1st Edition

Conspiracy Theories The Philosophical Debate

Edited By David Coady Copyright 2006
    184 Pages
    by Routledge

    184 Pages
    by Routledge

    Conspiracy theories have a bad reputation. In the past, most philosophers have ignored the topic, vaguely supposing that conspiracy theories are obviously irrational and that they can be easily dismissed. The current philosophical interest in the subject results from a realisation that this is not so. Some philosophers have taken up the challenge of identifying and explaining the flaws of conspiracy theories. Other philosophers have argued that conspiracy theories do not deserve their bad reputation, and that conspiracy theorists do not deserve their reputation for irrationality. This book represents both sides of this important debate. Aimed at a broad philosophical community, including epistemologists, political philosophers, and philosophers of history. It represents a significant contribution to the growing interdisciplinary debate about conspiracy theories.

    Foreword David Coady

    1. An Introduction to the Philosophical Debate about Conspiracy Theories David Coady

    2. The Conspiracy Theory of Society Karl R. Popper

    3. Popper revisited, or What is Wrong with Conspiracy Theories? Charles Pigden

    4. Of Conspiracy Theories Brian L. Keeley

    5. Living with the Conspiracy Lee Basham

    6. Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorizing Steve Clarke

    7. Malevolent Global Conspiracy Lee Basham

    8. Nobody Expects the Spanish Inquisition! More Thoughts on Conspiracy Theory Brian L. Keeley

    9. Conspiracy Theories and Official Stories David Coady

    10. Appealing to the Fundamental Attribution Error: Was it All a Big Mistake? Steve Clarke

    11. Afterthoughts on Conspiracy Theory: Resilience and Ubiquity Lee Basham

    12. Complots of Mischief Charles Pigden

    13. The Pragmatic Rejection of Conspiracy Theories David Coady


    David Coady is Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Tasmania, Australia

    "This is an important contribution to a neglected area of applied, public epistemology. The essays, along with Coady’s useful introduction, clearly set out the critical shortcomings of conspiracy theories via central epistemological concepts like evidence, warrant, and testability. But authors also uncover rich layers of complexity beneath our everyday talk, and in performing that philosophical task, they expose shortcomings of any attempt at simple dismissal of conspiracy theories. Coady has selected essays that display a surprising and attractive balance." -- Jonathan Adler, City University of New York

    "The book offers some useful definitions of both conspiracy and conspiracy theory." -- Scientific and Medical Network