This book explores the British Army's response on the Western Front to a period of seminal change in warfare. In particular it examines the impact of the pre-war emphasis on worldwide garrison, occupation and policing duties for the Empire's defence of the mindset of the Army's leadership and its lack of preparation for a continental war involving a massive, unplanned increase in men and material.
The reasons for the poor performance in the early years of the war, notably professionalism within the British Army, including poor staff work, 'trade unionism', careerism within the high command, and the tendency of an overconfident hierarchy to ignore the need for reform to tackle the tactical stalemate prior to 1916, are analyzed. The high command rapidly learnt from the defeats of 1915–16 and performed much better in 1916–18, an especially formative period resulting in the promotion of a younger, more professional leadership and the development of the first truly modern system of tactics which has dominated wars ever since.
During 1917–18 the Army's commanders and staff evolved and improved these new methods; developing a doctrine of combined arms to overcome the tactical stalemate bedevilling Allied offensives.
List of Illustrations Acknowledgements Abbreviations Sources Introduction 1. The Army's Ethos and Culture
2. The Decline and Fall of an Army 3. The Brain of an Army 4. Developing a Professional Leadership 5. The Army's Over-ambitious Decision-making 6. Training for Victory 7. Tactical Innovation 8. A Strategy for Victory 9. Conclusion
Notes Appendices Bibliography Index
This series publishes studies on historical and contemporary aspects of land power, spanning the period from the eighteenth century to the present day, and will include national, international and comparative studies. From time to time, the series will publish edited collections of essays and ‘classics’.