Introduction Part 1: Setting the Scene 1. Afghanistan and the Afghans Part 2: The First Anglo-Afghan War 2. The Failure of Diplomacy 3. Invasion 4. Occupation 5. Disaster and Withdrawal Part 3: The Second Anglo-Afghan War 6. Lord Lytton’s Folly 7. Occupation 8. Retreat Part 4: The Third Anglo-Afghan War 9. Amanullah’s Gamble Part 5: The Soviet-Afghan War 10. The Communist Takeover 11. The Khalq Regime 12. The Decision to Invade 13. Invasion and Occupation 14 Withdrawal 15. Aftermath Part 6: The American Intervention 16. The United States, The Taliban and al Qaida Part 7: Conclusions Chapter 17. Conclusions Notes Select Bibliography Index
Biography
Sir Martin Ewans is a retired diplomat with considerable experience of South Asia, including three years as Head of Chancery in Kabul.
'The principal arguement of the book, has to do with what is called "asymmetric warfare", that is how a weak power fights a stronger one. His sensible conlusion is that great modern powers should be wary of embarking on contests with smaller countries and should be much more serious about first exhausting the resources of diplomacy. In the end, he (Ewans) remarks rather sententiously, asymmetric warefare is about hearts and minds.' - Asian Studies
'The authors judgements on each conflict are pursuasive and in line with commonly accepted historical views.' - M. E. Yapp
