1st Edition

Britain, France and the Naval Arms Trade in the Baltic, 1919 -1939
Grand Strategy and Failure

ISBN 9780415646192
Published November 11, 2013 by Routledge
256 Pages

USD $62.95

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Book Description

The strategy of the British and French prior to World War II was to preserve the status quo after the disaster of World War I. Donald Stoker's book examines British and French involvement from 1919 to 1939 in the creation and development of the naval forces of Poland, Finland and the three Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. This is an in-depth scholarly study of a subject that should appeal to students of international history, strategy, international relations and naval history in general.

Table of Contents

1. War, Intervention and the Birth of the Successor States, 1914-19 2. Naval Development in the Baltic Successor States, 1918-22 3. Unintended Consequences: The effects of the Washington naval treaties on the Baltic 4. Contracts, Competition and Corruption, 1923-25 5. General Kirke's Mission to Finland, 1924-25 6. New Contracts, New Competition, New Corruption, 1926-32 7. The German Projects: Finnish naval development and Anglo-French failure, 1926-34 8. The Final Sales, 1933-39 9. The British Naval Treaties and British Abandonment, 1935-39 10. Grand Strategy and Failure 11. Conclusion

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'Donald Stoker's Britain, France and the Naval Arms Trade in the Baltic represents a welcome perspective on a subject that has been woefully under-represented.'

John Sugden


'This book's greatest strength is that it provides insight into the decisionmaking processes of the British and French Governments in their search for security guarantees in the Baltic. In this aspect, Stoker has done a masterful job.'

Raymond W. Westphal, Jr., The Journal of Military History, Vol. 69, 3, July 2005


'A most enjoyable book. Excellent reading for any historian of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. A valuable addition to any naval history collection covering as they do some of the more important aspects of navies in peacetime.'

Duncan Redford, Naval Review, February 2004