Similar to the divergent worldviews that came out in the Simpson trial, there is also a gap in the black voting pattern. By all measures, the vast majority of the community (often over 90 percent) vote in favor of the Democratic Party.

Yet, there are a number of factors that have contributed to a weak collective identity for the African-American community. Throughout history the most potent generator of conflict has been claims over territory. Few images produce a strong bond of collective identity than the idea of a motherland of a fatherland. Even when a group, such as the Jews in their Diaspora, did not have a territory, they shared the notion of entitlement based on the biblical promise to the land of Israel. In contrast, being brought in as slaves in an immigrant nation, the African-Americans did not have a specific territory they could claim as their homeland. Second, during the Jim Crow era, particularly in the South, the African-Americans were compelled to live in segregated communities regardless of income or social status. After the passage of the Civil Rights legislation,

the middle and upper middle class left the poor in the urban ghettos or in abject rural poverty for the suburbs. Therefore, an examination of income distribution of the community shows a U-shaped distribution, where most of the African-Americans are either in the bottom quintile or in the top.[37] These factors have contributed to a physical as well as psychological separation between the leaders and the followers in the community.

A similar picture emerges when we consider the image of the "enemy" or the "out-group" for the African-Americans. In the pre-Civil Rights legislation days, the binary world was painted with broad strokes of black and white. The mid-1960s also saw a huge increase in non-European migration. Today, the African-Americans are another minority group within a multicultural, multilingual, multihued society. In the center-cities of urban America, even those who claim African heritage are divided along myriad national, ethnic, and tribal lines. The Somalis, the Ethiopians, the Haitians, the Jamaicans, compete with the descendants of those who came mostly from West Africa on slave boats. The national debate over the "blackness" of the Presidential candidate Barack Obama is symptomatic of this complex maze of identity in the African-American community. Furthermore, with the disappearance of overt signs of racism, as many surveys have revealed the gradual recession of "racial discrimination" from the list of complaints of the black community, especially among the young.[38] Also, in a society which is firmly established on the bedrock notion of extreme individualism, the perception of a strong collective identity finds a very difficult footing. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Martin Luther King Jr. never promoted the image of a racial enemy. By framing his struggle against injustice, King took away the sharp edge of a dissident movement that is prevalent among most other parts of the world out of the racial politics in America.

On the other side of the world, there is another important puzzle. Very few groups, if any, have suffered as much in the hands of a larger society as the so-called "untouchable" castes in India. The humiliation and a total degradation that the society imposed on the hapless people remain unparalleled in human history. Yet, as we will see in the following chapter, until the Maoists gave them leadership and fomented a violent insurgency, in the long history of the Indian subcontinent such movements are conspicuous by their near total absence.

As I mentioned above, the answer to the puzzle appears to be simple. All of the factors of actual grievances provide the necessary condition for collective actions of all sorts, including terrorism. For *sufficient condition, we must look for the formation of a strong enough collective identity, which is formed through the framing of a grievance by political entrepreneurs by expressing them in the context of religion, nationalism or economic class.* The rise of political entrepreneurs remains largely a matter of historical chance; the

random occurrence of charismatic leaders with organizational capabilities who can channel the frustration and anger felt by an entire community into sustained collective actions.

Although nobody can predict the rise of a charismatic leader, it is clear that when there is an intense feeling of grievances, the chances of someone utilizing the widespread feeling and frustration increases.[39] Moreover, once these leaders emerge, their basis for constructing collective identity—religious, nationalistic, or economic class—depends on the existing sociopolitical environment. Thus, in an Islamic society, the strong sense of *Ummah* or community, defined by religion, provides a ready launching pad. In contrast, where there has been a strong tradition of political activism based on the language of economic class struggle, Communist movements will flourish. And, where the historic grievance is against another ethno-linguistic group, aspirations of nationalism are likely to sprout.

Along with the work of political entrepreneurs, there is another important aspect of the formation of collective identity, which is most often ignored in social sciences. This involves the role played by literature, music, and art in defining the in- and the out-groups. Every organized government, long before the invention of writing, has engaged in building monuments and sculptures to establish the symbolic identity of a nation. A king's crown is much more than an article of formal wear, it is the embodiment of an entire nation. Every nation today has a national anthem, whose regular singing instantly evokes pride among the audience by promoting the idea of a single community united in its purpose. Similarly, every social movement is shaped by the symbols it uses, the songs that are sung, the poems and the novels that are written, and plays that are staged. It is indeed impossible to quantify the impact of songs such as "we shall overcome someday" on the hearts and minds of those who took part in the acts of civil disobedience against an unfair society. Yet, any examination of people's collective choice will reveal the importance of the symbolic contributions of art and literature to the formation of a dissident movement.

Contagion of ideas

Since these identities, in the final analysis, are "imagined," the contagion of ideas plays a huge role in creating "waves" of terrorism and violence across the world. The local grievances are accentuated when they are linked to a larger global movement. This is the effect of contagion. In David Rapoport's (2006) terminology—discussed in the previous chapter—the global contagion of ideas is called the "waves." The ills of early industrialization produced the anarchists. Through disjointed individual acts, they hoped to change the world. The emerging media covered their acts and provided the

much-need publicity which the former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher called the "oxygen of the terrorists." The anarchists did manage to shake up the world, until the end of World War I, which saw the beginning of nationalistic aspirations in reaction to the exploitative colonial system. When this second wave died down with the granting of independence to the colonies in the 1950s, a new wave started where the anarchists left off. The emergence of the Soviet Union as a Super Power and China as a source of ideological stewardship provided the leadership and the resources to begin uprisings led by organized Communist parties. The US involvement in the Vietnam War added fuel to the fire by creating a vast cadre of activists and sympathizers for the third wave of global terrorism. As this wave subsided in the late 1970s and early 1980s, a fourth wave of international terrorism started mostly around the ideals of Islamic fundamentalism. The inability to find a solution to the Palestinian problem has been a source of deep frustration in the Arab/Islamic world. For the past half a century nearly every action from military invasion to terrorism had produced few tangible results for the Palestinians. In the Arab eyes, the West and the US, in particular, had increasingly shed their status as "honest brokers" and moved ever closer to the interest of the Jewish state. To some, the only possible redeemers to this continuing humiliation came in the shape of a defiant Saddam Hussain and, later, in Osama bin Laden. The quick capitulation of Saddam Hussain and his much feared Republican Guards in the two Gulf Wars and the rapid destruction of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan only added to the collective frustration and anger in the Arab/Muslim world. In a series of instructive reports, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP, 2002) painted a picture of a region increasingly failing to keep pace with the economically dynamic South and Southeast Asian nations.[40] Together, in a vast region of Islamic community the series of setbacks created a psychological miasma, from which the ideology of al-Qaeda provided an alternative to some. Thus, the present jihadi movement, representing a concoction of liberation theology, socioeconomic aspirations, and a search for identity in a rapidly changing world, was able to spread rapidly throughout the world as the fourth wave of international terrorism.

Finally, why do we find a strong correlation between state failure and terrorism? Every action is an outcome of motivation and opportunity. The relationship between terrorism and state failure is less of a motivational link and, instead, addresses the issue of opportunity. An organized government's central control and political legitimacy depend on its ability to deliver public goods, such as security, law and order, and physical infrastructure. However, when the central government gets weak a power vacuum is created, which is quickly filled by various extra-legal groups. They provide all the public goods that people in these areas need. For instance, a Brooking Institution report (2007) points out that the Hizbullah's "power resources stems not only from its demonstrated military capabilities to be able to withstand an all-out attack by the

Israeli Defense Force, but also from its ability to generate social capital and political legitimacy through their ability to deliver essential services to the devastated areas." Similarly, the Taliban came forward with its Pakistani-supported organizational hierarchy, which was able to provide a modicum of law and order in the war that ravaged Afghanistan in the late 1980s, which gave it a good deal of political legitimacy among a large segment of the war-weary population.

Furthermore, an organized government is characterized by its monopoly of imposing sanctions. If that monopoly is compromised, the ranks of the terrorists are going to be filled with those who otherwise might have been fence sitters. Among them, a significant portion may be called captive participants. Popkin (1979), in his much-cited work, clearly demonstrated the coercive impact of the Viet Cong on the decision-making process of the South Vietnamese peasants to join the forces of the North. Every group attempts to maintain its monopoly over its own territories. As a result, groups such as the LTTE, al-Qaeda, and IRA engage in killing and maiming members of their own community through a systematic process of intimidation. Through such activities, they recruit activists, whose only motivation for joining is the fear of retribution. In sum, any violent movement will comprise the true believers, the mercenaries, and the captive participants.

Birth of a movement

While studying the history we must recognize that no mass movement can be studied as a single event. If we look into the evolution of any movement, we will find its links to a distant past, which will link to an even more remote precedent. Thus, we may study the American Revolution, yet this epochal set of events was simply a culmination of other rebellions, such as the Sons of Liberty, which mobilized the shopkeepers in Boston in 1765 to protest against the Stamp Act.[41] By tracing its history we can go back to the Franco-British rivalry in Europe till the path is lost in the dim antiquity of unrecorded history. Therefore, any narration of the history of a mass movement must start from an arbitrary cut-off date.

A quick look around the world will show that among the multitude of minority groups included in Gurr's Minorities at Risk, only a handful take up arms in the name of their community to redress current or past injustices. Whatever the immediate cause that triggers an upheaval is, it is incumbent upon a political leader(s) to take the historic grievances and give them a political character through framing of the issues in a way that resonates with a sufficient number of people within the defined community. The political entrepreneurs, by attracting a core group of followers, establish an organizational structure. When there is a huge asymmetry of power a dissident

movement adopts terrorist strategies and carries out propaganda by deed to attract others from a larger base of sympathizers and free riders. I have presented the process by which a movement is born (see Figure 4.5).[42] Any current movement—except perhaps some idiosyncratic millenarian groups, such as the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo and the East African Lord's Resistance Army—can trace its roots to the history of past struggles and the rise of a charismatic leader. Thus, the current Maoist movement in India has its beginning in the failed movement of the 1970s, which, in turn, carried the remnants of the uprisings in the 1950s, and these to an endless series of peasant rebellions during the British colonial rule.[43] The same is true for the present-day Islamic movement and the rebellion by the Irish Catholics against their Protestant adversaries.

The group and the base

The birth of a movement is characterized by the formation of a dissident group by a small band of ideologically motivated men and women. The reason behind a strong ideological bond among the initial members is because they need to go against an established order, often taking enormous risks to their person. Furthermore, since the



Figure 4.5 Root causes of collective action.

nascent group is weak, it cannot offer its members special privileges or any other kind of special reward. In order to be viable, the group almost immediately develops a hierarchical structure with a charismatic leader at the helm. Since a dissident movement is created around a set of historical grievances, a larger base of sympathizers usually supports its core membership. These are the free riders, who share the group's core beliefs and feel that their entire community would benefit if the group is able to achieve its political goals. Yet, because of a number of "selfish" reasons they refuse to take activists' roles. Most often this support base is surrounded by an even larger group, which, typically, does not share the ideological orientation nor is it included within the perimeters of the dissident group's perceived "in-group." As a result, the larger society is either apathetic or hostile to the group's political aims (see Figure 4.6).

Al-Qaeda was established in the 1980s and, after the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Afghan war, transformed itself into a fighting force against the Saudi royal family and then against their principal benefactor, the US. The innovation of the idea of the near enemy (the "apostate" regimes of the Islamic nations) and the far enemy (the US and the West) was based on a long struggle, which goes back to the establishment of the young religion and its quick expansion, which brought it directly into confrontation with the established Christian Europe. Yet, al-Qaeda could bring only a fraction of the world Muslim community to its core.[44] The image of the pious bin Laden has enlarged its support base far and wide, yet many in the Arab/Islamic world still remain either apathetic to his message or are hostile to it. Therefore, public support is absolutely essential in the politics of terrorism. Without public support a dissident organization cannot recruit volunteers, raise money, operate safe houses, or avoid infiltration and



Figure 4.6 The group and the base.

destruction by the target government.[45]

The mixed motives of individuals and groups

Reliability of cross-group data on various dissident groups is always open to criticism. Yet, a researcher often needs to work with imperfect information. By using such a data set, collected by the Israeli group ICT, in Table 4.1 we can clearly see that most terrorist groups engage in only a few types of violent activities; they seem to specialize in no more than three activities.[46] As can be seen, nearly all of these ten groups shown in the table are highly specialized in their activities. This table presents a thumbnail portrait of these groups indicating the clustered nature of activities of the terrorist groups. Each cell of the table indicates the percentage of each activity for the groups. The last row presents the sum of the three most prevalent acts of violence as a percentage of each group's total activities. From this list we can easily discern the concentrated nature of the various groups. Thus, for instance, the Basque Homeland and Freedom Party (ETA) and the IRA's activities are primarily concentrated on bombings, car bombings, and shootings (96 percent and 94 percent of their total activities). The Peruvian group Sendero Luminoso (the Shining Path) prefers car bombing, shooting, and hostage taking (90 percent). The Islamic rebel group of the Philippines, the Abu Sayyaf group, and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), on the other hand, specialize in kidnapping and hostage taking. They comprise 91 percent and 82 percent of their respective activities. Similarly, only a handful of the world's terrorist organizations engage in suicide bombings. Of the 52 major groups listed by the ICT, only nine engage in suicide bombings. Of them, the ones that are active in the Middle East (eight out of nine) have committed 89 percent of all suicide bombings during the 12-year study period. From this table, it is apparent that Hamas and the PIJ follow the path of violence by choosing to concentrate on suicide bombings, shootings, and knife attacks. Thus, we can clearly see that violent opposition groups do not choose their weapons of terror in a random fashion but are guided by their internal organizational logic. It is also interesting to note that among the major groups listed in table 4.1, only the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) comes close to offering a full slate of terrorist activities. Their top three activities comprise a relatively low 62.1 percent of their total activities.

Since all of these groups appear to be highly specialized as parts of a deliberate strategy, the question arises, what does their choice of activities say about the motivations of these groups? I have discussed in the previous chapter that although we can never demonstrate a group's motivation, by following Samuelson I can assume that their choice reveals their preference and motivation.[47] In order to find out how these various activities are associated with each other, I ran a Factor Analysis. I have arranged the components according to their highest factor loading in the five categories and

Table 4.1 Comparison of profiles of ten terrorist groups (1980–2002) (percent of total activities).

Activities	*Hamas*	*Abu Sayyaf Group*	*al-Qaeda*	*Basque Homeland and Freedom (ETA)*	*Rev. Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)*	*Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE)*	*Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)*	*Irish Republican Army (IRA)*	*Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)*	*Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path)*
Bombing	6.1	**27.3**	**13.3**	**37.3**	**7.9**	**20.7**	9.3	**25.0**	**27.6**	5.0
Car bomb	4,3	0	**33.3**	**35.3**	**5.3**	10.3	18.5	**37.5**	0	**45.0**
Hand grenade	2.6	0	6.7	2.0	0	0	1.9	0	3.4	0
Highjacking	0	0	6.7	0	2.6	0	0	0	3.4	0
Hostage taking	0	**18.2**	0	0	7.9	0	0	0	0	5.0
Incendiary devices	0	9.1	0	0	0	0	0	0	10.3	0
Kidnapping	5.2	**45.5**	0	0	**65.8**	6.9	1.9	0	**20.7**	**10.0**
Knife attack	**7.8**	0	0	0	0	3.4	**1.9**	0	0	0
Letter bomb	0	0	0	2.0	0	0	1.9	0	0	0
Mortar attack	0	0	0	0	5.3	3.4	0	6.2	0	0
Rocket attack	0	0	6.7	0	2.6	3.4	0	0	0	0
Shooting	**37.4**	0	6.7	**23.5**	2.6	**10.3**	**27.8**	**31.5**	**13.8**	**35.0**
Suicide bombing	**34.8**	0	**26.7**	0	0	**41.4**	**35.2**	0	13.8	0
Vandalism	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3.4	0
Arson	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	3.4	0
Chemical attack	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Stoning	0	0	0	0	0	0	1.9	0	0	0
Vehicle attack	1.7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Lynching	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Total	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Top three activities as a percent of the total	**83.6**	**91.0**	**73.3**	**95.6**	**81.6**	**72.4**	**82.0**	**94.0**	**62.1**	**90.0**

Activities of terrorist organizations, 1980–2002. Originally published in Bjorgo (2005).

Source: www.ict.org.il/.

have presented them in Table 4.2. This table further bolsters the argument that dissident groups do not choose their activities randomly, but do so with careful consideration; they pick those which are closest to their ideology, expertise, opportunity, and the general modus operandi. Let us look at the logic of association of violent activities as identified by Factor Analysis. We may have a deeper understanding of the categories by focussing on the activities that load the highest within each category. Thus, suicide bombings define the first category and we can call it the ideological terrorists, since these are inspired by ideological fervor (Hamas), religious extremism (the PIJ and al-Qaeda), and personal charisma of a leader (the LTTE). I call them "ideological" because, apart from the technical know-how and complex logistics needed to carry out a successful suicide attack, the act needs supremely dedicated cadres who would be willing to give their lives for the cause. This is so rare in the world of violent conflict that only a handful of the groups can have a ready supply of suitable candidates. If we examine the other activities within this factor, we see that shootings and grenade attacks require being physically close to the target, which indicates the assumption of considerable personal risk by the attacker.

Table 4.2 Factor analysis of violent activities by selected terrorist groups (1991–2002)

Activities	*Component factors*				
	I Ideological terrorists	*II Professional terrorists*	*III Anomic terrorists*	*IV Hooligan terrorists*	*V Vigilante terrorists*
Suicide bombings	**.777**	−.228	.05	.322	.414
Shooting attacks	**.759**	.173	.338	.05	−.245
Grenade attacks	**.678**	.377	.302	.391	−.187
Bombing	.274	**.631**	−.444	.307	.313
Car bombings	.403	**.621**	−.590	−.112	.105
Letter bombings	.344	**.452**	−.698	−.021	.195
Mortar attacks	−.561	**.384**	.301	−.438	.191
Rocket attacks	−.495	**.364**	.292	−.362	.064
Vehicle attacks	−.301	−.012	**.938**	.055	.071
Kidnapping	−.357	−.06	**.898**	−.053	−.008
Hostage taking	−.631	.314	**.391**	.247	.110
Vandalism	−.331	−.005	.074	**.928**	.076
Arson attacks	−.331	.005	.074	**.928**	.076
Incendiary devices	−.387	−.05	.01	**.887**	−.003
Highjacking	−.659	.312	.252	**.344**	.105
Stoning	.267	−.299	.100	−.320	**.804**
Lynching	.134	−.630	−.100	.115	**.736**

Source: Originally published in Bjorgo (2005).

Note: Cumulative percentage of explained variance 89.0%.

In contrast, groups with specific professional skills carry out the second category of attacks. They include bombings and car bombings, which involve a number of specialized skills. Although seldom motivated by acts of religious zealotry, religion may be one of their principal reasons for conflict. These attacks are usually done with remote control devices, which accord the attackers time to escape. The IRA and the ETA fall into this category. Jessica Stern, having interviewed numerous members of terrorist organizations all over the world, notes:[48]

> Over time, however, militants have told me, terrorism can become a career as much as a passion. Leaders harness humiliation and anomie and turn them into weapons. Jihad becomes addictive, militants report, and with some individuals or groups—the "professional" terrorists—grievances can evolve into greed: for money, political power, status, or attention.

I, therefore, call these groups "professional" terrorists.

The third category of activities are promoted primarily by the groups who need to make a financial gain, such as FARC and the Abu Sayyaf Group. Their preferences for monetary gains are revealed through their preponderant emphasis on hostage taking and kidnapping. Their vehicle attacks are usually related to the attempts of taking hostages. Since the hostages are held for ransom, and usually for quite a large amount, we may conjecture that those taking part in these acts are motivated also by their personal pecuniary considerations. In other words, we may expect to find a larger proportion of what I call "mercenaries" among these groups. We may call them anomic terrorists, since they attempt to operate within an environment of anomie or lawlessness and thrive in failed states or in nations with weakened central control. Dissident organizations thus come with various forms of motivation. For the purpose of careful analysis and subsequent policy prescription, it simply does not stand to reason to paint all groups with a broad brush. We must understand the qualitative difference that separates the original al-Qaeda, founded by Osama bin Laden, from the likes of FARC and Abu Sayyaf.

Escalation and de-escalation

A dissident group becomes more powerful as its base gets strengthened. As shown in Figure 4.7, a group gets stronger when it gains popular support. As a group gains political legitimacy its core group increases in size taking new recruits from the pool of erstwhile free riders. I call them "easy riders" because in Olson's exposition[49] the free riders are those who would not take part in a collective action. The term implies a cut-and-dried absolute categorization.[50] However, as Horgan and others have shown, participation is a seamless process, where someone might take part in a terrorist action

and then not do anything in the name of the group.[51] Furthermore, participation can take numerous forms, from passing on a code word to providing a safe passage or a safe house to actually taking part in a violent action designed to kill or injure members of the enemy group. Through the process of escalation, those who did not pay much attention to the dissident group become increasingly attracted to its messages. As a result, a group gains strength and the forces of violent resistance increase.

When a group increases in size, importance, and power, it also develops the capability to recruit another group of activists, the captive participants. In every social movement, particularly those which espouse violence, there are activists who join out of fear of retribution or simple peer pressure. Among the IRA in Ireland, there are numerous examples of young men joining the group due to explicit threats.[52] Although there is no reliable information on how many join these groups out of fear, it is safe to conjecture that the proportion would depend on the strength of the group. Thus, the three types of participants form the core group: the true believers, the mercenaries, and the captive participants.

The opposite takes place when a group loses its political legitimacy and its core membership gets depleted through attrition, desertion, or arrest by the authorities. If the flow of new members is not enough to fill the void, the group starts losing ground. Dissident organizations fight for their political causes. Their choice of violence reflects their strategy to gain strength.



Figure 4.7 Escalation and de-escalation of violence.

Choice of strategy

When viewed from outside, a particular terrorist action may often seem foolhardy, since many attacks do not appear to have any military significance. For instance, the 9/11 attacks were of no consequence to the military imbalance between the wounded superpower and the Islamic radicals. In fact, these attacks virtually ensured a huge US armed response against al-Qaeda. With Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri on the run, the top echelon of al-Qaeda either killed or arrested, it is hard to imagine what instrumental rationality might have prompted the attacks against the US. As a result, there is often a pervasive assumption of irrationality on the part of the participants as well as the perpetrating terrorist groups.[53] Yet, a careful examination of the terrorist strategies reveals considerable planning and forethought.

By examining terrorist activities, we can divide them into two categories: those that are designed primarily as military actions and those which are symbolic actions, undertaken to produce a number of psychological, political, and, eventually, military results. Thus, those groups that are locked in a territorial struggle stage attacks including suicide missions to gain military advantage. Thus, Hopgood, having studied the use of the elite Black Tigers by the LTTE, saw their use usually for territorial gains.[54] Hopgood clearly states that "Black Tiger attacks aim primarily to win the war, not to spread error." Similarly, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of the al-Qaeda movement, is clear in his assertion of the efficacy of suicide attacks: "The method of martyrdom operation, [is] the most successful way of inflicting damage against the opponent and least costly to the Mujahidin in terms of casualty."[55]

In contrast, through its activities a group often attempts to send symbolic messages. In their insightful work Schmidt and de Graaf point out that to a terrorist group participation in a violent activity is a form of communication. [56] In the parlance of economics, this is known as "signaling." As they play out a macabre mix between violence and theater they send a message to a number of important adversary and client groups.[57] To the adversaries, it sends a message of threat, the shape of things to come, unless their demands are not met. Pape demonstrates the strategic use of suicide attacks against democracies by various terrorist organizations.[58] Through their acts of public cruelty terrorist groups also signal their commitment to the larger "cause." In their analysis of Hamas, Mishal and Sela argue that part of the motivation of the terrorist group was to provoke the Israelis into imposing draconian measures on the larger Palestinian community.[59] For instance, Bloom argues that Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have carefully chosen their strategies to coincide with the ebb and flow of the Palestinian public opinion.[60] When suicide attacks became unpopular they refrained from attacks. When opinion favored the Palestinian Authority to achieve a separate statehood through negotiations with the Israelis, the more radical groups

came to a hudna, or truce. Similarly, in the immediate aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, when the global public sympathy was clearly in favor of the US, there were no suicide attacks. Through these acts, the dissident groups aim at increasing their political legitimacy and solidifying their support base. Based on econometric analysis Gupta and Mundra showed that suicide attacks in Israel were also caused by inter-group rivalry among the various Palestinian dissident groups.[61] When a government responds with excessive force deemed by the target community, the perpetrating group only increases in stature.[62] Similar to a firm which tries to increase its market share thought advertisement, the various terrorist groups attempt to increase their popular support through acts of wanton violence.

The literature on the strategies of terrorism focusses on its impact on public opinion (both of the target society and the group's own community), the demonstration of the target government's lack of moral standing, inconsistency of application of force, and its offensive weakness in the face of the growing strength of the dissident group. Finally, the groups aim at discrediting the moderates who might be interested in coming to a negotiated settlement with the government.

A dissident group engages in strategic use of violence, which is reflected not only in its timing but also in the choice of activity. For instance, the use of stone-throwing children against the heavily armed Israeli army created worldwide sympathy for the Palestinians living under occupation.[63]

A dissident group may engage in violent activities to demonstrate weakness or inconsistencies of the target government. The ability of a group to expose government weakness increases when it has information on how it might react to the acts of provocation.[64] Empirical findings of Lichbach[65] and Moore[66] corroborate such behavior.

All types of governments are not equally equipped to respond to violence by non-state actors within its own borders the same way. Gupta *et al.* demonstrate that though non-democratic regimes are able to quell rebellions by using brutal force, the democracies are much more constrained in their response.[67] As a result, the democracies must rely on political accommodation rather than sheer repression in their response to violence.

Extremist groups often undertake acts of violence to spoil the middle ground of compromise. Kydd and Walter show that suicide attacks increased in frequency whenever the Israeli and Palestinian authorities were close to an agreement.[68] The Israeli government interpreted the campaigns of suicide attacks by Hamas and the Palestine Islamic Jihad as weakness (or even acquiescence) of the moderate Arafat regime to curb violence by the extremist groups.[69]

Finally, when do terrorist groups employ their biggest weapons, suicide attacks? The

smartest weapon in the arsenal of a group is its cadre of suicide attackers.[70] The defining characteristic of suicide attack is that the attackers know that the mission will not be considered a success unless they die in the process.[71] Therefore, as Elster points out, for a group to engage in suicide attacks, it must have volunteers for whom the motivation must shift from "reason" to the "cause."[72]

Evidence from around the world suggests that those groups that are imbedded in a community are typically inspired by nationalistic or irredentist sectarian aspirations, even when they profess religious or Marxist ideologies. These groups develop bases within the society and are much more sensitive to the cultural mores of the base. In contrast, those groups which are filled by the "outsiders," inspired by a millenarian vision, or are supported mostly by foreign countries, are less sensitive to the community's wishes. Similarly, groups that are criminally oriented tend to be less constrained by the community.

Transformation

Terrorist groups are not equal in their devotion to ideological goals. And, over time, some of these groups become more criminal in orientation than political. I distinguish between a terrorist group and a criminal organization by assuming that a terrorist group aims at achieving a set of public goods, the benefits of which will flow to all members of the community, regardless of participation. On the other hand, a criminal gang is motivated by the prospect of quasi-public good (or common pooled resources), the fruits of which are restricted only to the core members of the group.[73] These two goals are often incongruent and, despite the widespread belief to the contrary at the extreme ends of the ideological spectrum a clear division between the two is maintained. As we will see in Chapter 7, these two groups may occasionally develop some cooperative ventures, but they eye each other with unease and suspicion. As a result, their relationship becomes much more complex than is generally assumed.

Terrorism increasing and attenuating forces: the dynamics of terrorism

Terrorism and the strength of a movement follow the dynamic interactions between the state and the dissident group. Facing challenges from a dissident group the state reacts in a predictable way. Since much of what a violent protest group does falls outside the legal system of any organized society, the state portrays these as ordinary acts of criminal behavior. However, when the political nature of these acts becomes apparent, the authorities try a number of time-honored techniques of quelling the rebellion.

During the course of the life of a movement it goes through a number of peaks and

troughs when levels of violence escalate and when they subside. We can now develop a conceptual picture of this dynamic relationship by bringing together the accumulated knowledge of the vast literature. We can look at the dialectic relationship between a state and a dissident organization through the interaction between two broadly defined forces: terrorism increasing force (TIF) and terrorism attenuating force (TAF). Let us examine what would constitute these two forces.

In our everyday lives we allocate our available time to the pursuit of activities that promote self-interest as well as our group-interest. The forces that strengthen our collective identity or deepen our conviction that our selfish interests are best served by joining the forces of the opposition make the dissident movement stronger by attracting more activists. On the other hand, if people come to the opposite conclusion, the movement loses ground. Beside the calculations of benefits each rational actor faces a cost factor. If the cost of participation goes up, fewer people join the terrorist movement and vice versa. Beside these three factors of rational decision-making, there are a few facilitating factors. These factors help strengthen the TIF or, in their absence, make the TAF stronger. Let us examine the three factors that determine the escalation and demise of organized dissidence.

Strengthening of collective identity

The notion of "us" and "them" is predicated upon an essentially moral ideological perception, which pitches good against evil, religious against profane, rightful owners against invaders and interlopers. In the process the charismatic leaders frame the issues by defining the in-group and clearly singling out the enemies. The universal message from the leaders is that their community is under attack; without active and violent resistance ("the only language that the enemy understands") its future is doomed.

Rise of charismatic leaders

I have argued that the factors of economic political deprivation do not provide the sufficient causes for the development of systematic opposition to an organized government. For that we need a dissident organization, which can strategically shape the frustration that is widely felt in a community. And, for a successful organization to develop, we need the rise of a charismatic leader(s). This is the biggest unknowable in history, which ultimately makes any prediction of the rise of terrorism and mass movements problematic. Yet, if we examine the causes of the rise of the fundamentalist movement in Islam, we can see that Muslim grievance against the West has been

around at least since the breakdown of the Ottoman Caliphate in Turkey. However, it took a series of political entrepreneurs such as Hassan al-Banna, Sayyid Qutb, Abdul Azzam, Osama bin Laden, and Ayman al-Zawahiri to give it a shape through al-Qaeda by framing the existing grievances in the context of political Islam. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that Fair and Shepherd,[74] by using the Pew Research Center survey data, would find that the largest correlate of support for terrorism comes from those who perceive a threat to Islam.[75]

Overreaction by the government

From the earliest days of the Sicarii, the Jewish zealots who waged wars against the Roman occupiers,[76] to the current day's Islamic suicide attackers, terrorists have always laid a trap for the authorities to overreact and engage in such a manner that would clearly demonstrate their "true nature." Their inhumanity would enrage those who had preferred to sit on the fence and prompt them to take up an active role in the dissident organization. The opponents—often the forces of the target government—reinforce these sentiments through acts that further alienate and provoke the members of the support base. The memories of the atrocities are kept alive through songs, plays, and literature, and the political leadership use these as tools for mass mobilization: the pictures of the tortured and killed serve as the most potent recruiting tool for years to come. In the history of many mass movements, by simply visually inspecting the casualty figures, one can pinpoint the junctures of history when a movement came to life as a response to overreaction by the authorities.

Acts of political/religious provocation by the government

In the final analysis every dissident group lays its claim to moral high ground vis-à-vis the target government. They do it through resorting to religious justification, evoking the images of past glories, and/or demonstrating the immorality of the prevailing economic injustices. Through their strategic moves, the dissident groups attempt to bolster their moral claims. For every movement there are areas of symbolic importance. When the government transgresses these points, public sentiment is instantly inflamed. These arousals of public ire quickly get manifested in terms of higher levels of deaths and injuries.

Strengthening of self-interest

Self-interest rests at the heart of perceived political legitimacy of a government.

Through their actions, political authorities strive to engender belief among the citizens of the benefits of staying with the existing political system. However, when there are cracks in the political legitimacy of a regime, the forces that increase terrorism get a boost.

Demonstration of ability to provide public goods

Hearts and minds are not swayed solely by the prospect of ideological reward. Almost all successful dissident groups want to demonstrate their ability to provide material goods for the welfare of their community. The mythical story of Robin Hood exemplifies how a small group of outlaws could gain political legitimacy not only through the demonstration of moral superiority to the existing social structure, but also by distributing their booty to the non-participant population in and around Sherwood Forest. Hamas in the Palestine, Hizbullah in Lebanon, and the Naxalites in India have gained loyalty within their communities by providing public goods from healthcare to the rule of law.[77]

Costs

There are two aspect of costs of participation to an actor in anti-systemic violent actions. The first is the opportunity costs of time, and the second is physical costs imposed by the state in preventing terrorism.

Opportunity costs of participation

Opportunity cost is an economic concept which measures the amount of income that one must give up to engage in a time-consuming activity. To a prospective participant this is a very important consideration. That is why when an economy goes into a deep recession there is a greater propensity for political violence. For that reason, we find more young men and women joining mass movements. Yet to join the workforce on a full-time basis, and still be dependent on parents for room and board, the student population of the world has the lowest opportunity costs of participation.[78] For a similar reason, we find that those living in extreme poverty and eking out a meager existence cannot join dissident movement, since any time taken from their subsistence living would mean starvation. The high opportunity cost also prevents peasants, dependent on strict plant cycles, from joining dissident movements.[79] Although there is little systematic data in this area, a casual perusal of the biographies of the terrorists would reveal that a vast majority of them did not hold jobs in the formal sectors of the economy or were underemployed at the time of their participation.[80] Since it is

generally accepted that the activists in political violence are better educated than the rest of the population, their inability to find, or in some cases unwillingness to hold, formal employment commensurate to their educational achievement may signal a low level of opportunity cost for missing work.

Actual costs of participation: government coercion

In contrast to the opportunity cost, which is an indirect measure of forgone income, the actual costs of participation is the price one must pay for getting involved in an extralegal activity. These costs are exacted by the government and come in the shape of loss of income (fines) or liberty (prison time), pain (torture), and even life itself. It can also spill over to the actor's loved ones. For instance, the friends and family members can be targeted. In many cases they may lose their government jobs and, as is the case in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Israelis may destroy the family homes of those who take part in suicide attacks.

Under the standard economic model,[81] an increase in cost would lower the level of participation in the extra-legal activities. However, when it comes to ideological goods, such an assumption is sometime problematic. Thus Gurr argues for a quadratic relationship between government coercion and political violence. In other words, up to a certain threshold, which Gurr calls "high violence, high coercion," increase in government sanction only solidifies the opposition.[82] However, after the threshold is crossed and a set of draconian measures has been implemented, protest movements tend to decrease. A number of studies have empirically shown the existence of this quadratic relationship and have argued that while the democratic regimes, having to work within the limits of law and a biding constitution, are rarely able to cross the threshold of high coercion, the non-democratic nations can often impose such brutal retribution on the protesting dissidents.[83]

Facilitating factors

The factors of my expanded benefit–cost analysis, the ideological or group benefit, individual benefits, and the cost of participation are helped by two important facilitating factors: the presence of a network and the group's ability to raise money. Together they help a group of non-state actors to develop an organizational network and support their activities.

Network and organizational structure

Communication is at the heart of all organizations. The terrorist organizations are no exception to this rule. The way an organization communicates within itself [84] and to its clients through networks has been a subject of intense scrutiny by the theorists for nearly half a century.[85] Research into the process by which grass-root organizations in urban America have developed has shed important light on mobilization of the masses by overcoming the collective action problem.[86] Specifically, a number of scholars have explored the way terrorist and other dissident organizations develop their network.87

Dissident movements require the spreading of ideas and a means to mobilize a large number of people. Contrary to the traditional approach, where organizations are seen as hierarchical, elitist, and ahistorical,[88] the nonhierarchical organizations show definite cultural and historic patterns.[89] In their ability to adapt to the local conditions, some movements can tap into their traditional networks. Thus, the Iranian Revolution was greatly aided by the network of Shia mosques, which distributed illegally taped sermons of the exiled Ayatollah Khomeini and was able to mobilize the masses against the Shah's regime.[90] It is not only the Shites who have been able to take advantage of the existing network through the mosques; Islamists in general have been able to get their radical message across through the mullahs and the mosques. The Islamic tradition of daily prayer at the calls of the local mullah allows the recruiters to spread their messages and to recruit activists.91 However, not every city or every country offers the same opportunity. With differing history and socioeconomic, cultural, and historical backgrounds, mosques in London, Milan, Madrid, and Hamburg became hotbeds of radical politics yet they did not in Sydney, Berlin, Chicago, or Geneva, for example.92

In the private and public sector there is a wide variety of organizational structures. Some are strictly hierarchical, while others are franchises, with a much looser matrix of operational duties. Each type of organization has its strength and weaknesses. While a strictly hierarchical organization can be much more coherent and have a single vision, non-hierarchical organizations have the advantage of flexibility to adapt to regional conditions. The dissident organizations in a similar fashion demonstrate a wide range of typology. Sageman provides a picture of the al-Qaeda network, where a group of likeminded people across the world is seen as a network with a cluster of nodes.[93] In this framework, a mosque in London, where the volunteers to the global *salafi* movement are actively recruited and plots are hatched for future attacks, is a node. The entire movement may be seen as a network connecting these nodes. This is analogous to the network of air traffic with each airport serving as a node. However, not every airport is equal in status. Some, due to their size of population or geographic location, are the hubs, where the traffic volume is much larger than in the regional airports. Thus, Chicago, New York, Boston, Minneapolis, Atlanta, and Los Angeles are the national and international hubs, while Albany, San Diego, and Pittsburgh are more regional nodes. Similarly, in a fluid and constantly evolving architecture of terrorist networks, we

can clearly identify the nodes and the hubs. By plotting these links of communication, Sageman identified the Central Staff, Core Arab, Maghreb Arab, and Southeast Asia as the four clusters built around "hubs" such as Osama bin Laden, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, Abu Zubaydah, and Abu Bakar Baasyir. The Western journalists and policy-makers, unaccustomed to this fluid and rapidly changing organizational structure, often make the mistake of assuming a strict pyramidal structure of organization.[94] Thus, the respected London newspaper the *Observer* quotes an unnamed security official saying:

> If you look at the structure of al-Qaeda, what you basically have is a pyramid. . . . If you see the see the two groups of bombers [who carried out the 7/7 London bombings] as two separate teams of footsoldiers on the very bottom, then there is a possibility they are linked by command structure in the level above. This is the level we are trying to identify and track down . . .[95]

Unfortunately, the salafi movement is not a top-down system with a strict chain of command going down from bin Laden to Muhammad Sidique Khan (the ring leader of the group) to the teenager Hasin Hussain. As Robb points out, today's radical Islamic groups are not like the old-fashioned PLO with Yasser Arafat as the undisputed head of the organization. Instead, modern jihadi terror groups are linear, open-sourced, decentralized conglomerations of small, quasi-independent groups drawn more by inspiration from bin Laden than a direct instruction from him.[96]

Along the lines of Sageman's[97] understanding of the network, I have presented the structure of a hypothetical terrorist organization (Figure 4.8). In this diagram, a group of nodes make a cluster. I have represented "hubs" as dark nodes. In this hypothetical case, the core group is characterized by the presence of more hubs than the peripheral clusters.

These nodes and hubs should not be viewed simply as points of information exchange, such as "how to make a bomb." Rather, together they represent what is known as a "small-world" of virtual community on the web.[98] Through their interactions, they develop social capital, provide ideological and emotional support, raise money, keep the fire of hatred burning, and plan for future actions. For instance, Robb points out that there are between 70 and 100 groups that make up the Iraqi insurgency, which are organized like a "bazaar," where ideas are traded, and they all learn from each other's experience.[99] Through their communications the insurgents perfect their weapons, improve surveillance system and, sometimes, coordinate attacks. This is what Stern calls "inspirational terrorism."[100] Stern contends that their malleability of mission and the ability to create a "virtual family" gives groups like al-Qaeda its strength. As a result of this non-hierarchical organizational structure, they become the true multi-headed

Hydra.

In the summer of 2004, the police in London discovered what was quickly dubbed by the media a "sleeper cell." In a diabolical plan, Dhiren Barot, a converted Muslim from India, led a group of men to bomb, among other places, the London Underground. The group planned to stage a huge explosion in the tube tunnel under the River Thames. If they had succeeded, thousands of commuters would have drowned in the subterranean labyrinth of the underground network. What surprised the investigating detectives was the apparent professionalism that these men exhibited; they submitted a business plan to the al-Qaeda operatives minutely detailing every aspect of the project along with a cost estimate for carrying it out.[101] In contrast to this London group, which sought financial help in carrying out these proposed attacks, the Moroccan group that bombed the Atocha train station in downtown Madrid around the time Barot was arrested were even more independent of bin Laden's operation. Unlike the British group, they did not have any direct contact with al-Qaeda nor did they seek funding from any outside sources.[102] The Madrid cell's only contact with al-Qaeda was through the Internet.[103] They raised their own money from selling drugs and other illicit methods.

While al-Qaeda is largely decentralized, other terrorist groups are not. The difference between the two types of groups can be seen when its organizational structure is compared with the PKK (Kurdish Workers Party). The PKK was hierarchical under the leadership of Abdullah Ocalan. After he was arrested in 1999, the group went dormant for a while and changed its name to the Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress in



Figure 4.8 Hypothetical representation of terrorist network.

2002, then to the Kurdistan People's Congress in 2003, in order to distance itself both from Ocalan and from his Marxist ideology.

Although there are groups that are strictly hierarchical and those that are not, within the latter, a group may have a cluster that is non-hierarchical, with another one exhibiting more of a Weberian pyramidal structure. The Southeast Asian network, for instance, exhibited much more of a hierarchical structure.[104] Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Baasyir created Jemaah Islamiyah from top down along a much more Weberian pyramidal organizational pattern.

Funding terror

Waging a violent campaign against an established social and political order is an expensive proposition. Money is the lifeblood of any organization. To run a modern terrorist campaign a group must be economically savvy. While every group must raise money for their operations, the larger groups, such as al-Qaeda and the LTTE, have developed an incredibly intricate web of legitimate and illegitimate businesses. The very clandestine nature of terrorists makes it doubly difficult to raise enough money to sustain a group's activities. The problem for researching this area is that much of the information on the financing of terrorism is shrouded in secrecy. However, a growing number of important books and articles are filling this need.[105] Based on these published reports, Figure 4.9 presents a scheme for terrorist organizations' avenues for raising money.



Figure 4.9 Sources of terrorist funding.

The first and foremost source of funding, especially for some of the Islamic groups, is charitable contributions by their support bases. The religious duty of *zakat* or alms is one of the five pillars of Islam. Every faithful is obliged to give a certain portion of his wealth to charity. These contributions are often collected at the mosques. In Saudi Arabia, there is no income tax. Instead, the Saudi citizens are obliged ulfill their religious duties on a voluntary basis. Beside these personal contributions, Saudi banks also collect 2 percent of each transaction as zakat.[106] Since this money, paid by Muslims all over the world, is part of the religious tradition, there is hardly a strict assessment of its volume. However, journalists Pallister and Bowcott estimate that the 6,000 strong Saudi royal family alone is worth $600 billion, making their yearly zakat about $12 billion.[107] Beside zakat, there are many reports of wealthy benefactors supporting terrorist organizations. In fact, bin Laden may have invested most of his fortune in the creation and expansion of al-Qaeda. The role of contributions from the diaspora has been an essential factor in the sustenance and expansion of many groups. The Irish Catholic diaspora, particularly in Boston, have long supported the IRA, the Canadian Sikhs the Khalistan movement, and the Tamils in India, Australia, and Europe have sent money to the LTTE.

In the process of the development of a violent dissident movement, the crucial role that a foreign state plays in providing financial support cannot be overestimated. An organized government often supports a terrorist group operating in a different country for ideological or for political reasons. Thus, to the Pakistani governments, the support for the Mujahideens infiltrating the Kashmir valley has been a moral issue from the very beginning.[108] The problem for Pakistan has been that, without any history of its own, its national identity had to be artificially crafted. Hence, in order to maintain its separate identity, its political imperative required it to lay claims to the Muslim-majority state of Kashmir. Furthermore, from the point of view of military strategy, the geography of the subcontinent obviated the need for Kashmir to be part of Pakistan. The current jihadi movement did not originate in the late 1980s, as many might presume. Rather the six decade-long conflict has been a steady low-intensity conflict, which has been amply aided by the active support of the Pakistani military and its intelligence arm, the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). Similarly, supporting the anti-Castro Cubans has long been a part of US foreign policy, which led to the disastrous Bay of Pigs invasion in 1961.[109] Similarly, the US government has in many parts of the world covertly supported many dissident groups which can be called terrorist organizations.

Beside ideological and foreign-policy rationale, governments may also support terrorist groups in order to save their own societies from being their target. This is a sort of "protection money" that Palast claims prompted the Saudis and the Gulf states to secretly supply al-Qaeda with large sums of money.[110] Since nearly every nation

considers supporting dissident movements as part of their active foreign policy or out of some other domestic political concern, the United Nations has been unable to pass a legislation defining— and thereby banning its support by the signatories—"terrorism."

Dissident organizations also become involved in legitimate business ventures from banking in Riyadh to running taxicabs in Belfast. The economic system in the orthodox Islamic world attempts to straddle a delicate divide between what is acceptable in the Islamic tradition and the needs of a modern economy.[111] Thus, the theocratic Islamic economy must operate within a system that does not allow income taxes or interest on loans, and must treat voluntary charitable donations as outside the accounting process. As a result, Islamic banks from the Pakistani Bank of Credit and Commerce (BCCI)[112] to Saudi Dar al-Maal al-Islami (DMI) and Dallah al-Baraka (DAB) have raised suspicion and accusations of supporting all kinds of violent activities from financing terrorism to supporting the Pakistani nuclear proliferator A.Q. Khan's illicit operations. Even the US State Department has charged that Osama bin Laden had controlling interest on the DMI.[113]

Beside these legitimate business ventures, terrorist organizations engage in every kind of illegal activity from kidnapping and hostage taking for ransom, bank robbing, human trafficking, drug trading, gun running, smuggling, and even running prostitution rings. All of these operations carry the risk of alienating the support base, if the group loses its moral message. However, not every society is the same when it comes to the cultural acceptance of the various means of getting involved in these activities. Therefore, they pose a dilemma for the terrorist groups between seeking political legitimacy and raising money for their operations. I will discuss this issue in greater depth in Chapter 7.

Although I presented the case of terrorist groups engaging in legitimate and illegitimate business activities, not all of their activities can be classified along this binary classification. In the immigrant communities from the various lesser-developed nations strewn around in the Western world, sending money home is a matter of utmost priority. Since the cumbersome, expensive, and often non-existent corresponding banking system in their own countries makes it difficult to transfer money through the formal channel, they send money home through a time-honored system called the *Hawala*, which was, perhaps, created sometime in the dim past of the early medieval era to meet the similar needs then. Under this system the sender contacts a *Howaladar* (the one that operates the system) and gives him a certain amount of money. The *Howaladar* in London, Paris, or New York, in turn, contacts his counterpart, from whom the intended collects the corresponding amount in local currency. The entire system works on trust and through a network of traditional contacts, without keeping much of a paper trail. This system, which is controlled mostly by Indians and Pakistanis, helps millions of Asians and Africans to transfer funds

internationally. This not only ensures safety, but it also evades detection by the authorities. A joint World Bank and International Monetary Fund study concluded that:

> The anonymous transfer of funds through the [*Hawala*] systems has also attracted concerns about their potential use as a conduit for terrorist funds. Because there is no requirement for identification documents or source of funds, a [*Hawala*] dealer can initiate or facilitate a multiplicity of transfers, which conceal the ultimate origin of the funds through their network in different jurisdictions. The recipient of funds can use the funds to conduct a terrorist act. Once the transaction is completed, all customer identification documents, codes, or references are most likely destroyed, except, perhaps, those required for settlement purposes.[114]

Dynamics of terrorist movements

The interaction between a dissident group and the state authorities shapes the dynamics of their mutual destiny. We can show the process with the help of Figure 4.10. In this figure, the dynamic interaction is shown with the help of two forces: the terrorism increasing force (TIF) and the terrorism attenuating force (TAF). We should note that at each point in the history of a conflict the two forces exist side by side and their relative strength determines the outcome of the violent movement.

The dynamic interactions between the government and a violent dissident group are depicted in Figure 4.10. In this diagram, the vertical axis measures the relative strength of the two forces. If at any point the increasing force is greater than the attenuating



Figure 4.10 Dynamic interactions and growth and decline of violence.

force, the level of violence (shown on the horizontal axis) spirals out. However, since it cannot increase indefinitely, a society generates from within the forces that reduce the level of violence. During the course of a violent campaign, the society often settles for a long-standing standoff of low-intensity conflict, where the two forces seem to achieve a point of stable equilibrium. At this point, each side knows its limits and does not want to transgress the threshold. Take, for instance, the conflict between Hizbullah in Lebanon and the Israeli Defense Force. For several years, the Israelis became used to the Hizbullah sending short-range missiles across its borders and Hizbullah became accustomed to low-level Israeli retaliation. These tit-for-tat responses can keep the two adversaries on a more or less stable level of violence. In the stylized depiction of this dynamic relationship in Figure 4.10, point "a" shows a stable equilibrium. To the left of this point, the terrorism increasing forces (TIF) will gain the upper hand. This may happen due to the inner politics of the dissident groups, wanting to increase pressure on the government, or the government, seeking to satisfy public's demand to punish the members of the opposition group. If by any chance one of the parties takes a bolder action and the level of violence increases to the right of the point "a," the desire not to escalate the violence to an unacceptable level makes the reaction muted from the aggrieved party. As a result, the society becomes bogged down in a steady cycle of conflict. Situations like these are usually characterized by low-intensity violence, since a high level of violence produces its own dynamics, which takes it up to an even higher level of escalation, or countervailing forces generate conditions to reduce the intensity of fighting. This situation is also one of military stalemate, with neither side having the punch to knock the other out.

This equilibrium of the two forces can be severely shaken for a number of reasons. For instance, if any one party takes a move that is considered to be way outside the realms of a proportionate response, violence escalates to a new height. This sudden move, causing a shift of the curves (not shown in the diagram), can come as a deliberate action by the government of the terrorist organization, often due to a change in leadership, a gross miscalculation by either side or as a result of some historical accident. The combatants may wish to push the level of conflict to a different level with the hope of achieving a total victory over the other or it may be the outcome of a misunderstanding.

Richard English quotes Tom Maguire, one of the IRA men to whom the events of the Easter Rising, following a brutal crackdown by the British forces in 1916, was a "life-transforming event."[115] The British policy of using utmost force only helped forge Irish nationalism. McGuire writes: "The Easter insurrection came to me like a bolt from the blue. That is why the rise of charismatic leaders and abrupt points of escalation and dissipation punctuate the chronicles of all movements, I will never forget my exhilaration, it was a turning point in my life."[116] Another IRA activist Tom Barry pointed

out: "through the blood sacrifices of the men of 1916, had one Irish youth of eighteen been awakened to Irish nationality. Let it be recorded that those sacrifices were equally necessary to awaken the minds of ninety percent of the Irish people."[117] Such deliberate policy missteps by the authorities are always exploited by rebel leaders and others in society to keep the flames of hatred glowing for generations to come.

A radical shift in the stable equilibrium point can also be the result of a miscalculation by the leadership. The crisis across the Israeli–Lebanese border, which escalated into a full-scale war in the summer of 2006, is widely seen as an outcome of miscalculation on both sides.[118] Thus, *The Economist* writes:

> In launching his raid Nasrallah [the leader of Hizbullah] was in fact doing nothing new. In recent years, Hizbullah has mounted several similar raids into Israel. It got away with them, even when Israel was led by Ehud Barak and Ariel Sharon, tough prime ministers, who had been war heroes too. Their reactions were astonishingly mild.[119]

However, when the Hizbullah fighters sneaked across the border and, in a raid, killed several Israeli soldiers and abducted two others, the response was swift and overwhelming. From all indications, *The Economist* is right in stating that this time Nasrallah had miscalculated. In fact, after the war, which many Israelis saw as a humiliating defeat for Israel, Nasrallah admitted the miscalculation. In terms of our diagram, this brazen act by the Hizbullah pushed the dynamic relationship to a point where violence spiraled out of control. At this point the overwhelming forces of TIF would escalate violence to a very high level, resulting in many deaths and billions of dollars worth of damage to the economies of Israel and Lebanon.[120]

During the course of a conflict, there are moments when the future hangs in the balance. In my stylized rendering, this is the unstable equilibrium "b," where a small push can send the society to the path of a peaceful resolution of hostilities, or can set it up for huge escalation of violence. For instance, in the waning days of the Clinton Administration, as a last ditch effort, Yasser Arafat and Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak were brought to Camp David. As the world waited for a solution to the most intractable problem of all, all hopes were dashed when it ended without any agreement. This officially brought the Oslo peace process to an end. Within days, the entire region experienced the most violent spates of suicide attacks by the Palestinians and the Israeli retaliated with matching ferocity.

Historical accidents, outside the realm of the leaders of the dissident group and its adversary the target government, can also throw a society experiencing prolonged low-intensity conflict into the path of radical escalation of violence. In 1994, an American-born Jewish extremist Baruch Goldstein opened fire on a group of Muslims

praying at the Cave of the Patriarchs in the city of Hebron, killing 29 Arabs and wounding nearly 150. This act of violence inflamed passion among the Palestinians and the violence escalated to a new high. The history of every mass movement provides examples of events causing huge escalations of violence. The impacts of TIF and TAF over time are shown in Figure 4.11, where a continuation of a low-intensity conflict is suddenly shaken up by rapid escalation of violence. This quickly takes the society to an extremely high level of violence. Since this level of violence is unsustainable over a long period of time, the terrorism attenuating forces swell up to force a return to the old status quo, a negotiated compromise, or a victory of one side over the other.

The death of a movement

The death of a movement comes from three different, often interconnected, reasons. First, a movement dies when its political goals become no longer relevant in the face of a changed political reality, or the support base becomes disillusioned or gets tired of violence. It can be argued that the growing affluence of the Republic of Ireland and the general apathy of the British public to the cause of the Protestants in Northern Ireland laid the foundation to a peaceful outcome of the longest-standing conflict, where the oldest organized dissident group in the world, the IRA, was forced to accept the reality



Figure 4.11 Hypothetical impact of TIF and TAF over time.

of a divided Ireland.

Second, a dissident group, particularly one that is organized in a strict hierarchical structure around a charismatic leader, can suffer military defeat in the hands of far superior government forces. With the leaders killed or behind bars, the group disintegrates and disappears from the pages of history.

This fate is particularly applicable to relatively small groups, with little or no connection to the larger community. Many European groups, such as the Greek Revolutionary Organization 17 November[121] and the Symbionese Liberation Army[122] in America, suffered such a fate.

A radical movement ends when the leadership accepts an offer to join the democratic processes of a nation. With the leadership eschewing violence and deciding to contest the elections, violence subsides. The decision by Daniel Ortega of the Sandinista movement to contest in the Salvadoran election in 1990 essentially brought the violent conflict to an end.[123] This is usually the outcome of a negotiated agreement.

Finally, a group can achieve its military and political goals. Once these goals are reached, the need to fight on also disappears. Thus, the recent Communist rebellion in Nepal is on its way toward establishing a constitutional monarchy and joining hands with other political parties to form a democratic regime.[124]

In sum

Figure 4.12 sums up my arguments offered in this chapter. The top part of the figure shows the factors of individual motivations for joining a dissident group to achieve a set of public goods for the entire community. Rational individuals overcome the free-rider problems through a combination of incentives that appeal to their selfish interest as well as ascriptive or adoptive group welfare. A dissident group is composed of the ideologues, the mercenaries, and the captive participants.

A group gains or loses strength through its support bases (the easy riders and the sympathizers). The policies of the governments and the strategies adopted by the group leadership create the relative strength of the terrorism increasing force (TIF) and terrorism attenuating force (TAF). When the terrorism increasing forces overwhelm the attenuating forces, violence increases. The level of violence reduces when the reverse takes place. These two forces are influenced by the trigger events and other external factors.

With time, a group evolves. A few become victorious and become part of the legitimate government in the newly formed government, such as in Israel, Algeria, and Kenya. Some groups turn toward the economically lucrative side of the movement, and



Figure 4.12 Individual and group: a static view of evolution of terrorist organizations.

resemble more of an organized crime syndicate than a political movement. As we have noted, most groups die out. Their death comes when they suffer a military defeat. Their leaders are captured or killed, most group members scatter, leaving the organization voluntarily or are imprisoned. The Italian Red Brigade, the Black Panther movement, and the Naxalites in Bengal in the early 1970s provide good examples of military defeat. A violent dissident group may also disappear from the pages of history when their ideology becomes increasingly irrelevant in a changing world. As a result, they begin to lose vital public support among their bases. Perhaps the Basque separatist

group ETA makes a good example of this. Finally, a terrorist group may become mainstream as a result of a negotiated settlement. If the current peace process is maintained in Northern Ireland, the IRA as an organization may indeed be relegated to the pages of history.

Terrorism does not happen in a vacuum. This chapter discusses its origin through the interaction between a dissident group, the target state authorities, and the trigger events and other exogenous factors. This dynamic interaction shapes the ebb and flow of sociopolitical violence, including terrorism. In the process, apart from escalation and deceleration, there can also be prolonged periods of low-level tit-for-tat conflict.

Notes

1 Quoted in Tilly (2004: 5).

2 Lawrence (2005: 126).

3 Richardson (2006: 1).

4 Richardson (2006: 1).

5 Krueger and Maleckova (2003).

6 Russell and Miller (1978); Hudson (1999); Horgan (2003); Post *et al.* (2003).

7 Sageman (2004).

8 Pew Research Center (2002). The survey was conducted in Bangladesh, Ghana, Indonesia, Ivory Coast, Jordan, Lebanon, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Senegal, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, and Uzbekistan. Although part of the larger survey, Egypt did not allow this question to be asked. This survey was not conducted in Syria, Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.

9 Bueno de Mesquita (2007b).

10 Bueno de Mesquita (2007b: 12).

11 A simple regression model demonstrates the lack of statistical significance between the two:

Ln (fatalities and injuries) =2.84 + .014 percent below poverty

t-ratio	(5.1) ** (0.88)
R-squared	.008
F-statistic	.77 (1,98)

** Significant at 99 percentile level

12 Hibbs (1973); Venieris and Gupta (1983); Gupta (1990); Sandler and Enders (2004).

13 A simple regression results show that while the coefficient for Ln (GDP per capita) is statistically significant, it explains less than 1% of the variance in fatality among nations:

Ln (fatalities and injuries) =2.84 + .014 ln (GDP per capita)

t-ratio	(4.44) ** (2.84)

R-squared	.07
F-statistic	8.07 (1,108)

** Significant at 99 percentile level

The figures for per capita GNP were log transformed to reduce their variability.

14 The distinction between egotistical and fraternal deprivation was originally made by sociologist Ralph Dahrendorf (1958).

15 In contrast to the others, Saraj (2002), a noted Palestinian psychologist, has emphasized a feeling of humiliation and shame more than economic deprivation as the root cause of terrorism in Israel and the Palestinian territories.

16 Merari and Friedlander (1985); Berrebi (2003); Sageman (2004).

17 It is important to note that President Bush embraced the idea of spreading democracy as a justification for invading Iraq after a failed search for weapons of mass destruction.

18 Bueno de Mesquita (2007b); see also Li (2005).

19 A quick fitting of a linear relationship corroborates this lack of statistically significant correlation between the dependent and independent variables:

Ln (fatalities and injuries) =3.38 + .049 Democracy index

t-ratio	(10.85) ** (1.76)
R-squared	.028
F-statistic	3.11 (1,107)

** Significant at 99 percentile level

20 Pape (2005).

21 See Crenshaw (2007).

22 Fearon and Laitin (2003).

23 Ibid.

24 Rotberg (2004); Debiel and Klein (2002).

25 Rotberg (2002: 90).

26 For one of the best sources of state failure, see the State Failure Taskforce, http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/pitf/

27 O'Donnell (1998).

28 Napoleoni (2003: 140).

29 http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3098&src2=PJA05. These 12 factors include:

1) Mounting demographic pressures

2) Massive movement of refugees and IDPs (internally displaced persons)

3) Legacy of vengeance—seeking group grievance

4) Chronic and sustained human flight

5) Uneven economic development along group lines

6) Sharp and/or severe economic decline

7) Criminalization or delegitimization of the state

8) Progressive deterioration of public services

9) Widespread violation of human rights

10) Security apparatus as "state within a state"

11) Rise of factionalized elites

12) Intervention of other states or external actors

30 The variable state failure index alone explains a highly significant 22% of the variance.

Ln (fatalities and injuries) =.73 + .051 State Failure Index

t-ratio	(.73) (5.3)**
R-squared	.22
F-statistic	27.7 (1,98)

** Significant at 99 percentile level

31 Gupta (1990, 2001, 2005).

32 Gupta (1999, 2001).

33 Cleaver and Katsificas (2001).

34 McLlelan and Avery (1977).

35 Lee (2002).

36 O.J. Simpson was a star football player and was married to a white woman. He was accused of the murder of his wife and one of her male friends. The long televized trial clearly demonstrated the wide gap in perception of guilt in the black and white communities. In a very interesting research design, Enomoto (1999) showed that even after controlling for age, gender, income, and education, race provides by far the strongest explanation of sympathy for O.J. Simpson.

37 See, Hacker (1995: 104).

38 See Farley (1997).

39 While most leaders rise through the ranks and work for many years to rise to the top, a few others are the products of accidents of history. Thus, Corazon Aquino was thrust in the forefront of the anti-Marcos movement in the Philippines after her husband Benigno Aquino was assassinated. For an excellent discussion of the birth of leaders, see Post (2004).

40 http://hdr.undp.org.

41 For an excellent discussion of the "Sons of Liberty" movement and its link to the American Revolution, see Rapoport (2006). See also Graham and Gurr (1969).

42 Gupta (2006).

43 Gupta (2007).

44 Sageman (2004).

45 Bueno de Mesquita (2007b); English (2003); Clark (1990); Horne (1978); Bloom (2004).

46 The ICT dataset is by no means perfect. Unfortunately, as I have argued in an article (Gupta 2007), due to the lack of reliable information, we are often held hostage to available data. Currently, we have no other dataset that provides such breakdown of activities of the various terrorist groups.

47 Samuelson (1938).

48 Stern (2005: 112).

49 Olson (1968).

50 Gupta (2001a).

51 Horgan (2005).

52 Horgan and Taylor (2003).

53 See Elster (2005).

54 Hopgood (2005).

55 Benjamin and Simon (2002: 28–29).

56 Schmidt and de Graaf (1983).

57 Combs (2003).

58 Pape (2003, 2005).

59 Mishal and Sela (2000).

60 Bloom (2004, 2005).

61 Gupta and Mundra (2005).

62 de Figueirdo and Weingast (2001); Rosendorff and Sandler (2004).

63 Aronson (1990); Freedman (1991).

64 Ginkel and Smith (1999), DeNardo (1985).

65 Lichbach (1987).

66 Moore (1998).

67 Gupta *et al.* (1993).

68 Kydd and Walter (2002).

69 Bueno de Mesquita (2005b).

70 For an excellent review article, see Crenshaw (2007).

71 Ganor (2002: 141).

72 Elster (2005).

73 Some economists (Berman and Leitin 2007) have defined the objective function of aterrorist organization with the help of "club theory," where the group attempts to maximize the private benefits of their own members. Although such a formulation makes it easy to use standard economic models, the

problem with this approach is that it fails to distinguish between a primarily ideology-driven terrorist group and a profit-driven criminal organization.

74 Fair and Shepherd (2006).

75 Pew Research Center (2002).

76 Rapoport (1984); Gupta (2006a, 2006b).

77 Berman (2000).

78 Gupta (1990).

79 Popkin (1978).

80 The importance of holding formal employment is widely recognized in the scholarly literature. Amartya K. Sen (Dreze and Sen 1989) has shown that providing employment during droughts is the best way of preventing mass death. Similarly, Sen (1990) argued that the biggest deterrent for female infanticide is women holding jobs in the formal sector of the economy. Although holding formal employment may be a strong deterrent, it is certainly no guarantee against participation in acts of terrorism. The recent plot to bomb various locations in the UK, hatched by a group of doctors, is ample testimony to this precautionary note.

81 Becker (1976).

82 Gurr (1970).

83 Gupta (1990), Gupta *et al.* (1993), Venieris and Gupta (1983).

84 Guetzkow (1965); Perrucci and Pilisuk (1970); Tichy (1981).

85 Farace *et al.* (1977); Redding (1972).

86 Laupmann and Pappi (1976); Lipnack and Stamp (1986).

87 Sageman (2004); Stohl and Stohl (2007); Robb (2007).

88 Dye and Ziegler (1981).

89 Buchanan (2002); Fulk (2001).

90 Hiro (1989); Munson (1988).

91 Napoleoni (2005: 128–139).

92 For an explanation of the historical and cultural impact on communication, see Obershall (2004).

93 Sageman (2004: 138).

94 Stohl and Stohl (2007).

95 Thomson *et al.* (2005).

96 Robb (2007).

97 Sageman (2004).

98 Coll and Glasser (2005).

99 Robb (2007).

100 Stern (2003b).

101 BBC (2007).

102 *New York Times* (2007).

103 Wright (2004).

104 Sageman (2004: 140).

105 Gunaratna (2001); Napoleoni (2005).

106 Napoleoni (2005: 120).

107 Pallister and Bowcott (2002). We should be quick to note here that there is no reason to believe that the entire fund was devoted to supporting terrorism. The bulk of the money was used for various religious and social service work.

108 Swami (2007).

109 Schlesinger Jr. (1965).

110 Palast (2002).

111 For an excellent discussion, see Quran (2004), where he describes the dilemma in terms of Islamism and Mammon, the false god of avarice and greed.

112 For a detailed history of BCCI, see Beaty and Gwynne (1993).

113 Napoleoni (2003: 120). See also Daraghai (2001).

114 Quorchi *et al*. (2003: 24).

115 English (2003: 3).

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid.: 4.

118 See *The Economist* (2006), "Madness Reincarnate: The Accidental War." 20 July. http://www.pierretristam.com/Bobst/library/wf-290.htm.

119 Ibid.

120 These types of diagrams have been used extensively in development economics to demonstrate the forces that promote and thwart economic growth. See, for instance, Swan (1962) and Streeten 1967). In psychology, Sidanias and Pratto (1999) use the terms increasing and attenuating forces to explain socialdominance.

121 Kassimeris (1999).

122 McLleland and Avery (1977).

123 Walker (2003).

124 Sengupta (2005).

Is religious extremism a major cause of terrorism?

Chapter 5. Is religious extremism a major cause of terrorism?



YES: Religious extremism as a major cause of terrorism

Amanda Munroe and Fathali M. Moghaddam

Introduction

> One day Mulla was walking near a house when someone fell from the roof and landed on him, breaking his neck, while the man falling was unhurt. Pondering over the accident, Mulla observed, 'One should not believe that the principle of cause and effect is inevitable. A stranger falls off the roof, and it is my neck that gets broken'. (Nakosteen, 1974: 112)

Sufi stories, such as the one above, have been used over many centuries to help students and teachers question and re-examine basic assumptions. The story above is about Mulla Nasreddin (known to Turks as Gogia NaserEddin Effendi, and to Arabs as Haja; Nakosteen 1974: xiv), who ends up questioning 'the principle of cause and effect' after an accident. We use this Sufi story as a point of departure to discuss the role of religious extremism 'as a major cause of terrorism', but our point of departure inevitably involves a questioning of the meaning of 'causation'.

As Aristotle and numerous others have discussed over the last 2,500 years or so, causation is complex and multifaceted. Using an invalid model of the natural sciences, traditional social scientists have narrowly interpreted causation to mean only what Aristotle discussed as *efficient causation*, where the cause precedes the effect it produces. But this is clearly wrong, because important aspects of the natural sciences are not compatible with efficient causation – think of quantum field theory, for example.

The relationship between complex aspects of human social behavior, such as 'religious extremism' and 'terrorism', are best understood in terms of what Aristotle called *formal causality*, referring to the structure of a process, and final causation, the purpose of a process. It is formal causality and final causation that allow us to understand meaning and purpose in social life, but these involve non-linear relationships.

Invalid assumptions about causation have resulted in incorrect assumptions about the relationship between religion and terrorism: politically motivated violence, perpetrated by individuals, groups, or state-sponsored agents, intended to instill feelings of terror and helplessness in a population in order to influence decision making and to change behavior. We propose that the relationship between religious extremism and terrorism has to be understood in the context of accelerating 'fractured globalization' (Moghaddam, 2008a), but in terms of formal and final causation, rather than efficient causation (for further discussion of causation fallacies and their relationship to religion, see Burns, 2008).

In this chapter, we adopt a macro approach in two ways. First, we consider the larger context of global trends. Second, we take an evolutionary perspective, giving particular attention to catastrophic evolution (Moghaddam, 2008b). We acknowledge that given the range of factors postulated by Stern (2004) and others as potentially influencing terrorist action, our analysis gives priority to macro processes and neglects the micro-level processes that, for example, Juergensmeyer (2003) has presented from a reductionist, psychoanalytic viewpoint. The reason for this 'neglect' is that reductionist accounts are invalid, whether applied specifically to terrorism (Moghaddam, 2006) or more broadly to human behavior (Moghaddam, 2005).

Situations and behavior

Our argument is that terrorism arises in certain contexts, and we must look to situational characteristics to explain terrorism. The larger context of our analysis is fractured globalization and the consequent process of sudden contact. Particular groups, including religious groups, are experiencing abrupt exposure to out-groups without pre-adaptation, and at faster rates and more often than ever before. Research with animals and plants shows that sudden contact, involving the coming together of groups with little or no previous history of contact between species with low pre-adaptation, can result in rapid decline or even extinction of one or both groups in contact. The history of human societies since industrialization and the colonization of large parts of Africa and Asia by Western powers reflect the same trend of sudden contact leading to declining diversity.

Under intense pressures associated with sudden contact in the twenty-first century, some groups and individuals feel seriously threatened. This threat is not only concerned with material resources, but also with cultural and identity characteristics. Groups and individuals faced with surviving in a globalized world are forced to deal with both macro- and micro-level changes that threaten their distinct identities. Individual worries and constructions of meaning are reflective of macro-level concerns for group extinction.

Indeed, our argument is that sudden contact poses threats and heightens group and personal perceptions of mortality. Violence is a meaningful response to this threat. Terrorism is therefore not an inevitable result of strict ideology, but rather a reaction to the perception of threatened extinction or decline and loss of status. Numerous studies have attempted to pinpoint factors that predispose certain types of individuals toward terrorism, but there are rarely extraordinary characteristics singling out individuals who perpetrate terrorist violence. On the contrary, it is extraordinary circumstance that results in radical and sometimes violent action. It has been shown that neither

socio-economic status (Krueger and Malecˇová, 2002), high levels of psychopathology (Crenshaw, 1981; Ruby, 2002), nor level of education (Winthrop and Graff, 2010; Atran, 2003b) are directly linked to terrorist activity. On the contrary, terrorists are often recruited upon recognition of 'their technical skill and sophistication' (Winthrop and Graff, 2010: 32) and their ability to easily traverse cultures. It is rather the kind of education that terrorist recruits have undergone, which often favors unquestioning obedience to authority, fervent passion for a cause and a dichotomous belief in right and wrong, that make them ripe for recruitment across geographical boundaries (*cf.* Burns, 2008: 75; Winthrop and Graff, 2010: 32; Zimbardo, 2007: 292).

A very robust body of psychological evidence supports the view that people with normal psychological profiles can become extremely destructive and aggressive in certain conditions (Milgram, 1974; Zimbardo, 2007). In his famous studies on obedience to authority, Milgram (1974) demonstrated how psychologically normal individuals can be influenced by an authority figure to inflict (apparently) lethal levels of electric shock on innocent others. Zimbardo used a prison simulation to show how healthy individuals randomly assigned to play the role of prison guard seriously mistreated others who were randomly assigned to the role of prisoner. In discussing the behavior of American guards at Abu Ghraib prison, Zimbardo argued persuasively that the context created at Abu Ghraib, and not individual guards, determined behavior in the prison (Zimbardo 2006: 274) and illustrates how ideology is used to justify this fatal movement from good toward 'evil'. Ideology can show itself on the small scale (as in social psychology experiments, where a 'cover story' is used to encourage patients not to question certain orders) or on the large scale (as in the case of national or international movements, or in order to justify war).

Thus, from the social–psychological standpoint we know that particular situations can lead ordinary individuals to do extraordinary things. Determinate in this process are circumstances, guiding systems and dominant ideologies. Might forces of globalization, convergence and reaction have an effect on these circumstances?

With this body of social psychological research in mind, we turn to reassess terrorism arising out of Islamic communities. It has been argued that Islamic societies are experiencing an identity crisis in the global context, as Western values and lifestyles 'invade' Islamic societies and put pressure particularly on Islamic traditionalists and fundamentalists (Moghaddam, 2008a). These developments are resulting in a backlash against globalization on the part of Islamic fundamentalists, and a radicalization of even Islamic traditionalists. For example, the rapid modernization in the 1960s and 1970s in Iran resulted in a radical revolution spearheaded by Muslim fundamentalists, toppling the pro-American Shah. Similarly, funded by sources in Saudi Arabia, the rise of Wahabbism and Salafist traditions can be seen as a reaction to the threat of

globalization. Because of a resurgent adherence to reactionary interpretations of religion, women's rights have been markedly compromised in some Islamic communities. These are examples of the power of globalization to influence religion, and the power of religion to influence social life. In the following section, we address the way in which the forces of globalization affect psychosocial processes, and how this expresses itself – sometimes through terrorist actions.

Global trends spurring fractured globalization

'Fractured globalization' is a process by which social–psychological needs on a personal, micro level prove incompatible with macro level global trends. There is now virtually no location on the planet that remains untouched by globalization trends. Technological, economic and political forces connect people inextricably. This can be seen in international media and entertainment, the evolution of transportation and the global exchange of ideas. Technological forces in turn affect the world's economic stability by shifting labor sources and moving people. Likewise, national companies have morphed into global monopolies and multinational corporations. Finally, the political scene is being altered, as nations ally in larger and more cohesive blocs of trade and defense. The most comprehensive example of this emergence recently is the growth of the European Union, although alliances such as NATO (North American Treaty Organization) and the AU (African Union) make equally supportive arguments for the case, showing that strength can be found in size and the unification of goals.

At the same time that these macro forces of technological, economic and political connectivity reflect global convergence, forcing individuals and entire cultural groups to confront dissimilar out-groups, individuals' personal psychological needs often result in reactions against international pressures that promote similarity instead of difference, and sameness instead of uniqueness. These individual needs, particularly the need for a positive and distinct identity, are highlighted by research on social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978) and subsequent developments in self-categorization and social identity research (Postmes and Jetten, 2006). As global forces promote similarity, psychological defense mechanisms act to protect individuality – one's positive and distinct identity. This can be observed on a social level in a resurgence of local, regional and religious identities that serve to differentiate individuals and their communities from the seemingly oppressive and foreign forces of globalization. In addition to the above examples of Iran and Saudi Arabia, consider the increasing strength of regional political parties who wish to return to local governance and leave the European Union, the example of the 'Tea Party' in the United States promoting 'traditional' American ideals in the face of unwanted outsiders, or the many examples of independence movements attempting to break away to form smaller units globally, such as Basque

separatists, Quebec nationalists, French and Flemish separatists in Belgium, or the recent emergence of Southern Sudan. This trend toward the glorification of small,recognizable identity markers can be seen throughout the world.

The incompatibility of these simultaneous occurrences results in internal conflict, which sometimes manifests itself violently. We will investigate this conflict specifically in regard to religion. Combined with 'catastrophic evolution', global forces help explain a salient link between religion and terrorism, connecting the two through formal and final causation.

Catastrophic evolution: rapid and fatal

A final phenomenon which we believe noticeably impacts feelings of being threatened and the resultant resurgence of religious values linked to terrorism can be explained through the concept of *catastrophic evolution*, the process by which sudden contact between different cultures leads to a rapid decline in diversity, including religious diversity. In the same way that plant and animal species have begun to face extinction due to human destruction and the invasion of foreign species, unique languages, cultures and entire ways of life – including religions (particularly, fundamentalist communities) – are being lost in the process of globalization and cultural assimilation. This markedly began with the process of European colonization through the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Other examples include westward expansion through North America and the persecution of Native American peoples. Historically, migration of human groups was a gradual process that allowed both immigrating and receiving cultures the time to adapt to one another. With the onset of the industrial and technological revolutions and the enormous progress of rapid transportation over the last 200 years, the pattern of inter-group adaptation has changed dramatically.

Perhaps the most telling barometer for sudden contact today is the decline in the world's linguistic diversity. Catastrophic evolution is especially apparent in the vast expansion of world languages such as English, Mandarin Chinese and Spanish, daily gaining new adherents (languages which simultaneously diversify, developing distinct dialects), while at the same time contributing to the extinction of less-spoken languages. Hundreds of languages have only one or a few speakers still living, and by the twenty-second century, only 200 languages are likely to remain, the majority of humanity's seven billion people speaking just ten of them (Crystal, 2000).

Highly relevant to our thesis is the fact that this same process of declining diversity can be observed first, in the worldwide spread of dominant religions, and second, in the impact of globalization and sudden contact on fundamentalist interpretations of major

religions. It is thus a twofold process: on the one hand, the spread of major religions, and on the other, pressure on fundamentalist movements.

Western colonization, in particular, spread Christianity throughout Africa and the Americas. Today, many more adherents to Christianity exist in places where people formerly subscribed to local religious traditions. Islam is likewise growing rapidly. In January 2011, the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life published a report stating: '[t]he world's Muslim population is expected to increase by about 35% in the next 20 years, continuing an extraordinary growth rate that began more than 10 years ago' (Pew Research Center, 2011). Although the world's major religions, like its major languages, have increased the diversity of their expressions through divergent sects and the emergence of new denominations and movements, it can simultaneously be observed that local, smaller religions have decreased in adherence as the major religions (such as Christianity, Islam, Hindu and Judaism) increase their global membership yearly (Moghaddam, 2008b: 107–108; Banchoff, 2008: 6–11).

At the same time that major religions gain influence, fractured globalization and sudden contact is seriously threatening the survival of communities based on fundamentalist interpretations of the major religions. This threat is centered on the changing role of women, motored by technological transformations which mean that 'brains' could now matter more than 'brawn'. Women have demonstrated that when given the opportunity, they can equal or outpace men in education and brains domains, laying a foundation for their progress in the employment market and in financial and political spheres. This is enormously threatening to Islamic fundamentalists, among others, who see their continued power as requiring that women remain restricted to their traditional domestic role. Thus, the line in the sand for fundamentalists in the Muslim world becomes symbols such as the hijab and other 'cultural carriers' that support and represent the homebound role for women.

Our contention, then, is that fractured globalization and sudden contact have created conditions in which Islamic fundamentalists, among others, see themselves under threat of extinction. Their reaction has been radicalization and revolution, as in Iran, as well as terrorism, arising out of a number of Muslim communities. However, as we demonstrate in the next section, this is by no means a unique experience.

Terrorism through space and time: examples of religious extremism and terrorist activity in history

In order to further illustrate the link between the perception of threatened extinction and terrorist action, it may be helpful to remove ourselves from our present de facto conceptions of terrorists and terrorist violence. In the following, we investigate three

specific examples of groups who, under threat of impeding forces comparable to fractured globalization and catastrophic evolution, reacted violently with the intention of instilling terror in the opposing group.

Native American groups in 'The American Indian Wars', 1865–1891

One example that clearly illustrates our argument is the case of Native American ethnic communities in North America during the 'American Indian Wars'. Lasting from 1865 to 1891, the American Indian Wars were a slow process of minor battles between westward-moving 'Whites' (generally American citizens of European descent) and Native American 'Indians' defending their territory. In the same way that we witness catastrophic evolution today in the extinction of languages, cultures and species, so the Native Americans in the late 1800s were witnessing a threat to, and even the extinction of, their way of life. White soldiers and traders were ruthlessly killing buffalo herds that supported Native Americans and increasingly advancing on territory occupied by Native Americans. As these two groups encountered each other, conflict ensued.

At the same time that these processes of encroachment and defense took place, the native people clung fast to religion. Powerful religious leaders and medicine women and men in more than one of the ethnic communities had visions and prophecies. Leadership under these prophecies became an identifiable way out around which many people (feeling threatened) could rally. Indeed, it helped motivate Native American warriors for the numerous tragic battles occurring as Whites pressed their way West. In the Plains Indian tradition, a 'Ghost Dance' ritual became widely practiced. Sioux Indians in fact explicitly transformed one aspect of the Ghost Dance – a ceremony intended for peace – into war preparation: the Ghost Dance shirt (received at a Ghost Dance, embellished with designs reminiscent of sacred visions) was rumored to protect the warrior wearing it against bullets (Hook and Pegler, 2001: 107). Apache groups also witnessed a heightened amount of cultish adherence to prophetic religion, which became inextricable from war. Shamans would accompany warriors into battle, would pray before an assault and conducted rites and rituals during the battle, 'for war was a religious undertaking' (2001: 125).

Thus, we witness Native Americans fighting back against an overwhelming oppressor as they've encountered sudden contact through *fractured globalization* under threat of extinction (*catastrophic evolution*). The concentrated, deadly (and sometimes suicidal/sacrificial) attacks that Native Americans raged on American Whites during the American Indian Wars could be labeled as terrorism – for it was most certainly politically motivated violence with the intent to imbue feelings of terror and helplessness – and the Native Americans certainly wished to change the Whites' way of

thinking about Western conquest and taking property. Under extreme circumstances, drastic changes and fervent religious ascription occurred within Native American communities.

Zionists and British soldiers in the negotiation of Palestine, 1946–47

It is often in the face of incredible odds, under cultural oppression and with few other visible ways out that terrorist-like activities can be observed. For instance, as the modern state of Israel was being negotiated, there were numerous attempts by insurgents (former colonial residents) to rebel against Great Britain during the breakdown of colonial rule. A most telling example is the fervent insurgency launched by Palestinian Zionists, the Yishuv, in the late 1940s. Buildings were bombed, bloody conflicts ensued, martial law was imposed by the British in Tel Aviv (Cesarani, 2009), and violence erupted continually in attacks and counterattacks, not unlike what news media call terrorism today.

The Irish Republican Army, 1968–2000

Similar examples of insurgencies and counter-insurgencies at the end of British colonial rule were seen in Kenya, Malaya, the Middle East and most notably Northern Ireland, more wellknown for its recent terrorist activity. J. Bowyer Bell (2000) illustrates the volunteer and recruitment process for the Irish Republican Army, generally made up of devout North Irish Catholic Nationalists. Explaining the inseparable link between religion and political life, Bell names it ideology:

> In a real sense, structured ideology is a crucial component but has played only a limited role in the Provisionals' armed struggle . . . A volunteer does not so much learn right thinking as perform rites, acts of doctrine . . . that shape and deepen the faith. (2000: 71–72)

In Belfast, Palestine and the American West, what we have come to name 'terrorism' can arguably be observed throughout time. Without a doubt, these groups were suffering from the perception of a very real and overwhelming threat. And without a doubt, the ability to perpetrate such concerted, targeted terror was made possible through rigid adherence to an ideology. Psychologically, humans would find it far more difficult to commit such acts were it not so.

Conclusion

We have rejected the simplistic idea that religion causes terrorism and instead

explored a more complex and subtle relationship between the macro processes of fractured globalization, sudden contact and catastrophic evolution. Terrorist violence is perpetrated by individuals facing a world of threats who often seek refuge in strict religious communities. These communities perceive themselves to be facing extinction. Islamic fundamentalists are fighting back by taking over entire countries (as in the case of Iran) or radicalizing and undertaking terrorist actions (as in Pakistan and many other parts of the world). From this perspective, 9/11 was part of an effort to weaken the forces that are threatening Islamic fundamentalism with extinction.

Under threat to their way of life, individuals who flock to strict religious communities are often socialized into a rigid ideology, one that thrives on authoritarian systems of governance and black-and-white definitions of right and wrong. This unquestioning acceptance of authority makes such individuals especially attractive to recruiting terrorist organizations today, the 'us-versus-them' mentality increasing the individual's capacity to dehumanize their opponent. Threatened by oppressive factors they cannot control, individuals have a need to displace aggression. Fundamentalist religion provides both a welcoming community and an expression for that aggression. Looking for a way out, the individual moves from religious fervor toward terrorism, finding what feels like a justified escape.

NO: 'Religious terrorism' as ideology

Jeff Goodwin

Many scholars assume that life-and-death conflicts arise over struggles for control of people,land and other valued resources like oil and water. We assume, that is, a materialist basis to violent conflicts. Yet the idea that religion is a principal cause of contemporary as well as past campaigns of terrorist violence is of course widespread.Textbooks and pundits tell us that 'religious terrorism' is one of the main types of political violence, alongside 'nationalist' and 'revolutionary' terrorism. The main piece of evidence for these claims seems to be the undeniable fact that a number of groups that have employed terrorism as a strategy have also spoken in highly religious terms, emphasized their religious identities, and even invoked a religious duty to kill their enemies. Certain Islamic discourses, in particular (e.g., Salafism), are widely cited as a principal cause of terrorism – hence, the widespread concept of 'Islamic terrorism' – although just as many argue that these discourses are a perversion or distortion of 'true' Islam, which they portray as inherently nonviolent. A better conclusion would be that religious discourse is a rather malleable tool that can be used to justify a wide range of behaviors.

The case against religious terrorism

Strong allegations about Islamic (or Islamist) terrorism and religious terrorism more generally rest upon a series of conceptual errors as well as empirical claims with remarkably little empirical support. The conceptual errors arise from a misunderstanding of what an explanation of terrorism requires, namely, an account of why certain states, political groups, or individuals would decide to employ a particular strategy – violence against certain groups of ordinary people or 'noncombatants.' Religion may be central to the goals and self-understanding of states, organizations, and individuals without in any way causing them to employ this or any other strategy.

States and nonstate political organizations have of course expressed a range of discourses and ideologies – religious and secular, civic and ethnic – while contending in violent ways with others. But it cannot be automatically inferred that such discourses and ideologies account for the use of violence (let alone specifically terrorist attacks against noncombatants) by such states or organizations. Instead, such discourses may be employed for any number of reasons that have absolutely nothing to do with the strategic decision to kill ordinary people. For example, states and political movements may employ ideologies (including religion) to recruit soldiers and other supporters; to build solidarity and commitment among those soldiers and supporters; or to signal the general righteousness and legitimacy of their political goals. A mix of nationalism, populism and religion is typically projected by states and oppositional movements alike as they do battle with one another. But these ideas do not necessarily account for the strategies and tactics of states and movements, which can change dramatically over time in response to changing circumstances.

Those who stress the primacy of religion obviously run into some problems when nonreligious factors provide a perfectly sufficient explanation for terrorism. First, it is of course possible that religion is being used purposively to mask the real motivations for terrorism. Moreover, as Stephen Holmes (2007: 17) has suggested:

> The problem is not that individuals with secretly secular (personal or political) purposes may feign religious goals to burnish their reputations for purity. The problem, instead, is that one and the same decision could have been taken for either religious or secular reasons. In that case, it is often impossible to tell which motive played a preponderant role. For instance, emotions with a religious tinge, such as dread of contamination, might conceivably induce some individuals to face death without blinking; but so can nonreligious emotions, such as the craving for blood revenge. Duty to God can desensitize a believer to ordinary costs and benefits; but so can boiling rage.

One could take this argument a step further. For even if it could be demonstrated

conclusively that 'emotions with a religious tinge' did indeed facilitate a willingness to kill and be killed in a particular instance, those emotions do not necessarily explain the prior decision by a state or political group to employ a strategy of violence in the first place, let alone violence against particular noncombatants.

Sometimes, analysts infer that terrorism is motivated by religion without even examining the discourses or ideologies of the states or groups that have employed terrorist tactics. It is apparently enough to note that the two sides to a conflict (or some people on each side) practice different religions. For example, in his analysis of the 'deliberately exaggerated violence' allegedly perpetrated by religiously inspired organizations, Mark Juergensmeyer (2003: 123) cites the August 1998 bombing in the town of Omagh in Northern Ireland which killed 29 people and injured over 200. The bombing was carried out by a small group that calls itself the 'Real' Irish Republican Army (IRA), which consists in part of former members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army who oppose the political accords that were reached in Northern Ireland a few months prior to the bombing. The clear implication of Juergensmeyer's discussion is that the Real IRA is a religiously motivated group, presumably because the Nationalist community in Northern Ireland in whose interests the group claims to act is overwhelmingly Catholic. Alas, there is no evidence whatsoever for this inference. The motives and goals of the Real IRA – above all, the separation of Northern Ireland from Great Britain – are articulated and justified by the Real IRA in a completely secular language. The members of the Real IRA are no more religious (and probably less so) than Catholics who eschew violence.

The fact that the Real IRA is not religiously motivated does not mean that the carnage at Omagh is unusual in its viciousness. Research demonstrates that secular ethnonationalist groups like the Real IRA are just as likely as groups that define themselves as religious to carry out so-called mass-casualty terrorism (e.g., Asal and Blum 2005). Robert Pape (2005) has also shown the fallacy of attempts to explain suicide bombing as a product of religion. To begin with, much suicide bombing has been carried out by secular groups like the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. And virtually all suicide bombing, Pape shows, has been part of broader campaigns to end military occupations or foreign support for dictators.

Even if religious promises of an afterlife may make it easier for some individuals to become suicide bombers, these promises do not explain why such individuals would seek to kill certain ordinary folk in the first place. Religious injunctions to kill designated enemies may similarly render it more likely that some individuals will kill, but these injunctions do not explain why specific groups are seen as enemies in the first place. Pape (2005) suggests that groups become the targets of terrorist violence for reasons (like military occupations) that have nothing to do with religion.

If it is so badly mistaken, what might account for the popularity of the idea that a great deal of terrorism is caused by religious beliefs? I would argue that the idea serves an important ideological function. That is, it fits well with the material interests of those who propound it. More specifically, an account of terrorism as fundamentally religious prevents any consideration of the material circumstances that lie at the heart of the conflicts that have generated so much terrorism. For example, if Hamas's suicide bombings against Israeli civilians are not generated by religious ideas but are part of an effort to end the Israeli occupation, then Israelis might need to consider more forthrightly the justice and efficacy of the occupation. If al-Qaeda's attacks on U.S. citizens are not generated by religion but are part of an effort to introduce fundamental change in U.S. government policies toward Muslim countries, then Americans might need to consider more carefully the justice of those policies. In sum, religious terrorism is a comforting ideological concept, one that mystifies and deflects attention from the actual reasons behind the use of terrorist tactics. This serves the partisan interests of some of the key actors in many contemporary conflicts.

A relational account of terrorism

Are those who argue that religion may be a primary cause of terrorism in certain instances *necessarily* wrong? Or have they simply exaggerated the importance of religion somewhat or failed to make their case as convincingly as they might? To answer these questions requires an account of how terrorism might in principle be explained, assuming that no single cause or set of causes is likely to provide an adequate explanation for all cases.

Explaining terrorism requires a determination of why and under what conditions armed actors (state or nonstate) regard the killing of ordinary people or noncombatants as a reasonable (although not necessarily exclusive) means to advance their political agenda. I will outline briefly here a 'relational' account of terrorism in which social relations and interactions among key actors – states, armed rebels, and civilians – carry the primary explanatory burden, as opposed to ideas and ideologies, including religion. The presence (or absence) and the nature of social ties (whether conflictual or cooperative) between armed actors (states or rebels), on the one hand, and different kinds of civilians, on the other, provide the main incentives or disincentives for terrorism.

We can begin to move toward a better understanding of terrorism by considering the precise kind of civilians or noncombatants which states and rebels (sometimes) target for violence. Clearly, states and rebels do not indiscriminately attack just any civilians or noncombatants. Indeed, both states and rebels are also usually interested in winning

the active support or allegiance of certain civilians. So which are the 'bad' or enemy civilians whom they attack?

When they employ a strategy of terrorism, states and rebels generally attack or seek to harm civilians whose support or acquiescence is valuable to their armed enemies. These are civilians who support enemy armed actors and/or have some capacity to influence the actions of an enemy state or rebel movement. Attacking such civilians is a way to attack indirectly one's armed opponents. Indeed, the main strategic objective – the primary incentive – of terrorism is *to induce civilians to stop supporting, or to proactively demand changes in, certain government or rebel policies or to change or even destroy the government or rebel movement itself.* Terrorism, in other words, mainly aims to apply such intense pressure to civilians that they will either demand that 'their' government or movement change or abandon certain policies or, alternatively, cease supporting the government or rebels altogether. The religious beliefs of states and rebels are basically irrelevant to these considerations.

States' and rebels' calculations about whether they should employ terrorism as a strategy are strongly shaped by social and political contexts. An adequate account of terrorism needs to specify the key contextual factors that create incentives or disincentives for states or rebels to choose terrorism as a strategy. Most important in this regard is the incentive for states and rebels to employ terrorism against civilians who support violence by their states or rebels. By contrast, terrorism is discouraged when violence by armed enemies is opposed by significant numbers of civilians (or is limited or nonexistent). Rebel movements, for example, that have employed a strategy of terrorism have typically emerged from populations that have suffered extensive and often indiscriminate state repression (for example, in French Algeria, the West Bank and Gaza, Sri Lanka and Chechnya). In these contexts, moreover, there was also *substantial civilian support* for or acquiescence to that repression 'on the other side' (by European settlers, Jewish Israelis, Sinhalese and Russians, respectively). Indeed, the governments that carried out the repression in these cases had (or have) a substantial measure of democratic legitimacy among civilians. Democratic rights and institutions, in fact, are often effective at creating the impression (especially at some social distance) of substantial solidarity between the general citizenry and their states.

When extensive and indiscriminate state violence is supported by civilians and/or orchestrated by democratically elected governments, it is hardly surprising that rebel movements would tend to view both repressive states *and* the civilians who stand behind them as legitimate targets of counterviolence, which typically begins, and is justified, as 'selfdefense.' Nor is it surprising that *retribution* for such violence would be directed at civilians as well as at the enemy state's armed forces. For it would also be reasonable under these circumstances for rebels to conclude that attacking civilians

might cause the latter to put substantial pressure on 'their' states to change their ways. Extensive state terrorism seems to beget extensive oppositional terrorism, in other words, in contexts where there is a *citizenry with significant democratic rights*. The latter would appear to be a common if not necessary precondition for extensive terrorism by rebel movements.

This also helps us to understand why rebels who are facing an authoritarian or autocratic regime often carry out very little terrorism. Terrorism is much more likely when an entire ethnic group or nationality is supportive of a government as compared, for example, to a small economic elite or the cronies of a dictator. (In fact, all major cases of terrorism seem to have entailed the use of violence against or infliction of harm upon a large ethnic or national group.) For example, the Sandinista Front in Nicaragua carried out virtually no terrorism during their armed conflict with the personalistic Somoza dictatorship, an otherwise bloody insurgency during which some 30,000 people were killed. Civilians who supported the dictatorship consisted of a tiny number of Somoza cronies and a loyal elite opposition, both of which were drawn mainly from Nicaragua's small bourgeoisie. Virtually all other civilians in Nicaragua, from the poorest peasant to Somoza's bourgeois opponents, were viewed by the Sandinistas as potential allies, and indeed many would become such. Had the Somoza dictatorship been supported by more people – a larger social stratum, say, or a substantial ethnic group – then the Sandinistas (other things being equal) might very well have employed terrorism more frequently than they did.

Civilians may support the violence of their states and rebels, and thereby incentivize terrorism, in three main ways – politically, economically and militarily. First, terrorism is likely to be employed against noncombatants who *politically* support – or at least do not actively oppose – one's armed enemies. In this context, terrorism is a reasonable strategy (other things being equal) to weaken civilian political (or 'moral') support or tolerance for violence. By contrast, terrorism is much less likely to be employed against civilians who do not politically support – or are substantially divided in their support for – one's armed enemies.

Secondly, terrorism is likely to be employed against noncombatants who *economically* support armed enemies by, for example, supplying them with weapons, transportation (or the means thereof), food and other supplies needed to employ violence. In this context, terrorism is a reasonable strategy (other things being equal) to weaken civilian economic support for violence. By contrast, terrorism is much less likely when soldiers are supplied by foreign states or nonstate allies or through covert, black markets.

Thirdly, terrorism is likely to be employed, preemptively, against noncombatants who may *militarily* support armed enemies by, for example, being required to serve an obligatory tour of duty in a state or rebel movement's armed forces or by serving

voluntarily in a state or rebel reserve force, militia, or paramilitary force. In this context, terrorism is a reasonable strategy (other things being equal) to preempt or weaken civilian participation in the armed forces of a state or rebel movement. By contrast, terrorism is much less likely when civilians are not required to serve as warriors for states or rebels or show little interest in doing so – and may be actively resisting such service.

It is important to note that terrorism is *less* likely to occur in contexts in which civilians have a history of politically supporting or cooperating with opposing states or rebels – which is another way of saying that some significant fraction of civilians has defected from their state or rebel movement to the other side. Such civilians are not simply opposing the violence of their state or rebels – which, as noted above, would itself make terrorism against them less likely – but are also actively supporting the warriors who are fighting their state or rebels. In this context, terrorism would clearly *not* be a reasonable strategy (other things being equal) for the warriors who are supported by the dissident fraction of such civilians. Such terrorism would not only put at risk the support that these warriors are receiving from the dissidents, but would also make it much less likely that additional civilians would defect from their state or rebels. By contrast, terrorism is much more likely (other things being equal) when civilians have not and do not support or cooperate with opposing states or rebels.

The existence of a significant fraction of dissident civilians explains why the African National Congress (ANC) – the leading antiapartheid organization in South Africa – rejected a strategy of terrorism against white South Africans. The ANC eschewed this strategy even though the apartheid regime that it sought to topple employed very extensive state violence against its opponents. This violence, moreover, was clearly supported (or tolerated) by large segments of the white, especially Afrikaner, population. The Nationalist Party governments that unleashed the security forces against the regime's enemies were elected by the white population. So why did the ANC adhere to an ideology of multiracialism and refuse to view whites as such as enemies? The answer lies in the ANC's long history of collaborating with white South Africans, especially of British background – as well as with South Asian and 'colored' (mixed race) South Africans – in the antiapartheid struggle. Especially important in this respect was the ANC's long collaboration with whites in the South African Communist Party. Tellingly, an important, long-time leader of MK, the ANC's armed wing, was Joe Slovo, a white Communist. For the ANC to have indiscriminately attacked South African whites would have soured this strategic relationship, which, among other things, was essential for securing substantial Soviet aid for the ANC. In sum, given the long-standing multiracial – including international – support for the antiapartheid movement, a strategy of terrorism against white civilians made little strategic sense to ANC leaders.

The case of al-Qaeda: religious terrorism?

Let me now try to demonstrate how the relational account of terrorism outlined here helps to explain why al-Qaeda and affiliated or similar Islamist groups have carried out extensive terrorism in recent years, including the attacks of September 11, 2001. Although the violence of al-Qaeda is typically depicted as an exemplary case of religious terrorism, a closer look reveals that religion is not the primary cause of Al-Qaeda's terrorist tactics.

To be sure, al-Qaeda's political project may certainly be described as religious. Al-Qaeda views itself as a defender of the transnational *umma* or Muslim community. In al-Qaeda's view, this multiethnic, transnational community is currently balkanized and violently oppressed by 'apostate' secular and 'hypocritical' pseudo-Islamic regimes, from Morocco to Mindanao, as well as by the 'Zionist entity' in Palestine. And standing behind these regimes – and occupying Iraq and Afghanistan – is the powerful U.S. government (and, to a lesser extent, other Western governments, especially Britain). This understanding that the United States is the ultimate power which is propping up repressive, un-Islamic regimes in the Muslim world is the fundamental source of al-Qaeda's conflict with the United States. The problem as al-Qaeda sees it is not that the U.S. is a Christian nation, but that it is oppressing Muslims. Al-Qaeda believes that until the U.S. government (the 'far enemy') can be compelled to end its support for these regimes (the 'near enemy') and withdraw its troops and other agents from Muslim countries, local struggles against these regimes cannot succeed.

But why does al-Qaeda kill ordinary, 'innocent' Americans in addition to U.S. armed forces? Why would al-Qaeda target the World Trade Center, for example, in addition to U.S. political and military installations? Shortly after 9/11, Osama bin Laden described the rationale for the 9/11 attacks in an interview that first appeared in the Pakistani newspaper *Ausaf* on November 7, 2001:

> The United States and their allies are killing us in Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, Palestine and Iraq. That's why Muslims have the right to carry out revenge attacks on the U.S. . . . The American people should remember that they pay taxes to their government and that they voted for their president. Their government makes weapons and provides them to Israel, which they use to kill Palestinian Muslims. Given that the American Congress is a committee that represents the people, the fact that it agrees with the actions of the American government proves that America in its entirety is responsible for the atrocities that it is committing against Muslims. I demand the American people to take note of their government's policy against Muslims. They described their government's policy against Vietnam as

> wrong. They should now take the same stand that they did previously. The onus is on Americans to prevent Muslims from being killed at the hands of their government.
>
> (Quoted in Lawrence 2005: 140–141)

Bin Laden believes that it is reasonable to kill ordinary American citizens, then, not because they are Christian or Jewish, but because they pay taxes to and otherwise support an elected government, which makes Americans responsible for the violent actions of this government in Muslim countries (and, indirectly, of governments supported by the United States). Al-Qaeda views ordinary American citizens, in other words, not as 'innocents,' but as morally responsible for U.S.-sponsored 'massacres' and oppression of Muslims in a number of countries.

This idea has also been articulated by Mohammad Sidique Khan, one of the four suicide bombers who killed more than 50 people in London on July 7, 2005. In a videotape broadcast on *al-Jazeera* television in September 2005, Khan said:

> Your democratically-elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets.
>
> (quoted in Rai 2006: 131)

Again, civilian support for oppressive governments – not the religion of those civilians – is the factor that renders those civilians the targets of violence for Khan and his comrades.

Conclusion

We have seen that religion may matter in a number of ways for the states and political groups that employ terrorism, but that religion is not the primary cause of terrorism. That cause is civilian support for armed actors – usually oppressive governments – and the goal of terrorism is to induce civilians to stop supporting (politically, economically and militarily) those armed actors.

The idea that a great deal of terrorism today as well as in the past is fundamentally religious is ideological. That is, the conceptual framework of religious terrorism prevents consideration of the actual material circumstances that lie at the heart of the conflicts that have generated terrorist violence. By deflecting attention from the actual reasons behind the use of terrorist tactics, this framework serves the partisan interests of some of the key actors in these conflicts.

Discussion questions

1 How should we understand the causal relationship between religion and violence?

2 How might religion matter for terrorism without actually causing it?

3 What aspects of religious belief make it prone to violent exploitation?

4 Why might one assume that the 'Real' IRA in Northern Ireland practices religious terrorism? Why is this assumption mistaken?

5 Why do religious fundamentalists place so much importance on gender roles?

6 In what sense is the idea of religious terrorism ideological?

7 What aspects of globalization threaten the continued existence of religious and cultural groups?

8 Why would a state or political group attack ordinary people or noncombatants?

9 Given the thesis that fractured globalization and catastrophic evolution have resulted in terrorism arising out of communities threatened with extinction, from what sources should we expect terrorism to arise in the future?

10 Why did the Sandinista Front in Nicaragua and the African National Congress in South Africa largely reject a strategy of terrorism?

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