This volume charts how the national strategic needs of the United States of America and Great Britain created a "parallel but not joint" relationship towards the Far East as the crisis in that region evolved from 1933-39. In short, it is a look at the relationship shared between the two nations with respect to accommodating one another on certain strategic and diplomatic issues so that they could become more confident of one another in any potential showdowns with Japan.
Table of Contents
Anglo-American Intelligence, war planning and naval relations, 1933-39; British and American views of the Soviet Union's role in the Far East, 1933-39, I - the British; British and American views of the Soviet Union's role in the Far East, 1933-39, II - the Americans; the development of Anglo-American trust and the 1935 London Naval Conference (I & II); the Foreign Office and the State Department, 1937-39. Conclusion.
GREG KENNEDY Joint Services Command and Staff College, UK
'Kennedy makes a fine argument and one that is well worth making ... there is a lack of scholarly work that addresses this vital area of Anglo-American relations. His work helps to fill this void.' - H-Net