1st Edition

Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics

Edited By Christopher Cowie, Rach Cosker-Rowland Copyright 2020
242 Pages
by Routledge

242 Pages
by Routledge

242 Pages
by Routledge

Comparisons between morality and other ‘companion’ disciplines – such as mathematics, religion, or aesthetics – are commonly used in philosophy, often in the context of arguing for the objectivity of morality. This is known as the ‘companions in guilt’ strategy. It has been the subject of much debate in contemporary ethics and metaethics. This volume, the first full length examination of... Read more

Introduction  Part 1: Methodology  1. Companions in Guilt: Entailment, Analogy, and Absorbtion Hallvard Lillehammer  2. Two Kinds of Companion in Guilt Louise Hanson  Part 2: Normativity and Error Theory  3. Moral and epistemic normativity: The guilty and the innocent Richard Joyce  4. Metaethics Out of Speech Acts? Moral Error Theory and the Possibility of Speech Jonas Olson  5. The Prudential Companions-in-Guilt Objection to Moral Error Theory Wouter Kalf  Part 3: Alternative Companions: Mathematics and Aesthetics  6. Objectivity and Evaluation Justin Clarke-Doane  7. Moral Pluralism and Companions in Guilt Ramon Das  8. Contemporary Work on Debunking Arguments in Morality and Mathematics Christopher Cowie  9. Aesthetic properties, mind-independence, and companions in guilt  Daan Evers  Part 4: Moral Epistemology  10. Ethics and Perception: Two Kinds of Quasi-Realism James Lenman  11. Companions in Guilt Arguments in the Epistemology of Moral Disagreement Rach Cosker-Rowland  12. Companions in Love: Iris Murdoch on Attunement in the Condition of Moral Realism Anna Bergqvist.  Index

Biography

Christopher Cowie is an Assistant Professor in Philosophy at the University of Durham, UK. His book The Repugnant Conclusion: A Philosophical Inquiry is forthcoming with Routledge.

Rach Cosker-Rowland is an Associate Professor in the School of Philosophy, Religion and History of Science at the University of Leeds, UK. They are author of The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value (2019), and Moral Disagreement (Routledge, 2020).