Comparisons between morality and other ‘companion’ disciplines – such as mathematics, religion, or aesthetics – are commonly used in philosophy, often in the context of arguing for the objectivity of morality. This is known as the ‘companions in guilt’ strategy. It has been the subject of much debate in contemporary ethics and metaethics.
This volume, the first full length examination of companions in guilt arguments, comprises an introduction by the editors and a dozen new chapters by leading authors in the field. They examine the methodology of companions in guilt arguments and their use in responding to the moral error theory, as well as specific arguments that take mathematics, epistemic norms, or aesthetics as a ‘companion’, and the use of the companions in guilt strategy to vindicate claims to moral knowledge.
Companions in Guilt Arguments in Metaethics is essential reading for advanced students and researchers working in moral theory and metaethics, as well as those in epistemology and philosophy of mathematics concerned with the intersection of these subjects with ethics.
Table of Contents
Introduction Christopher Cowie and Richard Rowland
Part 1: Methodology
1. Companions in Guilt: Entailment, Analogy, and Absorbtion Hallvard Lillehammer
2. Two Kinds of Companion in Guilt Louise Hanson
Part 2: Normativity and Error Theory
3. Moral and epistemic normativity: The guilty and the innocent Richard Joyce
4. Metaethics Out of Speech Acts? Moral Error Theory and the Possibility of Speech Jonas Olson
5. The Prudential Companions-in-Guilt Objection to Moral Error Theory Wouter Kalf
Part 3: Alternative Companions: Mathematics and Aesthetics
6. Objectivity and Evaluation Justin Clarke-Doane
7. Moral Pluralism and Companions in Guilt Ramon Das
8. Contemporary Work on Debunking Arguments in Morality and Mathematics Christopher Cowie
9. Aesthetic properties, mind-independence, and companions in guilt Daan Evers
Part 4: Moral Epistemology
10. Ethics and Perception: Two Kinds of Quasi-Realism James Lenman
11. Companions in Guilt Arguments in the Epistemology of Moral Disagreement Richard Rowland
12. Companions in Love: Iris Murdoch on Attunement in the Condition of Moral Realism Anna Bergqvist.
Christopher Cowie is an Assistant Professor in Philosophy at the University of Durham, UK. His book The Repugnant Conclusion: A Philosophical Inquiry is forthcoming with Routledge.
Richard Rowland is a Senior Research Fellow at the Dianoia Institute of Philosophy, at the Australian Catholic University. He is author of The Normative and the Evaluative: The Buck-Passing Account of Value (OUP, 2019).
'I learnt a huge amount about particular debates from reading this book, and anyone with an interest in the forefront of contemporary metaethics is likely to find at least one extremely useful and engaging chapter in it.' - Luke Elson, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews