1st Edition

The Difficult Construction of European Banking Union

Edited By David Howarth, Joachim Schild Copyright 2020
270 Pages
by Routledge

270 Pages
by Routledge

270 Pages
by Routledge

The Difficult Construction of European Banking Union examines the political, legal and economic issues surrounding the lacunae and design faults of European Banking Union and its problematic operation. The volume brings together the work of sixteen scholars focused on the diverse debates surrounding the construction and operation of Banking Union (BU), and its necessary reform. BU... Read more

    Introduction: The Difficult Construction of European Banking Union

    David Howarth and Joachim Schild

    Section 1: On the Political Science and Political Economy of the move to Banking Union

    1. Banking union: the disadvantages of opportunism

    David G. Mayes

    2. Germany and France at Cross Purposes. The Case of Banking Union

    Joachim Schild

    3. Theoretical Lessons from EMU and Banking Union: Plus ça change

    David Howarth and Lucia Quaglia

    Section 2: On the design and functioning of supranational bank supervision

    4. Building responsive supervision over smaller banks in Europe: an insight from the Principal-Agent perspective

    Jakub Gren

    5. Harmonising national options and discretions in the EU banking regulation

    Zdenek Kudrna and Sonja Puntscher Riekmann

    6. Consultations and the ECB as Prudential Regulator: Enhancing Legitimacy?

    Ute Lettanie

    7. The multiple accountabilities of the European Banking Authority

    John-Paul Salter

    8. Rethinking the allocation of macroprudential mandates within the Banking Union – a perspective from east of the BU

    Katalin Méro and Dóra Piroska

    Section 3: On the design of the Single Resolution Mechanism

    9. Banking union: the problem of untried systems

    David G. Mayes

    10. International Law as a Negotiation Tool in Banking Union; the case of the Single Resolution Fund

    Ioannis G. Asimakopoulos

    11. A Common Backstop to the Single Resolution Fund

    Florian Brandt and Matthias Wohlfahrt

    12. Liberal Economic Nationalism, Financial Stability and Commission Leniency in Banking Union

    Shawn Donnelly

    Section 4: Setbacks en route to a sustainable Banking Union: the European Deposit Insurance Scheme and Bank Structural Reform

    13. The difficult construction of a European Deposit Insurance Scheme: a step too far in Banking Union?

    David Howarth and Lucia Quaglia

    14. Advocacy coalitions and the lack of deposit insurance in Banking Union

    Shawn Donnelly

    15. Deposit guarantee reform in Europe: does European deposit insurance scheme increase banking stability?

    Rosaria Cerrone

    16. Balancing market liquidity: Bank Structural Reform caught between growth and stability

    Vanessa Endrejat and Matthias Thiemann

Biography

David Howarth is Professor of European Political Economy at the University of Luxembourg and a former Jean Monnet Chair at the University of Edinburgh. He is the author or co-author of numerous works on EU economic governance, including The Political Economy of Banking Union, 2016.





Joachim Schild is Professor of Comparative Politics at Trier University, Germany. He published on Franco-German relations, French European Policy and the political economy of European integration. He co-authored (with Ulrich Krotz) Shaping Europe: France, Germany, and Embedded Bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics, 2013.