This book examines the circumstances under which aid can contribute to the management and transformation of intra-state conflicts.
How and when do insurgents govern? How does the presence of aid and social services influence how insurgents govern? Under what circumstances can aid contribute to the management and transformation of civil wars? The established literature in this area argues that aid exacerbates civil wars where resources are scarce as greedy rebels steal resources for themselves. This book, however, argues that under certain conditions such greed can be good.
Drawing on primary research from three very different conflicts – Northern Ireland (1969–1998), southern Sudan (1983–2005) and Tajikistan (1992–1997) – and more than 10 years’ experience working in and researching humanitarian crises, this study breaks new ground through its wide-ranging comparison of conflicts. The book argues that insurgent efforts to reap rewards from aid and social services have in turn facilitated organizational changes and that these changes, while they may have had conflict-enhancing effects in the short term, have also contributed to conflict transformation over the long term.
This book will be of much interest to students of insurgencies, civil wars, comparative politics, conflict management, humanitarian emergencies, public health and IR/Security Studies in general.
1. Introduction 2. Aid and Insurgencies: The Common Wisdom Debated 3. Introducing the cases: Background and Comparative Framework 4. Northern Ireland 5. Sudan 6. Tajikistan 7. Conclusions
This series will publish the best work in the field of security studies and conflict management. In particular, it will promote leading-edge work that straddles the divides between conflict management and security studies, between academics and practitioners, and between disciplines.