1st Edition
Chief Executive Offenders and Economic Crime A Convenience Theory Approach
This book examines the role of Chief Executives in white collar crime from a convenience theory perspective. Privileged position status, legitimate resource access, institutional deterioration, lack of control and guardianship, and criminal networks such as cartels are some of the typical factors of opportunity convenience when chief executives commit white-collar crime. By presenting and discussing such factors, this book aims to clarify vulnerabilities in organizational settings when the deviant chief executive takes advantage of their position for criminal means. The book applies convenience theory to explain a variety of cases of corporate crime committed by chief executives.
The work will be a valuable resource for academics and researchers in the areas of criminology and criminal justice, law enforcement policy, business management and organizational behavior.
Introduction
1 Trusted Individuals
Fairness of Perceived Trust
Felt Trust and Actual Trust
Trust in Religious Institutions
Efforts in Repairing Trust
Trust Depending on Gender
2 Chief Executive Officers
CEO Power and Influence
Trust in the Chief Executive
Accountability of the CEO
CEO Role and Behavior
3 White-Collar Offenders
Classic United States Offenders
Fraud Investigation Reports
Narcissistic Norwegian CEO
Offender-Based Perspectives
Corporate Crime Seriousness
4 Theory of Convenience
Crime Convenience Orientation
Financial Possibilities and Threats
Organizational Opportunities
Offender Deviance Willingness
5 Privileged Position Status
Position Status Characteristics
No Attribution of Blame
Untouchable Heroic Celebrities
CEO Language and Humor
Organized Irresponsibility
6 Legitimate Resource Access
Resource Characteristics
Resource-Based Perspective
Legitimate Access
7 Institutional Deterioration
Organizational Moral Decline
Dysfunctional Mirror Networks
Concerted Organizational Ignorance
Narcissistic Identification
8 Control of Guardianship
Lack of Oversight in Agency
Lack of Whistleblowing Willingness
Misleading Crime Attribution
Crime Signal Detection
9 Criminal Network Member
Corporate Cartel Activities
Corporate Corruption Networks
Rule Complexity Collapse
Norwegian Cartel Convenience
10 Research Propositions
Motivational Crime Themes
Opportunity Crime Themes
Willingness Crime Themes
11 Industry Effects
Corporate Crisis and Scandals
Stigma and Competition Effects
Internal Fraud Examiners
Non-Accused Organizations
Transparency Corruption Index
12 Conclusion
Bibliography
Biography
Petter Gottschalk is professor of strategy in the department of leadership and organizational behavior at BI Norwegian Business School in Oslo, Norway.
