The capabilities approach to equality, developed by Amartyr Sen and Martha Nussbaum, seeks to answer the question: what is a proper measure of a person's condition for the purposes of determining what we owe each other, as a matter of justice?
While the capabilities theory has avoided many of the conceptual difficulties that have undermined competing accounts of egalitarian justice, recent criticisms have raised questions regarding the focus, structure and justification of the theory. In this volume, leading scholars present new and original essays that address these controversies.
Table of Contents
1. Distributive Justice and Basic Capability Equality: ‘Good Enough Is Not Good Enough
2. Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice
Martha C. Nussbaum
3. A Sufficientarian Approach? A Note
II. A Clearly Differentiated Approach?
4. Capability vs. Opportunity for Well-being
5. Capabilities and Gender Inequality
6. What Goods do to (and for) People: Duality and Ambiguity in Sen’s Capability Approach?
III. Issues in Implementation.
7. Public Debate and Value Construction in Sen's Approach
8. Sen and Deliberative Democracy
9. Attending to Nature: Capabilities and the Environment
10. Disability, Capability, and Thresholds for Distributive Justice