1st Edition
An Economic Theory of Managerial Firms Strategic Delegation in Oligopoly
1 The theory of managerial firms: setting the stage
1.1 Of firms and markets
1.2 U-form vs M-form, and opportunistic behaviour
1.3 Asset specificity, moral hazard and vertical integration
1.4 What does a firm maximize?
1.4.1 The theory of the growth of the firm
1.5 Agency theory
1.5.1 Moral hazard in teams
1.6 Market competition and incentives
2 Strategic delegation in oligopoly
2.1 Sales expansion
2.1.1 Cournot competition
2.1.2 Bertrand competition
2.2 Market shares
2.3 Comparative performance
2.3.1 Cournot competition
2.3.2 Bertrand competition and the mixed case
2.4 All eggs in one basket
2.4.1 Output level vs comparative performance
2.4.2 Market share vs comparative performance
2.4.3 Output level vs market share
2.4.4 The reduced form
2.5 Endogenous timing
2.5.1 Managers choose timing
2.5.2 Owners choose timing
2.6 Entry barriers
2.7 Empirical and experimental evidence
3 Mixed oligopolies
3.1 Strategic delegation and asymmetric information
3.2 Strategic delegation without agency issues
3.3 Delegation and tax policy
4 Collusive behaviour and horizontal mergers
4.1 Stock-based compensation and collusion
4.2 Output-based compensation and collusion
4.2.1 Extension: partial collusion with grim trigger strategies or optimal punishment
4.3 Horizontal mergers
5 Divisionalization and vertical relations
5.1 Vertical separation: supply chain management
5.2 Multidivisional firms
5.2.1 Multidivisionalization with managers
5.2.2 Divisionalization and mergers.../part contents
Biography
Luca Lambertini is full professor of Economics at the University of Bologna, Italy. He was previously the Head of the Department of Economics of the same University and member of the Executive Committee of EARIE (European Association for Research in Industrial Economics).
