1st Edition

Bounded Bureaucracy and the Budgetary Process in the United States

By Jay Ryu Copyright 2011
    223 Pages
    by Routledge

    224 Pages
    by Routledge

    Bureaucracies have been criticized from various perspectives and blamed for a variety of failings. Critics have claimed that bureaucracies are too focused on conforming to rules rather than achieving an organization's core mission. Bureaucracies are said to oppress human freedom because of their orientation toward hierarchical control. Bureaucratic organizations are also said to be unable to deal effectively with public problems that span multiple administrative jurisdictions; they do not reach beyond their own organizational boundaries.

    This book provides solid data on how bureaucracies can expedite information processing and reduce organizational conflicts. Jay Eungha Ryu finds that the functions of bureaucracies are highly dependent upon external political conditions. Whether the executive and legislative branches are dominated by the same party significantly influences the ability of bureaucracies to function effectively.

    Ryu notes that the merits of bureaucratic centralization are worth close attention. Numerous attempts, including performance budgeting systems, have been made to improve bureaucratic malfunctions. However, such reform initiatives are doomed to failure, he argues, unless they employ a core feature of bureaucracy itself, centralization. Ryu defines bureaucratic centralization at its best as bounded bureaucracy. If well managed, bounded bureaucracy can substantially improve the rational behavior of organizations and reduce institutional frictions.

    Preface1 Bureaucraticization of Budget Processes: Causing or Remedying Bounded Rationality?Bounded Rationality of Decision MakersBounded Bureaucracy as a Remedy to Bounded RationalityCentral Budget Offices: Enhancing InformationProcessing and Reducing Institutional ConflictsBureaucracy to Save Bureaucratic Malfunctions2 Bounded Rationality in Policy and Budget ProcessesBounded Rationality and SatisficingIncrementalismSerial JudgmentDisproportionate Information ProcessingConclusion3 Bureaucratic Organizations as a Remedy to Bounded RationalityBureaucratic Organizations: Extending Human Cognitive and Analytical CapacitiesBureaucratic Centralization: Expediting Information Processing and Reducing Institutional FrictionsBureaucratic Centralization and Moderating Impact of Organizational StrategiesBureaucratic Centralization and Partisan ConfigurationsConclusion: Bounded Bureaucracy to Bounded Rationality4 Bureaucratic Centralization and the National Executive Budget ProcessU.S. Budget Outcomes: 1961–2006Bureaucratic Centralization in Presidents' BudgetsInstitutional Frictions in the U.S. Budget ProcessBureaucratic Centralization and U.S. BudgetPunctuations 81Bureaucratic Centralization and U.S. Budget StabilityConclusion5 Bureaucratic Centralization and the Congressional Budget ProcessCongressional Macrobudgeting: Institutions and Partisan PoliticsThe Congressional Budget Offi ce (CBO): A Bipartisan Information ProcessorBureaucratic Centralization and U.S. Budget PunctuationsBureaucratic Centralization and U.S. Budget StabilityConclusion6 Bureaucratic Centralization and the State Budget ProcessState Budget Outcomes: 1993, 1996, 1998, and 2000State Executive BudgetsState Legislative BudgetsState Budget Institutions: Item Veto and BalancedBudget RequirementsBounded Bureaucracy and the Budgetary Process in the United StatesBureaucratic Centralization and State Budget PunctuationsBureaucratic Centralization and State Budget StabilityConclusionAppendix: Legislative Professionalization and State Budget Punctuations and Stability7 Conclusion: Bounded Bureaucracy to Bounded RationalityBibliographyIndex


    Jay Ryu